Inspectors General

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U.S. Department of Defense

Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness

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Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

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**On the Cover:** We have chosen the Statue of Freedom from the United States Capitol as a symbol to be reflected in our report cover.

The bronze Statue of Freedom was designed by American sculptor Thomas Crawford in 1857-1859. Crawford described his creation as being readable understandable by the American people:

“I have endeavored to represent Freedom triumphant – in Peace and War...In her left hand she holds the olive branch while the right hand rests on a sword which sustains the Shield of the United States. These emblems are such as the mass of our people will easily understand ....I have introduced a base surrounded by wreaths indicative of the rewards Freedom is ready to bestow...”

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

The report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. government programs to train Afghan police and to prepare them to assume full responsibility for maintaining law and order in Afghanistan. It is based on analysis of data, interviews with officials, instructors, and trainees, and direct observation of training at police training facilities in Afghanistan. The State/Defense OIG interagency team met with senior military commanders responsible for training, officials at Embassy Kabul, and Afghan officials including the Minister of the Interior.

Recommendations in the report are based on the best knowledge available to the Offices of Inspector General and have been discussed with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations.

We appreciate the cooperation of all those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

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Executive Summary

Key Judgments

• The U.S.-funded program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) is generally well conceived and well executed. However, long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.

• The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for policy guidance; the Commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) executes the police program through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together well to administer and improve the police program.

• Building the Afghan National Police (ANP) requires a comprehensive, integrated approach that encompasses leadership training, sustaining institutions and organizations, and oversight and internal control mechanisms. As it has rapidly evolved, police readiness requirements have expanded beyond training to include sweeping institutional reform of the ANP through the Ministry of Interior.

• Nevertheless, ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable. Among them are: no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.

• The mentoring program is a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force. To reach its full potential, the mentoring program should be expanded and better managed to achieve program objectives.

• Management of the police training contract is problematic and requires more effective coordination between State Department contract managers and CSTC-A, which is responsible for executing ANP training programs.

• The procurement pipeline to Afghanistan for ANP equipment is slow, but is improving. There is inadequate accountability for equipment after it is turned over to the ANP, because the ANP logistics system is not yet effective. The ANP needs to establish and implement an effective end-to-end internal controls process.

• Until the Afghan criminal justice system, including law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections, has matured and is synchronized and coordinated from the national to the local level such that laws are standardized and uniformly applied, the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.
• The U.S. and international effort for standing up the ANP is not limitless; therefore, transitioning full responsibility and authority to the MoI needs greater emphasis.

• Building an effective ANP program will require a long-term commitment from coalition and international partners. Premature withdrawal from this commitment will compromise the progress already accomplished and put at risk the U.S. goal to establish a professional police force embracing the values and practices of community policing and the rule of law.

Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation 1. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and international partners, should develop, staff, and implement a comprehensive international police mentor program for Afghanistan. This program must coordinate international mentoring and training at local police districts, both inside the station house and on patrol, and describe procedures to track equipment and communicate issues, needs, and problems to the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. (Action: INL, in coordination with CSTC-A)

Recommendation 2. Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, should produce a document that clarifies the command relationships between regional training centers, border police, standby police, and highway police in relation to the regional and provincial commanders. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A)

Recommendation 3. Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, should work closely with the Ministry of Interior to establish an independent Afghan internal affairs and/or inspector general office to investigate allegations of bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and other forms of wrongdoing within the Afghan National Police, and to conduct audits and inspections. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A)

Recommendation 4. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs should assign a qualified contracting officer’s representative on a permanent basis to Embassy Kabul to improve program management of the police training contract in support of the U.S. military command in charge of the police training program, the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. (Action: INL)

Recommendation 5. The Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should provide the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and Embassy Kabul, as executors of the Afghan Police Program contract, a copy of the current contract task orders, Statement of Work, and modifications. (Action: Bureau of Administration, in coordination with INL)
Recommendation 6. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Embassy Kabul, should develop a formal memorandum of agreement to describe the positions, conditions, and process by which DynCorp will replace the temporary MPRI advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Action: CSTC-A, in coordination with INL and Embassy Kabul)

Recommendation 7. Embassy Kabul should reorganize its International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs office to improve coordination, communication, program management, and policy implementation. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

Recommendation 8. Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should publish an updated analysis and description of the police training and readiness program policies including a description of the counterinsurgency role of the Afghan National Police, the revised fielding plan, the dissolution of the highway police, and coordination with donor nations and the United Nations Development Program as the implementing agency for the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with INL)

Recommendation 9. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan should develop and implement a comprehensive method to verify Afghan National Police equipment accountability and readiness that may include international and U.S. mentors. (Action: CSTC-A)

Recommendation 10. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Embassy Kabul and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, should develop and implement an internal control training program and develop Afghan National Police logistics officers to improve logistics flow and provide accountability safeguards for equipment. (Action: CSTC-A, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)

Recommendation 11. Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should develop and submit for review in Washington a plan that will link key components of the rule-of-law spectrum – police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, courts, and prisons – to the training and reform initiatives in order to build capacity from the national to the provincial levels to ensure that these sectors advance the rule of law in Afghanistan. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with INL)

Recommendation 12. Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, should continue to develop a comprehensive master plan with appropriate milestones for the transition of U.S. government-sponsored programs and facilities for the Afghan National Police to Ministry of Interior control and responsibility. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A)

The interagency Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessment team (hereafter referred to as the assessment team) included:

**Department of State OIG**
- Ambassador Morris N. Hughes, Team Leader
- Mr. John Jones
- Mr. Anthony Carbone
- Mr. Lawrence Lesser

**Department of Defense OIG**
- Mr. Joe A. Baker, Deputy
- COL David Shaw, USAR
- LtCol Joseph Russell, USMC
- YN1 Willie Reid, USN

This assessment was a self-initiated evaluation of the U.S. government effort to train and develop the ANP. The assessment focused on the plans and programs in place for training the ANP and an examination of the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation between those Department of State and Department of Defense organizations responsible for developing, implementing, and conducting police training. The assessment team did not examine the process by which policy decisions were reached on the structure of the Afghan Police Program (APP), nor the policy decisions themselves.

As with all reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, the coalition programs to develop the ANP are continually evolving. The cutoff date for this assessment is June 22, 2006 – the day the interagency assessment team departed Afghanistan. The report does not reflect subsequent events or developments.
Background and Overview

End State of Police Program

The intended end state of the U.S.-funded APP is an effective, well-organized, professional, multiethnic national police force that is trained and equipped to provide a safe and secure environment for the people of Afghanistan and a force committed to the rule of law. The ANP need to be led well, paid decent salaries, and trained and equipped to carry out their assigned security and law and order missions. The program’s goal is to establish a self-sustaining ANP – a police force able to attract and retain qualified candidates and to operate with minimal international assistance.

Program Description

At a Geneva conference on Afghanistan security in April 2002, the United States and other donor countries agreed to support the rebuilding of the security forces in post-Taliban Afghanistan. They established a “five pillars” approach, each to be led by a different nation. The United States took the lead to build the Afghan National Army (ANA). Germany took the lead for the police sector. The Afghans and the coalition partners agreed to set the ANP force ceiling at 62,000, a figure based on a calculation by representatives of the government of Afghanistan and German planners as to the minimum number that could function effectively and be supported and financed by the Afghan government over the long term. That figure included 44,300 uniformed police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway police, and 2,300 counternarcotics police. During the January 2006 international donors conference in London, conferees reconfirmed the 62,000 ceiling while adding a standby reaction police force and adjusting the size of other ANP subdivisions.

The United States contributes resources to support basic and advanced training and individual and unit equipment requirements of the ANP. In addition, Embassy Kabul, CSTC-A, and coalition partners are assisting the Afghan Ministry of Interior in restructuring the ANP. The restructuring involves improving pay scales and rank structure, general organization, and deployment strategies to balance security and law enforcement requirements. These ANP reforms are coordinated with other international donors.

The assessment team agrees with the embassy and CSTC-A that the approach to developing the ANP must be comprehensive, including rank and pay reform, as well as training and equipment. The assessment team also notes that development of the ANP as an effective law enforcement entity is contingent upon successful establishment of rule of law. “Rule of law includes the entire legal complex of a modern state, from a constitution and a legislature to courts, judges, police, prisons, due process procedures, a commercial code, and anticorruption

1 The other pillars are the justice system (Italy), counternarcotics (Britain), and demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (Japan).
2 As used in this report the term donors refers to nations or organizations that commit support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Coalition partners are nations that commit troops or police for the purpose of maintaining or developing security.
A national police force is just one element in the rule-of-law spectrum, and all elements need to progress nonsequentially for the functioning of a safe, secure, and democratic environment where rights and liberties of individuals are protected. For example, the court system must be ready to handle a higher volume of cases as the police make more arrests.

**Afghan Police Program Funding**

International donors have financed the bulk of the Afghan budget. The Afghan government does not have the revenue to pay its police. The international community has established a mechanism to pay ANP salaries through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, administered by the United Nations (U.N.) Development Program. The U.S. contribution to that fund was $20 million in FY 2004, $40 million in FY 2005, and $9.5 million in FY 2006. In addition to police salaries, trust fund contributions pay for nonlethal equipment, facilities, recruitment, training, and institutional development.

As of May 2006, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) funding for the ANP program approximates $1.1 billion for the period FY 2004-2007. Almost all of that funding has gone to the contract with DynCorp International. In addition, there was a transfer of $200 million from the ANA program to the ANP program to procure weapons and equipment for the police in FY 2005. The FY 2006 supplemental of $1.3 billion includes bridge funding for FY 2007. Figure 1 graphically depicts the projected ANP program costs through FY 2012. Of note, the government of Afghanistan is projected to maintain a funding level through FY 2012 and beyond for the police at somewhere around $170 million. CSTC-A forecasts that the out-year sustainment requirement for the police (including training, infrastructure, and equipment) will be close to $600 million. The gap presumably will have to be filled by the international community.

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German and U.S. Police Training Programs

Beginning in April 2002, Germany has concentrated its efforts primarily to restore the National Police Academy (NPA) in Kabul, where police officer candidates go through a three-year professional training program. It soon became apparent, however, that the country’s pressing security needs called for a greatly intensified training program. In 2003, INL began training ordinary police “soldiers” (the Afghan term) and noncommissioned officers through a network of training centers in Kabul and at seven other locations around the country. The U.S. government is also equipping the ANP, both with individual equipment (e.g., uniforms and handguns) and unit equipment (e.g., vehicles and communications equipment). INL contracted DynCorp International to construct and staff the training centers with mentor/trainers. At the time of this assessment in June 2006, 5 INL had constructed and staffed the Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul and all seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs), and all are operational. 6 These centers have trained more than 60,000 police recruits and policemen who are currently serving.

5 The assessment team was in Afghanistan from June 1-22. Thus, unless stated otherwise, all observations refer to the situation as of June 22, 2006.
6 The assessment team visited the NPA, the CTC in Kabul, and five of the seven RTCs.
U.S. Military Put in Charge of Police Program

In April 2005, an interagency decision made in Washington shifted responsibility for directing the U.S.-funded Afghan police training and equipment program from the embassy’s INL office in Kabul to CSTC-A. Responsibility for policy guidance remained with the Chief of Mission in Afghanistan. CSTC-A assumed overall direction of the programs at the CTC and RTCs. INL in Washington retained contract management authority and provided CSTC-A with an embedded senior staff officer.

The U.S. government is actively engaged in restructuring the ANP and is assisting the MoI to increase ANP pay scales significantly, adjust the rank structure, reorganize ANP divisions, and rebalance ANP deployments in response to security requirements and the national nature of the ANP. These ANP reforms have been closely coordinated with coalition partners and the government of Afghanistan.

Assessment

The police training program has been well conceived and well executed. Trainees, instructors, and MoI officials are very positive about the program. The training program has made a good start in raising professional standards and competence. Processes and systems have been put in place to enhance readiness and improve how police recruits are vetted, paid, assigned, and equipped. Nevertheless, the readiness level of the ANP to meet its internal security and conventional law enforcement and community-policing mission remains low. Americans, Germans, other coalition partners, and the Afghans themselves share this judgment. Despite great strides in delivering training, developing an effective, efficient, and self-sustaining police force will take time. Official U.S. government program planning carries through FY 2010, but everyone the assessment team spoke to in Afghanistan believes that the program’s success will require substantial international assistance to the Afghan police well beyond that date.

Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of the major events contributing to the development of the current ANP.

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7 The Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan was responsible for training and equipping the ANA, when in April 2005 they were tasked with equipping and training the ANP. Subsequent to assumption of these new responsibilities, the command was renamed, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan.
8 INL states that it is responsible for implementing the training, mentoring, and reform program, and “CSTC-A directly implements the equipment and infrastructure support while providing oversight for execution of all program activities.”
9 The assessment team had contact with over 100 trainees and 80 Afghan instructors and commanders at training centers. The Minister of Interior and two deputy ministers confirmed this positive assessment.
10 Conditions pertinent to the Afghan situation are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A below.
Figure 2. Chronology of ANP Evolution
(Source: OIG)
Afghan National Police Structure

The *Tashkil* – the Government of Afghanistan’s Afghan National Police Program

The Ministry of Interior controls the ANP. The authorized force level of 62,000 has been captured in an organizational document called the *Tashkil*, which dictates force structure, personnel end strength, command relationships, and unit/staff functions and mission descriptions for the ANP.

The desired force structure described in the *Tashkil* was initially developed using German Police Program Office estimates for a police force that would meet the security needs of the nation and a force the Afghan government would be able to support and fund in the future. The government of Afghanistan approved the *Tashkil* in November 2005 and adopted it as the ANP force-structure planning document in December 2005. A committee comprised of members from the Afghan MoI, the German Police Program Office, and CSTC-A manages the *Tashkil*. Changes to the *Tashkil* require committee recommendation and MoI approval.

Rebalancing Afghan National Police Force Structure

The ANP is temporarily reassigning personnel from the highway police to the uniformed and border police as part of a rebalancing effort to deploy and assign police forces where most needed. In addition to patrol and traffic policemen, the figure for the uniformed police includes 4,116 standby police organized into eight battalions of 500 persons and a small headquarters element. A battalion of standby police will be stationed in each of the five regions, with three battalions stationed in Kabul. These changes were coordinated with coalition partners and the Afghan government in response to an increase in insurgent violence in the south and east of Afghanistan.

Personnel Numbers – Unreliable

It is difficult to determine the exact number of police on duty. A June 2006 CSTC-A report shows an ANP strength of approximately 70,000 – substantially higher than the end strength authorized in the *Tashkil*. Reports on actual numbers of police, however, are unreliable. They are inflated and there is no personnel accounting system in place. Numbers of on duty police are determined by the salaries delivered to police stations according to the number of patrolmen listed on the roles. Although the MoI has officially adopted the *Tashkil*, CSTC-A reports some units have not adjusted their force structure and strengths to comply with *Tashkil* authorizations. Affected police unit commanders report numbers of policemen based upon the *Tashkil*, but they are maintaining higher actual numbers. Currently, coalition (primarily U.S.) mentors are the best sources for verifying these numbers. Where there are no mentors, there is little accountability. CSTC-A has requested assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty

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11 The coalition concluded, with the concurrence of the MoI, that the highway police are so poorly organized and corrupt that the best solution is to draw that organization down while retraining and reassigning its manpower to other police organizations, chiefly the uniformed and border police.

12 Figure 8 depicts the five regions - North, West, South, East, and Kabul.
Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)\textsuperscript{13} and the U.S. Commander Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76) to verify police on duty. Provincial police chiefs have also been specifically tasked by the MoI to fix the personnel accountability problem. Until that happens, personnel numbers will continue to be unreliable.

**Counternarcotics Programs**

The MoI administers the Counternarcotics Police program in Afghanistan through the Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics.\textsuperscript{14} Afghan counternarcotics enforcement activities directed from within the MoI include the following entities:\textsuperscript{15}

- Counternarcotics Police - Afghanistan (CNP-A): CNP-A consists of counternarcotics investigative and enforcement divisions.
- National Interdiction Unit: Established in October 2004 as an element of CNP-A, the unit conducts counternarcotics interdiction raids across Afghanistan.
- Central Eradication Planning Cell: The Central Eradication Planning Cell is a U.K.-supported targeting and intelligence center that targets poppy crops for eradication.
- Afghanistan Eradication Force: The U.S.-supported Afghanistan Eradication Force conducts ground-based eradication of poppy crops throughout Afghanistan.
- Afghan Special Narcotics Force: The elite Afghan Special Narcotics Force receives special training from the British military and conducts interdiction missions against high value narcotics targets in remote areas.

The United Kingdom is the primary coalition sponsor of the counternarcotics program – with considerable program support from the United States. For example, the Counternarcotics Task Force at Embassy Kabul coordinates U.S. counterdrug strategy in consultation with their Afghan and coalition partners.\textsuperscript{16} Also, a new Counternarcotics Training Center, funded by the Department of Defense, is under construction in Kabul.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration manages a counternarcotics training program for the CNP-A at the National Interdiction Center in Kabul. The CNP-A teaches drug enforcement and investigations techniques to an elite corps of Afghan counternarcotics police. The CNP-A training is highly specialized, with members recruited from existing ANP units and

\begin{itemize}
\item ISAF is a U.N.-mandated operation under the auspices of NATO. ISAF comprises more than 18,500 troops, with contributions from 37 nations.
\item It is estimated that Afghanistan is responsible for as much as 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium poppy production. Afghan national counternarcotics strategy consists of five key goals: “the provision of alternative livelihoods for Afghan poppy farmers, the extension of drug law enforcement throughout Afghanistan, the implementation of drug control legislation, the establishment of effective institutions, and the introduction of prevention and treatment programs for addicts.” (Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, May 18, 2003)
\item Substantial growth in opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking led U.S. officials, in consultation with their Afghan and coalition partners, to develop a more comprehensive, complementary five-pillar plan to support the implementation of the Afghan counternarcotics strategy. The five pillars of the plan are public information, judicial reform, alternative livelihood development, interdiction, and eradication. (CRS Report for Congress, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” updated January 25, 2006)
\end{itemize}
from each graduating class at the NPA. The MoI has included CNP-A in the rank and pay reform program. Thus far 125 CNP-A students have graduated from the National Interdiction Center. The goal is to train 300 officers. Candidates are required to be literate. They submit to polygraph and urine examinations, as well as limited background checks.
Afghan National Police Readiness

CSTC-A and INL generally met the goal of providing entry-level training for 62,000 police by December 2005. However, quantity is one issue; equally important is the quality issue, or readiness. CSTC-A has established new criteria for reporting the readiness of the ANP to plan, execute, and sustain independent law enforcement operations:

- Training received,
- Unit staffing levels, and
- Equipment status.

Using these criteria, as of June 5, 2006, CSTC-A reported 30,395 ANP personnel trained and equipped to carry out their police functions. Readiness is gauged by field mentors and is partly subjective in nature, based on the mentor’s judgment. Every 30 days mentors, where they exist, perform routine assessments on ANP regional and provincial leadership. CSTC-A is developing a standard operating procedure on readiness assessments for mentors to improve the objectivity of readiness reports. CSTC-A has appointed operations officers to track the training, staffing, and equipping status of ANP units in each of the five regions. The operations officers collect and compile mentor assessments and use the reports to assess overall ANP readiness. In the future, CSTC-A will implement a Transition Readiness Assessment Tool to consolidate electronically the 30-day mentor readiness assessments.

CSTC-A uses Capabilities Milestones as a method to describe the ANP’s progress toward achieving a level of readiness that is self-sustaining. (Figure 3)

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17 CSTC-A and INL have trained 63,581 policemen. An additional 2,929 students are currently in training. CSTC-A and INL are exceeding the 62,000 requirement to accommodate high attrition. Border police and highway police have not yet reached 100 percent of the goal but plan to do so by January 2007.

18 The Transition Readiness Assessment Tool is a management information system that can be used to evaluate each ANP unit or station in terms of personnel, command and control, training, sustainment and logistics, on-hand equipment, and equipment readiness.
### ANP Capability Assessments

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<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td>Police element is fully capable of conducting law enforcement operations un-aided (w/o mentors). Has greater than or equal to 85% of equipment and personnel and is <strong>self-sustaining</strong>.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>Police element is <strong>capable</strong> of conducting law enforcement. Has 70-84% of equipment and personnel, still requires mentor support, <strong>but not self-sustaining</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td>Police element has presence in its geographic location and is <strong>partially capable</strong> of conducting law enforcement with coalition support. Has 50-69% of equipment and personnel.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td>Police element is formed, but <strong>incapable</strong> of conducting law enforcement operations. Has less than 50% of equipment and/or personnel.</td>
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As illustrated in Figure 4, ANP readiness is currently assessed at Capabilities Milestone 4. CSTC-A projects that in 2007 the ANP should reach Capabilities Milestone 3. By 2009, the ANP should reach Capabilities Milestone 2. For Capabilities Milestone 1 – fully capable of conducting unaided and self-sustaining law enforcement operations – the target year is 2010.19

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19 This matches the benchmark committed to in The London Compact agreed upon at a donors conference, January 31–February 1, 2006: “By end-2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police Force and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable.”
Direction of the Afghan National Police Program

CSTC-A’s police staff organization – Task Force Police Directorate and Police Reform Directorate – is functionally structured to focus on two areas: development of the police and police reform.

Task Force Police Directorate (TF-Police) is charged with training, mentoring, and organizing the ANP to enable them to perform the full spectrum of traditional law enforcement roles, as well as counterinsurgency operations. The mission of TF-Police is to create a respected and competent police force dedicated to the rule of law and loyal and accountable to the government of Afghanistan.20

In accomplishing this mission, TF-Police Directorate:

- Guides the activities of contract trainers, mentors, and advisors at police training facilities (CTC and the RTCs);
- Conducts basic police training, defensive tactics training, and specialty training;

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20 The Afghan commander at one of the RTCs told the assessment team that he tells the recruits being trained, “You have no family and no tribe. The ANP is now your family and your tribe.”
• Designs, maintains, and supports courses, and sustains the capability of trained policemen;
• Provides the ANP with mentors at the RTCs and in the districts;
• Monitors training contracts and provides oversight, thereto;\(^{21}\)
• Works with the ANP to develop a functioning staff structure;
• Supports regional commanders with regional police advisory teams, intelligence collection and dissemination, and officer tracking and rating, and
• Provides ANP status reports to CSTC-A leadership on equipment distribution.

The Police Reform Directorate is responsible for mentoring and training the MoI and ANP staff and for installing a program to develop an effective national security institution. The directorate played a large role in determining the process for implementing the ongoing pay and rank reform effort (discussed below and in Appendix C) and is assisting the MoI in developing methods and processes for manning, training, and equipping the national police force. In addition, the Police Reform Directorate assists the MoI in rebalancing the ANP, ensuring that the appropriate numbers of trained and equipped police are stationed in the highest-risk areas.

\(^{21}\) However, the lack of familiarity with the contract on site has been identified as a weakness in the system and is discussed in the section of this report on contract issues.
Training Program Assessment

Overview of the Afghan National Police Training Program

INL established the ANP basic and advanced courses. The DynCorp contractors teach these courses at the CTC and the RTCs. The courses are professionally administered, technically and tactically correct, and above all, relevant to the current security situation in Afghanistan. While these police courses are taught at a pedestrian level compared with western police academies, they are nevertheless appropriate for the Afghanistan situation, especially considering that more than 70 percent of ANP recruits cannot read or write.

The assessment team observed portions of the following courses:

- Basic I, II, and III courses,
- Transition Integration Program (TIP),
- Border Police courses,
- Firearms handling,
- Range training,
- Building searches,
- Vehicle searches,
- Drill and ceremonies,
- High risk vehicle stops,
- Defensive tactics,
- Baton training, and
- Handcuffing techniques.

The training tempo in the classroom environment is slower than at western police academies. The hands-on or performance exercises, however, are conducted at a pace similar to that of western academies and are both realistic and well received by the ANP recruits.

When police recruit graduates return to their local police stations, they are not typically assigned to law enforcement activities. Instead, the ANP policemen are usually assigned to security guard and other entry-level duties. Performing advanced police duties is deferred. Enforcement of criminal laws, including making arrests, is left to more senior police officers and to members of the Criminal Investigation Division. Thus, a typical ANP graduate is not assigned to duties that reinforce the CTC or RTC experience.

The CTC and RTC training courses provide only a basic platform for continued learning that must be rigorously reinforced by a local field training officer (FTO). In western police departments, FTO programs provide a critical bridge between academy training and actual police work. In addition, they allow police supervisors to evaluate the suitability of new police officers, under the supervision of an experienced officer. While limited field officer training has been accomplished, a formal FTO program at the local level has not yet been implemented. The ANP
will benefit greatly if the FTO program is extended to all police stations. The CTC and RTCs are now teaching five-week FTO courses to experienced ANP police officers who will take these skills back to their police stations to implement local FTO programs.

The Afghan instructors, INL, and the American police mentors are to be commended for creating dynamic and creative learning environments that facilitate student growth and self-confidence. It is important to provide these ANP training courses to the right students at the right times during their careers. However, in order to master and retain these skills, they should be practiced shortly after they are learned. (The section on mentoring, below, discusses mechanisms for follow-up training. A detailed description of the training curriculum is in Appendix B.)

The German-supported NPA in Kabul graduated its first class of 251 police officers in 2005. As a positive indication of gender diversity, the 2006 class includes 15 female students. The NPA program is a significant element in developing a professional national police force and teaches values and skills comparable to police academies in the west.

**Recruiting**

The recruiting section in the MoI Training Department is responsible for recruiting police officers and developing general recruiting standards. The Tashkil tasks the recruiting section to develop recruitment qualifications and selection criteria. Based on the assessment team’s interviews at the NPA, the CTC, and several of the RTCs, only the NPA screens students based on the entry qualifications of age, height, health, and literacy. The RTCs test only for literacy. Students who fail the literacy test are assigned to the five-week course for illiterate students.

Although the Tashkil calls for recruiting officers in all five ANP regional areas, the assessment team was unable to verify their presence in the regions. Based on interviews with the RTC commanders, mentors, and police district chiefs, almost all recruiting occurs at the police district level. In effect, police are recruited locally to serve locally.

**Vetting**

The Afghan MoI has an official process for vetting potential ANP recruits – and, by extension, a process for selecting basic police training recruits for the CTC and RTCs. Recruits sign an entry contract for three years of service. The contract includes a picture of the recruit and some background information – name, age, and home. Two individuals must also vouch for the character and good conduct of each recruit. Vouching individuals are supposed to be currently working as police officers, but if none exist in the recruit’s village, another government official is acceptable as a vouching individual. The voucher form is then sent to the MoI for screening and a records check. If the MoI deems the recruit acceptable, a second form bearing the MoI seal assigns the recruit a discrete identification number and is attached to the contract. The contract and the vetting form tell the CTC and RTCs that the student has been vetted and is approved for training. After the student completes training, these forms are returned to the MoI for record.

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22 The NPA classes for officers have a duration of three years. Noncommissioned officer courses last for 12 weeks.
RTCs, however, do not universally comply with the MoI vetting process. For example, one RTC’s vetting process did not involve the MoI at all. Instead, a letter from the recruit’s district chief was used to verify and certify that the recruit candidate was not Taliban and was not corrupt. In a country without reliable personal and criminal records and where regional and tribal affiliations are strong, it is difficult to verify suitability of police candidates. This difficulty in vetting individuals is evident for currently serving policemen receiving transitional integration training as well as for new recruits.

Although the current vetting procedure is ineffective, at least a process exists and the application of internal control procedures can lead to an improved, standardized, reliable process over time. However, until a national criminal database is established to support vetting and a national recruiting system is developed that does not rely on local police chiefs, the efficacy of the vetting process cannot improve significantly. Given the lack of institutional infrastructure, a viable communications network, and an effective judicial system, it is unlikely that a credible criminal records database will be developed in the near future. The MoI vetting system needs to be enforced and standardized as part of an impartial national MoI recruiting system free of cronyism and corruption.

Assignment and Deployment

The MoI lacks a national assignment system for graduates of the training centers and the police academy. Presently, graduates of the RTCs return to the province from which they were recruited. According to a MoI official, this assignment system promotes corruption. The official said the corruption is systemic and is related to tribal relationships and local or provincial loyalties. Some MoI officials suggest that the only way to fight corruption of this nature is by adhering to a national recruiting and assignment system. Because Afghans are subject to strong tribal influences, officials believe the best method to ensure police loyalty to the central government is to minimize the provincial/ethnic allegiance by assigning them to provinces other than their own.

The MoI intends at some point to improve the assignment process and assign graduates to provinces other than their home areas. The Minister of Interior has appointed himself champion of nationalizing the ANP and has started a recruiting campaign based on national service.

Several Afghan trainees interviewed at the RTCs said they would be willing to move from their province. Those who thought otherwise, however, expressed a more realistic view. For example, one RTC deputy commander said many policemen would be unwilling to move. He recalled that 60 policemen from other provinces had been assigned to serve in his province, but only two arrived for work. Police prefer to serve in their own province because of ethnic affiliations, travel difficulties, and problems sending pay home to families. Young policemen are reluctant to work in a different province than their own because locals do not accept them due to ethnic, religious, and language differences.23 In Bamiyan province, for example, many local recruits only speak a language unique to their area, making assignment outside the region

23 Afghanistan has 12 ethnic entities, five religious sects, and over 30 languages and dialects.
impractical without additional language training. The high illiteracy rate among policemen complicates this condition.

Working with the MoI, CSTC-A is making some positive efforts to diversify assignments and deployment. The MoI recently reassigned the Northern Regional Standby Battalion to the south, where reinforcements are needed. The MoI is proceeding with its plan to reorganize the highway police and to redeploy their personnel to standby and border police units elsewhere in the country. The MoI will make the final decision on their reassignments. In addition, CSTC-A has proposed a plan to boost ANP numbers temporarily by 2,100 to meet an upsurge in insurgency activity. These police trainees will be recruited from all over the country for assignment in the southern provinces.

**Retention and Attrition**

CSTC-A reports the attrition rate is about 15 percent per year. Interviews with students and trainers at the RTCs suggest that the number could be as high as 30 percent. There are no hard data to substantiate attrition.

There are many factors that contribute to attrition. They include:

- Female police recruits claim the main reasons for leaving the force are family and local pressure.\(^{24}\)
- Males cite family pressure, failure of the system to meet pay expectations, and excessive corruption. For example, recruits are often forced to give part of their pay to higher-ranking officers.\(^{25}\)
- Because there is no nationwide banking system, all salaries are paid in cash. Long lapses in the payment process further complicate the pay situation. Some trainees have not been paid in more than two months.

The new rank and pay reform procedures are intended to address at least some of the abuses in the current pay system. (See description of pay reform below.)

**Afghan National Police Recruit Profile**

The assessment team interviewed over 100 randomly selected police recruits. The typical recruit is a male in his early twenties who has little formal education and is illiterate or semiliterate.

\(^{24}\) The assessment team was told that there are currently 91 female members of the ANP, none of them high-ranking. Several interviewees said that the number of female police should grow substantially, especially because in a Muslim society only female police can appropriately deal with female suspects. In addition, female police are needed to deal with domestic disputes.

\(^{25}\) Often higher ranking officers will take a portion out of each patrolman’s pay before paying the policeman. In one instance, a police colonel boasted to his RTC counterparts that he always took a portion from the pay of every policeman in the province.
A number of recruits stated they had some paramilitary training and experience, but the source of training was not revealed and none of the recruits referenced any prior experience with the ANA.

Typically, the basic police recruit spends several months to one year performing administrative or guard duties as a police soldier in a local district police station before going to the CTC or RTC. A few of the students interviewed claim to have participated in police operations during this period, including making high-risk arrests and searching buildings. Some of the recruits who described these experiences claim they were armed with a loaded firearm during operations, but none had ever been trained or qualified with a weapon prior to coming to the CTC/RTC.

The recruits interviewed appeared motivated to learn. They said the police training was an excellent opportunity to enhance their lives and aid their country’s reconstruction efforts. Most of the recruits professed little or no comprehension of professional police officer duties prior to attending the basic police course. Many expressed surprise, as well as a new sense of pride, in the model of professional policing they were being exposed to in the basic police course.26

The high illiteracy rate among the police recruits is problematic. Obviously it is easier for the recruits to process the subject matter when they can read and write. In addition, the assessment team observed that the classes for literate recruits have more lively discussion and more student participation than do the illiterate classes. Nevertheless, there is no discernable difference between the literate and illiterate students during the practical exercises, such as high-risk traffic stops, handcuffing, building searches, full contact baton training, and vehicle searches. It must be noted that illiterate policemen cannot perform the full spectrum of professional police duties. Thus, to the degree that the ANP is manned by illiterate personnel, it cannot meet the performance standards of a fully professional police force.

26 The assessment team is aware that the Afghan students and instructors may have been coached on what to say but judges that the sentiments expressed in these interviews were sincere.
The CTC and some of the RTCs offer basic literacy training prior to the start of the basic police courses. Predictably, these literacy courses are most effective with recruits who arrive with some reading skills and some prior formal education. For an illiterate student, a five-week literacy course is a start toward literacy. However, such a short course does not fully prepare the illiterate recruit for the basic police course designed for literate students. Some police stations are attempting to address the illiteracy problem by providing local literacy courses. While these initiatives are important and should be encouraged, they typically occur after basic police training and, therefore, too late in the training process to ensure that the recruit receives the maximum benefit from the basic police course. Moreover, the assessment team learned that the literacy programs at the RTCs were often limited to just one hour per week or every two weeks.

**Evaluation of DynCorp Police Trainers**

DynCorp is contracted under a Department of State Civilian Police contract to provide ANP training. During the team’s visits to five RTCs and the CTC, the assessment team observed the DynCorp training cadre to be a professional, dedicated, and enthusiastic group. Most of the DynCorp trainers are recently retired police officers from small to medium-sized police departments in the United States; hence, they have extensive policing experience. Others are active duty police officers on leaves of absence from their departments to work in Afghanistan.

Based on feedback during the assessment team’s interviews, virtually all of the police trainers have extensive training backgrounds in a variety of police subjects and many have instructor certifications in multiple law enforcement disciplines. In addition, it is evident that INL and DynCorp have deliberately placed instructors with appropriate disciplines in the right positions. Many of the police instructors hold advanced educational degrees and many have senior command and advanced tactical operations experience.

Approximately half of the instructors have prior military experience, chiefly acquired before they became police officers. All of these police trainers believe their military experience greatly assists them in performing this mission given the unique security situation in Afghanistan and the daily contact with the military representatives from CSTC-A and ISAF.

The DynCorp police instructors that the assessment team met are generally respectful and proud of the ANP officers, instructors, and students with whom they live and work. While the DynCorp instructors are fully aware of the challenges and limitations faced by the ANP, they remain guardedly optimistic about the overall chances of success for the training program.

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27 Literacy training is a pilot program wherein illiterate students receive a five-week literacy skills course. Once the students pass the literacy skills program, they will begin the nine-week course curriculum now taught to literate ANP students. Once implemented throughout all training centers, this program will replace the current five-week course for illiterate candidates and channel all ANP students into a single common-core, skills-training program.
Mentor Program

The assessment team contends that the success of the police training and readiness programs in large measure depends on the success of the international mentors in the field. As the ANP force is built on a legacy of 28 years of civil war and dictatorships, the importance of experienced international civilian police trainers and mentors cannot be overstated. As of June 2006, DynCorp was supplying 245 American police contractors; an additional 30 were due to arrive in Afghanistan at the end of June. DynCorp is contracted to provide 352 police trainers and mentors. DynCorp reports that CSTC-A is seeking a total of 466 police trainers and mentors. As of the date the team departed Afghanistan, there is no evidence the contract has been modified to reflect the additional 114 proposed police mentors.

Police mentors play an essential role to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Whether assigned to an ANP headquarters or at a district police station, they provide a ready source of advice, assistance, and practical solutions to ANP personnel, most of whom have little or no actual police experience.

Despite the great potential of this program, the assessment team identified a number of potential limitations of the ANP mentor program. For example, most of the police mentors assigned to the northern provinces were suddenly relocated to southern provinces to create large mentor saturation teams. This was necessary to help control the disruption to police activity caused by insurgent attacks in the region, but this action left a mentor gap in the northern provinces. There was no timetable for replacing these mentors in the north.

The DynCorp contract requirement for 352 American police contractors is insufficient to provide adequate assistance to the fledgling ANP. While the current level of police mentors (when properly distributed) may provide mentoring for the top levels of ANP management in each of the five regional police commands, it is an insufficient number to make an impact at the local police stations. Every police station would benefit from continuous, dedicated mentorship on a routine basis. Experienced police mentors could have a great impact at the line level.
advising police officers, sergeants, and mid-level management in routine, as well as specialized, law enforcement operations. However, there are factors discouraging such an augmentation of the mentoring program. Generating this level of mentorship in the ANP would significantly increase the U.S. commitment in terms of overall contract costs, personnel, and equipment requirements, as well as increasing the risk to U.S. personnel.

**Recommendation 1.** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and international partners, should develop, staff, and implement a comprehensive international police mentor program for Afghanistan. This program must coordinate international mentoring and training at local police districts, both inside the station house and on patrol, and describe procedures to track equipment and communicate issues, needs, and problems to the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. (Action INL, in coordination with CSTC-A)
Police Reform

Pay and Rank Reform

The *Tashkil*, effective in December 2005, authorizes organizational reform. Rank reform will reduce a top-heavy and poorly organized ANP force. The number of higher-ranking officers will be reduced by 44 percent, within a constant total of 62,000 in the ANP workforce. Pay reform will establish parity between salaries in the ANP and the ANA. The MoI is committed to these reforms and is actively participating in the process of selecting ANP officers based on merit rather than loyalty or local influence.

The pay and rank reform is designed to:

- Create an organizational fix within the ANP that eliminates top-heaviness and bases rank on merit, not loyalty or connections;
- Improve the attractiveness of the ANP for recruiting and retention; and
- Break the chain of corruption by paying a living wage and recruiting and assigning police nationally.

The following table (Figure 7) shows pay and rank structure, before and after reform.

### ANP Pay & Rank Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK STRUCTURE</th>
<th>Before Reform</th>
<th>After Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generals</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Colonels</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>1,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenants</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>2,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Lieutenants</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>4,813</td>
<td>9,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolmen</td>
<td>36,600</td>
<td>45,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAY STRUCTURE</th>
<th>Before Reform</th>
<th>After Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt General</td>
<td>$107</td>
<td>$750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj General</td>
<td>$103</td>
<td>$650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig General</td>
<td>$95</td>
<td>$550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>$92</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Colonel</td>
<td>$88</td>
<td>$350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>$83</td>
<td>$300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>$78</td>
<td>$250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>$69</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>$66</td>
<td>$180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>$62</td>
<td>$115/$140/$160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolman</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$70/$80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pay per month in USD

CSTC-A, in coordination with the MoI, has developed a plan to phase in both pay and rank reform. The new pay levels are several times higher than the previous scale (except at the patrolman level) and will mitigate some of the discomfiture of those officers not retained in their former rank. Officers offered the option of a reduction in rank rather than separation will receive a substantially higher salary at their new lower rank than they received at their former rank. Officers not given the choice or voluntarily retiring will receive severance pay.
A commission led by a ranking Afghan General, and working through the MoI, is implementing the rank reform initiatives. The Rank Reform Commission is an all-Afghan board (advised by CSTC-A) that selects qualified officers to staff the streamlined ANP rank structure. The rank reform process has both objective and subjective elements. (Appendix C describes the selection and implementation process.)

**Pay Distribution**

Pay and rank reform addresses the structural elements of the pay issue. There are also problems with pay distribution. By all accounts, the MoI pay disbursement system is completely broken and is one of the causes of the systemic corruption long associated with the Afghan police. A common thread in ANP interviews is that police are not reliably paid. Salaries actually reaching ordinary policemen are routinely reduced because of salary skimming by more senior police.

The Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF) has primary responsibility for transferring the funds to the MoI for the payment of police salaries, but CSTC-A considers the MoF to be an ineffective ministry. Additionally, CSTC-A finds that the MoI finance department is understaffed. To correct the immediate problem and create an institutional correction that ensures timely and complete payment to ANP personnel, CSTC-A has placed a finance team in the MoI with the task of addressing the ministry’s pay problem at three different levels:

- National level – arrange to have three months’ pay in arrears distributed to the ANP;
- MoI level – initiate a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; and
- Operational level – map the MoI pay process to analyze for specific problem areas.

In mid-June 2006, CSTC-A enlisted the assistance of ISAF to participate in a program to observe the way police are paid in the field taking into account the absence of an adequate banking system, especially outside of Kabul. CSTC-A plans to put an additional 15-30 U.S./Afghan personnel trained in finance in the MoI Finance Department to incorporate lasting institutional changes to fix how and when police are paid. CSTC-A will recommend to the MoI that civilians—not policemen—be put in charge of the new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and Pay Master system. CSTC-A is working with the MoI to have a new pay system in place by mid-2007.

**Rebalancing Police Forces**

Historically, Afghanistan has been characterized as a nation of loosely confederated warlords who rule over geographically separate domains. As the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan struggles to assert its sovereignty in the face of persistent insurgent resistance, there is continued

28 Problems in the MoF are outside of the purview of CSTC-A (and this OIG assessment) and must be dealt with separately. U.S. Agency for International Development currently has a number of projects ongoing to assist the Ministry of Finance.
pressure from voices within the national government to revert to the old ways and permit provincial governors to field their own militias. To preempt the need to augment authorized police forces with armed militias, the embassy and CSTC-A have proposed rebalancing existing police forces as an acceptable alternative. Rebalancing consists of the following:

- Disestablish the highway police (3,400 strong) and transition them into the uniformed and border police;
- Shift stand-by police battalions from the northern to the southern region to provide additional security in high threat areas;
- Accelerate the rank and pay reform process; and
- Recruit and train 2,100 temporary additional ANP to be deployed to the south in support of the standby police battalion stationed there. These temporary police would not be counted in the authorized Tashkil level of 62,000, but after one year the temporary police could integrate into ANP regular ranks, compensating for normal attrition.

The sweeping reforms of the ANP represented by rank and pay reform and rebalancing are necessary if the ANP is to become a national force serving the central government and the interests of the population. The assessment team notes that the expansion of the police program beyond training and equipping the ANP is essential. The goals set by the international community to build a modern police force in Afghanistan will require flexibility, leadership, persistence, and sufficient financial resources to support the reforms.
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Command and Control

As this assessment was conducted, the first of five Regional Command Centers (RCCs) was established and colocated at the Kandahar RTC. Establishment of the RCCs is seen as an important step in transforming the focus of the police from a provincial to a national perspective. The five ANP RCCs will be located in each of the five regional command areas and will correspond to the ANP’s command and control structure. This structuring is deliberate and is intended to enhance coordination of security efforts between the ANP and ANA. Figure 8 depicts the five regional command areas.

![5 ANP Regional Command Areas](image)

Figure 8. Regional Command Areas
(Source: CSTC-A)

Each of the RCCs, except Kabul, will be colocated initially with RTCs to take advantage of common equipment, infrastructure, and facilities. Colocation of the Regional Commander at the Regional Training Centers optimizes the available infrastructure resources and obviates the need for additional security measures; however, having a more senior officer within the RTC compound causes confusion with respect to command and control. The Afghans are rank conscious, giving deference to the senior leader, regardless of chain of command. The RCC commander is senior to the RTC commander and will be perceived to exercise control over the curriculum or training at the RTC. Several of the DynCorp instructors expressed concern that the presence of the RCC commander within the RTC compound will unduly “operationalize” the police training. While the role and mission of the Regional Commander is spelled out in the Tashkil, the command relationship between the Regional Commander and the RTC Commander is not that clear.
**Recommendation 2.** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, should produce a document that clarifies the command relationships between regional training centers, border police, standby police, and highway police in relation to the regional and provincial commanders. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A)
Afghan National Police Internal Affairs/Inspector General

The Tashkil shows an Office of Internal Affairs reporting to the MoI, although other documents do not list this office. As reported to the assessment team, 28 ANP students graduated from a single course in professional standards or internal affairs in 2005. Initially, the ANP informed the CTC mentors that this was to be only the first of a series of classes to prepare internal affairs investigators to move into the five regional ANP commands and eventually into the 34 provincial police headquarters. However, ANP has not requested additional professional standards classes, nor is it clear that any of the former graduates were assigned to an internal affairs function. Anecdotal information gained by the CTC suggests that most or all of the professional standards students were absorbed back into other duties within the ANP, rather than internal affairs duties.

As the Afghan government develops its first modern police force – dedicated to the rule of law – it needs an internal affairs or an inspector general oversight capability to detect, investigate, and report allegations of mismanagement, abuse of authority, fraud, waste, and corruption. As a minimum, this office should investigate allegations of wrongdoing within the police force, but it should also be designed ultimately to provide audit and inspection functions as well. Development of a vigorous internal affairs or inspector general organization within the ANP should be considered a priority tasking for the U.S. and international mentors assigned to the MoI and to the regional and provincial command centers.

It should be noted that the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense has an inspector general (IG) system – an organizational structure and a trained staff to conduct inspections and investigations. The Ministry of Defense IG system includes two IGs; one IG advises and supports the Minister and the other IG conducts ANA oversight activities. Thus, the inspector general process is not a new concept for the government of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, as Afghan citizens begin to rely increasingly upon the ANP for law enforcement services, they need to know that the ANP is committed to building and preserving their trust and confidence. ANP personnel must conduct themselves in a professional and trustworthy manner. This is no small undertaking in a country with a history of systemic corruption and a dysfunctional criminal justice system.

**Recommendation 3.** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, should work closely with the Ministry of Interior to establish an independent Afghan internal affairs and/or inspector general office to investigate allegations of bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and other forms of wrongdoing within the Afghan National Police, and to conduct audits and inspections. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A)
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Contract Program Management Issues

There is a need to improve management of the contract for the APP. Operational responsibility for the police training program was transferred from INL to CSTC-A in April 2005, but INL retained authority for the program’s contract with DynCorp. That contract is part of a Firm Fixed Price task order to the Department of State’s global Civilian Police Program contract, which commenced July 1, 2005, and has a period of performance of three years, including a base year and two option years.

No Contracting Officer’s Representative

When CSTC-A assumed the operational responsibility for the police training program, it did not have anyone on its staff with technical knowledge of the Department of State’s police training contract. There is still confusion at CSTC-A and in the embassy’s INL office over what is contained in the Department of State contract and its numerous modifications. The assessment team requested a complete copy of the contract, task orders, statement of work, and modifications from INL/embassy and from CSTC-A. Neither the embassy nor CSTC-A had a copy of the contract or the modifications thereto. The assessment team asked the contractor in country and INL’s temporarily assigned contracting officer’s representative (COR) in Kabul if these documents were available. Neither could provide a complete set of contract documents relating to the ANP. Furthermore, the INL COR did not have all supporting documentation for the respective modifications, and the DynCorp office could not provide copies of several of the current contract modifications.

Frequently changing contract requirements have led to mistakes, increased costs, and disagreement among the program managers at CSTC-A, program managers at the embassy’s INL office, and officials at DynCorp. As an example, the Director of Task Force Management tasked the contractor to add trainers to an RTC without informing the INL office at the embassy. Because necessary housing and support requirements had not been met in advance, INL directed the trainers to return to their previous assignments. As a result, the contractor incurred additional contract costs while not providing the additional trainers requested by CSTC-A.

Lack of effective in-country program management of the DynCorp contract has created frustration, confusion, and uncertainty for the contractor. Caught between conflicting instructions, the contractor essentially serves three masters: CSTC-A, INL at the embassy, and the contract officer in the Department of State’s Bureau of Administration. Because there has been no single point of contact in Afghanistan to which DynCorp could turn for clarification of contract and modification requirements, they have had no reliable method for quickly resolving conflicting instructions.
At the time of the assessment team’s visit, a new short-term INL COR\textsuperscript{29} arrived in Kabul, assigned to the embassy’s INL office.

\textbf{Recommendation 4.} The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs should assign a qualified contracting officer’s representative on a permanent basis to Embassy Kabul to improve program management of the police training contract in support of the U.S. military command in charge of the police training program, the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. (Action: INL)

\textbf{Contract Administration}

Decisions affecting the APP contract have been made without coordination with the contracting officer or the contractor’s management representative in Kabul. This is an inappropriate management practice and contrary to good order and discipline.

CORs are required to establish a file containing, among other things, a complete procurement request package, contract and all modifications, and technical and cost proposals.\textsuperscript{30} Lack of a complete contract, task orders, statement of work, and modifications to the contract in Afghanistan has created a situation of the blind leading the blind. Neither CSTC-A nor the INL office at the embassy has had a full understanding of contract commitments or requirements. The fact that the contract specifications and requirements are not clear to those tasked with running the police program is unsatisfactory and must be remedied.

\textbf{Recommendation 5.} The Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs should provide the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and Embassy Kabul, as executors of the Afghan Police Program contract, a copy of the current contract task orders, Statement of Work, and modifications. (Action: A, in coordination with INL)

\textbf{Contract Clarification Needed}

Upon assuming the responsibility for the ANP training program in April 2005, CSTC-A became aware of the pressing need to engage the MoI more directly and to provide strategic planning capabilities throughout the various MoI directorates. To do this properly, CSTC-A needed to embed mentors and strategic planners in the MoI. Without a copy of the Department of State’s APP contract, CSTC-A tasked DynCorp directly to provide qualified mentors for the MoI. The mentors initially provided by DynCorp did not meet all of the strategic planning and executive mentoring requirements. CSTC-A reassigned some of the DynCorp contractors and replaced them with other strategic planning contractors from MPRI who had been working in the

\textsuperscript{29} The government, through the COR, is responsible for ensuring that technical and financial terms and conditions of the contract are carried out. The COR’s responsibilities include monitoring the contractor’s technical progress and expenditures of resources, resolving technical issues arising under the contract, and referring to the contracting officer contracting issues that cannot easily be resolved. The government is legally responsible for actively watching and following the contractor’s performance and taking prompt action to correct problems when they occur.

\textsuperscript{30} The COR Handbook, 6FAH-2, Para H516 “Standard COR Working File.”
Afghan Ministry of Defense. These replacement mentors were temporarily assigned to the MoI from a CSTC-A controlled contract.

In the situation described above, one contractor alleges that his company won the contract to provide mentoring services to the ANP and the MoI and that replacement of their personnel by contracted personnel from another company was a violation of the contract specifications. The Department of State contracting officer overseeing the contract states that the contract does not give any company exclusive rights for providing mentoring services at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, the assessment team concludes that the duplication of effort and the use of two contractors to provide mentors in the MoI is not an effective approach and is not cost effective.

**Recommendation 6.** The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Embassy Kabul, should develop a formal memorandum of agreement to describe the positions, conditions, and process by which DynCorp will replace the temporary MPRI advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Action: CSTC-A, in coordination with INL and Embassy Kabul)

**Security Situation Requires Responsive Contract Management**

CSTC-A managers assert that the contract managed by the Department of State for the APP is slow to meet changing program needs in the field. The contracting officer at the Department of State’s Office of Logistics Management in the Bureau of Administration, on the other hand, stated: “…the Civilian Police Program contract provides flexibility in spite of its size…[and] that contract modifications could be done quickly - in a matter of days - once the proper information is received from INL program managers in Kabul, and the requested changes are approved in Washington in the INL Bureau.”

The problem with contract execution is that the Department of State holds the contract for police training in Afghanistan, yet the military command, CSTC-A, is charged with executing the police training program. In spite of this awkward mechanism for contract support for the police program, the assessment team does not recommend that the contract be terminated for the convenience of the government and recompeted by the Department of Defense. First, the cost might be prohibitive. Second, it was an interagency decision in 2005 to leave contracting authority with the Department of State while transferring the responsibility for direction of the police program to the Department of Defense, and there is no request to revisit that decision. Third, it would be disruptive to the program. Fourth, there is no assurance that the resulting arrangement would work much better.

Given the circumstances, the best solution is to implement the foregoing recommendations regarding contract oversight and ensure that INL properly manages the training contract on behalf of CSTC-A. The police program has accomplished a great deal already despite the unwieldy management structure. The assessment team believes that improving management processes within the present framework is better than reorganizing the structure.
Department of State Reporting

The INL office at Embassy Kabul has been ineffective in reporting APP activities. Initially, the lack of personnel in the embassy’s INL office complicated matters. Now, the split control of the police training program – with the INL office in the embassy having some responsibilities and the INL representative at CSTC-A having others – has brought reporting to a near standstill. One of the consequences of this situation is that key offices in Washington are poorly informed of the progress of the ANP program.

The embassy in Kabul must remedy this communication problem. Among the various options, management must decide whether to keep the current arrangement in which the INL office operates as a separate section of the embassy, reporting to the Ambassador through the deputy chief of mission, or move it under the supervision of another office within the embassy to better coordinate and carry out policy decisions.

The lack of coordination between the embassy INL office and the INL officer embedded in CSTC-A has been a problem. The INL representative at CSTC-A failed to keep the embassy INL office abreast of emerging program changes in a timely fashion. The incumbent of the position reported only to the CSTC-A Commanding General and the deputy chief of mission. By contrast, the Senior Police Program Advisor in INL at the embassy, a former law enforcement officer with many years of experience, reported to the INL section chief. To ascertain what activities were underway at CSTC-A, this officer all too frequently had to obtain program information directly from contractors at the RTCs and the MoI. This convoluted process may correct itself with the arrival of a new INL representative at CSTC-A. However, in order to standardize procedures, improve interagency communications, and better inform the INL staff in Washington of police program policy discussions, the assessment team recommends that the INL office at the embassy be placed under the supervision of a senior division chief other than the deputy chief of mission. The INL office in the embassy and the INL representative at CSTC-A should coordinate their activities under the direction of another division chief at the embassy.

Recommendation 7. Embassy Kabul should reorganize its International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs office to improve coordination, communication, program management, and policy implementation. (Action: Embassy Kabul)
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Policy Support for Program Adjustments

Despite the above-mentioned difficulties in coordination at the action level, cooperation between the embassy and the U.S. military in Afghanistan at the most senior level has been excellent. Proposed changes to expand the police program have been vetted at the embassy, coordinated with Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan and the international community, and cleared with the government of Afghanistan with minimal delay. Execution of these initiatives, however, has frequently been stymied by contract and funding problems.

The police program initiatives that required policy guidance from the Ambassador have included the pay and rank reform initiative, the addition of a counterinsurgency role for the ANP, and the necessary paramilitary training and weapons procurement for the counterinsurgency mission. Moreover, the expansion of the rapid reaction force and the revised police fielding plan implemented in 2006 required coordination with the Afghan government and coalition countries, as did the proposed expansion of the mentoring program at the MoI and in the field.

The U.S. Ambassador made the policy decisions to support these changes to the police program. This collection of policy decisions should now be the subject of an omnibus message to bring all participants up to date on where the police program is and what lies ahead. The report should also address the implications for funding and for the role of the primary contractor. A clear statement covering these points, with funding sources and benchmarks, should be written at the embassy and distributed by cable. If possible, it should not be classified.

**Recommendation 8.** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should publish an updated analysis and description of the police training and readiness program policies including a description of the counterinsurgency role of the Afghan National Police, the revised fielding plan, the dissolution of the highway police, and coordination with donor nations and the United Nations Development Program as the implementing agency for the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.

(Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with INL)
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Equipment Procurement and Management

Procurement Chain

CSTC-A’s procurement process adequately supports the needs of ANP’s 62,000 policemen. The process encompasses several programs that equip and sustain the ANP:

- Procurement of small items purchased from Afghan companies: “Afghan First,”
- Foreign military sales,
- DynCorp equipment, and
- International donations.

CSTC-A maintains an adequate and competent staff of military logistics, procurement, and contracting professionals in Afghanistan. However, procurement officers from the various military branches have different tour lengths ranging from two months to a year. Frequent turnover of personnel results in loss of institutional memory and steep learning curves for replacement personnel. There have been instances where frequent equipment change orders (due to the turnover of key procurement personnel) have required contract modifications, slowing down the delivery and distribution of equipment.

Contract specialists with authority to make local purchases of goods and services are embedded within CSTC-A’s procurement organization. These individuals are key to supporting opportunities for local economic expansion, increased entrepreneurship, and skills training for the Afghan people through an Afghan First purchasing program. The Afghan First initiative, endorsed by the 2006 London Donors Conference, intends to increase procurement of Afghan goods for civilian and military activities. During FY 2005, CSTC-A purchased approximately $512 million locally through Afghan First (not all of it for the ANP).

CSTC-A operates a Foreign Military Sales Management and Tracking system for monitoring controlled and uncontrolled equipment. Upon receipt of requirements for equipment, the procurement section reviews the validity of each requirement and confirms that funds are available. The section then prepares a memorandum of request and submits it through channels to the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command for review. Letters of offer and acceptance are prepared and submitted and funds released for purchase of goods.

In the past, a DynCorp contract included an initial and one-time issue of uniforms and nonlethal equipment at graduation to ANP students attending the training centers. Uniform issue included uniforms, web belts, batons, and handcuffs. The program was terminated after 2004. According to CSTC-A staff, the program was ineffective. After graduation many students sold their equipment before they reached their duty station. CSTC-A is not currently tracking the equipment issued to CTC/RTC students.

31 As an example, the assessment team visited a clothing manufacturer in Kabul who has a $5 million contract with the U.S. military to make 62,000 uniforms for the ANP. Three hundred workers are employed for this purpose.
The international community donated approximately $92.5 million to the ANP from FYs 2002-2006 to purchase weapons, ammunition, airlift communications, electronic equipment, and vehicles. Weapons contributions include Hungarian AK-47/AMD-65 rifles (approximately $6.2 million) and German 9mm pistols ($1.3 million). Other international contributions include Russian, German, and Japanese vehicles (approximately $52.2 million). Vehicle maintenance has been a problem – the ANP has difficulty maintaining its donated Russian and German vehicles. CSTC-A incorporated plans and resources for support at the maintenance facilities at all five Afghanistan regional centers.

Ninety-five percent of the equipment received by the government of Afghanistan is nonstandard. Additionally, the donating country sometimes delays equipment delivery, citing problems with customs paperwork. As a result, receipt of equipment can take months, adding to delays in getting equipment to the field. Equipment quality is also problematic. Other sources of equipment exist, such as NATO-compliant and used American military equipment that can be obtained to speed up the procurement process.

**Equipment Fielding Plan**

The *Tashkil* and the CSTC-A Fielding Plan authorize the issue of ANP equipment. (See Figure 9.) When combined, these documents form a rudimentary but effective table of organization and equipment that is accepted by the international community and the Afghan MoI. Together the *Tashkil* and the Fielding Plan establish the baseline requirement for equipment procurement, distribution, and accountability.
As of June 1, 2006, the majority of ANP units possessed less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment. CSTC-A projects that by September 1, 2006, the majority of units should possess 80 percent or above of authorized equipment.\footnote{With a few notable exceptions – vehicles, radios, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades.} Based on current funding and memorandums of request, all ANP units should receive complete equipment issue, with the exception of vehicles, by the first quarter of FY 2008. CSTC-A has requested additional funding for accelerated vehicle fielding, but the current budget forecasts vehicle distribution for the lower priority regions and units in FY 2009.

To support the ANP’s operational security requirements, CSTC-A’s resource division distributes equipment based on fielding priority. CSTC-A assigns fielding priority according to each region’s security environment and the unit’s mission. CSTC-A has prioritized the regions for equipment distribution as follows: South, East, West, Central, and North. Units are also prioritized by type and mission as follows:

1. Border police,
2. Standby police,
3. Uniformed police, and

The fielding priority allows CSTC-A to ensure that phased equipment fielding is sourced to the regions and units to best meet Afghanistan’s most pressing security requirements.

**Equipment Logistics**

The *Tashkil* includes plans to enhance the ANP logistics systems to make it similar to the ANA system. The *Tashkil* establishes a central logistics office, national logistics center, five interregional logistics centers, and 34 provincial supply points. Logistics centers and supply points will be located throughout the country and will be constructed in the next two years. CSTC-A will either build new facilities or renovate existing facilities with funds included in the FY 2008 budget.

The central logistics office will be located in Kabul and will provide management level planning and supply functions to interregional logistics centers and supply points. The office will provide logistic services for nationwide procurement, pool and analyze needs for regional logistic centers, and identify funding.

The national logistics center will be colocated in Kabul with the central logistics office. Other regional centers will be in Paktia, Balkh, Kandahar, and Herat. Among other things, these facilities will:

- Identify and report funds required for purchase of equipment and consumables;
- Exercise supervisory control over storage, maintenance, and vehicle repair; and
- Control and instruct supply points.

The interregional logistics centers and 34 supply points will provide communications equipment, weapons, vehicles, other equipment, and supply maintenance facilities for vehicles to the ANP. Supply points will be located in all 34 provinces and will be subordinate to the regional logistics centers. Supply points will support provincial commands, district commands, uniformed, border, and standby police units. Supply points will also include car repair, weapons maintenance, information technology support, and communications shops.

Provincial commanders identify requirements for new and replacement vehicles, weapons, and equipment, and submit these requirements to regional commanders, who in turn report regional requirements to the respective regional logistics centers.

Preparation for developing a national distribution system will require in-depth training for Afghan personnel to maintain supplies and equipment at each center, development or hire of a vehicle and maintenance workforce, and sustained mentoring of MoI logistics leadership.
Equipment Distribution

CSTC-A controls distribution of all U.S.-funded equipment and the majority of international donor equipment. This does not include equipment initially distributed by DynCorp to students graduating from the CTC or RTCs. The other exceptions include 18,000 donated Czech AK-47s that the Afghan MoI national logistics center distributed directly to ANP units and other items procured using MoI funds.

CSTC-A item managers receive procured equipment shipments. The equipment is inventoried and stored in Kabul warehouses. Based on fielding priorities, CSTC-A logistics officers, national logistics center logistics officers, and the unit logistics officers conduct a combined inventory of the equipment to be issued (fielded) to ANP units. The combined inventory is recorded using Afghan and U.S. approved forms. CSTC-A resources division, the national logistics center, and the unit logistical office retain copies of these issue records.

Methods vary for equipment distribution. For weapons and ammunition distribution, unit logistics officers generally draw equipment directly from the CSTC-A warehouse in Kabul. A joint inventory is conducted and the unit logistics officer signs for the weapons and ammunition. CSTC-A provides local hire trucks and shipping containers for transportation of the weapons/ammo back to the unit’s provincial headquarters. If the unit does not provide an armed escort, then Afghan highway police provides a transportation security escort. To date, all equipment has arrived at the unit using this method. To transport furniture, organizational clothing and individual equipment, and other equipment, either the units use their own trucks or the U.S. contracts transportation for them. Mentors validate the unit equipment requirements; CSTC-A will not issue equipment without validation. For units that do not have a mentor, CSTC-A requires validation from mentors at the ministry level.

CSTC-A distributes equipment to provincial headquarters for the uniformed police, brigade headquarters for the border police, and to battalion headquarters for the standby police and highway police. The unit headquarters is responsible for further distribution of the equipment. Hoarding of equipment is reportedly a large problem within the ANP.

Afghan police receive their initial issue of equipment as they arrive at their unit or from their units as the unit receives it. Equipment lost to corruption after initial issue is not replaced. However, vehicles and equipment are replaced if loss is caused by maintenance problems or operational damage.

Equipment Maintenance

For donated vehicles, CSTC-A divided the initial maintenance program into two phases. Phase-I is a contract for vehicle services, windshield repair, and minor engine work. The contract requires accountability reporting to CSTC-A on vehicles serviced. Contracted maintenance exists in all five regions. The maintenance facilities employ Afghan mechanics, Philippine supervisors, and western managers. From the regional facilities, contract teams are sent to the provinces to conduct services and check accountability.
Phase-II is a contract for services, bodywork, and engine rebuilding. The contract allows for repair until work exceeds 75 percent of the cost of the vehicle. A repair parts and history tracking system is in place to examine trends and prevent fraud.

Mentors play a key role in the maintenance process. Provincial mentors are in contact with maintenance facilities to promote equipment induction into the maintenance system (many Afghans are reluctant to place vehicles into maintenance for fear of permanent loss). When the regional logistics centers are built, they will take over the vehicle maintenance function. The vehicle maintenance contract includes training as a deliverable, and the contractor will train Afghan supervisors so that eventually the ANP can assume the entire vehicle maintenance function.

There has been no award of a contract for weapons maintenance because no potential contractor met the cost criteria of the statement of work. As a second effort, a contract for a maintenance facility in Kabul that will send contract teams into the provinces was out for bid in June 2006. According to the terms of this contract, only a national weapons maintenance capability will exist until regional centers open. A communications maintenance contract is planned for October 2006. The contract for radios includes a maintenance and warranty provision, and the supplier was currently in country and making installation and repairs.

**Equipment Accountability**

CSTC-A’s resource and logistics division and elements of the Afghan MoI provide a dual chain process to monitor ANP equipment accountability. Logistics specialists from CSTC-A, serving as equipment item managers, accept equipment as it is received from procurement and donation sources.

Prior to issuance, item managers inventory and store received equipment at the CSTC-A warehouse in Kabul. Whenever equipment is issued, CSTC-A logistics officers, Afghan national logistics center logistics officers, and unit logistics officers conduct a combined inventory that is recorded on both Afghan and U.S. accountability forms. Each of these organizations maintains copies of these records.

The *Tashkil* and the CSTC-A fielding plan prescribe the priority and quantity of equipment to be issued to the units. Equipment is tracked upon issue, and records are kept by organizational unit showing equipment issued versus equipment authorized. Once the unit has received its authorized equipment allowance, further issuance is withheld unless required due to maintenance or operational loss. CSTC-A has budgeted for recapitalization funds after FY 2008.

Until ANP regional logistics centers and provincial supply points are built, staffed, trained, and equipped, U.S. accountability assurance (documentation) ends at the headquarters element of the unit receiving equipment. U.S. mentors to the ANP play a key role in verifying accountability below the provincial headquarters level for the uniformed police, the brigade headquarters for the border police, and the battalion headquarters for the highway patrol and standby police. U.S. mentors are present for joint inventories if equipment is delivered to the
unit headquarters, and they conduct periodic spot checks to ensure that equipment is accounted for and maintained.

Regional U.S.-contracted maintenance facilities – built, secured, and maintained by the contractor – provide an additional means for assuring accountability for vehicles. Through the vehicle services program, the maintenance facilities located in all five regions can account for 3,000 of the approximately 5,000 vehicles currently fielded to the ANP; they have not yet serviced the entire fleet of vehicles.

The current mentor program does not provide the coverage needed to support required end-user accountability of all distributed ANP equipment. Because of reassignment of mentors, the northern region lacks sufficient mentor capability outside of the RTC. Other regions have inadequate numbers of mentors to ensure accountability below the headquarters level. In Kabul, a single mentor is supporting 17 district police headquarters. In units where mentors are present, there is no formalized program or system to guide them in ensuring accountability. Mentors are not required to submit unit equipment accountability reports or to provide guidance on how to conduct accountability checks. Additionally, the majority of mentors are contracted civilians, and the security situation does not allow extended unescorted travel to assess equipment accountability. In regions where the international community provides the police mentors, they are not yet included in the effort to ensure equipment accountability. Some of the international mentors send status reports to their own countries, but have not sent them to CSTC-A. CSTC-A is developing a plan, coordinated with the MoI, to require police mentors and ANP logistics officers to submit logistics reports that detail unit equipment accountability and readiness. The U.S. mentors will use the transition readiness assessment tool. CSTC-A also intends to increase the number of mentors to improve program effectiveness. Tying international police mentors into this effort will significantly increase the reliability and coverage of ANP units and raise accountability standards.

**Recommendation 9.** The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan should develop and implement a comprehensive method to verify Afghan National Police equipment accountability and readiness that may include international and U.S. mentors. (Action: CSTC-A)

**Logistics Internal Control Training and Mentoring**

Neither CSTC-A nor MoI have developed or implemented formalized internal control training for police serving as logistics officers. Training in supply point management, armory procedures, and maintenance management are vital to establishing accountability within the ANP at the end-user level. Likewise, standard operating procedures facilitating an accountability system at the ministerial level are essential. Accountability must be institutionalized within the ANP to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and corruption.

**Recommendation 10.** The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Embassy Kabul and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, should develop and implement an internal control training program and develop Afghan National Police logistics officers to improve logistics flow and provide accountability safeguards for equipment. (Action: CSTC-A, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)
Looking Ahead

The Future of the Central Training Center and Regional Training Centers

The importance and relevance of the CTC and RTCs should increase with the role and duties that a professional and capable ANP will eventually play in Afghan society, assuming that the national security situation becomes relatively stable. Like the National Police Academy, the CTC and the seven RTCs play an essential role in shaping and developing the ANP. Beginning with teaching the basic police courses, the training centers are evolving and preparing more advanced and specialized police courses, which will periodically bring ANP personnel back for supplemental training. The long-term relevance of the CTC and RTCs lies with the supplemental and advanced police courses that are now coming on line to bridge the gap between the basic course and advanced police work.

The number of police recruits attending the basic police course should begin to decline, but the basic police course will continue in some, if not all, training centers to keep pace with ANP attrition. In addition, as the ANP seeks to move to a better qualified (i.e., more literate), and, thereby, more versatile police force, the demand for better-trained recruits will increase the expectations placed on the training centers. The first likely outgrowth of such increased competency expectations of the police is that the five-week basic police course for illiterate recruits will be superseded by a 13-week literacy and basic course, currently being tested at the CTC. That course is designed to bring illiterate students up to a first grade reading level prior to beginning the nine-week basic police course.

As the ANP, with the assistance of international police mentors, begins to venture out into proactive patrols and specialized investigative and enforcement activities, the need for a deeper level of police training and specialized police courses will increase. The CTC and RTCs recognize this need and are beginning to teach more specialized courses. An example is the five-week FTO course, which teaches the FTO how to train police recruits in policing skills. Also, there are the Transition Integration Program (TIP), which teaches more advanced management and leadership skills. In addition, the training centers have begun teaching a two-week Tactical Training Program, emphasizing the survival skills necessary to conduct effective police operations in a low-intensity conflict environment.

Plans are also moving ahead for prosecutors – and corrections officers as well – to receive in-service training at RTC facilities. The facilities are intended to house training programs throughout the justice and corrections sector.

Afghan Judicial System and the Afghan National Police

An adequate assessment of the training and readiness of the ANP requires a brief examination of the relationship between the ANP and the larger judicial system. While a thorough review of the status of the Afghan judicial system is clearly warranted at some point, this interagency OIG assessment was limited to the criminal justice infrastructure and its impact upon the ANP. In summary, as the Afghan judicial system follows its slow path to relevance, it...
has thus far failed to include the ANP as a full partner, relegating the ANP instead to a position more akin to a governmental security force than as part of an integrated rule-of-law system.

For the Afghan criminal justice system to become effective, it needs to have both a professional police force and an independent judiciary (including modern detention facilities for pretrial and post-conviction incarceration). Although the German and American governments have trained more than 60,000 Afghan police to date, efforts to revamp the court system, led by Italy, have not kept pace. There are too few courthouses or detention facilities and too few qualified prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and court/detention personnel to staff them. The resulting lack of capacity of a basic criminal justice infrastructure has adversely affected ANP efforts to emerge as a legitimate public safety organization. In the assessment team’s interviews with internal and external stakeholders, everyone agreed that rebuilding a strong and independent judiciary is critical to the success of implementing rule of law, protecting human rights, and gaining public confidence in government. However, the consensus of the same individuals was that efforts to link the ANP with the fledgling Afghan judicial system have thus far been largely ineffective. Thus, while the ANP is expanding its law enforcement operations and activities, there is still very little legal structure in place to follow through with criminal prosecutions. In this unenviable situation, the police are beginning to police, but the courts are not yet capable of prosecuting, defending, judging, or housing those apprehended by the police.

This lack of judicial resources has had a negative impact upon what should, by now, be two core competencies of the ANP – making arrests and assisting in the prosecution of criminals. The assessment team received abundant anecdotal evidence indicating that when the ANP actually makes an arrest, the suspect is likely to arrange a private settlement on the spot with the arresting officers. This pattern seemed to be especially well established outside of Kabul, where the absence of the judicial structure, a strong preference for local tribal or religious resolution of legal issues, and a general distrust of government still prevail.

While the “bribe and release” activities by the ANP described above can be attributed partially to a lengthy history of government corruption, it is also symptomatic of the police having little judicial recourse against criminals. When presented with having to release an accused criminal a day or two after an arrest due to a lack of a means to try him, it is not unreasonable to expect an Afghan policeman instead to impose an immediate fine on the offender in exchange for his freedom. Unfortunately, routine nonjudicial resolutions in criminal cases only undermine the legitimacy of the ANP and the Afghan government, encouraging the local populace to take such matters into their own hands. If and when the ANP and the judiciary can begin to work effectively together as partners in the criminal justice system, these two entities can also begin to act as checks and balances against corruption occurring in either house.

The obstacles associated with reforming the Afghan judicial system should not be underestimated. The 28 years of civil war, dictatorship, abrupt regime change, and resulting chaos erased any semblance of an effective, fair, or even centralized judicial system. This upheaval has left a confusing patchwork of conflicting and overlapping laws influenced primarily by Islam, tribal law, Marxism, fragmentary western legal principles, and different interpretations of all of the above by anyone wielding power. This confusion of applicable laws is particularly troublesome for the ANP, which needs the type of guidance that only the judiciary
can provide in determining which laws apply in any given situation. Without this kind of structured interaction and guidance, the ANP can only take their best guess when attempting to negotiate local, tribal, religious, and criminal codes. For many Afghan citizens the judicial system must seem to be just as corrupt and elitist now as it was under the various governments that ruled Afghanistan during its troubled past. Integrating this fractured institution with the ANP asks for a great leap of faith on the part of the police, especially when few incentives appear to exist at this point to justify doing so.

It is worth noting that attention is being given, and some progress is being made, in implanting the values of rule of law – such as due process – that will assist the ANP in fulfilling its charter. For example, legal and judicial training programs are being conducted by the United Nations and other public and private organizations. The Justice Sector Support Project under INL conducts training programs for the MoI and the Ministry of Justice to train judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Some of this training is to be conducted at the RTCs, which have available capacity. In addition, a number of judicial infrastructure repair projects are ongoing to provide the judiciary with the facilities to conduct legal business. An interim criminal code has been developed and adopted. However, few judges, prosecutors, or defense attorneys have been trained in enough basic criminal law to handle the cases that the Afghan police are theoretically supposed to bring to them. Beyond that, programs thus far have only scratched the surface on developing a rule-of-law culture that includes educational outreach to the general population and effective anticorruption mechanisms.

**Recommendation 11.** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should develop and submit for review in Washington a plan that will link key components of the rule-of-law spectrum – police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, courts, and prisons – to the training and reform initiatives in order to build capacity from the national to the provincial levels to ensure that these sectors advance the rule of law in Afghanistan. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with INL)

**Future of U.S. Government Role**

It is beyond the scope of this OIG assessment to make recommendations concerning future levels of U.S. support for the ANP, but it should be clear that standing up the ANP is not a turnkey project. It will require patience and perseverance on the part of donor countries.

Even in the most optimistic case, there will be a long-term need for U.S. and international investment and budget support for Afghanistan after capacity-building and technical assistance diminishes. The objective of a stable and effective Afghan government and a rule-of-law society can only be reached – if at all – with a sustained international effort over an extended period of years. Currently, program planning calls for a major U.S. effort through FY 2008, and continued out-year support, notionally projected at $600 million per year, to sustain the ANP. The NATO ISAF will assume overall responsibility for military operations in Afghanistan before the end of 2006, but the police training role of CSTC-A is expected to be relatively unchanged within the new military structure.
UNCLASSIFIED

A pitfall in the American style of assistance, which applies to the police training program, is the urge to move quickly and to take over if things do not move quickly enough. The police training centers are led and managed by Americans – official and contract. The Afghans appreciate the resources America brings to every program it has in Afghanistan. There are some who believe the Afghans need to be more assertive in exercising their lead role in all aspects of training and readiness for the police. In practice this is difficult, because the foreigners bring so much to the table – and are assertive.

Some police commanders claim they are in charge at RTCs or at police training centers in Kabul, but it did not always appear that way to the assessment team. In too many cases, the Afghan base commander only appeared after a welcome from an all American group and briefings that excluded the Afghan commander. Similarly, Afghans rarely gave briefings on police training, deferring instead to the Americans.

Despite the reluctance of the Afghans to take control and the projected continued need for international assistance, it is important that the coalition pursue policies that encourage Afghan initiative and leadership in managing and leading the ANP training program. The transition to Afghan control will take time and continued support and education. The embassy and CSTC-A should coordinate in developing and articulating a strategy for transitioning U.S.-sponsored programs and facilities to the MoI.

**Recommendation 12.** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, should continue to develop a comprehensive master plan with appropriate milestones for the transition of U.S. government-sponsored programs and facilities for the Afghan National Police to Ministry of Interior control and responsibility. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A)
Conclusion

Success at achieving the intended end state for the APP will be subject to many factors, some of which are well beyond the control of the police program (and outside the purview of the assessment team):

- Defeat of the insurgency,
- Strengthen democracy in Afghanistan,
- Develop a strong economy, and
- Expand literacy and education programs.

A Deputy Minister of Interior told the assessment team that for the police reforms to last there must be a change in the way the police view their responsibilities to the public. He said, “There must be a change in the culture of the police.” Those chosen to work in the police force must show that they are morally respectable and that their mission is not to serve their own interests but those of the population and the abstract ideal of the rule of law.

For its part, the government will have to show that it is prepared to protect the civil rights of its citizens through fair, prompt, and transparent legal procedures and impartial courts. The government must also be ready to pay the police a living wage and provide them with reasonable working conditions. It is a tall order, but it can be achieved with effective leadership and adequate budgetary support.

Afghan government officials, police commanders, trainers, and recruits were unanimous in their praise of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and the police program in particular. The reverse of that coin is the common fear that, without a substantial and extended U.S. presence in Afghanistan, the country will revert to civil war and become a failed state once more.

The environment where the ANP operate is strewn with obstacles to reform. Nevertheless, it is the view of the assessment team that the police program in Afghanistan is well conceived and is making progress in building a viable, self-sustaining ANP. There is more to be done, and there are appropriate plans in place to strengthen and broaden the program. U.S. and donor country support for the Afghan Police Program is a worthwhile investment that can help provide national security and prevent the return to an environment of lawlessness.

33 Their praise can be discounted to some degree by their desire to continue receiving training, equipment, and employment through the U.S. government assistance program, but in the team’s judgment, it reflects their fundamental calculation that the police and related programs are necessary for Afghan national security and development.
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Informal Recommendations

1. **Issue:** Classroom lecture comprises a significant amount of the illiterate curriculum. The illiterate students’ inability to take notes degrades long-term retention of concepts and techniques taught, and inhibits their participation in the FTO Program.

   **Recommendation:** Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan should develop and issue illiterate student materials with descriptive diagrams and pictures to increase post-course subject retention and facilitate Field Training Officer Program execution.

2. **Issue:** Although the RTCs are generally well run, and relations between American trainers and Afghan staff and students are good, the visit of the assessment team revealed some irritants: student complaints about substandard food, instructor complaints about the prohibition of cell phones on the compound (for security reasons), and – most seriously – complaints at one RTC that two American trainers acted disrespectfully to Afghan instructors. Disputes like these are inevitable. It was not obvious, however, that the RTCs had an adequate system for resolving them. The protesting instructors, for example, maintained that there is no point in complaining to the Americans in charge because they all stick together. Nor did they think it would work to take the problem to the Afghan commander of the facility, because he would be reluctant to raise such a sensitive matter with the American advisors.

   **Recommendation:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan should design and implement a plan for Afghan administration, instructors, and students at police training centers to raise and resolve issues and complaints arising at their sites.

3. **Issue:** Decisions affecting the course of the APP, and which have implications for the program’s contract, have been made without input of the contracting officer or the contractor’s management representative in Kabul. To improve the decision making process, especially regarding decisions that directly impact the terms of the APP contract, it is important that the contracting officer’s representative and a contractor management representative should be part of planning discussions. This action will make the decision making process seamless and will improve contract monitoring. Having a person knowledgeable of contract requirements at planning discussions will also expedite contract modifications, when they arise.

   **Recommendation:** Embassy Kabul and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan should write and implement a procedure to include the local contracting officer’s representative for the Afghan Police Program contract, when assigned, and the contractor management representative in any planning discussions that could have an operational impact on execution of the contract or that could affect compliance with the deliverables of the contract.
4. **Issue:** Ninety-five percent of police equipment received by the government of Afghanistan through international donations is nonstandard, and equipment quality is often questionable. Delivery of this equipment is frequently delayed because of problems with customs paperwork. The use of NATO-compliant and/or American surplus military equipment could improve the procurement and delivery process.

**Recommendation:** Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan should determine whether procuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization-compliant and/or American military equipment would improve the procurement and delivery processes and standardize Afghanistan National Police equipment and modify its procurement processes accordingly.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>Afghan Police Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Commander Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNP-A</td>
<td>Counternarcotics Police – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting officer’s representative</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Central Training Center</td>
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<td>Department</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>FTO</td>
<td>Field training officer</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Police Academy</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of the Inspector General</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Command Center</td>
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<td>RTC</td>
<td>Regional Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF-Police</td>
<td>Task Force Police</td>
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<td>TIP</td>
<td>Transitional Integration Program</td>
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Appendix A: The Environment for the Police Program

In briefings by the embassy and the military, the assessment team was repeatedly told that there are elements in the Afghan situation that present special challenges to organizing, training, and equipping a professional national police force. The relatively successful programs in Bosnia and Kosovo do not offer a model that can be applied to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is different; Afghanistan is more challenging.

To begin, Afghanistan is one of the world’s “largest poorest” countries. The most lucrative economic activity is illicit opium poppy production. (The next most lucrative is economic activity generated by the foreign presence in the country.) There are promising long-term prospects for investment in mineral exploitation, basic manufacturing, and commercial agriculture, but for the foreseeable future Afghan economic development will struggle with a primitive transportation infrastructure – mountainous, landlocked terrain, no railroads, very little long-haul truck traffic – and undeveloped communications as well. Only the local elite has telephones, television, or Internet access. Per capita income is $800 a year. Perhaps 70 percent of the population – maybe more – is illiterate.

Furthermore, the country has been at war for the past generation, and all of the fighting has been within the country. Rule by the Taliban in the late ‘90s was especially ruinous; the education system virtually shut down, women were driven from the economy, and the country took a big step backwards to pre-industrial disorder. The Taliban offered safe haven to the al-Qaeda plotters responsible for the events of September 11, 2001. By the time of the American intervention in late 2001, Afghanistan was a failed state.

It follows that the country has no history of effective governance from the center. Local warlords, tribal leaders, and drug kingpins wield decisive economic and political power, and assume decisive influence over the local offices of the institutions of the central government – including the police. Thus, the national security forces face a great challenge in combating the newly resurgent Taliban. In fact, the police themselves are often the targets of well-armed and well-organized insurgents; more than 400 police were killed in 2005.

There is no tradition of community policing in Afghanistan, and policemen have not been accorded high status or respect. They have been paid – if at all – less than a living wage (much less than members of the army), and it is taken for granted that they will supplement their meager salaries by accepting gifts from wealthy local figures or by shaking down ordinary citizens. They make few arrests, in part because the criminal justice system is similarly dysfunctional. Most ordinary policemen are illiterate, a situation that worsened under the Taliban. Many senior police officers are also unqualified; they obtained their positions not by merit but through local influence. Concepts of citizen rights and humane treatment of suspects are foreign to the Afghan tradition.

34 Afghanistan is about the size of Texas, with an estimated population of 32 million.
35 The number the assessment team was given is 432 (source: NPA briefing). It should be noted, however, that the number includes deaths from all causes, including not only targeted attacks on police employees but also vehicle accidents and “green-on-green” and family violence. No breakout by cause is available.
The difficulties described above explain why the task of standing up the ANP is more challenging than may have been appreciated at first. As the experience of the first couple of years of coalition activity demonstrated, it has to include much more than training and equipping police “soldiers.” It requires a transformation of the structure and culture of the police – and even that may not be enough, if the larger security situation and culture in Afghanistan do not also change and become more hospitable to a professionally competent and honest national police force.

Thus, in addition to training and equipping policemen, the history of police corruption and incompetence (and low status) cannot be overcome unless rank and pay are radically reformed. The inherited rank structure is top-heavy with senior officers, many of whom did not obtain their high rank by merit. Similarly, the pay structure has been abysmally low – and flat; even at senior levels it has been impossible to support a family on a police salary, and police salaries were only a fraction of analogous ANA salaries. By July 2005, U.S. policy makers in Afghanistan developed a plan for ANP pay and rank structure reform, and the MoI enthusiastically embraced it. That plan was being implemented in phases at the time of this assessment.

An additional factor has increasingly influenced the police program. The worsening security conditions in southern and eastern Afghanistan have required changes in the police training program. Resurgent insurrectionist activities of the Taliban and other illegally armed groups constitute a threat not only to domestic tranquility in general, but specifically to the police themselves. In order to be effective, the police must be able to defend themselves from organized attacks and they must be able to defend their areas of responsibility. In response to the increased insurgency, some threat-based paramilitary skills have been added to the basic police training curriculum. In addition, the government of Afghanistan has redeployed some policemen to regions of the country where insurgents are most active. The ANP has an essential role in the counterinsurgency effort that is crucial to the establishment of a viable national government. These recent occurrences have caused the basic police training program to be extended and the overall cost of training and other program expenses to increase at the fortress-like RTCs.

36 The training centers are constructed with blast-proof walls topped by razor wire. There are guard towers and tank-trap vehicle entrances and sandbag bomb bunkers, in addition to pedestrian security checks at the entrances.
Appendix B: Police Training Curriculum

Police Curriculum Overview

Entry-level courses for the ANP are offered through two different systems in Afghanistan, depending on geographic location and the entry rank of the students. The National Police Academy, supported by Germany, conducts training for ANP officers and non-commissioned officers. The academy’s comprehensive, three-year training program for police officers graduated its first class of 251 Lieutenants in August 2005. The academy’s 12-week noncommissioned officer program trains supervisory officers and noncommissioned officers (sergeants), including over 50 women as of June 2006. Training at the academy includes police operations and tactics, traffic policing, management, and criminology. Graduates from the academy are considered qualified to enter several disciplines within the Afghan government, including the judiciary.

The second and much larger program to train entry-level ANP personnel is offered through the courses given at the Kabul CTC and the seven RTCs located in Kandahar, Herat, Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Jalalabad, and Bamiyan. The curricula at the CTC and seven RTCs are thorough, relevant, and will prepare literate ANP personnel for police duties when the courses are properly sequenced and timely, and when follow-on training opportunities are seized by district police commanders. Key to the success of the entire ANP curricula is selecting qualified students to attend each course and demanding that each student demonstrate competence in the subject matter prior to graduation from each course.

The police courses and supporting ANP training curricula at the CTC and RTCs are professionally designed, technically and tactically correct, and relevant to the current security situation in Afghanistan. This curriculum can be relied upon to prepare ANP personnel adequately for basic police duties in Afghanistan. The training courses offered by the CTC and RTCs alone can only realistically provide a basic platform for continued learning that must be reinforced with a rigorous in-service training program and supplemented by an FTO program in the districts.

Individual courses taught at the CTC and the RTCs were observed to track the approved curriculum closely. Some variations in course length and topics covered were observed at the RTCs but appeared reasonably related to local and/or regional needs and requirements. Slight curriculum modifications made in response to operational security issues enhanced the survivability of the ANP students and were completely appropriate.

Basic Police Courses

The following basic police courses are currently being taught at the CTC and the RTCs to ANP personnel irrespective of whether they had prior police experience before they arrived at the training facility. Although several of these courses are in transition, they will continue to have a shelf life for many months or years until they are eventually replaced by updated courses or supplemented with additional subjects.
Basic I is a nine-week entry-level police course for literate students designed to provide ANP personnel with a basic understanding of accepted international police techniques and theory of democratic policing. This course represents the preferred method of training ANP recruits. The Basic I curriculum includes such topics as police officer values and ethics, democratic policing and human dignity, criminal law and procedure, community policing, first aid, human rights, hate crimes, crime scene management, security checkpoints, traffic control, criminal investigations, interview techniques, note taking, and report writing. This course has been in operation for over two years and is offered to uniformed, border, and highway police. A three and one-half day firearms component was added to the Basic I Course in 2006, emphasizing basic rifle handling and close-range shooting techniques.

Limitations. The Basic I Course, coupled with students able to read and write, is adequate, albeit minimally, to prepare a graduate for an entry-level position in the ANP. In addition to covering the same general subjects as covered in the five week Basic II Course discussed below, the nine week Basic I Course curriculum adds many additional subjects, covers equivalent material in greater depth and is taught to a greater degree of sophistication and level of difficulty. In short, considerably more is expected of the literate ANP recruits than of the illiterate recruits and, conversely, the literate students are able to gain greater benefit from the training. Each recruit is given a police training manual printed in the Dari language. Clearly, the ability to review lessons prior to the courses being taught and/or review the material after training is critical to the long-term retention of the material.

Basic II is a five-week entry-level police course for illiterate students designed to give ANP personnel a beginning awareness of police techniques and principles of democratic policing. This course follows the same general outline as the Basic I Course, but omits 32 classes that can only be practically taught to literate students – such as report and note taking, obtaining witness statements, and a more thorough study of criminal law and procedure. This course has also been operating for approximately two years and has trained a large number of illiterate uniformed, border, and highway police. The three and one-half day firearms component was also added to the Basic II Course in 2006, emphasizing basic rifle shooting techniques. When it becomes operational in the RTCs, the Basic III Course will replace this course.

Limitations. The five-week Basic II Course is inadequate to prepare an ANP recruit for assignment to anything resembling traditional western police duties. Illiterate ANP recruits can only be expected to perform supplementary or ancillary police duties, such as security functions, guard duty, and checkpoint security. The Basic II Course curriculum provides an illiterate police recruit with a base of learning that can be supplemented at frequent points along his or her career with additional training, not the least of which must be literacy training, that would create more versatile and competent police officers, assuming that the ANP is able to make a long-term investment in training.

Basic III will eventually replace the Basic II (five-week) course now taught exclusively to illiterate students. It will combine the nine-week Basic I Course now taught to literate students, but will be preceded by a five-week literacy skills course. Once the students in the five-week literacy skills program have passed this component of the training, they will begin the nine-week
course curriculum now taught to literate ANP students. This new course is designed to channel all incoming ANP students into a single common core skills program. This course is being piloted now at the CTC and has successfully graduated three classes to date.

The curricula for the Basic I, II, and III courses are well drafted and are roughly comparable to portions of the curricula in use in many western police academies today. In addition, the Basic I, II, III course curricula take into account many of the unique challenges and issues inherent to training Afghan students as well as policing in Afghanistan. However, the coverage and depth of the subjects, difficulty of material, testing and practical exercises, and the overall length of the ANP Basic courses are considerably less rigorous than the academic and physical requirements of the average western police academy.

The three basic police courses for new ANP recruits also differ substantially in terms of the expectations placed upon the recruits, due to learning abilities, and upon the instructional methods that may be effectively employed. In general, the current Basic II Course for illiterate students reflects the limitations in teaching students who cannot take notes, study outside of class, or take written examinations to test their mastery of subject matter. Furthermore, because illiterate students are unable to work with or create many of the staples of police work, such as accident, incident, or crime reports, this course can only mention them in passing. The practical exercises contained in the Basic II curriculum do serve to supplement the classroom training and do provide reinforcement of the lessons taught in the classroom.

Advanced Police Training Courses

The Transition Integration Program (TIP) courses are advanced in-service police courses for current ANP personnel and are now being taught at the CTC and the RTCs. Although some of these courses are now in transition, they represent a necessary evolution in training existing ANP personnel once they have graduated from a Basic I, II, or III course, in addition to some ANP personnel who were previously appointed to the ANP without attending a Basic course.

TIP I – This course was the first advanced officer in-service course created for current members of the ANP. It is designed for literate personnel and focuses upon the basics of democratic policing, protection of human rights, nondiscrimination, and compliance with international law. This three-week course is currently being taught at the CTC and RTCs and will be superseded eventually by the TIP III course.

TIP II – developed to be a supplement to the TIP I course, providing existing ANP personnel with beginning management courses, ethics classes, and operations classes that cover topics such as vehicle searches, mine awareness, etc. This course is designed for literate personnel and focuses upon the basics of democratic policing, protection of human rights, nondiscrimination, and compliance with standards of international law. This three-week course is currently being taught at the CTC and some of the RTCs. It will eventually be superseded by the TIP III course when it becomes operational.

TIP III – a new five-week program designed to become a requirement for all in-service ANP personnel, even if they have attended previous TIP I and/or TIP II courses. The major topics in
this course are criminal law, current operational police skills, interviewing techniques, forensic awareness, crime scene investigation, and firearms. The principal difference in the TIP III course over the previous TIP courses is the addition of a two-week leadership course designed to accommodate the management level of the students coupled with a refined three-week democratic policing course. The new TIP III course began as a pilot at the CTC in April 2006 and is scheduled to begin at the RTCs in late 2006.

The TIP III course will be offered in three versions, each designed to accommodate the rank and experience level of the police officers attending the course. Junior police officers will attend the TIP III A course, which will focus on first line supervision skills and expectations. Mid-level police officers will attend TIP III B, which will focus on mid-level management. Senior level officers will attend TIP III C. Upon promotion to a new supervisory level beyond their previous TIP III course, the officer will be required to complete the new level of TIP III training or, in the alternative, complete at least the two-week management portion of the course conforming to their new rank.

Additional Course Offerings

The CTC and RTCs also offer an array of other specialty courses to fit the needs of the ANP. These courses include the following:

**Border Police Course** – This is a two-week course that is typically, though not always, taught as a follow on to the basic police course. The course covers topics necessary to the operating environment of policing at or near an international border. Topics covered in the class include smuggling, narcotics recognition, hazardous materials, tracking, and checkpoint operation and security. The border police course is separated into two courses, one for literate students and the second for illiterate students, but both versions take two weeks and cover the same basic subjects.

**Criminal Investigation Division Course** – This course is designed to teach entry-level ANP criminal investigators the basics of investigating crimes and building a case for prosecution. During this three-week class, criminal investigation division students are taught report writing, crime scene management, evidence collection and preservation, interviewing and interrogation, criminal intelligence collection, and specific types of investigations to include homicides, narcotics, assaults, and theft. The criminal investigation division classes are limited to 20 students per class. Currently taught only at the CTC, a new Criminal Investigation Division II course will supersede this course. It will then be exported to the RTCs.

**Field Training Officer Program** – The FTO course is comparable to the programs operating in most western police organizations to mentor and evaluate new police officers. This five-week course trains selected ANP officers in the technical aspects of policing, as well as in coaching and mentoring skills. Upon return to their police stations, FTO graduates will be able to instruct and evaluate new graduates of the ANP Basic Police Course when they begin their first assignment. This course is taught at the CTC, as well as in some of the RTCs.
Firearms Training Courses – Firearms courses are now taught as a component part of basic police and TIP courses. Firearms training is also conducted during in-service training classes at the CTC and at several of the RTCs. The courses are constantly under revision to meet changing needs and opportunities as standardized weapons and ammunition are becoming more available to the training community in Afghanistan. The firearms courses will eventually take the form of a multi-tiered training approach from basic firearms handling and shooting to advanced firearms training, with each level building upon the previous level. Both handgun and rifle courses are included in the multi-tiered plan. Firearms instructor courses and train-the-trainer courses are also planned, as well as courses for district refresher programs.

Instructor Development Course – This course was designed for officers identified to have the potential of instructing other ANP personnel. This course is a prerequisite for provincial training officers, literacy instructors, and criminal investigation division instructors. Instructor development course-trained instructors are also required to evaluate other instructors at the CTC/RTCs to ensure that they meet the minimum level of competence to instruct.

Police Driving – This is a planned three-week course designed to teach a licensed ANP driver to operate a police vehicle safely on patrol. The first two weeks of the course cover knowledge of a vehicle and driving performance. The last week includes hands-on driving on a closed, secure course with a one-on-one student to instructor ratio. Difficulties in locating and constructing a suitable driving course have delayed the rollout of this course.

Professional Standards Unit – Taught once at the CTC in late 2005, this internal affairs course trained approximately 28 officers. More classes are expected when the MoI Internal Affairs Division becomes operational and the internal affairs function branches out into the provinces.

Police Tactical Training Initiative – This six-day intensive course is designed to provide current ANP personnel with a basic knowledge and practical application of tactical skills to interdict criminal activity and survive in hostile environments. The primary target group for this training is the border police and other police assigned to high-risk areas. The intent of the training is to reduce the incidence of death and injury to the ANP and to increase safety and security in the communities of Afghanistan with better-trained police officers. The class is designed for a limit of 75 students to keep the instructor-student ratio low.
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Appendix C: Rank and Pay Reform

Rank reform is executed through the MoI by a commission led by a ranking Afghan general. The Rank Reform Commission is an all-Afghan board (advised by CSTC-A) that selects qualified officers to staff the streamlined ANP rank structure. The rank reform process is both objective and subjective in selection. The selection process takes place in three parts:

- **Part I:** Written test (comprised of basic questions on human rights and policing values, plus essay questions). The test is a deliberate discriminator and eliminates the majority of candidates. For example, of the 2,200 colonels currently serving in the ANP as many as 1,500 may be found noncompetitive for retention in grade based on test scores.
- **Part II:** File Review. The commission then reviews the files of those candidates for retention at current rank that passed the written test, and with combined results of file review and test scores ranks the candidates numerically.
- **Part III:** Human rights vetting, conducted by the U.N. Assistance Mission Afghanistan. Because of the lack of reliable records in this area, very few candidates fall out in this process.

The final decision of the selection process is partly subjective among the candidates who remain eligible for retention in grade. The top candidates will not automatically be selected. Officers can potentially be selected from anywhere on the list based on political concerns and the need for ethnic and regional diversity. The process is the same for all ranks.

If an officer is not selected at his current rank, he may choose to compete for retention at the next lower rank. An officer keeps moving down the rank chain until he is selected for that rank, decides to retire, or reaches age limitations. The age limitations are: GEN – 65, COL – 55, LTC – 52, MAJ – 50. If an officer is not selected for retention at any grade, decides to quit, or reaches the age limit for the grade, he will receive one year of severance pay – based on the reformed (much higher) pay rate of the officer’s last rank. This is expected to serve as an incentive for noncompetitive officers (e.g., those who are illiterate) to retire or resign. Testing has been completed for all ranks except for a few make-up tests necessary due to operational requirements. As of the date of this assessment, however, only the top rank (General) had been restructured.

Pay reform is enacted as quickly as practical after rank reform.

- **Phase I.** Scheduled to become effective June 24, 2006, it is based on the restructuring of the Generals from 319 to 120.
- **Phase II.** Begins in June, scheduled for completion in September. Phase II of pay reform enacts the new pay scale for all officers, Colonel through 2nd Lieutenant, after the officers have been approved for their new rank.
- **Phase III.** Scheduled to start in September 2006. Reformed payment of the enlisted police ranks.

The U.N.-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan pays $75 million annually for ANP salaries (based on 62,000 police authorized by the Tashkil). The fund also pays $25
million a year for food, and it will pay $11.2 million for the severance pay ($5.8 million for 2006 and $5.4 million for 2007) for those officers leaving the ANP through this process.

The result of the rank reform initiative will be a streamlined ANP officer corps (reducing the officer corps by approximately 4,500), selected by ability and performance, and a tiered rank structure commensurate with the size of the ANP. Rank reform does not include a process for follow-on promotions. CSTC-A is coordinating with the MoI to develop such a process, projected to be in place by November 2006. After rank reform is complete, all newly commissioned ANP officers will be graduates of the Afghan NPA.
Appendix D: Principal Interlocutors and Organizations Visited

Department of State
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA)
Bureau of Administration (A)

Department of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
U. S. Central Command – Tampa, FL

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

National Security Council

American Embassy – Kabul, Afghanistan
   Ambassador Ron Neumann
   Ambassador Richard Baltimore, Rule of Law Coordinator
   Alistair Cooke, INL Office Director
   Political-Military Office
   Doug Wankel, Drug Enforcement Administration
   U. S. Agency for International Development
   Regional Security Office

Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan
   Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, Commanding General
   Brigadier General Bill Chambers, Deputy

Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
   Major General Robert Durbin, Commanding General
   Brigadier General Gary O’Brien (Canada), Deputy

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany – Kabul
   Ambassador Helmut Frick, Rule of Law

German Police Project Office, Kabul

Afghan Ministry of Interior
   Zarar Ahmed Moqbil, Minister of Interior
   General Abdul Hadi Khaliq, Deputy Minister of Interior/ Internal Security Strategy
   Lieutenant General Mohammed Daud-Daud, Deputy Minister – Counternarcotics
Afghan Ministry of Justice  
Gulam Sarwar Danesh, Minister of Justice

Afghan National Police  
Afghan National Police Academy  
Central Training Center, Kabul  
Regional Training Center  
Kandahar  
Jalalabad  
Mazar-e-Sharif  
Kunduz  
Bamiyan

Kabul Police Station  
District 4  
District 5  
District 9

Provincial Reconstruction Team  
Kunduz (Germany)  
Bamiyan (New Zealand)

Narcotics Interdiction Unit Training Facility (Kabul)

DynCorp International (Kabul)

MPRI (Kabul)

The OIG team directly observed training in progress at police training centers. The team met with or interviewed numerous Afghan administrators, instructors, and students, and American trainers and mentors at police academic and training centers and at Afghan government ministries and police stations.

With some exceptions interviews with Afghans were conducted with the assistance of interpreters provided by the host organization.
Appendix E: Scope and Methodology

This assessment was a self-initiated evaluation of the U.S. government effort to train and develop the ANP. The assessment focused on the plans and programs in place for training the ANP and an examination of the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation between those Department of State and Department of Defense organizations responsible for developing, implementing, and conducting police training. The assessment team did not examine the process by which policy decisions were reached on the structure of the APP, nor the policy decisions themselves.

In accomplishing this assessment, the team examined Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan and CSTC-A plans and related orders dealing with Afghan security training. The team interviewed security policymakers and implementers of Afghan police training in the United States as well as in Afghanistan. The team interviewed key members of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and CSTC-A, receiving numerous, comprehensive briefings from subject matter experts within those organizations. The team observed basic, advanced, and specialized police training at various sites throughout Afghanistan. The team interviewed members of the German Police Program Office in Kabul, contract police trainers and mentors, Afghan governmental officials, Afghan police instructors, Afghan police recruits, and veteran policemen. During the course of fieldwork, the assessment team interviewed over 300 individuals involved in Afghan police training. Appendix D provides a listing of the key policymakers and organizations contacted during this evaluation.

In April and May 2006, the assessment team researched available data in the Washington, DC area. The team conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan between June 1 and June 22, 2006.

Standard. The assessment team performed this assessment in accordance with the standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency published in Quality Standards for Inspections January 2005.

Prior Coverage

During the past three years, the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office have issued reports pertinent to the ANP. The Congressional Research Service, a congressional support agency, does not make its publications directly available to the public online. Unrestricted Government Accountability Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov.
Congressional Research Service


Government Accountability Office


Appendix F: U.S. Embassy Kabul Comments

September 22, 2006

U.S. Embassy Kabul Response to the Department of State and Department of Defense Inspectors General Draft Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program

PREFACE: Embassy Kabul believes that the recommendations from the Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Programs will assist the Embassy and CSTC-A in its efforts to oversee the creation of an effective, well-organized, professional, multi-ethnic national police force. Afghanistan faces a significant security threat in the form of an armed insurgency, particularly in the south and east of the country, as well as entrenched warlords and narcotics traffickers. A well-trained, well-equipped Afghan National Police (ANP) is critical to attaining a measure of security that will allow for reconstruction and development, as well as deterring trafficking and criminality. There are still too few police in many key districts to counter the insurgent presence, and those police who are at their posts are frequently less well paid and equipped than their adversaries, who have access to funds from a variety of terrorist and criminal sources including opium traffickers. The USG approach to police training, mentoring, and equipping needs to be sufficiently flexible to respond to an evolving security threat. For that reason, Embassy elements (Front Office, INL and POL-MIL), which have the policy lead, work closely with CSTC-A, which has the implementation lead, to develop and modify programs in response to the threat. All our organizational and contractual efforts must also be tied to this goal. Unity of effort between civilian and military elements in the U.S. mission is key to our success. Developing national Afghan institutions within the Ministry of Interior and other Afghan ministries that can sustain and build on U.S. efforts is our shared long-term objective.

Recommendation 1: Coordinate a document that clarifies the command relationship of various ANP entities.

Action: Embassy

Comment: Command relationships within Ministry of Interior are generally well-defined and can be described on a wire diagram. Post will prepare such a diagram and provide to OOIG.

Eventual Disposition: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

Recommendation 2: Develop, staff, and implement a comprehensive international police mentor program.

Action: CSTC-A.

Comment (CSTC-A): changes that fulfill this recommendation were implemented in September 2006. Please see separate CSTC-A response to DOD dated September 19, 2006.

Eventual Disposition: CSTC-A expects to comply fully with this recommendation.
**Recommendation 3**: Establish an independent Inspector General office in Ministry of Interior.  
**Action**: Embassy.  
**Comment**: Embassy will work with MoI and CSTC-A to ensure that an independent Inspector General office is included in the MoI reorganization plan being developed by MoI with CSTC-A assistance.  
**Eventual Disposition**: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

**Recommendation 4**: DOS to assign a qualified Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) to Embassy Kabul.  
**Action**: Embassy  
**Comment**: INL has agreed to send two contracting officers to post, who will act as CORs for various INL contracts. One of the contracting officers has already arrived at post.  
**Eventual Disposition**: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

**Recommendation 5**: DOS should provide CSTC-A and Embassy Kabul, as executors of the Afghan Police Program contract, with a copy of the current contract, Statement of Work, and modifications.  
**Action**: Department of State (A Bureau) and Embassy  
**Comment**: The INL CIVPOL contract is a multi-year, multi-vendor, worldwide contract. Neither Post nor CSTC-A needs a copy. INL/NAS Afghanistan needs/has copies of all Task Orders/modifications that apply to Afghanistan. The contract will gain us no advantage. As for sharing these with CSTC-A, INL Washington and the A Bureau should make that decision.  
**Eventual Disposition**: Embassy will comply fully with this recommendation, when the A Bureau sends the contract to post.

**Recommendation 6**: CSTC-A to develop an Memorandum of Agreement to describe the conditions and process by which MPRI advisors at Ministry of Interior will be replaced by the current contract holder – DynCorp.  
**Action**: CSTC-A.  
**Embassy Comment**: Embassy is working with CSTC-A to achieve the right mix of contractors to promote reform within the Ministry of Interior and stands ready to assist in resolving this matter. The Embassy, however, is not party to a contract with MPRI, so its role will be tangential at most. See separate CSTC-A response to this recommendation.  
**Eventual Disposition**: CSTC-A action.

**Recommendation 7**: Embassy Kabul should reorganize the INL Office and Embassy Kabul to improve coordination, communication, program management, and policy implementation.  
**Action**: Embassy  
**Comment**: INL is in the process of reorganizing its section and expects this reorganization to be completed by the end of the calendar year.  
**Eventual Disposition**: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

**Recommendation 8**: Draft an updated analysis and description of police training and readiness program policies.  
**Action**: Embassy
Comment: The Political-Military Section expects additional staff to arrive at post in late September and early October, including a new Counselor for Political/Military Affairs. As soon as that additional staffing has arrived, the Embassy will perform the analysis and prepare a description of the training and readiness policies.

Eventual Disposition: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

Recommendation 9: CSTC-A should develop and implement a comprehensive method to verify ANP equipment accountability and readiness that includes international as well as U.S. mentors.


Comment: Embassy agrees that equipment accountability is critical to a well-run program.

Eventual Disposition: CSTC-A action.

Recommendation 10: CSTC-A to develop and implement an internal control training program and develop ANP logistics officers to improve logistics flow and provide accountability safeguards.


Comment: Embassy agrees that internal controls are vital to assure safeguards are in place.

Eventual Disposition: CTSC-A action.

Recommendation 11: Develop a plan to link key components of the justice sector (prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, courts, and prisons) to [police] training and reform initiatives.

Action: Embassy.

Comment: The Regional Justice Sector Support Program (RJSSP) – formally the RJPIP – is designed to ensure the linking of Police and the Courts (including at the training and mentoring level). The first teams are already in country and will be deployed in the near future. INL has already built RJSSP class/office/hooch spaces at some the RTCs and, security permitting, it will be rolled out across the country within the year.

Eventual Disposition: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

Recommendation 12: Develop a master plan for transition of U.S. government-sponsored programs to Ministry of Interior control.

Action: Embassy, in coordination with CSTC.

Embassy comment; Within the next three months, CSTC-A will form a committee together with MoI and Embassy/INL to identify milestones for transition of the police development program to the MoI. The committee report is expected to be completed by summer 2007 and will be passed to OOIG.

Eventual Disposition: Embassy expects to comply fully with this recommendation.

Editor’s Note: The order of recommendations in the draft sent for management comment changed in the final document. The essence of the recommendations, however, remains largely unchanged.
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, ATTN: AIG, Inspections and Evaluations, 450 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202

SUBJECT: Concurrence with DoS/DoD Interagency Afghan National Police Assessment Findings


2. The management comments previously submitted are approved for inclusion in the report.

3. My point of contact for this action is Lieutenant Colonel Mark Drabik at DSN: 318-237-3766.

GARY J. P. O'BRIEN
Brigadier General
Deputy Commanding General – Policy
Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
UNCLASSIFIED

CSTC-A
INFO PAPER

SUBJECT: DoS/DoD IG Responses
STAFF LEAD: CSTC-A PRD / Col Mike Carlson/Michael.L.Carlson@centcom.mil / DSN 318-237-1074

PURPOSE: Provide PRD Responses to IG Report and Formal Recommendations, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program (Project No. D2006-DIPOE1-01/93, dated 29 Aug 06)

PRD was tasked to provide CSTC-A responses to four of the recommendations coming out of the IG Report and Formal Recommendations, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program (Project No. D2006-DIPOE1-01/93, dated 29 Aug 06). The responses are as follows:

Recommendation 2. CSTC-A, in coordination with INL and international partners, should develop, staff, and implement a comprehensive international police mentor program for Afghanistan. This program must coordinate international mentoring and training at local police districts, both inside the station house and on patrol, and describe procedures to track equipment and communicate issues, needs, and problems to CSTC-A and INL.

PRD recommended response: Concur
A completely revised mentor system was implemented in September 2006 to address the lack of emphasis upon mentoring and training at the local police district level. This program will also correct the deficiencies currently experienced regarding identification of issues and needs within the ANP and tracking the resolution of the same.

This mentoring program focuses on a systems approach and targets 14 specific systems. The use of a systems approach will facilitate a coordinated approach which will be more effective than focusing on each individual within the ANP. A significant degree of synergy will be achieved through the use of the systems approach due to the fact that systems span multiple organizations and disciplines. The 14 mentor systems include:

Strategic Planning
Operational Planning
Operations and Force Readiness
Internal Affairs
Intelligence
Logistics Management
Facilities and Installation Management
Acquisition and Procurement
Ministerial Administration
Personnel Management
Legal Affairs
Finance and Budget
Force Management
Training and Education

A comprehensive analysis was completed while developing these systems which resulted in a clear delineation of the desired endstate for the ANP and how each system helped to achieve the endstate. The analysis included the identification of the objectives for the systems and subsystems, the ordering and subsequent grouping of the

APPROVED BY:
PRD Director, Mr. John Collins
CSTC-A

Enclosures:

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objectives around milestones, and identification of those tasks that are required to reach the desired endstate. Upon completion of task identification, standardized measurement tools for each objective and milestone were developed and incorporated into a reporting system which facilitates the tracking and reporting of the progress achieved in each system.

This system is currently in use and proving to be an effective method of developing the ANP.

Another method used to streamline efficiency and address the problems at hand included the recent reorganization of the Police Reform Division of CSTC-A in September of 2006. This reorganization involved the genesis of the Regional Police Advisor Concept. As previously mentioned, the Regional Police Advisor Unit is a critical position supporting the implementation of the ANP/MoI organizational system development. The Regional Police Advisor Units are forward deployed within each of the 5 Regions of Afghanistan. These 15 man units provide support and direction to the ANP and direct and account for the mentors working at the Regional Command down to the District level. A significant efficiency is harvested by using these teams as they are forward deployed and therefore more able to identify issues, forward the issues to the staff of CSTC-A and track resolution of the issues. One of the most significant advantages realized through the RPA concept is that CSTC-A is able to obtain ground truth on the capabilities and strength of the ANA. This ability to actually observe the forces on a regular basis assists in the refinement of programmatic in order to target the identified issues. The RPAs specifically focus their efforts on 5 of the 14 systems; Finance and Budget, Logistics, Operations, Personnel and Training and Education. The RPA performs the following tasks:

- Liaison with PRD command staff and the mentor command staff
- Responsible for directing mentor activities assigned to their command
- Responsible for directing military activities assigned to their command
- Advisor to the ANP Regional Command
- Coordinates with the RCAG on matters relating to the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces)
- Assists the ANP Regional Command with planning, preparation, and execution of police operations within the region
  - Coordinates all police mentoring and training requirements within the region
  - Collaborates with the Chief Mentor for Systems Integration, Senior Mentor Supervisors, and Mentors for System Integration to ensure proper mentor assignments
  - Evaluates the progress of the ANP against measurable standards
  - Evaluate and coordinate ANP training needs
  - Facilitates fielding of equipment and accountability to ANP within AOR

APPROVED BY:
PRD Director, Mr. John Collias
CSTC-A

Enclosures:
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SUBJECT: DoS/DoD IG Responses
STAFF LEAD: CSTC-A PRD / Col Mike Carlson/Michael.L.Carlson@cfc-a.centcom.mil / DSN 318-237-1074

PURPOSE: Provide PRD Responses to IG Report and Formal Recommendations, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program (Project No. D2006-DIPOE1-0193, dated 29 Aug 06)

- Analyzes mission needs and establish priorities for developing, enhancing, and maintaining mentor and advisor needs
- Provides and maintain training for mentors on new or modified mentor systems
- Provides senior managers with status reports which include information pertaining to implementation and integrity of current and future missions

In sum, all RPA’s assist the ANP Regional Command in staffing a Logistics Unit. In order to focus on the previously mentioned systems, the RPA team must develop policy, accounting and reporting procedures at the Regional, Provincial and District levels. The mentors assigned to this function will ensure that proper procedures are in place and that routine inspections are conducted. CSTC-A, PRD, Resource Division, is also tracking all fielded equipment down to the Regional Level. With the establishment of the RPA and Systems approach we will have the required visibility at the regional and district levels which will greatly and positively influence the development of the ANP.

Recommendation 6. CSTC-A, in coordination with INL and Embassy Kabul, should develop a formal Memorandum of Agreement with Embassy Kabul to describe the conditions and process by which MPRI advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior will be replaced by the current contract holder – DynCorp International.

PRD Recommended Response: Concur. MPRI-DynCorp MOA

The contract for MPRI will expire in March of 2007. In January of 2007, CSTC-A, INI. Representatives, and Embassy Kabul will evaluate the work performed by the MPRI Mentors and will resolve any existing contracting issues via a collaborative Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

Recommendation 9. CSTC-A should develop and implement a comprehensive method to verify ANP equipment accountability and readiness that includes international, as well as U.S. mentors.

PRD Recommended Response: Concur.

The resource division of the Police Reform Directorate is currently working the Strategic Logistics Management System in an effort to align policy development, training and immediate requirements. Our intent is to assist MoI by conducting a series of comprehensive logistics seminars that will immediately enhance internal controls, accountability and maintenance procedures used by MoI and Regional Commands. The Logistics Management System is one of the five critically managed systems of the 14 currently tracked in CSTC-A. Identifying and establishing a working relationship with the key personnel at MoI and the Regional Logistics/Technical Officers

APPROVED BY:
PRD Director, Mr. John Collins
CSTC-A

Enclosures:

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Editor’s Note: The order of recommendations in the draft sent for management comment changed in the final document. The essence of the recommendations, however, remains largely unchanged.
Appendix H: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL – Department of State)

Comments

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TO: OIG – Diana McCormick
FROM: INL – Thomas A. Schweich
SUBJECT: Discussion Draft OIG (DOS and DOD) Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program, version dated August 29, 2006, #ISP-I-06

Overview

INL is generally pleased with the results of the OIG assessment of the Afghanistan Police Program (APP). In particular, I am pleased that the report addresses the challenges involved in effecting reform in an insecure environment. Additionally, I agree with the conclusion that greater progress on the Afghan justice system is a necessity, and I have made this a priority for FY07 and FY08.

However, there are a few aspects of the report that require clarification. Additionally, while I am pleased with the general accuracy of the assessment, the report should, I believe, more clearly delineate activities which are carried out by INL with oversight from CSTC-A and those activities which are carried out directly by CSTC-A.

I believe the final report should properly reflect the division of responsibility between the two entities. Specifically, INL implements the training, mentoring and reform program; CSTC-A directly implements the equipment and infrastructure support while providing oversight for execution of all program activities.

I understand that your team met with the INL program manager (Angelie Little-Turner) and INL/CIVPOL office director (Steve Peterson) on September 12 to discuss these issues in detail and that some of the clarifications listed below may have already been addressed. However, I understand that Angelie and Steve promised to follow up on the conversation with written comments and recommendations which are included in this memo.

Response/Comments on Formal Recommendations:

*Formal Recommendation 1:* Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A and in consultation with the Ministry of Interior (MoI), should coordinate a document that clarifies the command
relationships between RTC, Border Police, Standby Police, and Highway Police in relation to the Regional and Provincial Commanders.

**INL Response:** INL agrees that such a document would be useful and supports the recommendation. However, the RTCs are not police training facilities, but regional INL training facilities built with the intent of housing all INL training programs in the region, including justice sector and corrections sector programs in particular. As such, any document which clarifies chain of command should take this fact into account.

**Recommendation 2:** CSTC-A, in coordination with INL and international partners, should develop, staff, and implement a comprehensive international police mentor program for Afghanistan. This program must coordinate international mentoring and training at local police districts, both inside the station house and on patrol, and describe procedures to track equipment and communicate issues, needs, and problems to CSTC-A and INL.

**Response:** While such a program already exists, INL agrees that we need more staff and has committed to increasing the current strength of the mentor program by more than 50% [from 252 mentors to 388 mentors]. An RFP was issued to DynCorp in August and we have already completed evaluation of their response and provided funding to support the effort. The first class of new mentors is scheduled to begin pre-deployment training in October. We have also obtained some additional interest from our international partners (including Canada, Italy, and the U.K.) to provide mentors. Though such support will likely always remain minimal compared to the USG contribution, we continue to encourage other nations to contribute and coordinate accordingly.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Kabul in coordination with CSTC-A should work closely with the MoI to establish an independent Inspector General Office to investigate allegations of bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and other forms of wrongdoing within the ANP, and to conduct audits and inspections, as required.

**Response:** INL agrees with the recommendation and notes that such efforts are underway; INL is already working to establish such a function and is developing an associated training program to be delivered in FY07.

**Recommendation 4:** The Department of State should assign a qualified Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) on a permanent basis to Embassy Kabul to improve program management of the police training contract in support of the U.S. military command in charge of the police training program, CSTC-A.

**Response:** INL agrees with the recommendation and notes that a permanent position has been created and is filled. In addition, INL will enhance the Government Technical Monitor (GTM) staff to better support the in-country COR.

**Recommendation 5:** The Department of State should provide CSTC-A and Embassy Kabul, as executors of the Afghan Police Program contract, a copy of the current contract, Statement of Work, and modifications.
Response: INL has already made arrangements to assign a permanent COR as well as several GTMs in country to assist in contract management. Additionally, INL Washington has provided INL Kabul with copies of the statement of work and modifications and these have been shared with CSTC-A; the documents should have been available to the team to view in Kabul. However, INL will work to ensure that a complete COR file is maintained appropriately at US Embassy Kabul to improve access to such documents.

Some confusion may exist regarding the terminology as the APP is covered by a task order (rather than contract) which was issued competitively under the base CIVPOL contract. We have, on several occasions, provided copies of the task order but not the CIVPOL contract as it covers many other programs and is not specific to Afghanistan. The operating document is the task order.

Finally, the report incompletely describes the issues with the MOI mentoring program. DOS has had a successful formal mentoring program at the MOI since 2004, which was frequently discussed throughout 2004 and 2005 in the interagency. The mentors had been assigned to the MOI for some time and had developed and implemented a Kabul-based community policing program and new standard operating procedures (SOP) for the MOI, among other successes.

Until recently, it was not clear as to why there was a perception that some of these mentors lacked the appropriate skills and INL had difficulty replacing the individuals until it received better position descriptions. However, coordination on this process is much improved.

Recommendation 6: CSTC-A, in coordination with INL and Embassy Kabul, should develop a formal Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Embassy Kabul to describe the conditions and process by which MPRI advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior will be replaced by the current contract holder – DynCorp International.

Response: INL and CSTC-A have begun the process of replacing the MPRI mentors; many of the individuals have been replaced already as of early September. Progress has not been slowed by a lack of agreement over the process, but rather was initially hindered by a lack of clear, articulated position descriptions from CSTC-A. Thus, while we feel an MOA articulating the process is probably no longer necessary; a document listing all open positions with attached position descriptions would greatly aid the completion of the effort.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Kabul should reorganize the INL office to improve coordination, communication, program management, and policy implementation.

Response: The Embassy plans to reorganize the entire operation which will include changes in the INL offices.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Kabul should draft an updated analysis and description of the police training and readiness program policies. The report should include a description of the counter-insurgency role of the ANP, the revised fielding plan, the dissolution of the highway
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police, and coordination with donor nations and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the implementing agency for the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).

Response: INL agrees with the recommendation but requests that it be revised to involve INL in the preparation of this plan.

Recommendation 9: CSTC-A should develop and implement a comprehensive method to verify ANP equipment accountability and readiness that includes international, as well as U.S. mentors.

Recommendation 10: CSTC-A, in coordination with Embassy Kabul and in consultation with the MOI, should develop and implement an internal control training program and develop ANP logistics officers to improve logistics flow and provide accountability safeguards for equipment.

Response (to 9 and 10): The recommendation should be revised to delete the reference to use of international or U.S. mentors. Mentors are not assigned to the program for the purpose of tracking, inventorying and maintaining equipment. To use them this way would be inconsistent with the purpose of their deployment and outside the skill sets of many of them. We feel that given their expertise in this area, CSTC-A and DOD are better positioned to take responsibility for tracking, inventorying and maintaining equipment which they procure and distribute, to include the development of the logistic training program recommended.

The report states that DOD was provided a transfer of $600,000 from the ANA program to the ANP program to procure weapons and equipment for police. That it is incorrect – they were provided a transfer of $200,000,000 to support such purchases.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CSTC-A, should develop a plan and submit it for review in Washington that will link the key components of the justice sector -- police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, courts, and prisons -- to the training and reform initiatives in order to build capacity from the national to the provincial levels to ensure that these sectors advance the rule of law in Afghanistan.

Response: INL does not agree with the recommendation. DOD’s role in the criminal justice sector is primarily limited to police and infrastructure support. INL and Embassy Kabul have developed a plan (already approved by the interagency deputies committee on August 30) which does create the linkages recommended. Moreover, implementation of the first phase is already underway. Additionally, the report should be corrected to note that the JSSP was developed and is implemented by INL – not CSTC-A.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Kabul/INL, in coordination with CSTC-A, and in consultation with the MoI, should continue to develop a comprehensive master plan, with appropriate milestones, for the transition of U.S. government-sponsored programs and facilities for the ANP to MoI control and responsibility.

Response: INL agrees, but with the following reservations. Much of the transition plan for the training and mentoring program is inherent in both programs’ design; for example, the
use of a “trainer the trainer” approach and similar Field Training Officer approach for the mentoring program. Moreover, given the extent to which we are unsure whether the GoA will have the resources to support DOD’s equipment and infrastructure program, it may be premature to develop such a plan for this element. Thus while we agree such a plan is critical, it should be a flexible document which reflects changing realities on the ground. The overall security situation in the country will impact this transition as well.

Editor’s Note: The order of recommendations in the draft sent for management comment changed in the final document. The essence of the recommendations, however, remains largely unchanged.
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Appendix I: Management Response Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: DoS/DoD Interagency Afghan National Police Assessment

I appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report and provide recommendations. Overall, the assessment is accurate and well-balanced. Suggested corrections for the final report are attached.

Attachment:
As stated
Prepared by: COL Sherry Ownby, ISA/NESA 571-2500.
Summary of Recommendations and Discussion Draft

Comments

DRAFT

Recommendation 1. Concur with comment: Revise the recommendation to include the requirement for the document to define how the ANA and ANP will cooperate on security and counter insurgency missions: As Embassy Kabul likely does not have the operational expertise to handle these actions, recommend the action be revised as follows: Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in coordination with Embassy Kabul.

Recommendation 7. Concur with comment: Recommend the INL police program staff be merged with CSTC-A staff under the State Department Deputy for Police Training.

Recommendation 8. Concur with comment: CSTC-A has more appropriate expertise to draft the updated analysis and description of the police training and readiness program policies. Recommend CSTC-A be given the lead for this action in coordination with Embassy Kabul. The Department of State should retain the lead for the donor coordination piece.

Factual Corrections. The “commitments to support the rebuilding of the security forces in post-Taliban Afghanistan” were made at the Geneva conference on Afghanistan security in April 2002, not the Bonn conference of December 2001 (page 7, first sentence of second paragraph).

The ANP ceiling of 62,000 was based on calculations by representatives of the government of Afghanistan and German planners, not “coalition planners” (page 7, second paragraph). Also, remove the reference to the second Bonn conference in the previous sentence.
Summary of Recommendations and Discussion Draft

Comments

DRAFT

General Comments.

Recommend the report recognize the diversity of missions assigned to the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANP’s first mission was to conduct democratic and community policing at an international standard. Currently, the ANP is viewed as a key player in the overall counterinsurgency mission. The ANP’s role today is different/expanded and may require different training, expertise, and equipment.

The report also should recognize the current limits of USG efforts to influence the Afghan MOI and the ANP. The Government of Afghanistan is the lead on ANP efforts.

Editor’s Note: The order of recommendations in the draft sent for management comment changed in the final document. The essence of the recommendations, however, remains largely unchanged.
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Appendix J: U.S. Central Command Comments

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJ3 24 Oct 06

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA, 22202
ATTN: MR. JOE BAKER/703-604-9170

SUBJECT: DOS/DOD Interagency Afghan National Police Assessment

1. USCENTCOM and CSTC-A have reviewed the draft Interagency Afghan National Police Assessment Report and concur with the recommendations therein with the following comments:

   a. The report should be closely reviewed and amended to ensure that it accurately states the legal and official responsibilities and authorities related to the police train and equip mission. The final report should make it clear that Department of State retains lead responsibility for the police program, CSTC-A directs (and has operational responsibility for) the police training and equipment program, U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) manages the contract, and US Ambassador is responsible for policy guidance. Problem areas and related recommendations are highlighted in the attached draft report.

   b. USCENTCOM recommends that the IG team clarify the source of the 62K ANP strength ceiling that is mentioned in the draft report on page 7. This number may be unnecessarily limiting and CSTC-A and the AFG MOI have recently proposed a ceiling closer to 62K in order to meet the requirements of the situation in Afghanistan.

   c. USCENTCOM recommends that the IG team review Article 4 of the Police Law Booklet. The wording related to leadership and control of the Afghan police forces is vague, and Afghan governors have used this vagueness to justify receiving funds for police. A new Article 4 is being drafted by the MoI to more clearly define command and control (vice funding) of the police. USCENTCOM recommends that DoS and CSTC-A both closely monitor this project and push for more complete reform of Article 4 to add specificity in regards to funding.

   d. The IG team should be aware that there will be an interagency assessment of the counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan in October, 2006.

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Editor’s Note: The order of recommendations in the draft sent for management comment changed in the final document. The essence of the recommendations, however, remains largely unchanged.
GENERAL INFORMATION

Forward questions or comments concerning the Interagency Assessment of Afghan National Police Training and Readiness to:

U.S. Department of State
Office of Inspector General
Washington, D.C. 20520-6817

Or

Inspections & Evaluation Directorate
Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Inspections & Policy
Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4794
crystalfocus@dodig.mil

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