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**OIG**

**Office of Inspector General**

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ISP-I-17-19

Office of Inspections

June 2017

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# Inspection of Embassy Luanda, Angola

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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# OIG HIGHLIGHTS

ISP-I-17-19

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June 2017

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

Bureau of African Affairs

## Inspection of Embassy Luanda, Angola

### What OIG Found

#### What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected U.S. Embassy Luanda from October 11 to 29, 2016.

#### What OIG Recommended

OIG made 11 recommendations to Embassy Luanda to improve grants administration in the Public Affairs and Political/Economic Sections, strengthen internal controls in management operations, and ensure information technology systems management complies with Department standards.

In its comments on the draft report, the embassy concurred with all 11 recommendations. The embassy's response to each recommendation, and OIG's reply, can be found in the Recommendations Section of this report. OIG considers the recommendations resolved. The embassy's formal written response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B.

- Under the leadership of the Ambassador, U.S. engagement with the Angolan government was expanding into new areas of cooperation.
- Embassy Luanda's grants administration in the Public Affairs and Political/Economic Sections did not comply with some Department requirements.
- Following an extended vacancy in the Consular Section's most senior position, new leadership was taking steps to bring the section into compliance with Department standards on issues including visa adjudication review, crisis preparedness, and consular facilities.
- Under a new Management Officer, the Management Section was making progress implementing processes and procedures to correct deficiencies in management controls. Issues that still needed to be addressed included control over the use of official vehicles and accountability for fuel deliveries for official vehicles and residential generators.
- Embassy Luanda's server room for the unclassified computer system did not meet Department standards for structural integrity and physical protection.
- Embassy Luanda's alternate command center was not properly equipped.
- Spotlight on Success: The Management Section's use of a 3-D printer to produce custom products that were unavailable in the local market was efficient and customer-friendly.

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## CONTEXT

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A nation of 26 million people on the southwestern coast of Africa, Angola is almost twice the size of Texas. Angola became independent from Portugal in 1975 but tumbled into a 27-year civil war among groups backed by the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, China, and South Africa. U.S. support for the losing side of the civil war remains a complicating factor in the bilateral relationship, although relations have improved in recent years. The current president has held office since 1979.

Angola is sub-Saharan Africa's second-largest oil producer and the region's third-largest U.S. trading partner. Since the conclusion of the civil war in 2002, Angola has been one of Africa's highest growth markets. Oil exports account for 97 percent of Angolan export revenue. However, two-thirds of the population lives in poverty and the country is challenged by deficiencies in the areas of infrastructure, skilled labor, and institutional capacity. The health sector is another concern, as underscored by the yellow fever outbreak that began in early 2016. The fall in oil prices since 2014 has cut sharply into government revenues. The investment climate is hampered by rampant corruption and a complex, opaque regulatory environment, as reflected by rankings from globally recognized entities such as Transparency International, which places Angola 163 out of 168 nations. Luanda has also consistently been rated among the most expensive cities in the world for foreigners.

In 2009, Secretary of State Clinton declared Angola a "strategic partner" of the United States, one of three (together with Nigeria and South Africa) that the Obama Administration had identified in Africa. The U.S.–Angola Strategic Partnership Dialogue was formalized in 2010. Secretary Kerry hosted the first high-level Strategic Dialogue in December 2014 in Washington, DC and another in 2015. During the onsite inspection, the embassy was preparing for another round of discussions.

Embassy Luanda's Fiscal Year 2018-2020 Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) focuses on four main goals:

- Strengthen Angola's democratic institutions and government respect for human rights.
- Promote a transparent investment and regulatory framework to develop and diversify Angola's economy and trade with the United States.
- Boost Angola's capacity to maintain internal security and contribute to regional peace and security.
- Support efforts to realize Angola's human development potential.

The embassy compound, which opened in 2005, was constructed on a 1.6-acre site near the Luanda city center. At the time of the inspection, the mission's personnel complement included 52 U.S. direct-hire positions and 171 locally employed staff members. Other agencies represented in the mission include the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. U.S. foreign assistance to Angola for FY 2016 was \$53.4 million, which included \$48.3 million for health

initiatives, \$4.7 million for de-mining programs, and \$450,000 for the International Military Education and Training program.

OIG evaluated the embassy's policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act.<sup>1</sup> OIG also assessed security, which is covered in a separate report. The classified inspection report contains a comprehensive discussion of the conduct of the security program and issues affecting the safety of mission personnel and facilities.

## EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

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### Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

OIG assessed embassy leadership on the basis of 60 on-site interviews and 29 interviews in Washington that included comments on the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission's (DCM) performance; 104 questionnaires completed by U.S. and locally employed staff; OIG's review of documents; and observations of embassy meetings and activities during the course of the on-site inspection.

Under the direction of an ambassador committed to broadening and improving U.S.-Angolan relations despite historical bilateral tensions, Embassy Luanda is developing increasingly diverse and substantive contacts with the Angolan government and people. The Ambassador arrived in Angola in June 2104 and is serving for the second time as a chief of mission in a Portuguese-speaking African country. Washington partners and embassy staff praised her advanced language skills as an asset in working with the Angolan government and people to meet the Embassy's strategic aims. Employees consistently described the Ambassador and the DCM, who arrived in June 2015, as an energetic and engaged team. Interviews and OIG observations confirmed the leaders set a positive and professional tone, were attentive and open to staff, and worked long hours to manage a growing bilateral agenda.

Employees consistently told OIG that the Ambassador and DCM promoted an inclusive and supportive mission. OIG observed the Ambassador engage daily with embassy personnel of all ranks in their workspaces and common areas. In addition to a weekly country team meeting, the Ambassador chaired a monthly expanded session for U.S. direct-hire personnel to discuss her views and to promote broader awareness of mission activities. Employees considered these sessions, useful and worthwhile; they also had positive views of the monthly town hall meetings the Ambassador conducted to inform and interact with the entire mission community.

The Department of State (Department) designated Embassy Luanda as a difficult-to-staff embassy, acknowledging persistent recruitment problems that resulted in long-term staffing gaps and the stop-gap assignment of inexperienced personnel. Shortly before the inspection the Public Affairs Section went 3 years without continuous leadership, the Consular Section lacked a chief for 7 months, the Political/Economic Section did not have a warranted grants

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A.

officer for 6 months, and the Management Section suffered long-term staffing gaps of up to 2 years in almost every unit. In early 2016, vigorous recruitment of U.S. direct-hire candidates by the embassy's leaders and the Bureau of African Affairs succeeded in bringing new talent to fill key supervisory positions.

Under challenging staffing conditions, the Ambassador and the DCM relied on close oversight and supervision to maintain embassy operations and ensure quality products. Some employees told OIG that this level of executive involvement was not necessary to accomplish day-to-day business. OIG advised the Ambassador and the DCM that the influx of new hires presented an opportunity to transfer more authority and responsibility to lower-level supervisors.

## **Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives**

The Ambassador initiated and shaped measures to expand U.S.-Angolan bilateral relations and encourage Angola's cooperation in regional areas of concern to the United States. Washington stakeholders and embassy personnel gave her credit for reinvigorating the U.S.-Angola Strategic Partnership Dialogue and told OIG that she effectively engaged with the Angolan government on issues of U.S. concern, such as health, energy, human rights, trade development, and regional maritime security. Mission personnel gave OIG numerous examples of the positive effect of the Ambassador's personal intervention in overcoming roadblocks and advancing embassy goals.

Despite the hurdles posed by Angola's defensive bureaucracy and the country's wariness towards the United States, the Ambassador cultivated relationships with a broad range of government officials, as directed by 2 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 113c (7). An OIG review of the Ambassador's official calendar for the 6 months prior to the inspection showed that she met with an average of 10 senior-level Angolan officials a month, covering a range of ministries and executive offices. She worked with the government to set up bilateral working groups to coordinate activities and monitor progress in key areas of concern. Her schedule also confirmed regular participation in public diplomacy activities, ranging from media interviews to hosting events and delivering public remarks, all of which were designed to promote better understanding between the United States and Angola.

### ***Close Interagency Coordination***

Senior officials in the Department and other agencies praised the Ambassador's initiative and responsiveness when working with interagency partners in Washington. At the mission, agency and section heads confirmed to OIG that the Ambassador, as the Chief of Mission, unified the activities of all agencies at the mission, as mandated by the President's Letter of Instruction. Embassy personnel uniformly described interagency coordination at the mission as collegial and efficient. A framework of eight interagency working groups, linked to mission goals, provided for timely information exchange and flexibility in reacting to changing circumstances; OIG observations suggested these working groups would also serve effectively as a tool for joint decision-making.

The 2018-2020 ICS was developed in a series of interagency discussions tied to each of the mission's four main objectives. Agency and section heads uniformly told OIG that the final

product reflected the input of all members of the mission's country team, as required by 18 FAM 101.1-1, and that it accurately represented their views and interests. The Ambassador briefed all U.S. employees on the new ICS in an expanded country team meeting and then outlined ICS goals and priorities to the entire mission at a subsequent town hall session.

Although embassy personnel understood overall mission objectives, employees told OIG the multiple, often-urgent daily assignments from the Front Office sometimes left staff confused about the Ambassador's shorter-term priorities or expectations. OIG advised the Ambassador and DCM to clarify the Ambassador's priorities and requirements and to address resource issues with section leaders when assigning responsibilities to advance the embassy's growing agenda.

## **Adherence to Internal Controls**

The Ambassador emphasized the importance of internal controls, especially during staffing gaps in the Management Section. In October 2015, the Ambassador requested a regional rover from the Bureau of African Affairs to conduct an internal review of management operations. This review assisted the embassy officials in identifying and addressing various internal controls deficiencies. The Ambassador's Statement of Assurance for the period October 1, 2015, through August 31, 2016, did not identify any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses. Although the 2016 Statement of Assurance did not list any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses, OIG did identify deficiencies in the Consular and the Management Sections, as described later in this report.

## **Security of the Mission**

Embassy Luanda's Regional Security Office provided a secure environment for the conduct of foreign affairs and for U.S. embassy personnel. OIG surveys and interviews confirmed that the Ambassador and DCM supported the embassy security program, as required by the President's Letter of Instruction and 2 FAM 113.1 c(5). The embassy was up to date on conducting all drills. The Ambassador also attended a consular town hall meeting with U.S. citizens in August 2016, where she discussed personal security. After this meeting, several attendees volunteered for the American Liaison Network,<sup>2</sup> a key tool in ensuring the safety of U.S. citizens abroad.

Based on Embassy Luanda's critical threat rating for crime, OIG reviewed residential security, physical security, and emergency preparedness. OIG also assessed the technical security program. OIG identified some minor security deficiencies that the embassy corrected during the inspection. These corrective actions included updating two sections in the emergency action plan and placing provisions in the alternate command center. More significant security deficiencies that resulted in recommendations are discussed in detail in a separate classified inspection report.

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<sup>2</sup> The American Liaison Network is a network of U.S. citizens living abroad who volunteer to assist U.S. citizen tourists needing aid while traveling abroad.

## Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leadership

The DCM was mindful of her responsibilities under 3 FAM 2242.4 to foster the professional development of the Embassy's five First- and Second-Tour (FAST) officers. For example, she arranged for FAST officers to meet with high-level visitors and to serve as site or control officers, appointed a FAST employee to coordinate the ICS process, and put another in charge of the mission's official 4th of July event. FAST officers told OIG they valued their frequent informal contacts with the Ambassador and the DCM. OIG encouraged the DCM to continue to develop the post's FAST program.

## POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

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### Political and Economic Affairs

OIG reviewed the combined Political/Economic Section's reporting, outreach, commercial advocacy, grants administration, and security assistance oversight. The section directly administered or supported the Department in managing foreign assistance programs for demining, refugees, and anti-trafficking; these programs totaled approximately \$14.4 million. The section complied with Department guidance, regulations and applicable law, with the exceptions noted below.

#### *Political/Economic Section Met Reporting and Advocacy Responsibilities*

OIG found Department and other U.S. Government agency readers were satisfied with embassy advocacy and reporting, which aligned with ICS goals. Despite a challenging environment, officers in the Political/Economic Section engaged with an increasingly diverse range of Angolan contacts. Department and other agency readers highlighted the embassy's engagement on Africa's Great Lakes<sup>3</sup> regional security issues and advocacy on behalf of the American business community as particularly useful; they also praised reporting on the 2016 yellow fever epidemic. OIG reviewed reporting cables issued between April and September 2016 and found they addressed key issues and were sourced in accordance with Department standards. OIG discussed with the section chief ways to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of reporting, including increasing travel outside the capital, use of record emails, and developing and using a section-wide reporting and representation plan.

#### *Embassy Had Not Closed Out Political/Economic Grants*

Embassy Luanda had not closed out grants administered by the Political/Economic Section in accordance with the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive, dated January 14, 2016. Section 3.07 of the Directive requires managers of all federal assistance awards to complete the closeout process no later than 1 year after receipt of all required final reports. OIG reviewed all

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<sup>3</sup> Since 2014, Angola's President has served as acting head of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an inter-governmental organization of 12 countries in the African Great Lakes region.

open Special Self-Help, Taft, and Human Rights Democracy Funds<sup>4</sup> grant files, which dated from FY 2009 through FY 2015 and totaled approximately \$435,000. OIG found that 10 of 27 grants had not been closed out in accordance with the Department's guidance.

The section was not able to properly administer its grants program, including closing out grants and awarding new grants, due to staffing gaps, particularly the absence of a warranted grants officer for 6 months in 2016. Failure to close out grants leaves the embassy unable to verify whether the required outcomes have been achieved, and whether U.S. Government funds have been spent in accord with the terms of the grant. In August 2016, the section mitigated risks by suspending the award of new grants and returning \$35,000 in Self-Help funds to the Bureau of African Affairs. In November 2016 the grants officer completed the training necessary to obtain a permanent warrant.

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Luanda should close out all open grants in accordance with the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

### ***Grants Files Lack Required Documentation***

OIG reviewed the five active Special Self-Help grants issued between FY 2013 and FY 2015 and identified management deficiencies in all five. These deficiencies included four of five grants that contained no risk assessment. In addition, none of the grants had monitoring plans or quarterly performance and financial reports, all of which are required by Embassy Luanda's Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund Standard Operating Procedure, dated April 2016. In addition, only two of the five project sites covered by the grants were visited by embassy personnel, an important oversight function usually included in grant monitoring plans. Finally, none of the grants were entered into the Grants Database Management System as required by Federal Assistance Policy Directive Section 1.09. Failure to perform risk assessments, develop monitoring plans, and monitor and document grantee performance leaves the Embassy unable to verify that the purpose of the grant is being carried out, that required outcomes have been achieved, and that U.S. Government funds have been spent in accord with the terms of the grant. Because the activity period of the grants had been completed and the current grants officer had just received a permanent warrant and was aware of requirements, OIG did not make a recommendation. OIG did, however, advise the grants officer and grants officer representative to monitor and maintain complete and accurate files for all future grants, which they agreed to do.

### ***Leahy Vetting Conducted in Accordance with Department Guidance***

Leahy legislation prohibits U.S. Government-funded training of foreign law enforcement and security forces involved in human rights violations. In September 2016, the Department's Bureau

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<sup>4</sup> The Special Self-Help Fund is a small grants program of the Department's Bureau of African Affairs that provides targeted, visible small scale U.S. assistance to local communities. The Julia Taft fund is a small grants program of the Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to support small projects that help refugee populations. The Human Rights Democracy Fund is a small grants program of the Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to strengthen human rights and democracy.

of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor approved Embassy Luanda's standard operating procedures for Leahy vetting.<sup>5</sup> The Leahy coordinator and back-up had the requisite International Vetting and Security Tracking system training and worked closely with other embassy sections. The embassy vetted 37 individuals in 2015 and 68 from January 2016 through October 2016 for potential gross human right abuses in accordance with applicable laws and Department requirements.

## Public Diplomacy

Following a 3-year period of absent or truncated leadership, the current Public Affairs Officer arrived in March 2016, and the Assistant Public Affairs Officer arrived soon thereafter, restoring stability and program direction to the Embassy's public diplomacy operations. The section was well integrated into embassy policy implementation efforts and had responsibilities under each ICS goal. However, shortages in locally employed staff constrained program reach and operations. For example, during the inspection, the embassy cancelled plans for a U.S. election public diplomacy representational event because employee absences depleted the section's capacity to provide support. Similarly, the daily press briefing that the section normally provided the Ambassador and the DCM was suspended for several weeks, including the entire period of the inspection, for the same reason.

The Department's 2015 Rightsizing Review of U.S. Mission Angola recommended an increase of one to two locally employed staff positions, noting that the current ratio of six locally employed staff to two U.S. direct-hire staff was below the norm for comparably sized embassies. OIG concurred with that recommendation, noting that an additional locally employed staff position would boost the section's capacity to develop, support, and follow-through on programs. OIG reviewed strategic planning and reporting, grants administration, exchange programs, media engagement, and American spaces.<sup>6</sup> OIG found public diplomacy operations to be generally aligned with Department priorities and regulations, with specific observations and areas for improvement noted below.

### *Public Affairs Section Addressing Deficiencies in Grants Administration*

OIG identified deficiencies in the administration of public diplomacy grants. OIG reviewed all FY 2015 grants greater than \$2,000 (6 grants totaling \$104,931, comprising 85 percent of the total \$122,696 awarded during the fiscal year) and all FY 2016 grants (4 grants totaling \$78,515). At the start of the inspection, none of the FY 2015 or FY 2016 grants were in the Grants Database Management System, although this is mandated by the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive 1.09(B). Additionally, grant files lacked required documentation. For example, four of the six FY 2015 grants reviewed were missing the grantee application form, as required by Federal Assistance Policy Directive FAPD 1.08. Neither of the two FY 2015 grants greater than

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<sup>5</sup> The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the Department of State from furnishing assistance to foreign security forces if the Department receives credible information that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. See 22 USC 2378d.

<sup>6</sup> American Spaces are U.S. Government-operated or supported facilities that are venues for information outreach, educational advising, English language instruction, and other program activities.

\$25,000 included a record of regional bureau approval, as required by the Department's Procedural Guide to Grants and Cooperative Agreements. Additionally 47 completed grants, issued between FY 2010 and FY 2014, totaling approximately \$286,000, were not closed out properly.

During the inspection, the section made progress addressing these deficiencies. The Bureau of African Affairs supported a visit by a regional grants specialist to review grants administration, identify missing documentation needed to bring files into compliance with regulations, and retroactively enter all grants from FY 2015 and FY 2016 into the Grants Database Management System. The section's senior locally employed staff were trained and certified as grants officer representatives, strengthening the section's capacity to properly administer and monitor grants. Section staff met with the embassy's financial management staff to review the status of all grants that had not been properly closed out and to identify required steps to complete the process. OIG referred embassy personnel to the Department's close-out policy and guidance to adopt as a standard operating procedures

### ***Risk Assessment and Monitoring Needed Improvement***

Despite the general improvement in required documentation, as noted above, Embassy Luanda's public diplomacy grant files lacked required risk assessments and most also lacked monitoring plans. All six FY 2015 grants files reviewed by OIG lacked both risk assessments and monitoring plans. All four FY 2016 grant files lacked risk assessments, and two of the four also lacked monitoring plans. Staffing gaps and high turnover among the section's U.S. direct-hire officers and limited grants officer representative capacity among the locally employed staff contributed to inconsistent grants administration. Federal Assistance Policy Directive 2.03A, however, requires embassies to conduct a risk assessment on all competitive and non-competitive awards and include a corresponding risk mitigation strategy in each grant's monitoring plan. Effective risk assessment and mitigation reduce the risk of loss or misuse of U.S. Government funds and helps ensure that the program objectives are met and that grants are successfully closed out.

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Luanda should include risk assessment and monitoring plans with risk mitigation strategies as documented elements in all public diplomacy grant files. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

### ***Exchange Programs Growing but Flow Mostly in One Direction***

Exchange programs for Angolans were growing, The Young African Leaders Initiative, a youth exchange program launched in 2010, tripled from 6 to 18 Angolan grantees between FY 2015 and FY 2016. However, reciprocal programs in Angola for U.S. citizens were lacking, undermining the guiding principle written into the legislation, which established the Department's academic exchange programs to "maintain a reasonable balance, over the years, of participants from both partner countries."<sup>7</sup> For example, Embassy Luanda sends 13 Angolan Fulbright grantees to the

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<sup>7</sup> Guiding Principles from the Policies of the J. William Fulbright Scholarship Board, issued May 2015, by the Department's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs.

United States but Angola has not hosted any U.S. Fulbright student or scholar grantees since 2007. Private exchanges reflect the same pattern: 1,184 Angolans studied in the United States in 2015, up 20 percent from 2014, while there were no U.S. university-level students in Angola. An increased presence of American students and scholars in Angola would contribute to the Embassy's efforts to improve mutual understanding and move past the residual anti-Americanism linked to the civil war era and its wake. OIG encouraged the section to explore ways to address the imbalance of exchange flows, such as through the Department's Fulbright Specialist program that could bring U.S. experts in a wide range of fields to Angola.

### *Reaching New Audiences through American Spaces and Digital Outreach*

The Embassy supported two American Spaces in Luanda—the Information Resource Center located at the Embassy and an American Corner located in a vocational training center. OIG encouraged the Public Affairs Section to establish additional American Corners in one or more major provincial cities to reach new audiences outside the capital.

The Embassy focused its digital outreach on Facebook, which is used by nearly 60 percent of Angola's 6 million internet users.<sup>8</sup> At the time of the inspection, the Embassy Facebook page had approximately 14,000 followers, a small audience compared to other U.S. embassies in middle-income African countries of similar size. Given Angola's size and the challenge of in-country travel, digital outreach can more effectively project public diplomacy efforts beyond core audiences in the capital. The locally employed Social Media Coordinator was absent for several months, which limited initiative in this area, but OIG encouraged the section to use Department-supported social media analytics and develop a social media strategic plan in order to increase on-line engagement with target audiences.

### **Consular Affairs**

OIG reviewed the Consular Section's visa operations, American citizens' services, anti-fraud programs, Visas Viper (a program to identify terrorist threats), cashiering operations, facilities, and crisis preparedness. The section complied with Department guidance, regulations, and applicable law, with the exceptions noted below. The Consular Section experienced a series of leadership challenges during 2015 and 2016. As noted previously, the section chief position was vacant for more than seven months beginning in November 2015, and two first-tour officers ran the section during this period. The Bureau of Consular Affairs positively commented that the officers effectively handled responsibilities well beyond their level of training and experience. The new consular chief arrived in June 2016 and acted to improve operations, addressing the issues identified by the regional consular officer as described below.

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<sup>8</sup>Angola had 5,951,453 internet users as of June 30, 2016, according to [www.internetworldstats.com](http://www.internetworldstats.com), and 3.5 million Facebook users as of June 30, 2016, according to Facebook.

### ***Deficiencies Identified by Regional Consular Officer Being Addressed***

A regional consular officer from the Bureau of Consular Affairs made a regularly scheduled visit to Embassy Luanda from July 31 to August 4, 2016, and produced a report that included action items for the embassy. OIG reviewed the report and concurred with its conclusions. Most of the action items in that report had either been completed at the time of the inspection or Consular Section leadership was in the process of addressing them.

However, OIG noted a few additional problems during the inspection, most of which the section began resolving during the inspection. The Embassy had not performed visa adjudication reviews as required by 9 FAM 403.9-2(D), 9 FAM 403.10-3(D), and 9 FAM 504.11-3 (A) (2). The section chief and the DCM brought their reviews into compliance before the inspection was completed. The section did not have up-to-date local standard operating procedures but were developing new procedures or updating existing ones. Consular sections should have local standard operating procedures to ensure that their operations are uniform, consistent, and repeatable as required by 7 FAH-1 H-264.

### ***Crisis Preparedness Vulnerabilities***

The Consular Section needed to take additional steps to prepare for a crisis in accordance with 7 FAM 1812.109. In particular, the section had not conducted crisis training since November 2014. To address the lack of training, the section, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, scheduled a crisis exercise for November 2016. The embassy also scheduled a crisis management exercise, led by a trainer from the Foreign Service Institute, for December 2016. The American-citizen warden system, made up of volunteers who assist the embassy in helping U.S. citizens, suffered in recent years as large numbers of wardens left Angola, following the economic downturn. At an August 2016 town hall meeting, the section recruited a number of new wardens.

### ***Consular Section Facilities Did Not Meet Some Department Standards***

The embassy's Consular and Management Sections worked together to improve the Consular Section facilities by installing a window in the cashier booth to provide line of sight by an American officer as required by 7 FAH-1 H-282 and by adding an additional interview window to handle the section's workload. However, problems with the Consular Section facilities remained.

The consular waiting room lacked privacy for interviews and was not in compliance with the standards in 7 FAH-1 H-282. OIG advised the section to explore installation of noise-reducing wall coverings. There was no storage room for the effects of deceased Americans, as required by 7 FAH-1 H-648.3-2, because the designated room had been converted into office space to accommodate additional staff. Although the section has had little need for such storage in the past, the embassy must be able to provide such storage when required. OIG advised section leadership that the embassy should identify space to address this possibility.

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

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### Management Operations

As a result of staffing gaps, the embassy relied on a succession of temporary-duty Management Officers sent by the Bureau of African Affairs for the 7-month period from November 2015 to June 2016. The assigned Management Officer arrived in June 2016 to find a section confronting operational weaknesses, including management control deficiencies, lack of procedures, and outdated management policies. OIG reviewed internal controls systems in the General Services, Financial Management, Facility Management, and Human Resources functions and determined the Management Section was making progress in implementing processes and procedures in accordance with regulations and Department policies and procedures, with the exceptions noted below.

#### *General Services Operations Control Vulnerabilities*

##### *Inadequate Controls over Fuel Coupons for Official Vehicles*

The Embassy did not exercise control over official vehicle fuel coupons that motor pool drivers used to obtain fuel at local gas stations. The Embassy spent a total of \$220,058 on official vehicle fuel in FY 2015 and FY 2016 but had no controls in place to ensure it was not overpaying. OIG found no record of inventory, receipts, monthly reconciliations, or verifications of fuel coupons. In addition, the motor pool did not require recipients of gas coupons to sign for them, nor did it track the number of coupons distributed. These problems occurred because the section's property management officer had not designated a coupon control officer to maintain records in accordance with standards outlined in 4 FAH-1 H-814.3-2. Lack of recordkeeping and oversight leaves the fuel coupon system vulnerable to fraud, which could result in the misuse or loss of U.S. government funds.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Luanda should implement management controls over its fuel coupon system. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

##### *Ineffective Controls over Use of Official Vehicles*

Embassy Luanda did not have a control system for issuing keys for official U.S. Government vehicles. Instead, the General Services Office permitted drivers to pick-up and return keys to a guard at the embassy entrance gate. During the inspection, the General Services Office took possession of all official vehicle keys and disseminated a notice informing mission employees of new procedures on key pick-up and drop-off. However, under the new procedures, the keys remain unsecured. In accordance with 14 FAM 436.3 (c) the officer accountable for official vehicle use must establish effective management control procedures to ensure vehicles are used only by qualified drivers or other authorized operators. Lack of an effective key control system increases the risk of theft or unauthorized use of official vehicles and exposes the Embassy to potential liability in the event of an accident or other incident.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Luanda should establish a system for control of all keys to official vehicles, including a vehicle key control log for issuance and return of vehicle keys. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

### *Incomplete Residential Lease Files*

Embassy Luanda's residential lease files were incomplete. OIG reviewed 10 out of 42 lease files and found that none contained documentation that the Regional Security Officer had conducted required inspections and had certified that security upgrades were completed. Guidance in 5 FAM 252.4 (a) requires the Regional Security Officer to conduct residential security surveys on all residential properties that may be occupied by U.S. personnel to determine whether the residence meets, or can be made to meet, required residential security standards. Although OIG determined that the inspections had been conducted, the absence of documentation regarding the completion of residential security upgrades is inconsistent with this Department policy. OIG advised the General Services Office to ensure that documentation was included in the lease files showing the installation of security upgrades prior to occupancy.

## **Financial Management**

### *Embassy Lacks Comprehensive Currency Exchange Policy*

The Embassy had a policy that permitted the limited sale of U.S. dollars to American employees for local use and a security directive prohibiting employees from exchanging currency on the street or in public places. The cashier policy and security directive, however, did not fully reflect 3 FAM 4123.1 regulatory guidelines that establish employee standards of conduct in regard to currency exchange. For example, 3 FAM 4123.1A (6) prohibits independent and unsanctioned private transactions. Absent a comprehensive policy establishing expected standards of conduct, American employees may engage unknowingly in currency exchange activities prohibited by regulation and local law, which, in turn, could put American personnel at risk and cause embarrassment to the U.S. government.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Luanda should establish a comprehensive currency exchange policy for American employees. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

## **Facility Management**

### *Embassy Apartments Do Not Meet Fire Standards*

Embassy leased apartments did not meet Department fire standards. The embassy leased 42 residences; 38 were apartments in high-rise buildings. Guidance in 15 FAM 812.5 states that apartments in high-rise buildings are required to have at least two means of egress, a fire detection and alarm system, and a sprinkler system throughout the building. The Facility Management Officer found that 28 out of 38 apartments did not meet all the requirements outlined in the cable and will need to be removed from the mission's housing pool. Embassy officials explained that construction in Luanda often does not meet U.S. construction codes and

U.S. fire standards. However, failure to comply with these standards raises the risk of injury and property damage in the event a fire.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should relocate employees to residences that meet Department fire standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda, in coordination with OBO)

### ***No Oversight for Generator Fuel Deliveries to Residences***

The Embassy did not have a system to track fuel deliveries for generators at embassy residences. Between FY 2015 and FY 2016, fuel purchases for residential generators totaled \$290,311. OIG found that there was no receiving clerk to oversee fuel deliveries at residences. Guidance in 14 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-312 (b) states that the acceptance of goods and services on behalf of the U.S. Government is an inherently governmental function that must be performed by a U.S. Government employee. Further, 14 FAH-815.2 (d) states that copies of orders for fuel deliveries must be forwarded to the receiving clerk and kept in a pending file until delivery is made. In addition, the acquisition document should be compared with vendor delivery tickets to ensure that the correct quantity and type of fuel is delivered. Because there was no receiving clerk accepting and verifying fuel deliveries, there was no independent verification of what was delivered against what was ordered. Lack of proper oversight increases the risk of fuel theft or inaccurate fuel deliveries, which results in a misuse or loss of U.S. government funds.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Luanda should strengthen its controls over residential fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards to include establishing a receiving clerk to oversee deliveries. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

### **Spotlight on Success: Pioneering the Use of 3-D Technology**

Due to the unavailability of resources in the local market, the Facility Management Section purchased a 3-D printer to produce products such as custom brackets and mounts, equipment tags, hinges, and custom parts. This cost-effective technology enhanced both the efficiency and customer service of the Facility Management team. The Facility Manager trained locally employed staff on the use of this technology and discussed this initiative with other facility managers at a conference in the Regional Training Center in Frankfurt.

## **Information Management**

OIG validated that most information management programs and services met customer needs and complied with Department requirements outlined in 5 FAM 120. However, OIG identified deficiencies in the physical protection of the unclassified servers, high frequency radio operations, IT contingency plan testing, and operation of the local IT configuration control board. OIG advised the Information Management Officer on solutions for optimizing the mission's network infrastructure, communications security procedures, telephone network operations, system administrator cross-training, helpdesk management, and documentation of information system security.

OIG reviewed the physical, environmental, and technical security of classified and unclassified computer networks and dedicated internet networks. OIG reviewed the radio and telephone systems, diplomatic post office and mail, classified and unclassified pouch operations, mobile computing, communications security, records management, equipment inventories, and emergency operations. From May 2015 until August 2016, the Information Management Section suffered staffing gaps, which limited the section's ability to implement proactive management initiatives. Now that the section is fully staffed, as it was at the time of the inspection, information management leadership can take actions such as securing unclassified servers and testing the unclassified IT contingency plan.

### ***Unsecure Unclassified Server Room***

Embassy Luanda's unclassified servers were housed within an unsecure, make-shift enclosure that did not provide required physical protection. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security reported this issue in a computer security assessment, dated October 2014. Further, OIG recommended that the embassy relocate the server room in its previous inspection report.<sup>9</sup> OIG closed the recommendation based on Embassy Luanda's assertion that it had addressed the problems in the server room. Department guidance at 2 FAH-10 H-272.17.1 requires security controls for all server rooms, including perimeter walls extending from floor to ceiling, to protect against unauthorized physical access to the equipment. The Information Management Officer drafted a statement of work in order to hire a contractor to construct a server room that meets security standards. OIG advised the Information Management Officer to ensure that the Department's security requirements are incorporated in the statement of work. Storing servers in an unsecure enclosure leaves the equipment vulnerable to unauthorized access.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should construct an unclassified server room that meets physical security requirements. (Action: Embassy Luanda, in coordination with OBO)

### ***Inoperable High-Frequency Radio at Alternate Command Center***

OIG's review of the alternate command center found that the high-frequency radio had not been tested to ensure functionality and was, in fact, inoperable. The high-frequency radio was previously serviced by a technician from a Department regional information management center and thought to be in working order. The absence of testing is inconsistent with guidance in 12 FAH-1 H-261c (b), which states that high-frequency radios should be tested periodically to ensure functionality during an emergency or other crisis. The mission's high-frequency radios are critical to the mission's emergency communications and should be operational at all times. Non-functioning equipment puts the safety and security of embassy personnel at risk in the event of a crisis.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Luanda should repair or replace the high-frequency radio at the alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

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<sup>9</sup> OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Luanda, Angola*; (ISP-I-09-19A; March 2009).

### *Untested Information Technology Contingency Plan*

The Information Management Section had not tested the 2016 Information Technology Contingency Plan for the unclassified computer network. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security computer security assessments, dated June 2012 and October 2014, also identified this deficiency. Per 5 FAM 851a, every information system must have a documented contingency plan that is tested annually. Staffing gaps and competing priorities limited the information management staff's ability to test the plan in compliance with this requirement. An untested IT contingency plan increases the risk of ineffective responses to or loss of critical information during an emergency or crisis event.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Luanda should conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified network in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

### *Information Technology Configuration Control Board Not Established*

Embassy Luanda had not established a Local Information Technology Configuration Control Board for governing all systems equipment operated on the mission's network. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security computer security assessment dated June 2012 also identified this deficiency. Per 5 FAM 862.1b, an embassy that maintains its own information technology systems must establish a Local Information Technology Configuration Control Board to ensure that the hardware, software, or network components installed on the local area networks do not adversely affect the existing local information technology infrastructure. The lack of a Local Information Technology Configuration Control Board can put Department computer systems at risk of potential compromise.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Luanda should establish a Local Information Technology Configuration Control Board in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

## RECOMMENDATIONS

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OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to Embassy Luanda. The embassy's complete response can be found in Appendix B. The Department also provided technical comments that OIG incorporated, as appropriate into this report.

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Luanda should close out all open grants in accordance with the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted that many outstanding grants were closed in accordance with the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive and it was working on closing out the remainder.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of all open grants being closed in accordance with Department directives.

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Luanda should include risk assessment and monitoring plans with risk mitigation strategies as documented elements in all public diplomacy grant files. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted that the Public Affairs Section included risk assessment and monitoring plans with risk mitigation strategies in all open grants.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the risk assessment and monitoring plans in all public diplomacy grant files.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Luanda should implement management controls over its fuel coupon system. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it discontinued use of the fuel coupon system and switched to a fuel card system.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the use of the fuel card system.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Luanda should establish a system for control of all keys to official vehicles, including a vehicle key control log for issuance and return of vehicle keys. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it installed a "key watcher" system in its motor pool and all vehicle keys were electronically registered when they are checked in or out.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the installation and use of the "key watcher" system.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Luanda should establish a comprehensive currency exchange policy for American employees. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it prepared a comprehensive currency exchange and accommodation policy that was distributed to all embassy personnel.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts the embassy's currency exchange and accommodation policy.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should relocate employees to residences that meet Department fire standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda, in coordination with OBO)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it was actively implementing a strategy that is re-shaping its housing pool. The embassy expects to replace 7 of the 10 most vulnerable units by the end of 2017 and the remaining 3 will be replaced no later than mid-2018.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of employees relocated to residences that meet Department fire standards.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Luanda should strengthen its controls over residential fuel deliveries to include oversight and spot checks. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted that it procured an eGauge system to help monitor deliveries electronically. Until the system is implemented, the Facility Manager is physically present during both residential and chancery fuel deliveries.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the use of the eGauge system.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should construct an unclassified server room that meets physical security requirements. (Action: Embassy Luanda, in coordination with OBO)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it was working with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to rework the server room to meet Department guidelines.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of an unclassified server room that meets physical security requirements.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Luanda should repair or replace the high-frequency radio at the alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it ordered and received the necessary equipment for the high frequency radio in the alternate command center. A Regional Information Management Center visit was scheduled to install the equipment.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the high-frequency radio installation.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Luanda should conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified network in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it completed two information technology contingency plan tests since the OIG inspection.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the contingency plan tests.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Luanda should establish a Local Information Technology Configuration Control Board in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

**Management Response:** In its May 19, 2017, response, Embassy Luanda concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted it began the process of establishing an Information Technology Configuration Control Board.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the established board.

## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

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Title	Name	Arrival Date
<b>Chiefs of Mission:</b>		
Ambassador	Helen R. La Lime	6/14
Deputy Chief of Mission	Constance C. Arvis	6/15
<b>Chiefs of Sections:</b>		
Management	Marialice Burford-Castillo	6/16
Consular	Samuel Worland-Esquith	6/16
Political/Economic	Chuka Asike	6/15
Public Diplomacy	Naomi Mattos	3/16
Regional Security	Dwayne Gordon	
<b>Other Agencies:</b>		
Department of Defense	Matthew V. Sousa	8/14
U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service	Ricardo Dias	4/14
U.S. Commercial Service	Julia M. Rauner	1/15
U.S. Agency for International Development	Mark White, acting	10/16
Centers for Disease Controls and Prevention	Suzanne Westman	7/14
Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator	Carey Spear	6/16

## APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

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This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

### Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### Methodology

In conducting inspections, OIG uses a risk-based approach to prepare for each inspection; reviews pertinent records; reviews, circulates, and compiles the results of survey instruments, as appropriate; conducts interviews; and reviews the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by the review. OIG used professional judgment, along with physical, documentary, testimonial, and analytical evidence collected or generated, to develop findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

For this inspection, OIG conducted 273 documented interviews in Washington and at Embassy Luanda. OIG also reviewed 712 documents and responses to OIG questionnaires that were submitted by 36 American employees and 97 locally employed staff.

## APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

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*Embassy of the United States of America*

Luanda, Angola

May 19, 2017

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THRU: AF – A/AS Peter Barlerin

TO: OIG – Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: U.S. Embassy Luanda – Constance C. Arvis, Charge d'Affaires

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of U.S. Embassy Luanda

U.S. Embassy Luanda has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by the OIG:

**OIG Highlights, Preamble:** We note that the paragraph entitled “What the OIG Recommended” on the highlights page of the draft report includes a reference to a consular recommendation. We note that there are no formal consular recommendations.

**OIG Recommendation 1:** Embassy Luanda should close out all open grants in accordance with the Department’s Federal Assistance Policy Directive. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and informs that many outstanding grants have been closed in accordance with the Department’s Federal Assistance Policy Directive. We are working to complete the closing out of the remainder of our grants.

**OIG Recommendation 2:** Embassy Luanda should include risk assessment and monitoring plans with risk mitigation strategies as documented elements in all public diplomacy grant files. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and informs that the public affairs section has included risk assessment and monitoring plans with risk mitigation strategies in all open grants.

**OIG Recommendation 3:** Embassy Luanda should implement management controls over its fuel coupon system. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has discontinued using the fuel coupon system. Instead, post now uses a fuel card system with one card dedicated to each vehicle.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Luanda should establish a system for control of all keys to official vehicles, including a vehicle key control log for issuance and return of vehicle keys. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has put in place a "key watcher" system in Motor Pool. When shifts end, all keys must be returned to the key watcher box located inside of the Chancery. Now, vehicle keys are electronically registered when they are checked in and out. The system also allows Management to know which driver has what vehicle at what time.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Luanda should establish a comprehensive currency exchange policy for American employees. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has completed a comprehensive currency exchange/currency accommodation policy which has been distributed to Embassy personnel and is available on the Embassy's share point site.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should relocate employees to residences that meet Department fire standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda, in coordination with OBO)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has developed, and is actively implementing, a strategy that is re-shaping its housing pool. By the end of calendar year 2017, we expect seven of the 10 most vulnerable housing units to have been replaced. Barring unforeseen circumstances, by no later than mid-2018, the remaining three units will be replaced.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Luanda should strengthen its controls over residential fuel deliveries to include oversight and spot checks. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has procured an eGuage system that will help to monitor deliveries electronically. In the interim, the Facility Manager is physically present during both residential and Chancery fuel deliveries.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should construct an unclassified server room that meets physical security requirements. (Action: Embassy Luanda, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and is coordinating with OBO to rework the Server Room and ISC area to meet FAM/FAH guidelines, provide sufficient space for equipment, and address the lack of sufficient cooling in the server room.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Luanda should repair or replace the high-frequency radio at the alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

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- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation, and has already ordered and received the necessary antenna and equipment to install the HF Radio at the ACC. A RIMC trip is scheduled to do the installation. The installation of the E&E radio at the ACC has been completed and tested.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Luanda should conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified network in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has exercised its ITCP twice since the departure of the OIG team. ISC also regularly ensures back-ups are good by performing restore operations from the back-up data.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Luanda should establish a Local Information Technology Configuration Control Board in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Luanda)

- **Response:** Embassy Luanda acknowledges this recommendation and has begun the process of establishing an LCCB, but has not completed all of the required paperwork yet.

The point of contact for this memorandum is Marialice Burford de Castillo, Management Officer.

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## APPENDIX C: FY 2016 STAFFING AND FUNDING BY AGENCY

Agency	U.S. Direct-hire Staff	U.S. Locally Employed Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff <sup>a</sup>	Funding (\$)
<b>Department of State</b>					
Diplomatic & Consular Programs	15	1	9	25	2,346,700
Consular	3	2	3	8	648,693
ICASS	5	7	108	120	11,148,000
Public Diplomacy	2	0	6	8	806,200
Diplomatic Security	2	1	8	11	709,449
Marine Security	8	0	5	11	258,000
Representation	0	0	0	0	45,420
Gift Funds	0	0	0	0	50,424
Overseas Buildings Operations	0	0	0	0	4,708,630
Subtotal	35	11	139	183	20,721,516
<b>Department of Defense</b>					
Defense Attaché Office	3	0	1	4	709,337
Office of Security Cooperation – Army AFRICOM	2	0	1	3	447,000
Office of Security Cooperation – Navy PEPFAR	0	0	1	1	115,000
Subtotal	5	0	3	8	1,271,337
USAID	7	0	16	23	2,823,200
Foreign Agricultural Service	0	0	1	1	105,270
U.S. Commercial Service	1	0	4	5	641,133
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	3	0	7	10	849,932
<b>Total</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>26,484,588</b>

Source: Embassy Luanda

## ABBREVIATIONS

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DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
Department	Department of State
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAST	First- and Second- Tour
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

## OIG INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

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Carol van Voorst, Team Leader  
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Eleanor Nagy  
Randy Smith  
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