Report of Audit

REVIEW OF INL-ADMINISTERED PROGRAMS IN COLOMBIA

00-CI-021

July 2000

(Redacted)
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## APPENDICES

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALSE    Aviation Life Support Equipment  
CIA      Central Intelligence Agency    
CNP      Colombian National Police      
Department Department of State        
FMS      Foreign Military Sales System  
INCP     International Narcotics Control Program  
INL      Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  
INL/AD   Aviation Division, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  
INL/RM   Office of Resource Management, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  
NAS      Narcotics Affairs Section      
NTSB     National Transportation Safety Board    
OIG      Office of Inspector General      

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose
In March 1999, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, and Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, requested that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The request tasked OIG with answering 21 specific questions about INL’s counternarcotics programs in Colombia.

The Committees’ 21 questions centered around 5 areas of the Department of State’s (the Department) counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. These included 1) the experience and training of Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) officers, 2) the chain of command between INL headquarters and NAS Bogota, 3) the costs and benefits of using American contractors in the eradication program, 4) the configuration of the B-212 and UH-II helicopters transferred to the Colombian National Police (CNP), and 5) maintenance and safety issues related to the CNP Air Service.

Background
Colombia is the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a key supplier of heroin to the United States. Colombia is also the largest recipient of U.S. counternarcotics assistance. The primary objective of providing this assistance is to stop the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. Between fiscal years 1972 and 1998, INL provided more than $300 million to Colombia under the International Narcotics Control Program (INCP). During FY 1999 support increased to approximately $203 million, $173 million of which was part of the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation.

Two of INL’s most significant counternarcotics efforts in Colombia are the funding and operational support for the CNP Antinarcotics Division and the INL Air Wing. The CNP Antinarcotics Division is a 2,300 member force responsible for implementing the Government of Colombia’s counternarcotics policy. The INL Air Wing is one of the Department of State’s (the Department) programs for eradicating illicit drugs crops overseas. The INL Air Wing in Colombia is made up of over 100 American contractor pilots and mechanics. The CNP Antinarcotics Division and the INL Air Wing work together to reduce coca and opium poppy cultivation through an aerial eradication program. In 1998 alone,
the joint CNP/INL eradication effort resulted in over 65,000 hectares (one hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres) of coca being sprayed. In addition to the eradication campaign, INL provides support for the CNP’s interdiction operations, which are dedicated to the disruption of drug trafficking organizations.

Prior to 1997, the primary role of the INL Air Wing was limited to training Colombian pilots and mechanics. During FY 1997, senior Department officials were not satisfied with the CNP’s eradication statistics and decided that the most effective way to increase the area sprayed was to introduce more American contractors into the eradication process. This decision resulted in an influx of American contractors into the eradication program. A plan is currently being developed to nationalize the eradication effort by phasing out the American contractors over a 3 year period.

**Results in Brief**

We found that INL is doing an adequate job of recruiting qualified NAS officers in Bogota. We also found examples where communication was lacking between INL headquarters, INL Aviation Division (INL/AD), and NAS Bogota, however, we do not believe the formal chain of command needs restructuring. There is a cooperative working relationship between NAS Bogota and INL/AD personnel in Colombia.

The increased American contractor presence in the eradication program resulted in more drug crops being sprayed in Colombia. However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department disagree about the effectiveness of this increased spray activity. Nevertheless, the Department’s efforts have had little measurable impact on the availability of drugs in the United States. The increased American involvement in the eradication process has not harmed CNP morale nor has it been counterproductive to have both INL and the CNP involved in eradication. According to CNP personnel, the participation of American contractors has resulted in improved training for the CNP and a more effective eradication program.

NAS Bogota and INL should have been more proactive in helping the CNP identify desirable modifications to the standard UH-II helicopter configuration. Better communication among NAS Bogota, INL/AD, and INL headquarters may have reduced some of the problems associated with the transfer of these helicopters.

The CNP is not ready to assume full responsibility for aircraft maintenance. A 3-year nationalization plan is being developed to transfer the responsibilities of the American contractors to the CNP. The CNP needs to focus on improving its management of aircraft
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

maintenance and logistics for the nationalization plan to be implemented effectively.

Principal Findings

Effectiveness of the Eradication Effort is Uncertain

Despite spending over $100 million on the increased eradication efforts during FY 1997-99, the results of the spray program are uncertain. Although the data indicates that the spray program has had the effect of moving cultivation from one region to another, it is uncertain whether the current program has decreased the supply of drugs from Colombia. Furthermore, according to the General Accounting Office, the Department’s efforts have had little measurable impact on the U.S. drug market, as Colombian cocaine and heroin continue to be readily available. According to Department officials, the key to significantly reducing the supply of illegal narcotics from Colombia is the ability to spray crops in Putumayo – an area in Southern Colombia where it is believed the majority of increased coca production has taken place. To date, the Government of Colombia has not allowed full scale aerial eradication in this location.

Inadequate Assistance to CNP in UH-II Configuration and Spare Parts

NAS Bogota and INL could have been more proactive in assisting the CNP with defining configuration specifications for the UH-II helicopters. For example, neither NAS Bogota nor INL suggested the CNP consider installing auxiliary fuel tanks or additional minigun mounts on the UH-II helicopters, even though 2 years earlier INL specified these same options on its own helicopters used in Colombia. This equipment was later installed on the helicopters, resulting in aircraft downtime that could have been avoided. NAS Bogota and INL also permitted the UH-II and B-212 helicopters to be transferred to the CNP without a parts support package. This decision was made with full knowledge that the CNP did not have an adequate supply of parts to service its existing fleet of aircraft. Providing additional aircraft without a parts support package resulted in unnecessary downtime for CNP aircraft.

CNP Has Not Established Proper Controls Over Flight Gear

In April 1999, two CNP officers were injured in a helicopter crash because they were not wearing helmets. The CNP was unable to provide these individuals with helmets primarily because of inventory mismanagement by the CNP. NAS Bogota had provided the CNP with more helmets than the number of CNP positions requiring helmets, but because of poor controls over the distribution of helmets, the CNP had no helmets in its inventory to issue to these individuals. Although the CNP has recently taken steps to improve its control over helmets and other flight gear, we believe NAS Bogota must continue to closely monitor the CNP’s efforts in this critical area.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations  OIG recommends:

- INL perform an assessment of the increased eradication efforts in Putumayo and Caqueta, and work with the Central Intelligence Agency to reconcile the varying approaches to measuring coca cultivation and the impact of eradication.

- NAS Bogota closely monitor the CNP’s recent initiative to implement proper internal controls over flight gear.

Department Comments

We discussed our findings with INL and CIA officials and provided them with a draft version of the report. Where appropriate, we have incorporated their written comments throughout the text of the report. The full text of INL’s comments to the draft report is contained in Appendix B. We were unable to include the CIA’s written comments as an appendix due to the overall classification of the document.

INL noted that the report was not entirely accurate in its discussion of the UH-II helicopter configuration issue. For example, INL believes the report erroneously implied that INL/AD was acting in an advisory capacity to the CNP concerning the configuration of the UH-II helicopters. We modified the text to address INL’s concerns.
II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

On March 3, 1999, the Chairmen of the House Committees on International Relations and Government Reform requested that OIG review INL’s counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The committees were specifically concerned about the Department’s ability to implement an effective counternarcotics program in Colombia that would prevent illicit narcotics from entering the United States. OIG was asked to answer 21 questions related to the counternarcotics program in Colombia. The questions centered around five major areas: 1) the experience and training of NAS officers, 2) the chain of command at INL headquarters and NAS Bogota, 3) the costs and benefits of using American contractors in the eradication program, 4) the configuration of the B212 and UH-II helicopters, and 5) maintenance and safety issues related to the CNP Air Service. (See Appendix A for a complete list of the 21 questions posed by the congressional committees.)

In conducting this review we interviewed officials and reviewed records at INL headquarters, Embassy Bogota, and INL/AD headquarters at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. In addition, we met with members of the CNP, congressional staffers, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Crime and Narcotics Center. During the overseas fieldwork in Colombia, we also visited several of the field bases for the CNP eradication and interdiction missions.

To address the Congressional Committee’s request, we prepared individual responses to each of the 21 questions.

This review was conducted by OIG’s Consular Affairs and International Programs Division of the Office of Audits. Major contributors to this report were David Wise, division director; Max Aguilar, audit manager; Mike Capozzi, auditor-in-charge; Djenaba Kendrick, management analyst; and Robert Retka, consultant.
III. BACKGROUND

Colombia is the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a key supplier of heroin to the United States. Three quarters of the world’s cocaine supply is either produced in or transits Colombia.

The United States supports Colombian Government counternarcotics programs under provisions of the INCP. The INCP is authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291) and is administered by the Department. Within the Department, INL is responsible for INCP. To implement the INCP program, INL established field offices in 20 countries around the world. In most countries, these offices, known as NAS, are responsible mainly for narcotics control programs. The NAS at Embassy Bogota is the largest such field office in the world.

Colombia is also the largest recipient of U.S. counternarcotics assistance. Between FY 1972-97, INL provided more than $271 million in INCP support to Colombian efforts. In FY 1998, the annual level of support increased, with INL providing $43 million in INCP support, an additional $14 million for helicopter upgrades, approximately $21 million in aviation support, and $41 million in military equipment and services drawn from U.S. stockpiles. Support during FY 1999 grew even further, to a total of approximately $203 million, $96 million of which was earmarked for the provision of six Blackhawk helicopters to the CNP.

INL Efforts in Colombia

The primary focus of the Department’s counternarcotics programs is to stop the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. To accomplish this, INL supports two major counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. First, INL provides funding, guidance, and training to the CNP’s Antinarcotics Directorate. The majority of this funding is used to support the CNP’s Air Service. NAS Bogota works with the CNP to improve its ability to eradicate drug crops, disrupt trafficker organizations, and interdict shipments of precursor chemicals and finished drugs such as cocaine. Support is also provided to the National Narcotics Directorate, the National Plan for Alternative Development, elements of the military involved in counternarcotics activity, and other Colombian Government entities such as the Civil Aviation Administration. The CNP Air Service is currently comprised of 65 rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and approximately 1,000 pilots, mechanics, and support personnel.

In addition to supporting the CNP’s Air Service, INL funds and operates its own Air Wing in Colombia. The INL Air Wing, which is primarily made up of U.S. contractor personnel, is responsible for assisting the CNP Air Service in eradication and interdiction missions. Currently, the INL Air Wing is concentrating its efforts on coca eradication while the CNP Air Service focuses on opium poppy eradication. To perform these missions, INL maintains an Air Wing of approximately 23 rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The U.S. contractor, Dyncorp, has a resident site manager, 43 permanent staff in Bogota, and 65-70 rotating temporary staff. Additional Dyncorp personnel rotate in and
Two INL/AD aviation advisers stationed in Colombia oversee Dyncorp activities, monitor use of INL/AD aircraft, and coordinate with NAS Bogota.

During FY 1997, INL increased the number of American contractors and aircraft involved in the aerial eradication program. According to senior INL officials, additional American contractors were needed to improve the CNP’s eradication results of 1995 and 1996. During this time, INL increased significantly the assignment of aircraft to assist the CNP and the role of the contractor also changed from being primarily responsible for training Colombian pilots and mechanics, to directly maintaining the aircraft and actively participating in planning and conducting eradication operations. NAS Bogota and INL/AD are currently placing increasing emphasis on the nationalization of the eradication program with the goal of turning over full responsibility for these operations to the CNP. The nationalization plan includes a 3 year goal for phasing out U.S. contractor support.
IV. FINDINGS

Question 1: What kind of expertise should INL be looking for in the hiring of potential NAS officers for service abroad? Should it require some law enforcement, military, procurement, or intelligence backgrounds?

Based on our review of the counternarcotics program in Colombia, diplomatic and program management skills are the most essential qualifications needed by NAS officers. Although law enforcement, military, procurement, and intelligence backgrounds may be desirable for NAS officers, with the possible exception of procurement, they are not the principal focus of NAS work. Requiring NAS officers to have these backgrounds would severely limit the pool of candidates for these positions. When specialized expertise is needed to meet program requirements, INL should continue its policy of hiring qualified contract advisers. The current advisers to NAS Bogota have military, procurement, and aviation expertise. To date, NAS Bogota has not needed to hire advisers with law enforcement or intelligence expertise. When such expertise is needed, the NAS can call upon law enforcement and intelligence resources available from other agencies within Embassy Bogota.

Background

The Department manages the INCP using a mix of Civil Service, Foreign Service, and contract personnel. Overseas, NAS staffing includes Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service nationals, and individual contractors hired under personal service agreements. Foreign Service personnel procedures are used to select direct-hire American officers for INL positions overseas. When a NAS needs special technical expertise, the Department hires technical advisers on contract. Examples of technical experts hired on contract are pilots, aviation maintenance technicians, field advisers, and logistics management specialists.

Program Management Skills Needed by NAS Officers

Program management and diplomatic skills are the qualifications most needed by NAS officers. Need for these skills flows directly from their principal responsibilities.

NAS officers are responsible for managing a variety of bilateral projects with the host country. These range from drug demand reduction to the eradication of illicit crops. In managing these projects, NAS officers procure, deliver, and monitor significant amounts of program commodities and services each year. Consequently, it is important for NAS officers either to have a strong background in or receive specialized training in such areas of program management as financial administration, procurement, internal controls, and end-use monitoring.

Diplomatic skills and are an essential requirement for NAS officers. For example, they must advise embassy management on counternarcotics issues and report regularly to the Department. They must also manage the day-to-day diplomatic contact with host
government officials, influential organizations, the media, and private sector leaders on counternarcotics issues. It is the NAS officer’s responsibility to help advance U.S. drug policy objectives with all of these groups. NAS officers are also required to be familiar with the full range of bilateral narcotics control issues.

**Need for Law Enforcement, Military, Procurement, or Intelligence Backgrounds**

Although a law enforcement, military, procurement, or intelligence background might be desirable for NAS officers, they are not, with the exception of procurement expertise, essential skills, because the primary mission of the NAS is to administer counternarcotics assistance to host governments. Requiring NAS officers to have such backgrounds would unnecessarily limit the pool of Foreign Service officer candidates for INL work overseas. That pool is already limited to Foreign Service officers who bid on INL jobs. Establishing additional background preconditions would further limit the pool of eligible candidates.

INL should regard prior law enforcement, military, or intelligence experience as desirable but not required. INL should actively recruit officers having program management experience, especially in the areas of financial administration and procurement. When officers having these skills are not available, the bureau should improve its training of officers new to NAS work to ensure that they receive, prior to their arrival at post, basic training in the program management skills they will need (see discussion of related training issues under Question 2).

Where NAS officers do not have the specialized expertise to meet specific program requirements, the bureau should continue to contract with appropriately qualified advisers. INL agreed with this view, stating that although experience in law enforcement and/or the military might be useful in some programs, it is not necessary for NAS officer to have such backgrounds due to the many sources of technical assistance available to a NAS.

Our review of NAS Bogota programs and staffing indicated that INL has been able to recruit experienced officers. Both the NAS director and deputy director administered smaller NAS programs before being assigned to Bogota. Another NAS officer is an experienced Foreign Service administrative officer. These direct-hire personnel are supported by four highly qualified aviation advisers with special expertise in maintenance, logistics, and operations. At the time of our review, one adviser had over 29 years of aviation experience and 7,800 hours of actual flight time. Another adviser had over 20 years of maintenance experience in the U.S. Army. The advisers provide the NAS with essential aviation experience unavailable from within the Department.
**Question 2:** What kind of training should be mandated beyond the two weeks on-the-job training that INL now offers its NAS officials before they go abroad?

There is no 2-week, on-the-job training program. The only training that INL offers is an annual 1-week classroom-based course provided to officers before they begin their NAS assignments. This is supplemented by field assistance visits conducted by INL headquarters staff. INL could improve its training by increase the frequency of its field assistance visits to NAS offices.

**INL Training**

NAS direct-hire officers are recruited from the Foreign Service generalist corps. Some of the responsibilities of NAS officers, such as reporting on narcotics program developments and bilateral drug issues, are similar to those of other Foreign Service officers and do not require specialized training. NAS officers also manage bilateral assistance programs funded under provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. Administration of these programs involves financial management and procurement procedures and regulations beyond those typically used by the Department. As indicated in our response to Question 1, some officers who have not previously served in a NAS will need special training in these areas.

To meet the special information needs of new NAS officers, INL conducts an annual 1-week classroom-based training program that provides information about INL and NAS work. Foreign Service officers newly assigned to NAS positions generally take the course before beginning their assignments. INL headquarters staff also provide follow-up through field assistance visits to NAS programs. The classroom training provides a general introduction to INL management policies and practices. The field assistance visits focus on specific NAS management issues and problems.

In 1999, INL provided 1-week of classroom training for 23 Department and 5 Office of National Drug Control Policy personnel. The training included two distinct audiences – officers assigned to work overseas and those assigned to headquarters. Of the 23 participants, 6 were officers who were beginning various NAS assignments overseas. We found that the 1-week of classroom training provided NAS officers with an adequate introduction to INL, U.S. counternarcotics and anticrime objectives, and INL programs overseas.

**Field Assistance Visits**

According to INL, field assistance visits to overseas posts complement the classroom training. A former NAS director who now coordinates INL’s annual training program found these visits very useful because they focused specifically on issues affecting his program. We do not believe INL’s field assistance program, as currently implemented, is an effective training tool because INL has not been able to visit every NAS. In FY 1998, for example, INL visited only 5 of 15 overseas offices that had resident NAS direct-hire officers. In FY 1999, INL visited only 7 of the 15 offices. A
previous OIG report\(^1\) urged INL to increase the number of field assistance visits each year. If INL cannot visit every NAS each year, we believe, as recommended below, that it should focus its field assistance visits each year on those locations where officers have been newly assigned.

We believe the classroom training provided to new NAS officers should be reinforced by a follow-up field assistance visit 6 – 12 months later. This will give new officers a chance to seek guidance and additional training on problems they encounter in their specific assignments.

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs conduct annual field assistance visits at posts to which new Narcotics Affairs Section officers are assigned.

INL agreed with the recommendation and commented that it will make every effort to schedule field visits within 6 – 12 months of the arrival of a new NAS chief or, in the case of a larger post, the administrative officer.

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Question 3: The INL air wing is run from Patrick Air Force base in Florida. What is the chain of command between Patrick Air Force base and the NAS officer on the ground in Colombia as well as the INL headquarters in Washington?

Question 4: What is the relationship between the NAS officer in Colombia and the INL air wing? Who does oversight and budget control over the Dyncorp contractor who runs and maintains the INL air wing in Colombia?

INL supports Colombian counternarcotics efforts through two separate but related programs. NAS Bogota administers INL-funded projects that provide material and technical support to CNP counternarcotics activities. INL/AD provides aircraft and personnel, through its contractor, Dyncorp for its own Air Wing to conduct joint operations with the CNP for aerial eradication of drug crops in Colombia. Parallel chains of command govern the two programs. NAS Bogota reports to the Office of Latin American Programs in INL. INL/AD, headquartered at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida, reports directly to INL’s Assistant Secretary. INL/AD and Dyncorp officials coordinate closely with NAS Bogota, the Ambassador and the NAS director have final decisionmaking authority over all counternarcotics activities in Colombia. INL/AD contracting personnel at Patrick Air Force Base exercise budget control and technical oversight over Dyncorp.

Relationship Between NAS Bogota and INL/AD

NAS Bogota and INL/AD both support CNP drug crop eradication activities. The NAS director makes on-the-ground decisions about the program, and the Ambassador has the final say over what will be done in-country. On-the-ground decisions are made in a team environment with NAS Bogota taking INL/AD’s opinion into account. Both NAS Bogota and INL/AD, including personnel at Patrick Air Force Base and Colombia, stated that their offices have a good working relationship in Colombia. NAS staff meet regularly with the two resident INL/AD aviation advisers, who are responsible for overseeing the American contractor.

NAS Bogota and the Embassy control INL/AD assets and personnel indirectly by managing program policy and by using country clearance authorities. Principal NAS and INL/AD officers supporting the Colombian counternarcotics activities know each other well, having worked together in the past. This familiarity has helped them resolve disagreements over program implementation.

The relationship and chain-of-command between NAS Bogota and INL/AD is clearly illustrated by events that followed the July 1998 crash that killed two American pilots. The NAS director and the head of INL/AD disagreed strongly about how to proceed with the recovery of aircrew members. The latter wished to follow standard operating procedures and deploy a search and rescue team immediately in order to recover the pilots. The NAS director disagreed, citing witness accounts of how the aircraft had hit the ground, the low probability of pilot survival, and a strong guerilla
presence in the area. The Ambassador agreed with the NAS director and they decided to postpone search and rescue operations until the following day when the NAS director could be there in person. Although INL/AD disagreed with this decision, it was understood that the Ambassador had the final decisionmaking authority. Subsequent to the accident investigation, INL/AD agreed with NAS Bogota and decided all future decisions would be made on the ground where the operational situation is known best.

**Reporting to INL Headquarters**

NAS Bogota reports to the Office of Latin American Programs (INL/LP) in headquarters. INL/AD, headquartered at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida, reports directly to the Assistant Secretary for INL. With the exception of INL/LP, the consensus is that the chain-of-command among NAS Bogota, INL/AD, and INL headquarters is working as intended. The Office of Latin American Programs believes it is inappropriate for INL/AD to report directly to the Assistant Secretary. However, INL/LP was unable to cite any specific problems that occurred because of the current chain-of-command. INL/LP would prefer INL/AD to report to the Assistant Secretary through INL/LP. Nevertheless, INL’s Assistant Secretary supports the existing chain-of-command.

**Contractor Oversight**

Technical oversight and budget control over Dyncorp is performed primarily by INL/AD personnel at Patrick Air Force Base and NAS Bogota. INL/AD’s contracting officer representative at Patrick Air Force Base performs oversight of the contract. However, the contracting officer representative relies primarily on the INL/AD structure including two INL/AD aviation advisers in Colombia to provide daily monitoring, oversight, evaluation, and guidance related to contractor activities. The U.S. contractor is responsible for controlling and reporting contract costs in accordance with specific contract requirements. In addition to INL/AD staff at Patrick Air Force Base, INL personnel in Washington exercise budgetary control over the contract by monitoring contractor cost reports and invoices.

**Conclusion**

Although INL maintains parallel chains of command with its two subordinate offices that support CNP eradication activities, a single functional command structure governs actual U.S. operations in Colombia. As with other U.S. programs, the Ambassador has final oversight and decisionmaking authority. Based on our review of operations in Colombia, we see no reason to recommend changing the current chain-of-command arrangements.
Question 5: Assistant Secretary for INL, Mr. Gelbard, a few years ago decided to increase the American role (Dyncorp) in the eradication program in Colombia: What was the cost of that effort?

We were unable to determine an exact cost for the increased American eradication role in Colombia because INL accounting systems do not track program expenditures in a manner that allows precise reconstruction of these costs. However, based on INL/AD-provided cost estimates for the INL Air Wing during FY 1997-99 and program funding data from NAS Bogota, OIG estimates that the expanded American eradication effort in Colombia during FY 1997-99 cost approximately $106.8 million. This includes $24.4 million in FY 1997, $47 million in FY 1998 and $35.4 million in FY 1999.

Colombia Eradication Program Costs Not Readily Identifiable

INL/AD and NAS Bogota both incur eradication program costs in Colombia. We were unable to identify actual costs related to the expanded American eradication role in both offices. For example, prior to February 1, 1998, INL/AD support costs were not charged directly to a country-specific program such as Colombia. In addition, INL/AD contract cost-reporting periods do not correspond with fiscal years, making it difficult to align costs with standard cost accounting time frames. Distinct INL/AD contract periods during FY 1997-99 also complicated cost allocation, as did a change in the contract line item numbering system used during the period under study. Despite these difficulties, INL/AD was able to provide estimates of the contract costs related to the American contractors expanded role in Colombia during the FY 1997-99 time frame.

Similarly, we were unable to identify specific program expenditures made by NAS Bogota. For example, the NAS tracked funding for support of rotary-wing aircraft and aviation fuel, but did not monitor how much of this funding related to eradication operations as opposed to interdiction or other counternarcotics efforts. In addition, the purchase of herbicide was a separate line item in the budget that related to the eradication program, but it was not clear what proportion of these costs related to the increased American role. The NAS funding data also did not systematically separate the costs of CNP eradication activities from those of Dyncorp.

Cost Estimates

We estimated the total cost of the increased American presence by combining estimates of the contract costs incurred by INL for the Air Wing and the additional expenses incurred by NAS Bogota. Due to the problems identifying the expenses incurred by NAS Bogota, we estimated the additional costs by using FY 1996 funding for the CNP project as a baseline level. We then subtracted FY 1996 CNP funding from the corresponding figures for FY 1997-99 to obtain estimates of increased eradication program costs related to the expanded American role in eradication. The specific costs associated with the increased American presence are illustrated below.
<table>
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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>INL Air Wing Costs&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>$10.2 million&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$20.2 million</td>
<td>$26.8 million</td>
<td>$47 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$21.5 million</td>
<td>$13.9 million</td>
<td>$35.4 million</td>
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<sup>1</sup> The INL Air Wing costs for Colombia do not include a portion of the overhead or indirect costs associated with the services provided by Patrick Air Force Base, because there is no systematic way to allocate the costs incurred there.

<sup>2</sup> Actual program costs for the INL Air Wing were not available for the period October 1997 – January 1998. These costs were estimated by averaging the actual monthly contract costs from February – September 1998 and projecting them to the period October 1997 – January 1998.
Question 6: Today, Colombia has more coca production and the eradication of opium is down while the Colombians have gained dominance of the U.S. heroin market. How did we benefit by the injection of more Americans into Colombia?

The injection of more American personnel and aircraft into Colombia in late 1996 has resulted in a significant increase in the area of drug crops sprayed. Overall spraying increased from slightly over 28,000 hectares (one hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres) in 1995 to almost 71,000 hectares in 1998. Nevertheless, the impact of this increased spraying on illegal drug cultivation in Colombia is unclear. According to the CIA, total coca cultivation in Colombia has doubled since the beginning of the spray campaign. However, these estimates are disputed by the Department and the Colombian Government.

Furthermore, in a February 2000 review of U.S. Drug Control Efforts, the General Accounting Office noted that the Department’s counternarcotics efforts have had little measurable impact on the U.S. drug market, as Colombian cocaine and heroin continue to be readily available. This is discouraging because the ultimate goal of the eradication program is to reduce the availability of drugs in the United States. According to Department officials, the key component to reducing the coca cultivation in Colombia is full scale eradication in Putumayo. Senior Department officials believe the majority of Colombia’s increased coca cultivation has occurred in this area. To date, the Government of Colombia has not allowed full scale spraying in Putumayo.

Increased Spray Activity

Although year-to-year trends have been inconsistent, spraying of drug crops in Colombia generally increased between 1995 and 1999. Program statistics published by NAS Bogota and the Government of Colombia indicate a substantial increase in the area of coca and opium poppy sprayed after the injection of additional American personnel and equipment and a companion increase in effort by the CNP in late 1996.

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4 71,000 hectares sprayed does not equate to 71,000 hectares killed. The effectiveness of the spray program is affected by factors such as weather, pilot experience, and the location of the crop. Estimates of the effectiveness of the spray program range from less than 50 percent to as high as 90 percent.
5 GAO/NSIAD-00-90R U.S. Drug Control Efforts
Spraying of Drug Crops in Colombia: 1995 – 99 (hectares)\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coca</th>
<th>Opium Poppy(^7)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>24,046</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>19,306</td>
<td>6,893</td>
<td>26,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>41,847</td>
<td>6,935</td>
<td>48,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>67,950</td>
<td>3,012</td>
<td>70,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>43,111</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>51,312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CIA Estimates**

Despite increased spraying of coca and opium poppy fields in Colombia, CIA estimates\(^8\) indicate that coca cultivation in Colombia has increased each year since 1995, but opium cultivation has been generally stable. This data suggests that the spraying program has not dissuaded Colombian farmers from planting drug crops.

CIA Estimated Net Coca and Opium Poppy Cultivation in Colombia: 1995 – 99 (hectares)\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coca</th>
<th>Opium Poppy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50,900</td>
<td>6,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>67,200</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>101,800</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>122,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INL/AD officials dispute the CIA estimates of net coca and opium poppy cultivation figures, arguing that coca cultivation prior to the spray program was more extensive than the official estimates. The director of INL/AD estimated, based on overflights of the coca growing areas in Colombia, that in 1996 there were 230,000 hectares of coca in Colombia prior to the American expansion of the spray program as opposed to the CIA estimate of 67,200 hectares. In addition, INL staff have raised concerns about the accuracy of the methodology used by the CIA to estimate coca cultivation. More specifically, some INL staff have questioned the CIA’s ability to distinguish between healthy and dying coca during its analysis of satellite imagery. CIA

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\(^6\) Hectares sprayed are not the same as hectares killed. The effectiveness of the spray program is affected by numerous factors. Some of these include: weather, pilot expertise, and the size and location of the crop being sprayed.

\(^7\) Opium poppy can be harvested three times a year in Colombia and therefore must be sprayed as much as three times per year.

\(^8\) The Crime and Narcotics Center of the CIA is responsible for producing the official U.S. Government estimates of illicit drug cultivation overseas.
analysts disagree and believe their statistic-based methodology is providing accurate estimates of total coca cultivation.

INL is in the process of performing its own limited analysis of coca cultivation in Colombia. The analysis is being conducted with a multispectral imagery reconnaissance system but is focused on targeting for mission planning purposes. Currently, only 45 percent of the known growing regions and 20 percent of the entire country have been photographed and analyzed. INL/AD hopes to have the principal growing areas imaged and analyzed in the next 2 to 3 years.

**Impediments to Success**

The spray program in Colombia faces significant and continuing problems. First, the Colombian Government has been unwilling, so far, to allow full-scale spraying in Putumayo, an area in Southern Colombia where coca planting has increased most dramatically in recent years. The director of INL/AD believes the impact of the program will increase markedly if INL/AD is permitted to spray in Putumayo. Both INL and the Colombian Government point to reduced coca cultivation in the Guaviare area as evidence of success for the spray program. The next challenge, they argue, is to implement the program in Putumayo, an area that has not been the focus of major spraying to date.

Second, the program currently does not have enough aircraft and personnel to spray in all regions simultaneously. The former director of the CNP’s Directorate of Antinarcotics said the eradication program could have more impact if spraying took place in all coca and poppy producing areas simultaneously. These constraints allow coca growers to offset crops lost to eradication in one region by expanding production in areas where the spray program is not operating. The Administration’s “Plan Colombia,” if approved by Congress, would substantially increase support for the CNP’s counternarcotics efforts in Southern Colombia.

**Conclusion**

The impact of the spray program in Colombia is uncertain. CIA data indicates that the spray program may have moved cultivation from one region to another, and it is questionable whether the program is capable under its current geographical constraints of decreasing the supply of drugs from Colombia. There is considerable disagreement between CIA and the Department over the effectiveness of the current program. Plan Colombia would significantly increase the efforts in Southern Colombia. A thorough analysis of the impact of the eradication program will be needed after the increased spray efforts begin in Putumayo, to assess its long term viability. Such an analysis should be based on methodology that has general acceptance among the decisionmakers.
**Recommendation 2:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs perform an assessment of the increased eradication efforts in Putumayo and work with the Central Intelligence Agency to reconcile the varying approaches to measuring coca cultivation and the impact of eradication.

INL agreed with both parts of the recommendation and stated that it has been working with the Central Intelligence Agency to reconcile the varying approaches to measuring coca cultivation and the impact of eradication for the last year. The Central Intelligence Agency also stated that they have been working closely with the Department to improve the methodology for assessing eradication efforts. INL plans to formally assess the impact of the increased eradication efforts in Putumayo.
**Question 7:** What has the American presence done to morale in the CNP anti narcotics police who have the lead role in drug eradication?

**Question 8:** Has it been counterproductive to create and have two parallel organizations in Colombia (INL and CNP) involved in eradication?

Overall, the increased American contractor presence has had a positive impact on the CNP’s morale. Although there were some initial problems, both the American contractors and CNP personnel are currently committed to working together for a common mission. These initial problems are no longer an issue and coordination between the groups is good.

Further, it has not been counterproductive to have both INL and CNP involved in the eradication program. The influx of American contractors in early 1997 was necessary to support increased aircraft assignments and to meet the objective of increasing the number of hectares sprayed. In the process of achieving this goal, the American contractors have provided the CNP with much needed technical expertise in aerial eradication. According to CNP personnel, the involvement of INL and the American contractors has resulted in improved training for CNP pilot and maintenance personnel and a more effective eradication program.

**Initial Problems**

Language barriers, cultural differences, and job security were all issues that negatively affected the CNP’s morale during the 1997 influx of American contractors into the eradication program. According to both CNP personnel and American contractors, one of the biggest initial problems was the inability to communicate. Very few of the American contractors were proficient in Spanish and few of the CNP staff spoke English. In addition, there were cultural differences in the way the CNP personnel and the American contractors approached the eradication mission. According to NAS officials, the work habits of the CNP were not as structured or as disciplined as the American contractor. This cultural difference contributed to a strong feeling of displacement among the CNP staff, as some members of the CNP believed the increased American presence was diminishing the CNP’s role in the eradication program. The CNP staff were also unsure if they would continue to be an integral part of the eradication program. Over time, these concerns diminished.

**Current Situation**

The CNP morale has improved significantly since the influx of American contractors in 1997. According to working-, middle-, and senior-level CNP officials, morale among the CNP is good, and the CNP work together with the American contractors in a team environment. For example, the CNP participates in all search and rescue missions and provides helicopter support for the American pilots responsible for spraying coca. Furthermore, the American contractor has provided the CNP with valuable “hands on” expertise in pilot and helicopter maintenance training, mission
planning, and results measurement. There have also been several occasions when the American contractors have risked their lives to rescue CNP personnel from hostile situations.
Question 9: What was the main cause of the death of the several American pilots killed in Colombia?

Since the beginning of the Department’s counternarcotics program in Colombia, three American contractor pilots have been killed in aircraft accidents. The first accident occurred in January 1997 during a routine spray mission and resulted in the pilot being killed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the cause of the crash was pilot error. The second accident occurred during a training flight in July 1998 and resulted in the death of two pilots. Despite an investigation by NTSB, the cause of the accident is still uncertain.

January 1997 Accident

In response to an April 1997 request from Congressman Dave Weldon of Florida, OIG had already reviewed the events surrounding this accident. During our current review, we sought additional information. We found none.

According to the accident report, the January 1997 crash resulted from inadvertent contact with a 100 foot tall tree located along the flight route. The circumstances surrounding the first accident were as follows. There was no hostile fire involved in the crash. The aircraft’s right wing hit a tree that was above the normal tree line. Afterwards, the pilot lost control and the aircraft did a nose dive into the ground at a near vertical angle approximately 125 feet from tree impact. The aircraft speed was over 196 miles an hour on impact. The aircraft disintegrated on impact, killing the pilot. The cause of the accident was determined to be pilot error. According to the accident report, all operations were normal when the flight took off.

The crash investigation report revealed two significant factors that may have contributed to the crash. First, the speed of the aircraft was in excess of normal spray operations. Second, the coca field being sprayed had a slightly rising terrain in the direction of travel. This would make it more difficult for the pilot to notice a tree that was above the normal tree line.

July 1998 Accident

Based on the investigation conducted by NTSB, the circumstances surrounding the July 1998 crash are not as clear. The two pilots were on a training flight and all operations were normal when the pilots made their first flight call to the command and control center. The flight instructor stated he would keep them posted on the flight’s progress. This was the last contact made with the command and control center during the flight. The plane was found the next morning, inverted and embedded into the ground. There were no mechanical problems linked to the aircraft and everything was in working order. Even after an investigation, the official cause of the accident is uncertain.

As noted in the accident report, before the flight, the pilots committed serious breaches in flight protocol. For example, they did not file a flight plan or coordinate with
the command and control center before take off. They discussed the training flight only with the maintenance crew before departure. In addition, they did not advise the forward operating location’s site manager of the flight that afternoon. It is unclear why the command and control center did not terminate the flight upon discovering that a flight plan had not been filed.
Question 10: What is the status of repair and maintenance of the INL Air Wing in Colombia, and how does it compare to the CNP aircraft?

The INL Air Wing and CNP Air Service operate separately and maintain their own fleets of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in Colombia. The INL Air Wing has 23 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and the CNP Air Service has 65. During 1998 and 1999, the INL Air Wing maintained an average operational readiness rate of 85.5 percent for its aircraft. During the same period the CNP maintained an average operational readiness rate of 64.5 percent. The average operational readiness rate for U.S. military aircraft similar to that used in Colombia is 80 percent. The difference in operational rates is attributable to various factors, including (1) the quality and experience level of the working and midlevel maintenance personnel of the two groups, (2) the management of CNP contract mechanics and maintenance schedules, and (3) the availability of aircraft spare parts for the two groups.

Experience Levels of Maintenance Personnel

The most critical factor affecting the difference in operational readiness rates between the INL Air Wing and CNP Air Service is the experience level of the personnel involved in aircraft repair and maintenance management. Other factors include the CNP’s rotation policy and a shorter work week.

INL Mechanics

The INL Air Wing currently employs about 55 American contract mechanics to maintain its 23 rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The INL Air Wing contract mechanics are typically former U.S. military personnel with many years of experience maintaining similar aircraft. In addition to their extensive work experience, INL’s contract with the mechanics is written in such a manner that if they do not maintain the aircraft to agreed-upon specifications, they will lose their job. Consequently, the INL contract mechanics are motivated to perform their work in an efficient and effective manner. According to a NAS official, this is one of the biggest differences between the INL and CNP mechanics.

CNP Mechanics

In contrast to the extensive experience of the INL mechanics, the CNP has a large number of inexperienced maintenance personnel. Out of a total of 338 maintenance personnel, there are currently 100 CNP mechanic trainees. According to a NAS official, it will take 3 to 4 years before these entry-level mechanics will become productive journeyman mechanics.

Another factor that negatively impacts the CNP’s operational readiness rate is that it is not unusual for the CNP to rotate its more experienced personnel into other areas of the CNP in order to provide developmental opportunities. This policy makes it very difficult to maintain a skilled workforce and requires the CNP to constantly be in a training mode. Finally, the CNP mechanics do not work as many hours each week as
their American counterparts. On average, the CNP mechanics work 31 hours a week while the INL mechanics are required to work 40 hours a week.

In order for the CNP to meet its maintenance requirements, it has had to hire Colombian civilian contractor mechanics to fill the void left by the CNP uniformed mechanics. Similar to the INL contract mechanics, the Colombian civilian contractors often have many years of experience working in the Colombian military. The Colombian contractors are regarded by the American contractor mechanics and the NAS maintenance personnel as being highly skilled and essential to the CNP maintenance function. They were responsible for identifying numerous deficiencies in the UH-IIs that were refurbished by U.S. Helicopter. One NAS official estimated that the 59 Colombian contractor mechanics perform 60 percent of the CNP’s maintenance workload.

Management of Contract Mechanics

Although the Colombian contractors provide a valuable resource to the CNP, they are not properly managed. For example, the Colombian Government requires that government contractors be awarded certain benefits like vacation and insurance if employed year round. To avoid these payments, the CNP temporarily lays off all the Colombian contractor mechanics for 30 – 40 days at the end of each year. Although this policy saves a few dollars in the short term, the maintenance of the CNP’s aircraft suffers. During the 1998 lay off, none of the aircraft being repaired left the maintenance facility. Although the NAS has brought this problem to the attention of the CNP, the CNP has not changed its policy. We believe this policy is detrimental to the program and that the NAS should raise this issue to higher levels of CNP management. The financial implications of eliminating this policy should be lessened with additional resources from Plan Colombia.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota work with the Colombian National Police at the necessary senior management levels to eliminate the policy of temporarily laying off the Colombian contract mechanics each year.

INL agreed with the recommendation and stated it is currently taking the necessary steps to eliminate this problem.

Management of Maintenance Schedules

The CNP also needs to improve the way it manages flight hours and maintenance schedules. For example, when the CNP received the six B-212 helicopters from INL in October 1998, the CNP needed to manage the flight hours so that only one of the helicopters would be in maintenance at any given time. Although the NAS emphasized the importance of properly managing the maintenance schedules of these aircraft, the CNP was not able to implement an appropriate management schedule and, instead, had multiple aircraft in maintenance at the same time. According to the NAS, this kind of
management will negatively impact operational readiness rates regardless of the quality of the maintenance personnel.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota continue to work with the Colombian National Police to better manage aircraft maintenance schedules.

INL concurred with this recommendation.

**Availability of Spare Parts**

The availability of spare parts is another factor that contributes to the difference in operational readiness rates between the INL Air Wing and CNP Air Service. The INL Air Wing maintains appropriate levels of inventory to meet operational demands and is able to procure parts faster than the CNP. Ultimately this results in the INL Air Wing having fewer aircraft grounded because of a lack of parts. During 1998 and 1999, the number of CNP aircraft grounded due to supply problems was twice as much as that for the INL Air Wing. The rates were 10.8 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively.

**Inadequate Supply of Parts**

Inadequate funding for CNP spare parts has not permitted the CNP to maintain an adequate supply of aircraft parts. At the beginning of FY 1999, the CNP was already in need of additional parts for the six B-212s and 14 UH-1Hs that it was operating. At that time, NAS Bogota budgeted $1 million in its FY 1999 budget for parts replenishment. However, due to a severe reduction in the budget made by INL, NAS Bogota was unable to fund the parts. NAS Bogota’s FY 1999 budget was reduced from $45 million to $32.7 million. According to a senior INL official, INL reduced NAS Bogota’s budget to fund other counternarcotics programs. One of the primary reasons why INL reduced NAS Bogota’s FY 1999 base funding was because it would be offset by the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation, which provided an additional $173 million for the counternarcotics program in Bogota.

In October 1998, the CNP received 6 additional B-212 helicopters from INL, which effectively doubled the fleet of B-212s. Although these aircraft were in flyable condition, they were older aircraft that required many spare parts. INL did not provide the CNP with a parts support package for the B-212s. Consequently, the B-212s further depleted the CNP’s already low inventory of parts. Compounding this problem was the arrival of the six UH-IIs during the first 8 months of 1999. These aircraft use many of the same parts as the B-212s, and like the B-212s, neither a parts support package or additional funding for parts was provided with the aircraft.

NAS Bogota budgeted $1.25 million out of its $50 million FY 2000 budget to replenish the CNP’s low inventory of B-212 spare parts. However, as of February 2000, INL had not provided NAS Bogota with the funding. According to a senior INL official, this was due to several continuing resolutions and a 2 month delay in the submission of
the Department’s spending plan to Congress. Furthermore, NAS Bogota did not request any of the $6 million allocated to CNP operations and support in the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation be used to replenish low inventory levels. Instead, this money was used to modify two C-26 fixed-wing aircraft with airborne surveillance sensors. Consequently, no parts have been ordered to replenish the low inventory levels that were identified over 18 months ago, despite a 63 percent increase in the number of helicopters.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota ensure sufficient spare parts are provided to the Colombian National Police for any future aircraft used to support this program.

INL agreed with the recommendation, but disagreed with some of the supporting information. We modified the text to address INL’s concerns.
**Question 11:** How much more must we pay Dyncorp employees versus having the CNP do the job?

American contractor pilots and mechanics are paid [(b)(4)------------------] more than the Colombian contractors employed by the CNP. Since their skill levels and productivity are fairly comparable, we compared the costs of the American contractors to the Colombian contractors and not to the CNP uniformed mechanics. The skill level of the uniformed CNP mechanics is not comparable to the American contractor mechanics and there are currently no active CNP fixed-wing pilots. Furthermore, a cost comparison to the uniformed CNP mechanics is difficult because the salary levels fluctuate significantly based on the rank, age, and experience level of the individual.

Based on data received from INL, contract salary rates for American personnel and actual salary payments to Colombian contractors, we have summarized the salary costs as follows (all figures are in U.S. dollars):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>American Contractor (Dyncorp)</th>
<th>CNP Hired Colombian Contractors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-Wing Pilot</td>
<td>[(b)(4)----]</td>
<td>[(b)(4)----]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary-Wing Pilot</td>
<td>[(b)(4)----]</td>
<td>[(b)(4)----]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td>[(b)(4)----]</td>
<td>[(b)(4)----]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the costs of the American contractors include the base salary plus [(b)(4)----] for other expenses. Some of these include (1) danger pay and post differential for the time the contractors are actually working in Colombia, (2) fringe benefits, (3) overhead, (4) administrative expenses, and (5) award fee expenses. Fringe benefits include the cost of company paid insurance, FICA, unemployment, vacation and sick leave. Overhead expenses include various operating expenses of the contractor, such as utilities and real property. Administrative expenses include the personnel costs to administer the contract.

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9 Dyncorp also hires non-Americans for some of its mechanic and pilot positions. For example, Dyncorp employs several Colombian contractor fixed-wing pilots.

10 Salaries for Colombian contract mechanics and pilots do not include costs for benefits such as vacation, sick leave, or health insurance. The CNP does not provide their contract personnel with such benefits. In addition, the CNP contract personnel generally work about 11 months (see Question 10 and Recommendation 4).
Question 12: What has been the annual cost of providing housing and security for these American employees versus having CNP policemen perform the same functions?

The housing costs for American contractors in Colombia consist of two distinct parts. The first is the living quarters allowance for the 42 permanent contractors living in Bogota. This cost is part of the contract with DynCorp and is budgeted at approximately $335,000 per year. The second part is funded by NAS Bogota and includes the cost to provide housing facilities at the forward operating locations for the 122 contractors who rotate to and from the field every few weeks. According to NAS Bogota records, the average annual cost for this housing during FY 1998-99 was approximately $138,000.

The security costs associated with having American contractors involved in the counternarcotics program is far more difficult to determine. Many of the security improvements that were made as a result of stationing Americans at the forward operating locations were basic security improvements that were necessary regardless of whether American contractors or CNP personnel were performing the operation. Since FY 1997, the NAS has spent approximately $97,000 on security improvements at the locations where American contractors are housed.

Housing Costs

During FY 1999, approximately $300,000 was spent on living quarters allowance for the 42 permanent contractors that are stationed in Bogota, Colombia. This cost would be eliminated if the CNP were to take over the responsibilities of the American contractor.

Since the influx of the American contractors in 1997, the most significant housing costs for the rotational staff have been the construction of two 40 – person dormitories at the San Jose del Guaviarre forward operating location. The cost to build these units was approximately $140,000. Building this housing for the American contractors as opposed to CNP personnel increased the costs by approximately 50 percent because the American contractors prefer to have semiprivate rooms (four to six beds per room) with air conditioning. Semiprivate rooms require twice as much space for construction. In addition, air conditioning is not typically provided to CNP personnel.

The NAS has not had to construct housing units at any of the six other forward operating locations. For the American contractors stationed at Larandia, the Colombian military allows the NAS to use four of its houses. In exchange for this, the NAS pays for the maintenance of these houses. For the other forward operating locations, the CNP has provided temporary housing free of charge when American contractors have needed to stay at them. For FY 1998 and FY 1999 the costs to maintain the housing for the personnel in San Jose del Guaviarre and Larandia were approximately $138,000 per year.
**Security Costs**

Since the influx of American contractors in 1997, NAS Bogota has spent approximately $97,000 from its budget on security improvements at the forward operating locations where Americans are housed. This does not include any of the $6 million from the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation that was allocated for security improvements. The types of improvements made were basic security measures that were necessary regardless of whether American contractors or the CNP were performing the eradication mission. A few examples of these include clearing brush from the perimeters, filling sandbags for a perimeter defense, and installing barbed wire. A lack of basic security measures facilitated the October 1998 guerilla attack and takeover of the CNP base at Miraflores, which resulted in numerous casualties. The U.S. Congress recognized this and allocated $6 million in the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation for additional security improvements.
Question 13: Why did the last three INL helicopters that arrived in Colombia (UH1Ns) come properly equipped with all the right configurations from U.S. Helicopter in Alabama, while the UH-IIIs for the police did not have the same proper configurations, including no auxiliary fuel tank, mini-gun wiring, and movement of the mini-gun structural mounts forward for installation of the auxiliary fuel tank?

Question 14: Was the CNP consulted in the configuration of the UH-IIIs? If not, why not, especially since these choppers are used in combat and their range was an important consideration in their purchase?

Question 15: Why did the INL helicopters come properly configured; is there lack of coordination between NAS, Dyncorp, and the CNP in Colombia?

Both the UH-1N helicopters for INL and the UH-II helicopters for the CNP were delivered by U.S. Helicopter with configurations that were originally specified by both parties in the contracting process. The primary reason the UH-II helicopters were not configured in the same manner as the UH-1Ns is that the CNP did not request these options at the beginning of the refurbishment process. NAS Bogota met with the CNP on several occasions about the standard configuration of the UH-II. However, NAS Bogota never suggested or advised the CNP to consider additional modifications such as auxiliary fuel tanks or forward mounting hardpoints. We believe both NAS Bogota and INL should have taken a more proactive role in assisting the CNP to identify desirable modifications to the standard UH-II configuration. In addition, NAS Bogota and INL should have ensured that the CNP received a parts support package for the UH-IIIs and B-212s. Coordination among NAS Bogota, INL, and the CNP should have been better.

UH-1N Configuration

Between December 1998 and February 1999, INL sent a total of six UH-1N helicopters to its Air Wing in Colombia. These aircraft replaced the six B-212 helicopters that the INL Air Wing transferred to the CNP in October 1998. The first three arrived in December 1998, and the second three arrived in February 1999. The UH-1N helicopters were configured by INL so that they would serve as appropriate replacements for the B-212s, which were used for search and rescue missions. In addition to a more advanced avionics package, the configuration included auxiliary fuel tanks because of the need to travel longer distances. The UH-1N and B-212 airframes standard configuration includes all necessary plumbing and electrical connections for auxiliary fuel tanks, and forward mounting structural hard points that allow machine guns to be mounted in front of the auxiliary fuel tanks. In contrast, the UH-II standard configuration does not include forward mounting structural hard points which are necessary for the use of miniguns with auxiliary fuel tanks. The UH-II standard configuration includes all the necessary plumbing and electrical connections for auxiliary fuel tanks.
**UH-II Configuration**

The primary reason why the two UH-IIs that arrived in Colombia in February 1999 for the CNP did not have auxiliary fuel tanks or the forward mounting structural hard points is that the CNP did not request these items until the first two UH-II helicopters were delivered in February 1999. Upon receiving the requests, the NAS and INL worked with the CNP to meet its needs for all future UH-IIs. At that time, the CNP was scheduled to receive 8 more UH-IIs in 1999 and an additional 15 UH-IIs in 2000. Although the NAS and INL worked with the CNP and U.S. Helicopter on this issue, the four UH-IIs received in August 1999 did not come equipped with the forward mounting hard points or auxiliary fuel tanks. This was because the forward mounting hard points were not a standard modification practice on the UH-II. This caused delays because U.S. Helicopter was uncertain how to proceed with the modification.

In April 1999, the NAS maintenance adviser in Bogota was able to provide U.S. Helicopter with documentation illustrating the proper installation of the hard points. This allowed U.S. Helicopter to begin installing the hard points. However, it was too late in the refurbishment process to install the hard points on the UH-IIs that were scheduled to arrive in August 1999. In order to prevent additional delays in the delivery of these helicopters, the CNP agreed to perform these modifications in Colombia after taking delivery of them in August 1999. The CNP successfully made these modifications to the first six UH-IIs to arrive in Colombia. All UH-IIs received by the CNP after August 1999 have had the forward mounting hard points installed.

The CNP and NAS decided it would be more efficient for the CNP to install the auxiliary fuel tanks themselves. The CNP already had eight auxiliary fuel tank kits in its inventory, at a cost of approximately $28,500 each, and the UH-II standard configuration included all the necessary plumbing and electrical connections. This decision resulted in both time and cost savings. Because of this, the CNP will continue to install the auxiliary fuel tanks on all future UH-IIs.

It should be noted that the UH-IIs were delivered with the necessary wiring for the miniguns. The CNP requested this modification after a September 1998 visit to U.S. Helicopter, the contractor who was responsible for performing the UH-II modifications. At that time, the CNP requested grease type main rotor hubs and dual electrical fuel pump boosts be installed in the UH-IIs. INL and the NAS added these requirements to the contract with U.S. Helicopter and all of the UH-IIs delivered to Colombia have included these items.

**Poor Communication with the CNP**

Although the NAS had regular meetings with members of the CNP Air Service to discuss the details of the UH-II project, more should have been done to ensure that the operational needs of the CNP would be met. Both the NAS and INL should have been more proactive in suggesting to the CNP the best possible configuration for the UH-IIs. Neither NAS Bogota nor INL suggested that the CNP consider installing auxiliary fuel
tanks or additional minigun mounts on the UH-IIs. This is particularly puzzling because in 1997, INL/AD requested auxiliary fuel tanks and additional minigun mounts on its own UH-1H helicopters that were going to be used as escort helicopters in Colombia, the same function for which the CNP is using the UH-IIs. A senior INL/AD official stated that INL/AD viewed its job to facilitate, in a nonadvisory capacity, the contracting process with U.S. Helicopter, not to identify performance specifications for the CNP. We believe it was inappropriate for INL/AD to ensure that its own helicopters were configured to such desirable specifications and not advise the CNP to configure its helicopters in an equivalent manner.

In addition to not working with the CNP to establish configuration specifications, poor communication between NAS Bogota, INL, and the CNP resulted in the first nine UH-IIs being procured and delivered to the CNP without a parts support package. Because a parts support package was not considered at the time the Department purchased the UH-II upgrade kits from Bell Helicopter, the CNP encountered excessive lead times and delays in trying to procure UH-II parts. For example, in November 1998, NAS Bogota ordered over $900,000 of spare parts, which were still not delivered as of September 1999. In another example, one of the UH-IIs in Colombia was grounded because of a faulty exhaust temperature indicator gauge. A 201 day lead time exists for the replacement part.

NAS Bogota and INL also allowed the transfer of six B-212 helicopters to the CNP in October 1998 without an accompanying parts support package. Although NAS Bogota inquired with INL about the possibility of a parts support package, none was provided and the NAS did not pursue the issue. A senior INL official stated that INL/AD did not want to transfer a parts package with the B-212s because INL planned to use these parts on the INL Air Wing UH-1Ns that were scheduled to replace the B-212s given to the CNP. This decision had a major impact on the CNP as each of the B-212s received from INL consumed numerous parts for both routine maintenance and unexpected repairs. These repairs further depleted the CNP’s already low inventory levels. NAS Bogota should have insisted that INL provide the CNP with an adequate supply of parts. The failure to do this resulted in unnecessary aircraft downtime.

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota establish a process to ensure that helicopters intended for the CNP are appropriately configured and supported.

INL concurred with the recommendation, but questioned the accuracy of some of the supporting information cited in the report. For example, INL noted that the report erroneously implied that INL/AD was acting in an advisory capacity to the CNP regarding the configuration of the UH-II helicopters. We modified the text to address INL’s concerns.
**Question 16:** What will it now cost the U.S. taxpayer to get these UH-IIIs configured right on the ground in Colombia, versus doing it first at U.S. helicopter in Alabama?

The UH-IIIs in Colombia have been configured to the specifications of the CNP. Based on the labor and materials used to configure the first six UH-IIIs, it was less expensive to perform the work in Colombia than it would have been to have U.S. Helicopter perform the work initially. This is largely due to the lower labor costs in Colombia and the NAS’s ability to procure components at lower costs through the use of Foreign Military Sales (FMS).\(^{11}\) Performing the modifications in country resulted in a cost savings of approximately $85,000 per helicopter, or a total of approximately $410,000.

**Hard Points**

The CNP and the NAS estimated that it cost approximately $1,800 in labor to install the additional hard point on each of the first six UH-IIIs. In contrast, U.S. Helicopter performed the identical work for $4,531 per helicopter on the remaining UH-IIIs, a difference of $2,731 per helicopter.

**Auxiliary Fuel Tanks**

U.S. Helicopter did not install the auxiliary fuel tanks for any of the UH-IIIs because it was faster and less expensive for the CNP to install the fuel tanks itself. Because the CNP already had eight auxiliary fuel tank kits in stock, the NAS and the CNP made a joint decision for this work to be completed in Colombia. The most expensive portion of this modification was the purchase of the auxiliary fuel tanks, which the NAS purchased through FMS for approximately $28,545 per kit. U.S. Helicopter would have charged $110,000 per kit because they would have procured the kits commercially, with lead times ranging from 24 to 30 months. There was also a $1,000 savings per helicopter in labor for the CNP to install the auxiliary fuel tanks. The CNP continues to install the auxiliary fuel tanks in the UH-IIIs.

\(^{11}\) Foreign Military Sales is the system used for government-to-government military equipment sales.
**Question 17:** What is the best way to maintain the CNP aircraft we provided for eradication? Is it to use the FMS system, or Dyncorp on the ground in Colombia, or for the police themselves to maintain the aircraft?

One of the long term goals of the Department’s counternarcotics efforts in Colombia is for the CNP to maintain the aircraft without the assistance of American contractors. OIG believes this is the best way to maintain the CNP aircraft. In addition to saving money because of significantly lower labor costs, using the CNP to maintain the aircraft will encourage more program accountability. The CNP should also continue to use the FMS system for the overhaul and replacement of major components given it is cost-effective when properly used.

Although the CNP is currently doing an adequate job of maintaining its aircraft at an operational readiness rate of 65 percent, it is not yet ready to assume total responsibility for maintenance. Based on discussions with CNP and NAS officials, the CNP needs to (1) develop more expertise in fixed-wing maintenance, (2) have more qualified instructor mechanics, and (3) improve the management of the maintenance and logistics function.

**Full Utilization of the Foreign Military Sales System**

The CNP needs to ensure it fully utilizes FMS for aircraft spare parts. The CNP uses FMS for the majority of its parts needs but uses commercial vendors when a part is unavailable through FMS or an aircraft is grounded and must be repaired immediately. FMS is an ideal system for procuring long term parts such as transmissions, engines, tail booms, and other components that regularly require replacement. The cost savings from FMS are significant in comparison to commercial sources. However, due to the long lead times, it is essential to accurately anticipate future parts needs and place orders in advance. The CNP currently is not capable of doing this on its own. This is one of the reasons that the U.S. contractor for the INL Air Wing is able to obtain higher operational readiness rates than the CNP. The CNP needs to do a better job at determining its long term parts needs if the nationalization plan is expected to succeed. The NAS logistics adviser is working with the CNP to help it become more self-sufficient in the procurement of spare parts.

**CNP Lacking Some Skills**

As previously mentioned in the response to Question 10, the CNP maintenance function relies heavily on the CNP civilian contractors. This is especially true for the repair of fixed-wing aircraft. According to CNP and NAS officials, the CNP uniformed mechanics need to develop more expertise in this area. If the eradication program is turned over to the Colombians, the CNP’s ability to properly maintain the fixed-wing aircraft will be essential because of the increase in the number of fixed-wing aircraft to maintain.
In conjunction with this, the CNP needs to have more qualified instructor mechanics to ensure the CNP has the capability to properly train its entry level maintenance personnel and hence develop a more skilled work force. This is especially important given the CNP’s high turnover rate.

Management of the maintenance function is another area where the CNP needs improvement. As noted in the response to Question 10, the CNP needs to ensure the various maintenance schedules are started and completed on time. In addition, the CNP must manage the Colombian civilian contractor mechanics more efficiently. These mechanics are essential to the CNP’s maintenance function and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. The CNP must maximize the use of the Colombian civilian contractor mechanics and abandon its policy of laying off the mechanics for a specified time each year (see page 25 for additional information.) The CNP also needs to monitor operational readiness rates more closely. Monitoring operational readiness rates is a basic maintenance function. When we asked midlevel CNP officials for the operational readiness records for the CNP fleet, they were unable to produce them and had to request that a NAS adviser provide them. The need for the CNP to develop these basic management skills is becoming increasingly important given the increasing size of the CNP Air Wing. Over the last 2 years alone, the number of aircraft has increased by 50 percent, from 45 to 67 aircraft.
Question 18: What does the maintenance of the INL Air Wing in Colombia cost each year?

The cost of maintaining the INL Air Wing during FY 1998 and 1999 was about $12.9 million and $12.3 million, respectively. Direct labor and material costs are the two primary factors that contribute to the total cost to maintain the INL Air Wing in Colombia. In addition, there are two other costs that must be considered. The first is the cost to transport the rotational American contractors between the United States and Colombia. The second is the $35 per day allowance for meals and incidental expenses that is paid to the rotational American contractors while they are in the field. The INL Air Wing in Colombia consists of a total of 23 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The approximate costs to maintain the INL Air Wing during FY 1998 and FY 1999 are summarized in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labor Costs(^{12})</th>
<th>Material Costs</th>
<th>Transport Costs and Meals Allowance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1998(^{13})</td>
<td>$5,808,252</td>
<td>$4,754,517</td>
<td>$2,358,843</td>
<td>$12,921,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1999</td>
<td>$5,510,793</td>
<td>$4,740,812</td>
<td>$2,023,159</td>
<td>$12,274,764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{12}\) The labor costs include the actual salary levels of the American employees plus 47% for the following expenses: (1) danger pay and post differential for the time the contractors are working in Colombia, (2) fringe benefits, (3) overhead, (4) administrative expenses, and (5) award fee expenses.

\(^{13}\) Actual labor, material, and transportation costs for the 4 month period 10/97 – 1/98 were not available, because the latest accounting software package began in 2/98. We estimated these costs by averaging the actual monthly cost figures from 2/98 – 9/98 and projecting them to the period 10/97 – 1/98.
Question 19. What would it cost the CNP to maintain that same INL Air Wing?

It is uncertain what it would cost the CNP to maintain the INL Air Wing. In the CNP’s official response to this question, they could not provide a cost estimate because of uncertainties over the exact type and number of aircraft that would be transferred to the CNP. Given that the CNP could not provide a cost estimate of maintaining the INL Air Wing, we were unable to ascertain the answer to this question.

We believe it is reasonable to conclude that some cost savings would be achieved if the CNP were to maintain the INL Air Wing. This is primarily due to the lower labor costs in Colombia. However, it is uncertain to what extent the quality of the Air Wing maintenance would be affected. The CNP is not currently capable of maintaining the aircraft to the same level of operational readiness that the INL Air Wing’s U.S. contractors are providing.
**Question 20:** Why were the CNP helicopter pilots who were recently involved in a crash not provided helmets?

On the April 11, 1999, there was a CNP helicopter accident where a copilot and gunner were not wearing helmets. Both individuals were hospitalized as a result of the accident. The copilot suffered a head injury and the gunner sustained a spinal fracture. The CNP copilot and gunner were not provided helmets because the CNP’s helmet supply was depleted at the time of the flight. Although the NAS had delivered more than enough helmets for all CNP staff whose positions required one, there were no helmets available. This is because the CNP did not properly control the inventory.

**Mismanagement of Helmets**

At the time of the accident, the CNP had a total of 209 positions that required helmets. The NAS had provided a total of 232 helmets for the 209 positions. Accordingly, there should have been extra helmets available at the time of the accident. At the time of our review, NAS aviation advisers and CNP officials stated that the CNP did not have adequate controls over flight helmets. For example, some CNP pilots left the Air Service without returning their helmets. In addition, some CNP personnel were issued more than one helmet, while other personnel who need helmets never received one. Finally, some CNP personnel were issued helmets even though their positions do not require them to have a helmet. All of these examples contributed to the CNP’s shortage of helmets and have been brought to the CNP’s attention by the NAS.

Prior to the accident, the CNP took a significant step towards improving the internal controls over helmets and other flight equipment. In February 1999, the CNP designated an Aviator Life Support Equipment (ALSE) unit in the CNP supply room at the Guaymaral maintenance facility. The ALSE unit is responsible for ensuring proper controls over the flight gear inventory and informing logistics personnel when supplies need to be reordered. At the time of the accident, the ALSE unit was not fully operational. With the assistance from NAS advisers, the U.S. contractor ALSE technician provided a 2-day training session to the CNP on proper ALSE management. Although the creation of an ALSE unit is an excellent first step to establish control over flight gear, its effectiveness has been hampered by the CNP’s rotation of personnel out of the unit. Some of the staff who were trained by the U.S. contractor have already been rotated to other jobs. Consequently, the NAS should carefully monitor the CNP’s management of the ALSE unit to ensure its objective of improving the controls over flight equipment is achieved.

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota closely monitor the Colombian National Police’s recently established Aviator Life Support Equipment unit to ensure the program is being properly implemented.

INL concurred with the recommendation.
Question 21: What is being done by the State Department to ensure the protection and safety of the UH-IIs scheduled to arrive in Colombia soon?

As of November 1999, the State Department provided the CNP 10 refurbished UH-II helicopters, at a cost of over $14 million. These helicopters are located at various CNP forward operating locations in Colombia. To ensure the protection of the UH-IIs, the Department has primarily focused on the security at each of the forward operating locations.

Recognizing the importance and need for security improvements, the U.S. Congress allocated $6 million from the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation for CNP forward operating location security upgrades. To ensure this money would be properly used, NAS Bogota requested the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Air Force conduct a security and threat assessment of the CNP’s forward operating locations. These assessments concluded that the CNP needs to focus more attention on basic security measures, such as establishing secure perimeters and base security plans. These basic security measures are currently being carried out by the NAS. In addition, the U.S. Air Force security evaluation team noted that some of the CNP’s forward operating locations could benefit from more advanced security measures such as thermal imagers and electronic sensor systems. Based on the recommendations of the U.S. Air Force, the NAS has decided to install an electronic sensor type security system at two of the CNP’s forward operating locations. As of November 2000, the quick-fix recommendations suggested in these reports have been completed and approximately $2.24 million of the $6 million has been obligated. NAS Bogota is in the process of completing the remaining security recommendations. The recommendations are scheduled to be completed in 2001.
V. CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs conduct field assistance visits at posts where new Narcotics Affairs Section officers are assigned.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs perform an assessment of the increased eradication efforts in Putumayo and work with the Central Intelligence Agency to reconcile the varying approaches to measuring coca cultivation and the impact of eradication.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota work with the Colombian National Police at the necessary senior management levels to eliminate the policy of temporarily laying off the Colombian contract mechanics each year.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota continue to work with the Colombian National Police to better manage aircraft maintenance schedules.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota ensure an adequate supply of spare parts is provided to the Colombian National Police for any future aircraft used to support this program.

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota establish a process to ensure that helicopters intended for the CNP are appropriately configured and supported.

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota closely monitor the Colombian National Police’s recently established Aviator Life Support Equipment unit to ensure the program is being properly implemented.
21 Congressional Questions

1. What kind of expertise should INL be looking for in the hiring of potential NAS officers for service abroad? Should it require some law enforcement, military, procurement, or intelligence backgrounds?

2. What kind of training should be mandated beyond the two weeks on-the-job training that INL now offers its NAS officials before they go abroad?

3. The INL air wing is run from Patrick Air Force base in Florida. What is the chain of command between Patrick Air Force base and the NAS officer on the ground in Colombia as well as the INL headquarters in Washington?

4. What is the relationship between the NAS officer in Colombia and the INL air wing? Who does oversight and budget control over the Dyncorp contractor who runs and maintains the INL air wing in Colombia?

Assistant Secretary for INL, Mr. Gelbard, a few years ago decided to increase the American role (Dyncorp) in the eradication program in Colombia:

5. What was the cost of that effort?

6. Today, Colombia has more coca production and the eradication of opium is down while the Colombians have gained dominance of the U.S. heroin market. How did we benefit by the injection of more Americans into Colombia?

7. What has this American presence done to morale in the CNP anti-narcotics police who have the lead role in drug eradication?

8. Has it been counterproductive to create and have two parallel organizations in Colombia (INL and CNP) involved in eradication?

9. What was the main cause of the deaths of the several American pilots killed in Colombia?
10. What is the status of repair and maintenance of the INL air wing in Colombia, and how does it compare to the CNP aircraft?

11. How much more must we pay Dyncorp employees versus having the CNP do the job?

12. What has been the annual cost of providing housing and security for these American employees versus having CNP policemen perform the same functions?

13. Why did the last three INL helicopters that arrived in Colombia (UH1Ns) come properly equipped with all the right configurations from U.S. Helicopter in Alabama, while the UH-IIs for the police did not have the same proper configurations, including no auxiliary fuel tank, mini-gun wiring, and movement of the mini-gun structural mounts forward for installation of the auxiliary fuel tank?

14. Was the CNP consulted in the configuration of the UH-IIs? If not, why not, especially since these choppers are used in combat and their range was an important consideration in their purchase?

15. Why did the INL helicopters come properly configured; is there lack of coordination between NAS, Dyncorp, and the CNP in Colombia?

16. What will it now cost the U.S. taxpayer to get these UH-IIs configured right on the ground in Colombia, versus doing it first at U.S. helicopter in Alabama?

17. What is the best way to maintain the CNP aircraft we provided for eradication? Is it to use the FMS system, or Dyncorp on the ground in Colombia, or for the police themselves to maintain the aircraft?

18. What does the maintenance of the INL air wing in Colombia cost each year?

19. What would it cost the CNP to maintain that same INL air wing?

20. Why were the CNP helicopter pilots who were recently involved in a crash not provided helmets?
21. What is being done by the State Department to ensure the protection and safety of the UH-IIs scheduled to arrive in Colombia soon?
MEMORANDUM

TO: OIG - Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers
FROM: INL - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Draft OIG Report
Review of INL-Administered Programs in Colombia

INL appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report. On the whole, we found it a reasonable and thoughtful assessment. Attached are INL's comments on the report and its recommendations.
Recommendation 1:

We recommend that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs modify its annual training program for new Narcotics Affairs officers to provide more specialized training on the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs financial management and procurement policies and procedures.

INL Comment:

This recommendation does not appear to be based on any problem identified in the report. INL plans to continue the current practice of providing, after its one week training program concludes, additional financial management and procurement training to selected course attendees. INL does not believe that adding substantially more of this material to the NAS officers course will be useful. The new NAS officers lack the context necessary to make much use of some of the information we now provide.

As Foreign Service National employees handle the bulk of financial management and procurement-related work at Narcotics Affairs Sections, INL has focused most of its training efforts on them. In addition to training provided during field assistance visits, INL has, in the last several years, sponsored two regional procurement classes in Lima and Guatemala for FSNs. Another, scheduled for this month in Guatemala, had to be postponed because there were to few candidates nominated. To assist GSOs, the personnel who are responsible for ensuring that NAS-financed procurement is properly executed INL personnel have also participated in the FSI GSO course. Further, we make every effort to meet with new GSOs and Budget Management Officers being assigned to NAS posts prior to their departure and provide them with INL-specific reference materials.

INL notes that, contrary to the report’s statement that essential aviation experience is unavailable to NAS’s from within the Department, it is in fact available from INL’s Aviation Division.
Recommendation 2:

We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs conduct field assistance visits at posts where new narcotics Affairs Section officers are assigned.

INL Comment:

INL agrees that the optimum time to conduct field assistance is approximately six to twelve months after the arrival of new Narcotics Affairs Section chief’s, or at the larger posts, the NAS Administrative officer’s arrival at post. We will make every effort to schedule visits accordingly. Unfortunately INL will shortly lose one very experienced budget officer who has handled financial management field assistance while more recently hired less experienced personnel are themselves trained. INL plans to award a personal services contract for assistance in this area.

Recommendation 3

We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs perform an assessment of the increased eradication efforts in Putumayo and Caqueta, and work with the Central Intelligence Agency to reconcile the varying approaches to measuring coca cultivation and the impact of eradication.

INL Comment:

INL agrees with both of the recommendations. In fact, we are already working on the second and have been for almost a year, and we will, of course, assess increased eradication efforts in Putumayo and Caqueta.

That said, we disagree that the results of spray operations during 1997-1999 are necessarily discouraging. We believe in part that the OIG conclusion can only be reached if one assumes the accuracy of CNC’s estimating methodology. INL believes the report findings should acknowledge INL’s belief that coca cultivation in Colombia is in constant flux and that the apparent increase in coca cultivation reflected in the CIA data may well be largely attributable to new discoveries of pre-existing coca not surveyed in
preceding years. The report acknowledges that the accuracy of cultivation and eradication estimates remains an open question and concludes that the impact of the spray program is uncertain. Given these findings there would seem to be no basis for so disparaging a characterization of the results of the spray program.

The report refers to "statistics published by NAS Bogota, the Government of Colombia and the American contractor." INL’s contractor does not "publish" any data related to its work for INL. INL/AD provides statistical data on its efforts to INL, the Government of Colombia and Embassy Bogota.

As mentioned above, evaluation of the effectiveness of aerial eradication is an integral on-going part of INL eradication operations. Consequently, INL would appreciate specific suggestions from OIG as to the nature of the recommended assessment so that INL can be responsibly address the recommendation.

Recommendation 4

**We recommend that the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota work with the Colombian National Police at the necessary senior management levels to eliminate the policy of temporarily laying off the Colombian contract mechanics each year.**

**INL Comment:**

The "layoffs" result from the means by which the contract services are acquired by the CNP’s Fondo Rotatorio. INL and NAS are working to award a contract for the services currently being provided via the Fondo and expect it to be awarded later this year. The new contract will preclude a recurrence of these "layoffs."

Recommendation 5

**We recommend the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota continue to work with the Colombian National Police to better manage aircraft maintenance schedules.**

**INL Comment:**
INL concurs with the recommendation.

Recommendation 6

We recommend the Bureau of International narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota ensure an adequate supply of spare parts is provided to the Colombian National Police for any future aircraft used to support this program.

INL Comment:

INL agrees with the recommendation but takes exception to some of the report findings.

- The INL Air Wing does not necessarily have "higher levels of inventory" than the CNP Air Service. It does, however, have an appropriate level of the right kinds of spares to meet operational demands.

- The report inaccurately observes that the six B-212 aircraft turned over to the CNP were "older aircraft that required many spare parts." These aircraft were on a routine maintenance schedule and there is no indication that their parts usage was different from any other similar helicopters.

- The C-26 aircraft to which the report refers were not purchased by the Department, but rather provided to the CNP under a section 506(a) drawdown. Emergency supplemental appropriation funds made available in FY ’99 are being used to modify the aircraft to equip them with airborne surveillance sensors.

Recommendation 7

We recommend the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota establish a process to ensure that helicopters intended for the CNP are appropriately configured and supported.

INL Comment:
INL concurs with the recommendation but believes the report is not completely accurate in its discussion of configuration issues. It states in part "We believe it was inappropriate for INL/AD to ensure that its own helicopters were configured to such desirable specifications and not advise the CNP to configure its helicopters in an equivalent manner." This statement implies, erroneously, that INL/AD was acting in an advisory capacity to the CNP and that AD set a lower standard for the CNP than for its own aircraft.

The specifications used for the "Huey II" configuration were developed by AD for its own conversion program that was suspended for lack of funding. Those specifications reflected AD mission plans for the aircraft. CNP mission plans for the aircraft were not known to AD. A CNP-specific revision to the specification was not contemplated by AD nor requested by the CNP. Lastly, the statement does not recognize that some configuration differences between the AD UH-1Ns and the CNP Huey IIIs (most notably, "hard points") are attributable to the inherent design of the aircraft, not to AD specifications for the Huey II modification. Forward hard points come standard on the UH-1N but not on the UH-1H, the airframe used for the Huey II modification.

With respect to B-212 parts, the report says that the INL Air Wing was reluctant to transfer AD B-212 parts because they "could" be used on Air Wing UH-1Ns. The Air Wing’s use of these parts to support Air Wing UH-1Ns was planned and in no way conjectural. Further, the transferred B-212s required parts not for "numerous repairs" but to support routine maintenance schedules.

In its comparison of the compensation of DynCorp and CNP personnel, the report says, "there are no active CNP fixed-wing pilots" when, in fact, there are, including several T-65 pilots. Also in this section the report gives the impression that all DynCorp employees are American citizens though this is not the case.

**Recommendation 8**

We recommend the Narcotics Affairs Section at Embassy Bogota closely monitor the Colombian National Police’s
recently established Aviator Life Support Equipment unit to ensure the program is being properly implemented.

INL Comment:

INL concurs with the recommendation.