



OIG

Office of Inspector General

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Office of Inspections

February 2017

Inspection of Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan

BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

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OIG HIGHLIGHTS

February 2017
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Inspection of Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan

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What OIG Found

What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected U.S. Embassy Islamabad from May 8 to June 17, 2016. The inspection included Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar.

What OIG Recommended

OIG made 15 recommendations to improve Embassy Islamabad's operations and procedures. The report addresses implementation of Department of State-managed government-to-government assistance, embassy management support to the consulates general, and the need to improve information management coordination.

- The U.S. Mission in Pakistan advanced U.S. interests despite Pakistan's challenging security environment, host-nation restrictions on travel, and impediments to program implementation.
- The Ambassador led the mission in positively shaping U.S.-Pakistan relations, making progress toward achieving its Integrated Country Strategy goals, and focusing on the mission's security.
- The embassy's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Pakistan Section had deficiencies in program oversight and management controls.
- Embassy Islamabad provided inconsistent management support to Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar.
- The mission conducted effective and innovative public diplomacy programs.
- The mission's Information Management Sections provided satisfactory customer service but needed to improve coordination.

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CONTEXT

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the world's sixth most populous country with over 200 million people. In 2015, its gross domestic product per capita was approximately \$5,000, with an estimated gross domestic product growth of 4.0 percent. As of 2015, Pakistan recorded a surplus of \$1.9 billion in trade with the United States, which totaled \$5.5 billion. Pakistan had its first successful transition between successive democratically elected governments in 2013, when current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was elected. The Pakistani military continues to play a strong role in national security and foreign affairs. The country faces external and internal challenges to its stability from crime and terrorism. As a result of sustained conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan hosts a large refugee population. Pakistan has stable relations with its neighbors, chiefly India and Afghanistan, but historical grievances and more recent tensions continue.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship encompasses issues of critical importance to U.S. national security, as outlined in Mission Pakistan's Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for FY 2015-2017. These include counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, peace in Afghanistan, and domestic and South Asian regional economic growth and development. Mission Pakistan's highest policy priorities are to promote regional stability, combat terrorism, and support a secure, economically vibrant, and stable Pakistani democracy. Three unrelated events in 2011—an incident in Lahore involving an American citizen, the Osama bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, and the Salala border clash — were perceived as challenges to Pakistani sovereignty and set back U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. Since then, the two governments have taken steps to improve relations, culminating in Secretary Kerry's 2015 visit to Islamabad to co-chair the Strategic Dialogue and the Pakistani Prime Minister's official visit to Washington the same year. Nevertheless, bilateral challenges remain, including advancing the Afghanistan reconciliation process, combatting terrorism, and promoting civil society, the empowerment of women, and the rule of law.

Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance. In FY 2015, Pakistan received \$803 million, including \$538 million in civilian assistance and \$265 million in security assistance. Civilian assistance is centered on five sectors: energy, economic growth, stabilization, education, and health. Security assistance focuses on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. However, the Department of State's (Department) Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan reported a 61 percent decrease in foreign assistance funds to Pakistan from its peak in 2010 to the 2017 request, due to changing regional priorities.

Mission Pakistan includes the embassy in Islamabad and consulates general in Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. At the time of the inspection, the mission hosted 12 U.S. agencies. Total FY 2015 funding for the mission was \$672 million. As of April 2016, Mission Pakistan had 769 U.S. direct-hire staff, 1,781 locally employed (LE) staff members, and 72 eligible family members. Most U.S. employees serve without dependents on 1-year tours of duty. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is in the middle of a construction project to build a new chancery building, diplomatic staff apartments, chief of mission residence, and key support buildings on the

Embassy Islamabad compound. In 2015, embassy employees occupied the new chancery and office annex buildings on the compound. OBO completed construction of a new consulate compound in Karachi in 2011.

The local security environment shapes how Mission Pakistan personnel work and live. All American employees in Lahore and Peshawar live on the consulate general compound. Mission security policies and Government of Pakistan travel restrictions limit employees' off-compound movements, making it difficult to monitor U.S.-sponsored projects and meet with Pakistani contacts and audiences. Moreover, Pakistan restricts the issuance of visas to U.S. Government personnel and civilian contractors, and limits approvals of U.S. projects and implementing partners. Negative opinions toward the United States are pervasive throughout Pakistani society.

OIG evaluated the embassy's policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act.¹ OIG also assessed security, which is covered in a classified annex to this inspection report.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

OIG based the following assessments of mission leadership on the results of 463 documented interviews at the four posts, 220 of which elicited comments on the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM); meetings in Washington and Pakistan; 423 questionnaires completed by American and LE staff that included comments on Front Office performance; and OIG's review of documents and observations of embassy meetings and activities during the course of the on-site inspection.

The Ambassador arrived in November 2015. Although new to South Asia, this is his third assignment as chief of mission. The DCM, whom policymakers in Washington and mission staff consistently recognized as an officer with expertise on Pakistan and in the bilateral policy environment, arrived in September 2015. Given the strategic importance of the U.S. presence in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan's role in U.S. efforts to promote peace and stability in South Asia, the embassy played a key role in advancing U.S. national interests.

Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

From his arrival, the Ambassador emphasized the importance of ethical and Equal Employment Opportunity standards as outlined in the President's Letter of Instruction and 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214. He did so in a variety of settings, including town hall meetings, country team meetings, and informal sessions with embassy sections and First- and Second-Tour employees. According to interviews with American and LE staff and the record of his mission town hall meetings, the Ambassador underscored the importance of maintaining a work environment free of harassment and discrimination. The DCM met regularly with the embassy

¹ See Appendix A.

Equal Employment Opportunity counselor and helped resolved two sensitive Equal Employment Opportunity cases, demonstrating Front Office support for those principles. Both the Ambassador and the DCM took actions that demonstrated the value of diversity in the workplace, such as screening a Pakistani-origin diversity documentary at the Ambassador's residence and working to improve gender balance in mission programs. The Ambassador modeled integrity by leading country team discussions about the potential harm improper behavior or violations of embassy security procedures could cause for the bilateral relationship.

OIG found that the Ambassador and the DCM established a collaborative relationship. Senior Washington policymakers consistently credited them with valuable contributions to sensitive policy discussions. The Ambassador and the DCM coordinated their respective input as they led Emergency Action Committee meetings which focused on mission personnel security and sought each other's counsel on sensitive personnel decisions. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of maintaining a reasonable work-life balance as a means to function effectively at this critical-threat post, where American staff could be accompanied only by adult family members who were hired to fill a mission position. He adopted a work schedule consistent with this message. He and the DCM emphasized the value of gender balance in official representation events, mission hiring, and public diplomacy outreach. The embassy's U.S. staff consistently complimented the Ambassador for conducting an anonymous morale survey shortly after he arrived and for implementing recommendations based on the survey's results. The Ambassador also announced plans at an LE staff town hall to conduct an LE staff morale survey in the near future.

Inspectors reviewed Front Office and consulate general representation and official residence expense vouchers and found that they complied with Department standards. OIG's review of mission gift procedures found no anomalies.

Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

Pakistan's cooperation and partnership with the United States are vital for achieving peace and sustaining democracy in a volatile region. In his first 6 months, the Ambassador participated via secure videoconference in 20 senior-level interagency meetings with the Department, National Security Council staff, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. He also took part in weekly video conferences with the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bilateral engagement on issues related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan was a particular focus of high-level visits to Pakistan by the Special Representative, senior National Security Council staff, and senior U.S. military commanders charged with leading U.S. military efforts. The Ambassador established relations with and access to Pakistan's top decision-makers, including the Prime Minister, Chief of Army Staff, cabinet ministers, and the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs. In support of the Mission Pakistan ICS, which was prepared under the previous Ambassador's guidance, the Ambassador and the DCM engaged on key aspects of the bilateral relationship, including foreign assistance, commercial promotion and advocacy, and public diplomacy. The Ambassador directed the mission's Coordination Office for Economic and Development Assistance (ASSIST) to undertake a first year review of the ICS to assess progress and determine what adjustments might be necessary. The Ambassador and the DCM both participated in

regularly scheduled meetings with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) section, and the ASSIST Coordinator. The Ambassador initiated a "Direct Line for American Business" webinar outreach effort with over 40 U.S. firms interested in doing business in Pakistan. He also actively supported interagency efforts to hold the June 2016 "Business Opportunities Conference" in New York City to promote U.S. investment in Pakistan, including publishing an op-ed in a prominent English-language business newspaper. When the Ambassador and the DCM visited Karachi and Lahore, the consuls general in those posts scheduled activities to promote business outreach, American non-security assistance, and public engagement. The Ambassador and his public diplomacy team embraced social media as a successful means to reach many Pakistanis; his June 2016 Ramadan video message reached over 3 million Facebook viewers within a week of its release.

Adherence to Internal Controls

Resources and Human Capital

The Ambassador and the DCM paid appropriate attention to internal control issues. Shortly after arrival, the Ambassador reviewed the Statement of Assurance of Management Controls signed in August 2015 and supporting materials to understand vulnerabilities and how mission staff had arrived at their conclusions. The ambassador and the DCM increased oversight of the mission's INL program in light of evidence showing leadership and oversight deficiencies. However, OIG's review of key elements of the embassy's internal control system found deficiencies in the INL and Management Sections, described in the Policy and Program Implementation and Resource Management sections of this report.

Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leaders

In June 2016, Embassy Islamabad had 18 officers and specialists in its First- and Second-Tour staff program and over 70 in its interagency Mid-Level Development Program. Both groups reported that the Ambassador and the DCM assisted and advised their leadership. According to First- and Second-Tour staff interviews and Front Office schedules, the Ambassador met with them or participated in their events nine times since his arrival while the DCM met with them or attended events eight times, including hosting the group twice at his residence. The mid-level group organized a seminar on leadership for both groups and mission military personnel at which the Ambassador, the mission's ranking military officer, and the USAID Mission Director made presentations.

Security of the Mission

Embassy and consulate general personnel and Washington officials told OIG that the Ambassador, the DCM, and the Consuls General made mission security a top priority in the face of critical threats from political unrest and terrorism throughout Pakistan. During the inspection, the embassy's Emergency Action Committee met six times to discuss heightened threat risks, including holding two meetings chaired by the Ambassador. After embassy Emergency Action Committee meetings, the consulates general each conducted separate meetings with their staffs to review their respective security postures. The DCM normally chaired the embassy meetings

and conducted them in an inclusive style to foster good communication and a thorough understanding of the risks facing the embassy community. The Front Office and Consuls General encouraged all personnel to conduct and participate in regular emergency and crisis management drills.

The Regional Security Officer met biweekly with the Ambassador and weekly with the DCM, and more frequently when conditions warranted. The embassy and the three consulates general followed prudent procedures to permit official engagement with host country officials and contacts. When local threat conditions permitted in Islamabad and Karachi, they also allowed personnel to leave the compounds on private, non-official trips. Threat conditions in Peshawar and Lahore precluded private trips. The Ambassador, the DCM, and the Consuls General emphasized the importance of adequate security for LE staff in town hall meetings but adjusted policies to provide flexibility, as appropriate.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Foreign Assistance

ASSIST Office Coordinates Interagency Civilian Assistance

In 2009, the Department established the ASSIST office in Embassy Islamabad to coordinate increased civilian assistance funding to Pakistan authorized by the Kerry-Lugar Berman Act.² In addition to fulfilling this role, the office also prepares mandatory assistance reports and provides policy direction to the implementing agencies. For FY 2015, the total civilian assistance budget was \$538 million, which the ASSIST office distributed among embassy sections and implementing agencies in country, including USAID and the U.S. Departments of Energy and Agriculture.

OIG reviewed the processes to coordinate civilian assistance and found no problems. Managers of embassy sections that implement civilian assistance told OIG that the incumbent ASSIST Director improved interagency coordination of the embassy's civilian assistance portfolio.

Challenges Impeded Implementation of Civilian Assistance

Mission Pakistan faced several challenges that impeded implementation of civilian assistance projects. These included difficulties in obtaining Pakistani visas and registering international nongovernmental organizations to operate in country, restrictions on travel, and a restrictive security environment. To address these challenges, the ASSIST office held interagency meetings, met with Pakistani Government officials, and submitted cables and memoranda to Washington

² The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act ("Kerry-Lugar Berman Act"), enacted in 2009, authorized an increase in U.S. civilian assistance to Pakistan of up to \$1.5 billion annually from 2010-2014. Since 2010, the United States has committed over \$5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan to support bilateral and regional strategic objectives in five pillars: energy, economic growth, stabilization, education, and health.

stakeholders. At the 2016 U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Secretary Kerry raised the difficulty in registering international nongovernmental organizations with the Pakistani Government's Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, who committed to review the issue.

Project Monitoring and Site Visits

Mission security requirements and travel restrictions imposed by the Government of Pakistan made on-site monitoring of projects difficult and, in some cases, impossible. OIG found that embassy sections and implementing agencies effectively applied secondary methods of oversight, such as using video-conferencing software applications and email, or relied on the funded entity to provide information.

No Major Deficiencies in Grants File Review

OIG reviewed 22 of 25 grants files totaling \$25.2 million from the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the Refugee Coordination Sections and found they awarded and documented the grants in accordance with the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive.

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

The embassy's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Pakistan Section (INL-P) manages assistance programs that seek to build civilian law enforcement capacity; counter the production, trafficking, and use of illicit narcotics; enhance the rule of law and corrections systems; and promote gender equality in Pakistan's criminal justice sector. At the time of the inspection, INL-P had 110 personnel³ with an FY 2015 budget of \$40 million.

INL-P Efforts to Overcome Operational Challenges

INL-P experienced operational problems, including high leadership turnover and weaknesses in internal controls. At the time of the inspection, the section was on its third director since 2015 and had developed internal standard operating procedures for only some of its daily operations. For example, INL-P's funding pipeline grew to \$150 million as of March 2016 because it did not approve a plan to begin new assistance projects in 2015. Pakistani Government changes to its project approval process also increased the approval time for INL-P projects.

OIG found that INL-P had made progress in overcoming some of its operational challenges by the end of the inspection. INL-P received approval from the Government of Pakistan to begin some new projects, which increased the amount of expended funds and reduced the pipeline to \$119 million. The section also established a plan to implement new projects and to update standard operating procedures. INL-P, Mission Pakistan, and Washington stakeholders told OIG

³ INL personnel include U.S. direct-hires, personal service contractors, LE staff, and third party contractors. OIG excluded the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance Training staff totals.

that they had changed how they assign officers to the INL-P director position in order to improve the section's leadership.

Government-to-Government Funding Risk Assessments Inconsistent

OIG's review of the process by which INL-P performed risk assessments of its government-to-government assistance⁴ found that it was neither standardized nor consistently applied to all host government entities receiving assistance funds. U.S. Government regulations require that a risk assessment be performed for all government-to-government assistance. This requirement outlines several provisions for the Department and USAID to assess the recipient's (host-country agency or ministry) systems and capabilities in an effort to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses.⁵ INL-P told OIG that prior to 2012 it did not document its risk assessments. Subsequently, it documented these assessments for some, but not all, host government entities receiving assistance funds through this mechanism. INL-P cited one-year tours of section officers and insufficient section leadership as causes for this deficiency. OIG found that INL in Washington had begun to take steps to improve government-to-government assessments for INL-P implementing partners by awarding a contract to a third party to conduct risk assessments. However, at the time of the inspection, this risk assessment process was not yet in effect. A lack of risk assessments increases the possibility for mismanagement of government-to-government assistance.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should perform risk assessments of all agencies and sub-agencies receiving its government-to-government assistance. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with INL)

Program Files Lack Consistency

OIG found that INL-P did not maintain its program files in accordance with 5 FAM 413, which establishes a procedure to create, maintain, use, and dispose of records in the conduct of official business. INL-P did not establish templates, standard operating procedures, or checklists indicating which documents should remain in the official file. INL-P attributed the cause of this deficiency to one-year tours of section officers and the lack of continuity of INL managers. Section managers recognized the deficiencies of its program files and began taking steps to fix the problems during the inspection. Without an established records management program in place, U.S. government program files are at risk for loss or destruction.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Islamabad, should establish standard operating procedures that comply with Department standards for records management of International Narcotics and

⁴ Government-to-Government assistance is federal assistance funds given directly to the host government. INL -P implements more than 50 percent of its assistance funds through this mechanism.

⁵ Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Section 7031(a).

Law Enforcement Affairs Pakistan Section's program files. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Islamabad)

Advocacy and Analysis: Political and Economic Reporting

Overall Reporting Meets Washington Needs

Policymakers and stakeholders in the Department and other agencies consistently told OIG that Mission Pakistan's political and economic reporting was useful. OIG evaluated 208 Political Section cables from December 2015 through May 2016 and found that they met or exceeded standards for timeliness, relevance, and depth of sourcing and analysis, and addressed ICS goals. OIG's review of the Economic Section's 82 cables from the same period also found they met these standards, reflected input from other embassy offices, and included the views of relevant Pakistani Government officials, private sector executives, and civil society leaders. Economic reporting included cables drafted by the section's environment, science and technology, and health officer.

The Political and Economic Sections collaborated with other sections and agencies at post, especially the Public Affairs Section (PAS), the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan, Treasury's financial attaché, the Foreign Commercial Service, and USAID. This collaboration informed and enriched the sections' reporting. Coordination with Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar ensured that reporting took into account regional dynamics.

OIG's review of combined political and economic reporting from Consulates General Karachi and Lahore over this same 6-month period concluded that reporting met standards. The embassy's Political and Economic Sections supported the Front Office and participated in videoconferences with Washington policymakers on a weekly basis in 2015-2016.

High-level U.S. government officials based in Washington praised the mission's Political and Economic Sections for their policy and logistical support for frequent official visits to Pakistan. They also expressed appreciation for Department officers' support for interagency coordination of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. These officials particularly noted the Political-Military Unit's policy-related advice to the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan, which implemented this security assistance.

Public Diplomacy

PAS managed over \$60 million in U. S. government resources devoted to public diplomacy programs in FY 2015, making it one of the Department's largest public diplomacy operations. The section played a central role in mission strategic planning and execution. PAS representatives chaired the embassy's Strategic Communications and Countering Violent Extremism working groups. The Front Office tasked the section with conducting 8 of the 12 key activities under ICS objective 1.1, to increase civilian and non-civilian capacity to counter violent extremist narratives. The section had the Department's only unit dedicated exclusively to countering violent extremism, called the Community Engagement Office. This office provided

approximately \$2 million annually in grants to partner organizations to conduct countering violent extremism programs. Embassy leadership told OIG they considered the mission's public diplomacy operations a long-term investment in a strategically significant country in which the United States had a consistently low public approval rating.

Information Programs Active

PAS efficiently monitored, analyzed, and reported on Pakistani media outlets, including electronic media. An "innovation team" produced the online content distributed on embassy digital platforms. A network of 17 American Corners,⁶ known in Pakistan as "Lincoln Corners," provided a platform for U.S. speakers and messages. PAS consistently coordinated messaging across mission sections and agencies, and engaged Pakistani interlocutors on commonly used social media platforms to take advantage of their high usage.

Section Adjusted Its Programs to Security Restrictions

The mission's security policies limited PAS staff travel in Pakistan, which in turn restricted the types of public diplomacy programs the section conducted. However, it used exchange programs, virtual programming, and program alumni to overcome these restrictions. The section sent 1,198 Pakistanis to the United States under the auspices of 27 Department cultural and educational exchanges in FY 2015. The United States Education Foundation in Pakistan, the largest Fulbright operation in the world as measured by U.S. funding, sent 181 Pakistanis to the United States on Fulbright grants that same year. In addition, an information officer hosted a call-in radio show, fielded listener questions by social media, and directed listeners to mission websites. An Embassy-supported exchange visitor alumni organization in Pakistan had 19,000 members. In FY 2015, the section arranged for dozens of them to speak on U.S. topics at Lincoln Corners and other venues across the country as surrogate speakers for American officers who could not travel due to security restrictions.

Security considerations also affected monitoring and evaluation of grants and in some cases prevented PAS from carrying out site visits to gauge grant activity. Instead, the section used digital video conferences and other virtual interviews, frequent program reports, and outreach sessions to potential grantees to accomplish these tasks. They held back final grant payments pending receipt of required reports.

Public Diplomacy Grants

PAS had 168 open FY 2011-2016 grants totaling approximately \$68 million in April 2016. OIG reviewed 16 grant files, focusing on grants awarded in FY 2015 and FY 2016 and prioritized those valued at \$200,000 or more. The largest grant OIG reviewed was for \$3 million, while the total value of OIG-reviewed grants was \$7,714,000. The review discovered no systemic problems. The section was developing a grants handbook codifying its standard operating procedures.

⁶ American Corners are open-access facilities used to engage foreign audiences overseas.

Grants Manager Position Needed

The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs divided responsibility for managing the section's grants between the embassy section and the bureau's public diplomacy office. OIG interviewed 15 bureau and embassy public diplomacy employees with varying levels of responsibility for grants management, including the embassy's full-time PAS Grant Manager. PAS created this position in 2012 as a "3161"⁷ excepted Civil Service employee. The section planned to eliminate the position upon the incumbent's departure in 2016 because the "3161" excepted hiring authority had expired. Although the section grants officers and grants officer representatives will continue to oversee the section's grants, several factors suggest that a full time manager is preferable. In particular, the section's grant portfolio is high value and high volume, with many covering several years, while American officers serve only 1-year tours. At the time of the inspection, the embassy and the bureau's Public Diplomacy Office were taking steps to dedicate a new position to perform the grant manager duties upon the incumbent's departure.

Consular Affairs

The Consular Sections in Embassy Islamabad and Consulate General Karachi provided American citizens and non-immigrant visa services; only the embassy section processed immigrant visas. At the time of the inspection, all officers except three unit managers in Islamabad were on the standard 1-year tour. Consular Section leadership emphasized standard operating procedures and training plans to ensure continuity of operations during annual turnover of U.S direct hire staff. In the first half of FY 2016, non-immigrant visa workloads in Islamabad and Karachi were, respectively, 40 percent and 23 percent higher than in the same period in 2015, and consular managers implemented measures to improve efficiency and processes. The embassy's Immigrant Visa Unit, one of the top immigrant visa issuing operations in the world, had no backlog, and there were readily available appointments for American Citizens Services. The Fraud Prevention Unit focused on immigrant visa fraud. There was an investigations backlog due to staffing vacancies, travel restrictions, and, in Islamabad, time devoted to a Department-mandated pilot program to check the social media accounts of fiancé and immediate-relative-spouse immigrant visa applicants.

The embassy Consular Section was located in swing space a 10-minute walk from the chancery pending the completion of a new office building, scheduled for March 2018. Consular leadership arranged for other mission members, including the Ambassador, to meet regularly with consular staff to reduce their isolation from the rest of the community.

OIG reviewed the mission's full range of consular operations, including visa and American Citizens Services, the fraud prevention program, and consular management controls, and found they met Department standards except as discussed below.

⁷ Title 5, Section 3161 of the U.S. Code allowed the Department to hire temporary employees for specific positions and for a specific length of time.

American Citizens Services

Consulate General Lahore suspended consular services in August 2013 due to security threats. The Department re-assigned the Lahore Consular Officer and two LE Consular Assistants to the embassy's Consular Section. The Consular Officer and one Consular Assistant spent approximately 1 week per month in Lahore attending to consular emergencies, establishing and maintaining contacts, and preparing for a possible restoration of American Citizen Services there.

Consular Section Lacked Clear Standards for Processing Passports, Consular Reports of Birth

The Consular Section in Islamabad did not have standards to determine the timeframe in which passports and consular reports of birth abroad should be processed. This created backlogs that delayed completion of case processing. At the beginning of June 2016, there were 48 passport and 70 consular report of birth abroad cases pending for more than 90 days, with some dating back to June 2015. Consular management did not include standards in its passport and consular reports of birth abroad operating procedures because of competing demands on its time. In addition, consular staff accorded higher priority to assisting applicants to prepare for appointments for these services than following up on pending applications that required additional documentation. Guidance in 7 FAM 1367a, 7 FAM 1445.4c, and 7 FAM 1445.8b permits applications for passports and consular reports of birth abroad to be held in pending status for 90 days, with limited exceptions. Standards in 7 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-821 require services to be "provided without needless delay" and state that applicants "should have to wait no longer than absolutely necessary to accomplish the service." In addition, 7 FAH-1 H-825.1 encourages posts to set standards for timely service delivery and to evaluate operations and measure results. Unresolved citizenship cases delay issuance of identity and citizenship documents to those entitled to them. For those who are not entitled to such documents, unresolved cases delay findings of insufficient evidence of citizenship and the entry of lookouts into consular databases.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Islamabad should implement standard operating procedures for processing passport and consular report of birth services. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Improvements to Consular Crisis Preparedness

The mission's Consular Sections improved their ability to assist private U.S. citizens in a crisis. Consular staff recruited new "wardens"—volunteer private U.S. citizens who assist the mission in maintaining contacts with other private U.S. citizens—in the Karachi and Lahore consular districts. Embassy Islamabad also organized the first town hall meetings in years for private Americans. In the months prior to the inspection, the embassy and Consulate General Karachi began outfitting "flyaway" kits with equipment needed in an emergency and required staff to take online consular crisis training. The embassy and Consulates General Karachi and Lahore strengthened contacts with local officials and organizations in their consular districts. During the inspection, Information Management (IM) staff in the embassy and Consulate General Karachi

trained consular personnel on the operation of satellite telephones. OIG advised consular leadership that tabletop exercises could help the staff better prepare for and respond to consular emergencies.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Management Operations

OIG found that the Management Section implemented most required processes and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and Department guidance, with the exceptions noted below. The FY 2015-2017 ICS states that the mission's objectives can only be achieved in the context of an adequate and supportive management platform. The ICS has three objectives intended to enable this platform: completion of the New Embassy Compound construction project; leveraging human capital through increased emphasis on cross training and mentoring among the current LE staff and documentation of processes; and managing security in an uncertain environment. Mission Pakistan's FY 2015 International Cooperative Administrative Support Services⁸ (ICASS) budget of \$59.7 million was the fourth largest in the Department. Total ICASS staffing at the time of the inspection was 36 U.S. direct-hire and approximately 1,100 LE staff members. OIG reviewed internal control systems in the Human Resources, Financial Management, General Service Operations (GSO), Facility Management Section, IM, and the Health Unit and Equal Employment Opportunity programs.

Embassy Management Support for Consulates General was Inconsistent

OIG reviews of and discussions with consulate general management officers revealed that the level of embassy support to the three consulates general varied by management sub-section. The Facilities Management Section and Health Unit had support schedules for the consulates general, but the GSO, Human Resources, and IM Sections did not have defined schedules for visits or other support. For example, the embassy GSO Section failed to send any of its seven direct-hire General Service Officers to support Consulate General Karachi's sole remaining General Service Officer during a 7-month staffing gap in its senior general services officer position from November 2015 to May 2016. In addition, the mission's Regional Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) did not perform his information security duties for the consulates general. OIG concluded that management inattention caused the inconsistent consulate support. Per 2 FAM 021.1 c (1), Department managers must evaluate internal control systems on an ongoing basis. Visits by embassy staff help ensure that the internal control systems in the consulates general operate as intended and that the posts have the necessary resources to operate effectively. Failure to monitor internal control systems increases the risks of fraud and that internal control deficiencies will keep the mission from meeting its objectives.

⁸ The International Cooperative Administrative Support Services system is the principal means by which the U.S. Government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at its more than 250 diplomatic and consular posts overseas.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Islamabad should develop action plans to provide the three constituent posts with regional management support services on a regular basis. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Human Resource Office Strained to Process Job Applications for LE Staff Vacancies

OIG found that the embassy's Human Resources Office did not meet Mission Pakistan's ICASS service standard for LE staff recruitment services. In 2015, the embassy received 43,502 applications for 189 published vacancy announcements, averaging 230 applications for every announcement. For the first five months of 2016, it did not meet standards for screening times for 23 of the 56 advertised LE staff vacancies. To correct this deficiency, OIG advised the office to consider adding additional staff or automation tools and to continue its new practice of regularly updating hiring offices on the status of recruitment milestones.

Consulates General Lack Required Post Training Officers

Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar did not have designated post training officers. Per 13 FAM 022.6, principal officers shall designate a post training officer at posts under their authority. However, a March 2014 Mission LE Staff Training Policy designated the embassy human resources officer as the mission's sole post training officer. The embassy's decision not to designate a training officer at each constituent post created the risk that training directly related to an employee's job duties and identified as a priority by post management would be disapproved. During the inspection, OIG identified several cases where the embassy denied such training for consulate general employees.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Islamabad should require the Principal Officer at Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar to designate a training officer at their posts. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Financial Management Operations

Cashier Advance at Consulate General Karachi Is Excessive

The Class B cashier advance of \$110,000 for Consulate General Karachi exceeds the standard level, defined as the amount the cashier requires for one week's activity plus an amount sufficient to cover replenishment turn-around time. Although Consulate General Karachi required this amount at one point, its cash requirements diminished in 2015. The mission did not, however, ask the Department's Global Financial Services Bangkok to lower the cashier's advance level. This is inconsistent with 4 FAH-3 H-393.4-2 (c, d), which provides that the advance may not exceed the actual needs of the cashier and that, when conditions warrant, a decrease in the amount of a cashier advance authorization must be processed in the same manner as initial designation. The excessive cash advance exposes the consulate general to greater risk for accounting errors and fraud.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should conduct a review of cash requirements for Consulate

General Karachi to determine an adequate level of the cashier's permanent advance. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with CGFS)

General Services Operations

Lack of Acquisition Planning

Mission Pakistan lacked an acquisition plan for procurement. Embassy Islamabad did not seek input from the consulates general to forecast contracting opportunities at the beginning of FY 2015. As a result, the embassy and the consulates general separately awarded purchase orders for fuel, maintenance, and internet, which increased the work load of Embassy Islamabad and Consulate General Karachi. Mission Pakistan lacked an acquisition plan because the embassy Management Section did not establish one as part of its annual fiscal year budget planning process. As stated in Federal Acquisition Regulation 7.102 (a), agencies shall perform acquisition planning and conduct market research for all acquisitions. Without an annual acquisition plan, the mission runs the risk of being unable to determine optimal contracting methods, increase competition, or provide cost savings.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Islamabad should prepare an annual acquisition plan and include the consulates general in the planning process. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Embassy Did Not Use Available Information Systems to Optimize Motor Pool Operations

Embassy Islamabad did not use the Department's automated Fleet Management Integrated System to manage its \$14 million vehicle fleet. The data for records of fuel, maintenance, vehicle and driver usage, and vehicle operators' records did not accurately reflect the embassy's fleet or provide data integrity. The embassy did not use the application correctly because motor pool supervisors failed to input the required information. Guidance in 14 FAM 437.1 (a) states that for effective fleet management and management controls, all records should be maintained and kept on file for all official vehicles. In addition, the Government Accountability Office's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*,⁹ Principle 13.06, states that management should process relevant data from reliable sources into quality information within the entity's information system. Without such quality information, mission management cannot make informed decisions and evaluate the efficiency of motor pool operations.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Islamabad should consolidate its motor vehicle records into the Fleet Management Integrated System. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Embassy Chauffeurs Lacked Safety Training

At the time of the inspection, 45 out of 99 embassy motor pool chauffeurs had expired Smith System safety training. Until April 2016, the embassy did not have a certified Smith System

⁹ GAO-14-704G, September 2014.

trainer to conduct training. In accordance with the embassy's motor vehicle safety program and 14 FAM 432.4 (c) (2), safety training must be provided to all chauffeurs upon initial assignment of an official vehicle and at least every two years thereafter. During the inspection, the General Services Officer established a corrective action plan, and the newly certified trainer started conducting refresher training. OIG advised the GSO Section to add a second certified trainer to ensure compliance with safety training requirements.

Mission Chauffeurs Lacked Armored Vehicle Training

Mission Pakistan chauffeurs lacked armored vehicle training. Mission Pakistan's Travel Policy mandated the use of fully armored vehicles for all motor pool vehicle movements. Fully armored vehicles, however, require specialized skills for effective and safe operation. Of the mission's 213 Department chauffeurs, only 23 received the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's armored vehicle training. The embassy set aside funding for training but did not secure enrollment in the course for its chauffeurs. The *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*,¹⁰ Principle 4.02, states that management establishes competence to carry out assigned responsibilities through relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities, which are gained largely from professional experience, training, and certifications. Failure to ensure proper training is inconsistent with this principle, especially given that Mission Pakistan is on the elevated risk list for driving conditions. Failure to provide armored vehicle training increases the risk of motor vehicle mishaps.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should implement a plan to provide armored vehicle training to all mission chauffeurs. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the DS)

ICASS Support to INL-P was Undefined

GSO did not define the extent or nature of its support to INL-P in procurement, supply, property management, and motor pool. INL-P management and the General Services Officer did not establish an agreement or discuss the level of support GSO should provide, which created confusion between the two sections. For example, GSO and INL-P did not establish procedures for procurements administered by INL-P. Per the INL bureau's acquisitions guidelines, a GSO section should be the least preferred method for arranging acquisitions. Per Department cable 12 State 1211389,¹¹ resources at posts may be limited and certain requests may exceed the capabilities of overseas contracting staff and as such, additional contracting support may be obtained from the Bureau of Administration Office of Acquisitions Management for the full range of contracting support. Failure to define support provided by GSO to INL-P increases the risk of internal control deficiencies.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should establish a memorandum of understanding

¹⁰ GAO-14-704G, September 2014.

¹¹ Department cable 12 State 1211389, "Planning and Managing Contracting by Overseas Posts," December 7, 2012.

defining General Services Operations' support to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement-Pakistan section. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with INL)

Information Management and Information Security

Mission Pakistan's IM Sections at the embassy and three consulates general provide classified and unclassified computer, classified and unclassified pouch, diplomatic post office mail, radio, telephone, and communications security services. Embassy Islamabad supported 1,100 computer users, Consulate General Karachi supported around 280 users, Consulate General Lahore supported around 150 users, and Consulate General Peshawar supported about 100 users. Due to the small sizes and security environment in Consulates General Lahore and Peshawar, the embassy IM section served as their classified computer, diplomatic mail, and classified and unclassified pouch hub. The embassy IM section also provided temporary duty staff support to Consulates General Lahore and Peshawar. The Department's Regional Information Management Center assigned three Information Management Technical Specialists to provide radio and telecommunication infrastructure support to the consulates general, but embassy IM management also assigned these specialists responsibility for the embassy's radio and telephone services. The four IM sections' scores on the 2016 ICASS customer satisfaction survey ranged from 4.18 to 4.58 on a scale of 1-5.

OIG reviewed Mission Pakistan's IM sections and advised managers on issues including: records coordinator responsibilities; SharePoint knowledge management; computer resources access control; annual information technology contingency plan testing; access and maintenance log keeping for computerized telephone system; media markings and safeguarding; and mobile devices inventory.

Mission Pakistan Information Management Operations Not Integrated

The embassy IM section provided temporary duty staffing and technical support to the consulates general IM sections when requested. However, it did not provide adequate coordination and assessments of their operations, nor did staff travel to the consulates general regularly to conduct operational reviews. Moreover, embassy IM managers did not integrate embassy and consulate general activities, such as information security reviews, telephone operations management, SharePoint site administration, Information Technology Control Board oversight, and staff development. In addition, embassy management did not assign consulate general IM supervisory, coordination, and assessment responsibilities to the Information Management Officer position through the Foreign Service evaluation and assignment processes. These practices are inconsistent with Department guidance. As stated in 5 FAM 121. 1 (a) and (b)6, the embassy Information Management Officer is the senior IM official at a mission comprised of multiple posts and is responsible for coordinating embassy and constituent post IT operations. In addition, according to 5 FAM 121.1, embassy IM managers are required to travel to the consulates general on a periodic basis to assess operations. The lack of a supervisory relationship prevented the Information Management Officer from providing adequate coordination, assessments, and integration to consulates general, which added to the workload of those IM sections.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Islamabad should assign responsibility for supervision, assessment, and coordination of information management programs at the consulates general to the Information Management Officer. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Non-Performance of Regional Information Systems Security Officer Duties

The mission's ISSO focused solely on embassy information security and did not perform these duties for the consulates general, because they were not reflected in the officer's work requirements. According to 12 FAM 632 and 12 FAM 642, ISSOs are required to perform regular reviews and analyses of information systems audit logs, user libraries, emails, workstations, servers, and hard drives to discover inappropriate or unusual activity. The IM specialists in the consulates general performed these ISSO's information security duties, which decreased the time they had to fulfill their regularly assigned IM functions.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Islamabad should implement standard operating procedures for Regional Information Systems Security Officer duties to include the consulates general. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Eight Dedicated Internet Networks Created Security Vulnerability

The Department's eight dedicated internet networks installed at Embassy Islamabad lacked adequate security and management controls. The embassy recognized the deficiency in internet networks management and started to consolidate the networks and implement appropriate controls to secure them as outlined in 5 FAM 872.1a. Embassy IM managers told OIG that the high number of networks was a legacy of the lack of network infrastructure at the old chancery. Lack of appropriate management exposes government computers to security breaches and inappropriate use of resources. Managing the networks drew embassy IM resources away from managing the Department's mission-critical sensitive-but-unclassified network.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Islamabad should consolidate its dedicated internet networks and establish standard operating procedures for dedicated internet network management. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Ineffective Active Directory Groups Management Created Risk

Embassy Islamabad did not update its Active Directory security and distribution groups for its unclassified computer network. The embassy lacked a standard operating procedure to guide sections in how to manage the groups. As outlined in 12 FAH-10 H-112.1-1-a (2-3), embassy section chiefs, in coordination with IM staff, need to review the access privileges of users under their supervision to verify that privileges are still required. Security and distribution groups are used to combine user accounts into manageable groups to ensure information is distributed to or accessed by the intended people. Letting users who no longer need access remain in Active Directory groups increases the risk of a security breach, especially if the group has access to sensitive information.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Islamabad should implement a standard operating procedure to manage its Active Directory groups. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

MISSION SUPPORT SERVICES

Employee Association Needs a Capital Investment Plan

The United States Employee Association had \$1.9 million in available cash reserve in its bank accounts but had no capital investment plan for the money. Per 6 FAM 531.4, an association may be required to complete a capital investment plan when there are excessive amounts of retained earnings. Association officers told OIG they could not create a capital investment plan for the cash reserve because OBO did not provide a list of furniture and equipment to be installed in the association's new recreation center, ancillary facilities, and offices in phase II of the New Embassy Compound project. OBO also did not inform the association what furniture and equipment it must pay for. The lack of a capital investment plan could create the vulnerability that funds are unavailable to replace association furniture, equipment and other capital assets.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should require the United States Employee Association to submit a capital investment plan to the Bureau of Administration. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with A and OBO)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should perform risk assessments of all agencies and sub-agencies receiving its government-to-government assistance. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with INL)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Islamabad, should establish standard operating procedures that comply with Department standards for records management of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Pakistan Section's program files. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 3: Embassy Islamabad should implement standard operating procedures for processing passport and consular report of birth services. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Islamabad should develop action plans to provide the three constituent posts with regional management support services on a regular basis. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 5: Embassy Islamabad should require the Principal Officer at Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar to designate a training officer at their posts. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should conduct a review of cash requirements for Consulate General Karachi to determine an adequate level of the cashier's permanent advance. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with CGFS)

Recommendation 7: Embassy Islamabad should prepare an annual acquisition plan and include the consulates general in the planning process. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Islamabad should consolidate its motor vehicle records into the Fleet Management Integrated System. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should implement a plan to provide armored vehicle training to all mission chauffeurs. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the DS)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should establish a memorandum of understanding defining General Services Operations' support to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement-Pakistan section. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with INL)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Islamabad should assign responsibility for supervision, assessment, and coordination of information management programs at the consulates general to the Information Management Officer. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 12: Embassy Islamabad should implement standard operating procedures for Regional Information Systems Security Officer duties to include the consulates general. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 13: Embassy Islamabad should consolidate its dedicated internet networks and establish standard operating procedures for dedicated internet network management. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Islamabad should implement a standard operating procedure to manage its Active Directory groups. (Action: Embassy Islamabad)

Recommendation 15: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should require the United States Employee Association to submit a capital investment plan to the Bureau of Administration. (Action: Embassy Islamabad, in coordination with A and OBO)

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
Chiefs of Mission:		
Ambassador	David Hale	11/2015
Deputy Chief of Mission	Jonathan Pratt	9/2015
Constituent Posts:		
Consulate General Karachi, Principal Officer	Brian Heath	8/2014
Consulate General Lahore, Principal Officer	Zachary Harkenrider	5/2014
Consulate General Peshawar, Principal Officer	William Martin	10/2015
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	Virginia Keener	8/2014
Consular	Thomas Rogan	8/2015
Political	Ian McCary	7/2015
Economic	Robert Garverick	7/2015
Public Affairs	Jeffrey Sexton	7/2015
Regional Security	Edwin Guard	7/2014
INL	Vacant	
ASSIST	Leon Waskin	10/2015
OBO	Vacant	
Other Agencies:		
Department of Defense	Colonel Patrick Sullivan	11/2015
Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan	Major General Rick Mattson	3/2016
Department of the Treasury	Larita Bolden	3/2016
Foreign Commercial Service	Cheryl Dukelow	10/2014
U.S. Agency for International Development	John Groarke	7/2015
Department of Homeland Security	Vacant	
Drug Enforcement Administration	Michael Dinnall	12/2014
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Michael LaPlante	10/2015
Foreign Agricultural Service	David Williams	8/2014
Department of Energy	Allison Johnston	1/2015

Source: Embassy Islamabad

APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

In conducting inspections, OIG uses a risk-based approach to prepare for each inspection; reviews pertinent records; reviews, circulates, and compiles the results of survey instruments, as appropriate; conducts interviews; and reviews the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by the review.

For this inspection, OIG conducted 141 documented interviews in Washington, D.C. and 423 in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, Pakistan; reviewed 766 surveys from Embassy Islamabad and Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar American and LE staff member; and reviewed 1,557 other documents.

ABBREVIATIONS

ASSIST	Coordination Office for Economic and Development Assistance
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
Department	Department of State
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
GSO	General Services Operations
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
IM	Information Management
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
INL-P	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Pakistan Section
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer
LE	Locally Employed
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
PAS	Public Affairs Section
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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