



Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

AUD-GEER-25-01

Office of Audits

October 2024

**(U) Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive
Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul,
Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine**

GLOBAL EMERGENCIES AND EMERGING RISKS



HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

AUD-GEER-25-01

(U) What OIG Audited

(U) U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, suspended operations on August 31, 2021, and U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, suspended operations on February 28, 2022. In accordance with Department of State (Department) requirements and guidance established by the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division (DEAV) within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), both posts were required to remove or destroy sensitive security assets—to include special protective equipment (SPE) and armored vehicles (AVs)—in advance of the suspensions of operations to prevent their potential use by hostile forces.

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Embassies Kabul and Kyiv managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation at each post in accordance with Department guidance.

(U) OIG has also prepared a classified report, *Supplemental Classified Report on the Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine* (AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024).

(U) What OIG Recommends

(U) OIG made three recommendations to the Bureau of Administration and nine recommendations to DS. Based on Management's responses to a draft of this report, OIG considers all 12 recommendations resolved, pending further action. A synopsis of Management's comments and OIG's reply follow each recommendation in the Results section of this report. Management's responses to a draft of this report are reprinted in their entirety in Appendices B and C.

OCTOBER 2024

OFFICE OF AUDITS

GLOBAL EMERGENCIES AND EMERGING RISKS

(U) Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine

(U) What OIG Found

(U) OIG found that Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv faced different challenges that impacted their ability to manage, safeguard, and dispose of sensitive security assets in advance of their respective evacuations. For example, OIG found that 26 percent of Embassy Kabul's firearms and 63 percent of Embassy Kabul's AVs were left in Afghanistan. Many of those assets were abandoned intact, although some were disabled using ad hoc methods. OIG identified several issues that contributed to assets being abandoned intact, including Embassy Kabul maintaining more assets than needed for daily operations, inadequate disposition planning, inadequate guidance, and insufficient training. When intact sensitive security assets are left behind, hostile forces may use them against the United States, its allies, or civilian populations. In contrast to Embassy Kabul, Embassy Kyiv staff were able to remove all of the embassy's sensitive security assets prior to the suspension of operations. However, a senior Embassy Kyiv security official acknowledged that they had a smaller inventory of sensitive security assets than Embassy Kabul and may have also had to abandon or destroy assets if they had faced a more exigent evacuation scenario.

(U) OIG also found that DEAV did not fully and accurately account for sensitive security assets exfiltrated from Embassy Kabul. For example, DEAV prematurely declared some assets as abandoned that were later recovered. This occurred, in part, because the Department did not have a formal requirement to reconcile a post's assets following a suspension of operations. In addition, DS's records management practices were not conducive to the timely reconciliation of Kabul's assets. The failure to fully and promptly account for assets following a suspension of operations prevents the Department from determining if assets were lost, stolen, or misappropriated.

(U) Finally, OIG found that the Department issued a waiver allowing for the transfer of half of Embassy Kyiv's AV fleet to the government of Ukraine after the suspension of operations, in February 2022. As a result of the transfer, Embassy Kyiv did not have sufficient AVs after resuming operations.

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(U) OBJECTIVE

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine, managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation at each post in accordance with Department of State (Department) guidance.

(U) BACKGROUND

(U) Department Responsibilities for Sensitive Security Assets

(U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division¹ (DEAV) manages the Department's special protective equipment (SPE)² and armored vehicle (AV) programs. The Defensive Equipment branch of DEAV manages and coordinates the worldwide inventory of the Department's SPE. The Armored Vehicle branch provides program management, policy oversight, and fleet management support for the Department's AV fleet worldwide.

(U) Terminology: Sensitive Security Assets

(U) In this report, OIG uses the term "sensitive security assets" to refer collectively to both SPE and AVs. OIG also refers to each type independently by name, where appropriate in the context of this audit.

(U) At embassies and consulates, Regional Security Officers (RSO) are responsible for the security of personnel, property, and sensitive information. RSOs are broadly responsible for implementing and managing security at overseas posts and are responsible for maintaining control and accountability of their SPE. RSOs and General Services Officers³ share responsibility for the management of AV programs at post.

(U) The Office of Program Management and Policy within the Bureau of Administration's Office of Logistics Management is responsible for oversight of logistics policy, logistics systems, and management of official Department property. The office manages the Department's global logistics IT platforms, including the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS) and the Secure Integrated Logistics Management System (S-ILMS). These systems support the distribution, transportation, receipt, and tracking of all Department property, including

¹ (U) DEAV is positioned within DS's Office of Physical Security Programs.

² (U) According to 12 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 041.2, "Definitions," SPE refers to "department-issued specialized equipment for law enforcement and/or security duties including, but not limited to, firearms, other lethal weapons, and less than lethal weapons."

³ (U) General Services Officers have a range of responsibilities related to the management of physical resources and logistical functions at overseas posts, including the motor pool fleet.

sensitive security assets, both domestically and overseas. ILMS is used to track the status of all Department personal property, including the Department’s sensitive security assets.⁴

(U) Key officers at each overseas post, including RSOs, serve on the post’s Emergency Action Committee. Emergency Action Committees are responsible for planning and coordinating each post’s response to contingencies such as natural disasters and civil unrest.⁵

(U) Evacuations of Embassies Kabul and Kyiv

(U) To ensure the safety of U.S. mission personnel during political instability or other security threats, the Department may evacuate personnel and suspend operations at an embassy or consulate. The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) describes two types of evacuation procedures—an authorized departure or an ordered departure.⁶ Evacuations from a country may also require the assistance of the U.S. military in the form of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO).⁷ For example, a NEO was executed at Embassy Kabul in August 2021. For those posts that are unable to resume operations within a certain timeframe, the Department may ultimately decide to suspend operations,⁸ resulting in the complete closure of the post for an undetermined period. The Chief of Mission or the Secretary of State may initiate a suspension of operations.

(U) Terminology: Evacuation of Embassies Kabul and Kyiv

(U) OIG is using the term “evacuation” consistent with the Department’s use of the term in its publicly released *After Action Review on Afghanistan* (March 2022). Accordingly, in this report, OIG uses the term “evacuation” to refer to the exigent evacuation of all Department personnel from the Embassy Kabul compound in August 2021. Similarly, the evacuation of Embassy Kyiv refers to the drawdown of equipment and personnel from Embassy Kyiv facilities on February 14, 2022, prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

⁴ (U) Specifically, S-ILMS, the secure version of ILMS, is used to track the status of the Department’s SPE, while the unclassified ILMS is used to track the status of AVs. RSOs are also responsible for completing a hazardous material survey on a dedicated online DEAV website. Hazardous materials are materials that would be dangerous to individuals or the environment without special precautions.

⁵ (U) 12 FAM Exhibit 451.1, “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) on Security Support Abroad.”

⁶ (U) According to 3 FAM 3770, “Travel to Post(s) Under Authorized Departure, Ordered Departure, Suspended Operations, Contingency Operations or to Unaccompanied/Partially Unaccompanied Posts,” an authorized departure is an evacuation procedure in which post employees and/or family members are permitted to leave post in advance of normal rotation when U.S. national interests or imminent threat to life requires it. An ordered departure is a mandatory evacuation procedure by which the number of U.S. government employees, family members, or both, at a post is reduced. According to 3 FAM 3771, “Subchapter Definitions,” an ordered departure may be initiated by the Chief of Mission or the Secretary of State.

⁷ (U) NEOs are a type of evacuation procedure in which the Department of Defense assists the Department in facilitating the departure of all U.S. citizens, including Department personnel as well as other designated persons, when their lives are endangered.

⁸ (U) According to 3 FAM 3771, a suspension of operations is a “term used to denote a U.S. mission or post that has ceased operating.”

(U) Operational Environment at Embassy Kabul

(U) During the 20 years of conflict in Afghanistan, Embassy Kabul operated in a high-risk environment,⁹ and grew to have one of the Department’s largest embassy footprints in the world. Because of ongoing security threats in Afghanistan, Embassy Kabul required a substantial security apparatus, including significant holdings of firearms and AVs at the main embassy compound and at satellite Department facilities in Kabul.

(U) On April 14, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would fully withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. On April 27, the Department announced an ordered departure “of U.S. Government employees whose functions can be performed elsewhere due to increasing violence and threat reports in Kabul.”¹⁰ Following rapid territorial gains by Taliban forces, President Biden announced a NEO of all remaining U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, including all Department personnel, on August 14, 2021.¹¹ The Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021. On the same day, the Afghan President fled the country and the Afghan government collapsed. By the morning of August 16, all Department personnel had been evacuated from the Embassy Kabul compound using helicopter flights operated by the Department of Defense.¹² On August 31,



(U) Figure 1: Image of U.S. Embassy Kabul.

(U) Source: Embassy Kabul planning documentation, October 2020.

⁹ (SBU) (b) (7)(E)

¹⁰ (U) “Security Alert – U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan,” April 27, 2021, <https://af.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-kabul-afghanistan-14/>.

¹¹ (SBU) In comments provided to OIG in response to a draft of this report (see Appendix C), DS asserted that this report did not sufficiently acknowledge the unique circumstances faced by Embassy Kabul. (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OIG reported on the specific circumstances, including planning and execution, of the evacuation of Embassy Kabul in its classified report: *Review of Emergency Action Planning Guiding the Evacuation and Suspension of Operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-23-15, May 2023). This report is not intended to duplicate that report. An unclassified summary of OIG’s review (*OIG’s Review of the Department of State’s Evacuation of U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-23-33, September 2023) is posted on OIG’s public website: <https://www.stateoig.gov/report/aud-mero-23-33>.

¹² (U) All Department personnel departed the Embassy Kabul compound on August 16, 2021. Personnel initially moved to Kabul International Airport before departing for safe havens at U.S. Air Force bases across the world. Operations continued at Kabul International Airport until August 31, 2021.

2021, the Department announced that it had formally suspended operations at Embassy Kabul and had fully withdrawn all personnel from the Afghan capital. Although Embassy Kabul personnel had months to prepare for a possible evacuation of the embassy compound, the actual order for the evacuation did not come until August 14, approximately 48 hours before all U.S. personnel left post.¹³

(U) Operational Environment at Embassy Kyiv


(U) Embassy Kyiv planned for and executed an evacuation following months of public warnings from the Biden Administration about a possible full-scale invasion by Russia. The Department first reduced the number of personnel at Embassy Kyiv on January 23, 2022, by implementing an authorized departure of nonemergency personnel and an ordered departure of all eligible family members. On February 14, 2022, the Department announced that Embassy Kyiv's operations would be temporarily relocated to Lviv, Ukraine. One week later, the Secretary of State released a statement announcing that Department personnel in Lviv would further relocate to Poland. Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the Department formally suspended operations at Embassy Kyiv on February 28, 2022. The Department later reopened Embassy Kyiv in May 2022 after Russia's ground forces retreated from the area around the capital.¹⁴

¹³ (U) For additional details regarding the Department's preparation for and execution of the evacuation of U.S. government personnel, private U.S. citizens, Afghans at risk, and other individuals from Afghanistan in August 2021, see *OIG's Review of the Department of State's Evacuation of U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-23-33, September 2023), which is an unclassified summary of OIG's classified report *Review of Emergency Action Planning Guiding the Evacuation and Suspension of Operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-23-15, May 2023).

¹⁴ (U) For additional OIG reporting related to the reopening of Embassy Kyiv see *Audit of Technical Security Following Reestablishment of Operations at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine* (AUD-MERO-23-24, August 2023).

(U) Figure 2 shows a comparison of the different circumstances each embassy faced, and the timelines associated with the evacuations.

(U) Figure 2: Evacuation Context – Timelines for Evacuations of U.S. Embassies Kabul and Kyiv



(U) Source: Generated by OIG from previous OIG reports and information obtained from the Department.

(U) AUDIT RESULTS

(U) Finding A: Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv Faced Different Challenges To Manage, Safeguard, and Dispose of Sensitive Security Assets

(U) OIG found that Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv faced different challenges that impacted their ability to manage, safeguard, and dispose of sensitive security assets in advance of their respective evacuations. Throughout the spring of 2021, Embassy Kabul shipped out a limited number of firearms and either destroyed or shipped out 37 percent of their AVs in advance of a possible drawdown. Despite these efforts, OIG found that 26 percent of Embassy Kabul's firearms and 63 percent of Embassy Kabul's AVs were left in Afghanistan.¹⁵ Many of the assets were abandoned intact, although some were disabled using ad-hoc methods. For example, post officials attempted to disable approximately 10 percent of the AVs that remained in Kabul, but reported they were unable to do so using approved procedures and instead used ad hoc methods, such as pouring sand in the gas tanks.

(U) OIG found that a range of issues impacted Embassy Kabul's ability to manage, safeguard, and dispose of its sensitive security assets in advance of its evacuation including maintaining more equipment than what was needed for daily operations, inadequate disposition planning, a reluctance to implement disposition plans, inadequate guidance regarding destruction methods, and insufficient training. When sensitive security assets are left behind without first being disabled or destroyed, hostile forces may take and use them against the United States, its allies, or civilian populations. In fact, satellite images show that abandoned assets were taken from the embassy following the evacuation.

(U) OIG found that Embassy Kyiv adequately managed and safeguarded all of its sensitive security assets in the lead-up to the February 2022 evacuation. Specifically, Embassy Kyiv retained all of its sensitive security assets following the evacuation. Embassy Kyiv security personnel further reported that they did not have to disable or destroy any sensitive security assets prior to the evacuation. This occurred both because Embassy Kyiv had a relatively small number of sensitive security assets and because Embassy Kyiv officials had sufficient time to execute their established disposition plan. However, one Embassy Kyiv senior security official acknowledged that they may have also been forced to abandon or destroy assets if they had faced an accelerated evacuation timeline.

¹⁵ (U) OIG determined the total number of firearms that were assigned to Embassy Kabul at the time of the evacuation by using the December 2020 annual scanned inventory of serialized SPE and then adding any firearms transferred into Afghanistan between December 2020 and August 2021. OIG determined the total number of AVs that were located in Kabul as of February 2021 based on data from the motor vehicle certified inventory, supplementary embassy records, and DEAV tracking data. The last available Embassy Kabul motor vehicle inventory was signed in February 2021. See Appendix A, "Data Reliability" for further information.

(U) Embassy Kabul’s Management, Safeguarding, and Disposition of Firearms During the Evacuation

(SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

16 (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

17 [Redacted]

(U) Throughout the spring of 2021, Embassy Kabul shipped out some firearms in advance of a possible drawdown. However, it did not significantly decrease its inventory and only shipped out 4 percent of its firearms prior to the evacuation.¹⁸ As shown in Figure 3, OIG found that 26 percent¹⁹ of Embassy Kabul’s firearms were abandoned in Afghanistan during the evacuation without first being disabled or destroyed in accordance with Department guidance. According to several Embassy Kabul security personnel, some firearms were disabled using ad hoc methods, while some were abandoned intact. However, because documentation was not maintained in accordance with Department guidance, OIG could not determine how many firearms were disabled through ad hoc methods and whether they were fully destroyed. OIG based its analysis on the number of firearms recovered by DEAV after the evacuation.


¹⁶ (SBU) 12 FAH-1, Annex K, Addendum 2.1(2), “Actions to take to Suspend Operations” (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]

¹⁷ (U) Ibid.

¹⁸ (U) Although OIG verified that Embassy Kabul reduced certain types of SPE in the months leading up to the evacuation, it did not significantly reduce the total number of firearms.

¹⁹ (U) OIG found that 26 percent of the firearms that were assigned to Embassy Kabul prior to the evacuation were ultimately abandoned. However, as discussed in Finding B of this report, the Department did not maintain sufficient accountability over Embassy Kabul’s firearms after the evacuation. Accordingly, there may be firearms that were exfiltrated from Kabul but that have not yet been returned to DEAV.

(U) Figure 3: Status of Embassy Kabul’s Firearms Following the Suspension of Operations



(U) Source: Generated by OIG using information obtained from DEAV and S-ILMS.

(U) Embassy Kabul security personnel reported that most of the exfiltrated firearms were hand carried out of Afghanistan by security personnel during the evacuation. For the equipment that was not exfiltrated, post officials reported that they attempted to destroy some of the firearms onsite.²⁰ However, several officials stated that they only had time to destroy a portion of the remaining firearms and that they ultimately had to leave behind much of the equipment intact. Additionally, officials did not prepare formal disposal documentation²¹ to capture the attempted destruction actions onsite. As a result, OIG could not determine the quantities or types of firearms that were disabled or destroyed during the evacuation.^{22,23}

²⁰ (SBU) (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] Although a portion of Embassy Kabul’s firearms were destroyed (b) (7)(E), post officials did not document how many firearms were destroyed using this method, nor could security officials confirm whether the specific methods outlined in DEAV guidance were strictly followed.

²¹ (U) Embassy Kabul security personnel took some photographs documenting their attempts to destroy firearms, but the photographs do not include specific serial numbers. OIG independently obtained photographs from former Department contractors. However, individual assets are not identifiable, and the photographs cannot be used to determine whether the assets were in fact rendered inoperable.

²² (U) OIG also found that a significant amount of ammunition was left behind in Kabul without first being destroyed. For more information, see *Supplemental Classified Report on the Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets in Advance of Evacuations at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine* (AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024).


²³ (SBU) In comments provided to OIG in response to a draft of this report (see Appendix C), DS stated (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] that this report did not fully recognize the complexity of the logistical operations to evacuate one of the largest embassies in the world. (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

(U) Embassy Kabul’s Management, Safeguarding, and Disposition of Armored Vehicles During the Evacuation

(U) Routine Department disposition guidance outlined in the FAM requires the destruction of AVs at the end of their useful life, in part to reduce the possibility of unauthorized use of the vehicles. Routine approved disposal methods include, in order of preference, crushing, disassembly, burning, explosive demolition, or burial.²⁴ RSOs serve as reporting officers for all AVs at their respective posts and oversee annual AV accountability.²⁵

(U) As of February 2021, Embassy Kabul had a significant fleet of AVs.²⁶ In accordance with Department guidance for routine disposition methods, Embassy Kabul reduced the size of its fleet between March and July 2021. Specifically, Embassy Kabul, working in coordination with DEAV, destroyed 14 percent of its AVs that were in poor condition at U.S. government destruction facilities in Afghanistan. Embassy Kabul also shipped 23 percent of its newer AVs that were excess or could not be used in country out of Afghanistan. In addition to reducing the AV fleet, in February 2021, Embassy Kabul stopped a shipment of new AVs that were planned to be sent to post, citing COVID staffing limitations and the uncertainty surrounding the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Figure 4 shows Embassy Kabul’s efforts to reduce its AV fleet in the months leading up to the August 2021 evacuation.²⁷

(U) Figure 4: Timeline of Embassy Kabul’s Routine Reduction of Its AV Fleet



(U) Source: OIG-generated based on documentation obtained from the Department and ILMS.

²⁴ (U) 12 FAM 388, “Disposal and Transfer.”

²⁵ (U) 12 FAM 423(41), “RSO Responsibilities and Duties.”


²⁶ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

²⁷ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [Redacted]

(U) OIG found that, according to Department guidance updated after the evacuation of Embassy Kabul, RSOs have primary responsibility for determining how a post’s AVs will be managed in the event of an evacuation, including making decisions about whether there is enough time to ship or drive AVs out of the country or if the AVs should instead be destroyed onsite to prevent them from falling into the hands of hostile forces.²⁸ Approved methods for destroying AVs during an evacuation scenario differ from the routine disposition methods outlined in the FAM and are covered in specialized guidance developed by DEAV.²⁹ According to Department records, as of August 16, 2021, 63 percent of Embassy Kabul’s were still in Afghanistan—as shown in Figure 5.³⁰

(U) Figure 5: Status of Embassy Kabul’s Armored Vehicles Following the Suspension of Operations

Armored Vehicles (AVs) in Embassy Kabul’s fleet at the start of 2021



(U) Source: OIG-generated based on documentation obtained from the Department and ILMS.

(U) Beginning on August 12, 2021, Embassy Kabul security personnel moved many of the remaining AVs to Camp Eggers, a site near the embassy that was controlled by the Department. Security officials believed that Camp Eggers had adequate open space for destruction activities. Initially, security personnel planned to burn the vehicles at Camp Eggers to destroy them.³¹ However, Embassy Kabul security personnel stated that Department of Defense officials assisting with the NEO were concerned that smoke from burning vehicles might impair the

²⁸ (SBU) (b) (7)(E)

However, the FAH does not require posts to develop a written disposition plan for AVs. Furthermore, the previous version of 12 FAH-1, Annex K, Addendum 2.1 in place at the time of Embassy Kabul’s evacuation did not include instructions directing posts to evaluate their AV fleets in advance of an evacuation.

²⁹ (U) DEAV, “Armored Vehicle (AV) Disposal [Standard Operating Procedures] – Modified Disposal – Abandonment Method” (Version 20190204).


³⁰ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

³¹ (U) According to DEAV’s “Armored Vehicle Disposal General Guidance,” burning is an acceptable AV destruction method.

flight path of helicopters that were evacuating embassy personnel. According to Embassy Kabul security personnel, some Department of Defense officials also raised concerns that smoke resulting from destruction activities could further incite the Taliban.

(U) As an alternative to burning the AVs, Embassy Kabul security personnel decided they would attempt to destroy the AVs at Camp Eggers by crushing them with an excavator.³² However, the embassy did not have an excavator and security personnel had to obtain one from a local vendor. Ultimately, the excavator arrived at the embassy compound too late and was abandoned before it could get to Camp Eggers, as shown in Figure 6.

(U) Figure 6: Excavator Abandoned Enroute to Camp Eggers (August 16, 2021)



(U) Source: © 2021 MAXAR.

(U) Embassy Kabul security personnel recalled making a “last-ditch effort” to disable AVs at Camp Eggers by pouring sand in the gas tanks or putting dirt in the engines and running the vehicles until they “seized up.” One Embassy Kabul security official estimated that personnel only had time to use these methods on approximately 10 percent of the AVs that remained in Kabul as of August 2021.³³ Because security personnel did not have time to follow DEAV’s procedures for disabling the AVs and instead used ad hoc methods, they were not certain whether the vehicles were fully disabled at the time of the evacuation. Furthermore, post personnel did not document the destruction methods used, record the vehicle identification numbers, or retain photographs of the vehicles that were disabled. Even if the contemporaneous estimate of the number of AVs disabled during the evacuation was correct,


³² (U) According to DEAV’s “Armored Vehicle Disposal General Guidance,” crushing is also an acceptable AV destruction method.

³³ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

that would mean that approximately 90 percent of Embassy Kabul AVs that remained in Kabul as of August 2021 were abandoned without being disabled or destroyed.³⁴

(U) In addition to moving AVs to Camp Eggers, security officials positioned a few AVs at embassy access points. Embassy Kabul security personnel indicated that explosives were used to render the vehicles inoperable and to block access to the embassy.³⁵ Figure 7 is a satellite image showing the location of the AVs that were positioned to block Embassy Kabul access points during the final hours of the evacuation, as confirmed by Embassy Kabul security personnel.

(U) Figure 7: Embassy Kabul AVs Disabled In-Place on Perimeter of Embassy Kabul



(U) Approximate Perimeter of U.S. Embassy Kabul on August 16, 2021

(U) Source: © 2021 MAXAR.

(U) Several Factors Led to Assets Being Abandoned in Afghanistan

(U) A January 2022 Unrecoverable Property Asset Memorandum issued by DEAV stated that, as a result of the deterioration of the security environment and the collapse of the Afghan government, “the rapid evacuation led to the destruction and abandonment of critical security

³⁴ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]


³⁵ (SBU) (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

assets.” However, OIG found that there were multiple other factors that contributed to the challenges Embassy Kabul faced in the lead-up to the evacuation, including maintaining more equipment than what was needed for day-to-day embassy operations,³⁶ inadequate disposition planning, a reluctance on the part of post officials to implement disposition plans, insufficient training, and inadequate guidance regarding destruction methods. OIG examined Department guidance in several areas and have included an assessment in Figures 8, 9, and 10 summarizing whether guidance in these areas was sufficient, needed improvement, or did not exist.

(U) Excessive Firearm Stockpile and Armored Vehicle Fleet

(U) One reason for the deficiencies identified was that Embassy Kabul had more sensitive security assets than it needed. Figure 8 summarizes the Department’s policies on conducting inventories and right-sizing holdings of sensitive security assets.

(U) Figure 8: OIG’s Assessment of Department Guidance for the Management of Sensitive Security Assets

	(U) SPE	(U) Armored Vehicles	(U) Hazardous Materials
(U) Asset Management 	+ (SBU) (b) (7)(E) posts are not required to conduct an analysis of whether equipment holdings at post are appropriately sized. ^a	+ (U) According to 14 FAM 430, “Managing Official Vehicles at Posts Abroad,” the Vehicle Allocation Methodology is a federally mandated process to determine appropriate size and composition of U.S. government fleets based on utilization. However, the methodology reflects an imbalance of security and usage considerations and may allow high-threat posts to maintain excessively large AV fleets.	+ (SBU) (b) (7)(E) posts are not required to conduct an analysis of whether holdings at post are appropriately sized. ^a
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sufficient	+ Needs Improvement	X Does Not Exist

^a (SBU) (b) (7)(E)

(U) Source: OIG-generated based on an analysis of FAM and FAH requirements.

(U) OIG found that Embassy Kabul made some strides in reducing its firearm stockpile and AV fleet in the months leading up to the August 2021 evacuation. However, it still retained large quantities of these sensitive security assets that could not be easily managed or disposed of in

³⁶ (U) In its analysis, OIG also considered calculations made by Embassy Kabul security personnel of the amount of equipment that would be needed in the event of an evacuation to be part of the embassy’s “day-to-day operations” because overseas posts must always be prepared for the possibility of an unexpected or exigent evacuation.

an exigent evacuation scenario. For example, multiple Embassy Kabul officials stated that they believed that the embassy maintained an excessive amount of ammunition. OIG also conducted its own analysis of the quantities of ammunition maintained by Embassy Kabul, and throughout 2021, Embassy Kabul maintained more than twice the amount of ammunition recommended in DEAV guidelines.^{37,38} According to Embassy Kabul officials, the majority of the embassy's ammunition was left behind in Afghanistan at the time of evacuation.

(U) Additionally, multiple former Embassy Kabul officials stated that they questioned whether Embassy Kabul needed such a large AV fleet for day-to-day operations. When interviewed by OIG as part of this audit in 2023, Management personnel who were assigned to Embassy Kabul in 2020 estimated that the embassy needed only half of its total AV fleet. One official stated that movement outside of the embassy was rare at that time. The audit evidence OIG obtained also indicated that the size of the AV fleet exceeded what would have been needed for an exigent evacuation scenario. For example, although Embassy Kabul officials calculated the total number of AVs that might be needed for ground movements in the event of an exigent evacuation, emergency planning documentation also shows that embassy security personnel considered moving more than 200 AVs from its fleet to Department of Defense facilities for storage in February 2021. This raises further questions about whether the number of AVs maintained by Embassy Kabul was in excess of what was needed for both day-to-day operations as well as an exigent evacuation scenario.

(U) The Department's Vehicle Allocation Methodology (VAM) survey is designed to assist posts in determining the appropriate number and composition of vehicles based on use.³⁹ As part of the VAM process, every 3 years, each overseas post provides the Bureau of Administration's Office of Logistics Management with data related to each vehicle in its fleet, including how many hours each vehicle is driven in a year and the purpose of each vehicle.⁴⁰ The Office of Logistics Management uses the data to calculate a "usage score" and a "criticality score." The Office of Logistics Management then uses the data to help the post determine whether to retain or eliminate each vehicle.

(U) Although the VAM is intended to ensure that overseas posts maintain appropriately sized fleets, OIG identified deficiencies with the methodology that contributed to the excessive number of AVs at Embassy Kabul. Specifically, the two most important factors used to determine the criticality score are how dangerous the post is and whether the vehicle is used for security purposes. As a result, virtually all AVs assigned to a high threat post have a high

³⁷ (U) OIG assessed the amount of ammunition that Embassy Kabul maintained during 2021. The embassy's total quantities of ammunition modestly decreased throughout 2021, but the stockpile remained over twice the recommended amount.

³⁸ (U) DEAV ammunition stockpile guidelines are outlined in "2021 Special Protective Equipment Annual Guidance." OIG provides additional information on the DEAV guidance and Embassy Kabul's ammunition stockpile in AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024.

³⁹ (U) 14 FAM 431.4, "Definitions."

⁴⁰ (U) See 14 FAM 436.2(a), "Fleet Size, Composition and Life Cycle."

criticality score. For Embassy Kabul, the criticality factor was weighted more significantly in the assessment process than the usage factor, resulting in the embassy keeping underutilized AVs.

(U) Specifically, in the 2019 VAM survey—the most recent VAM survey conducted for Embassy Kabul prior to the August 2021 evacuation—Embassy Kabul reported that 12 percent of its AVs were collectively used for less than a total of 23 hours in the previous year. Of those AVs, nearly half were driven for 3 hours or less.⁴¹ However, the embassy decided to retain all but two of those minimally used AVs because of their high criticality scores. During the FY 2019 VAM, Embassy Kabul also reported that, out of those low-usage AVs, 20 percent were no longer being actively used at all and requested that they be disposed of or transferred to the Department of Defense. However, again, because the VAM results identified those AVs as having high criticality scores, the Office of Logistics Management recommended that the embassy retain those AVs. Ultimately, the bias in the VAM survey may have contributed to Embassy Kabul retaining more AVs than it needed for day-to-day operations, which in turn, created challenges in managing, safeguarding, and disposing of the large AV fleet in the lead up to the evacuation.

(U) Unlike AVs, the Department does not require posts to periodically analyze their use of or need for SPE and hazardous materials.^{42,43} In accordance with the FAH, DS conducts an annual inventory of all accountable property, including SPE and hazardous materials maintained at overseas posts. However, the annual inventory does not include an analysis of whether the amount of equipment maintained is appropriate to fulfill the post’s day-to-day operations.⁴⁴ Multiple Department officials told OIG that overseas posts would benefit from regular, post-driven assessments to determine whether the post has appropriate quantities of SPE and hazardous materials that would lead to the elimination of excess assets.

(U) OIG is offering the following recommendations to improve the Department’s approach to determining the appropriate quantities of SPE, hazardous materials, and AVs to maintain at overseas posts.

⁴¹ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

⁴² (SBU) Hazardous materials are materials that would be dangerous to individuals or the environment without special precautions. Examples of hazardous materials include (b) (7)(E)

⁴³ (U) OIG reviewed Department guidance related to the management and disposition of ammunition and data on the amount of ammunition that Embassy Kabul maintained in 2021.

⁴⁴ (SBU) (b) (7)(E)

Recommendation 1: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and update the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments. This evaluation should consider the relative weight of each factor within the criticality score and consider requiring justifications for the retention of low-usage, high-criticality vehicles to achieve a balanced score.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Administration concurred with the recommendation and stated that its Office of Logistics Management will work with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology to understand the underlying cause(s) for high-threat environment AV retention bias and will make any necessary updates to the criticality scoring system.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Administration's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Administration has, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluated the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and updated the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments.

Recommendation 2: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring overseas posts to periodically assess the volume of special protective equipment and hazardous materials. The guidance should take into consideration usage rates and the criticality of each asset in order to determine the appropriate quantities needed for post operations and provide instructions for adjusting asset holdings based on the outcomes of the assessment.





Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will develop and formalize specific guidance for posts to (1) periodically evaluate sensitive security asset holdings based on a calculated criticality and usage method and (2) provide instructions to adjust sensitive security asset holdings based on the resulting assessment.


OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed and implemented guidance requiring overseas posts to periodically assess the volume of special protective equipment and hazardous materials.

(U) Flaws With Destruction Planning

(U) OIG found that the absence of a fully developed destruction plan also contributed to the challenges that Embassy Kabul faced in managing, safeguarding, and disposing of firearms and AVs in the lead-up to the evacuation. Figure 9 summarizes the Department’s requirements for developing destruction plans.

(U) Figure 9: Department Requirements for Developing Destruction Plans

	(U) SPE	(U) Armored Vehicles	(U) Hazardous Materials
(U) Post Disposition Planning 	<p>+</p> <p>(SBU) (b) (7)(E)</p>  <p>(U) The FAH does not explicitly state that posts must document destruction plans in writing, does not indicate when the plan should be developed, does not require periodic updates to the plan, and does not provide detailed guidance on the types of issues the plans should address.</p>	<p>+</p> <p>(SBU) (b) (7)(E)</p>  <p>(U) There is no requirement for embassy security personnel to develop a written disposition plan for AVs.^b</p>	<p>+</p> <p>(SBU) (b) (7)(E)</p>  <p>(U) The FAH does not explicitly state that posts must document disposition plans in writing, does not require periodic updates to the plan, and does not provide detailed guidance on the types of issues the plans should address.</p>
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sufficient	+ Needs Improvement	X Does Not Exist

^a (SBU) 

^b (U) The August 2020 version of 12 FAH-1, Annex K, Addendum 2.1, which was in place at the time of Embassy Kabul’s evacuation, did not include instructions directing posts to evaluate their AV fleets in advance of an evacuation and made no mention of AVs at the time.

(U) Source: OIG-generated based on an analysis of FAM and FAH requirements.

(U) Although the Department had guidance in place prior to the evacuation of Embassy Kabul that stated that RSOs are responsible for coordinating the destruction and disposition of SPE,⁴⁵ the guidance does not explicitly require posts to develop a *written* destruction and disposition plan.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the guidance does not clearly state when this plan should be initially developed, there is no requirement for posts to periodically revisit their destruction and disposition plans to ensure they are up-to-date and accurate, nor does the Department provide examples of destruction and disposition plans developed by other posts. Finally, the Department does not have a requirement for embassy security personnel to develop a disposition plan for AVs in case of an evacuation. The emergency disposition of AVs can be particularly time consuming and challenging because of the complexity of the disposition process, especially for posts facing an exigent evacuation.⁴⁷

(U) Although not explicitly required by Department guidance at the time, in September 2020, Embassy Kabul security personnel developed written emergency plans that outlined disposition strategies for the embassy's sensitive security assets.⁴⁸ The plans outlined the embassy's approach to managing its firearms and AVs in various types of evacuation scenarios, including plans for shipping assets out of the country and for conducting emergency destruction onsite using Department-approved destruction methods in an exigent evacuation scenario. The plans acknowledged that shipping out or destroying the embassy's "large stockpiles" of firearms and ammunition could take months. By February 2021, Embassy Kabul had established formal plans for managing and disposing of assets in permissive, uncertain, and exigent evacuation scenarios. The final iteration of Embassy Kabul's emergency destruction plan was completed on August 10, 2021, days before the final evacuation of Embassy Kabul.⁴⁹

(U) Although Embassy Kabul developed a disposition plan, OIG found that the plan did not include key details such as what steps would be required to acquire the necessary tools and equipment to destroy sensitive security assets. For example, the plans stated that security personnel would burn any remaining firearms and ammunition. Specifically, the plan stated that AVs would be parked in a line and rigged with timed incendiary devices for destruction. However, a former Embassy Kabul explosive technician stated that Embassy Kabul did not have

⁴⁵ (U) 12 FAH-1 Annex K Addendum 2.1, "Actions to take to Suspend Operations."

⁴⁶ (U) As discussed later in Finding A, OIG found that Embassy Kyiv security personnel stated that they had not developed a written destruction plan for its sensitive security assets prior to the February 2022 evacuation and suspension of operations.

⁴⁷ (SBU) DEAV issues AV procurement planning guidance annually, which requires RSOs to review routine AV disposal requirements in the FAM (b) (7)(E)

⁴⁸ (U) Embassy Kabul's efforts to develop written disposition plans proceeded in the wake of the United States and Taliban signing the Doha agreement (February 29, 2020), the subsequent reduction in U.S. troop levels to 8,600 (July 2020), and the increase in the Taliban takeover of Afghan territory (August 2020). See *Information Brief: OIG's Review of the Department of State's Evacuation of U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-22-33, September 2023).

⁴⁹ (U) As of August 2021, Embassy Kabul's plans acknowledged that shipping options were no longer viable because of a deteriorating security situation. Therefore, the August 2021 iteration of the plan focused exclusively on emergency destruction of equipment.

enough incendiary devices or explosive materials to execute the plan. Moreover, one Embassy Kabul security official reported that, as early as January 2021, Department of Defense officials expressed concerns that the smoke that would result from burning the AVs might negatively impact ongoing evacuation efforts. Despite these concerns, post officials did not revise the destruction plan or come up with alternatives to burning the AVs.

(U) Embassy Kabul's destruction plan also described an option to bury firearms in a pit and fill the pit with concrete. At the time, Embassy Kabul staff stated that they did not have the type of concrete on hand needed to implement that option. One former Embassy Kabul official stated that he first submitted an order for quick-setting concrete in support of the destruction plan on July 25, 2021. However, given the lengthy procurement process, the requested concrete did not arrive prior to the evacuation. Embassy Kabul's destruction plans also included an option to crush AVs with heavy equipment, but the embassy did not have access to an excavator, which would be needed to execute the plan. As late as August 2021, email correspondence between Embassy Kabul security personnel indicated that there was uncertainty about where an excavator could be located and who could operate it.

(U) Furthermore, the final destruction plan was based on the assumption that the quantity of sensitive security assets at the embassy would already be significantly reduced before the evacuation. Specifically, the plan anticipated that Embassy Kabul would have significantly reduced its firearms and AVs by the time that the embassy would be faced with an evacuation. However, at the time of the evacuation, large numbers of firearms and AVs were still onsite. Therefore, Embassy Kabul security personnel had significantly more sensitive security assets to manage than they had anticipated. Former post officials stated that the final version of the plan assumed that Embassy Kabul security personnel had several more weeks, if not months, to reduce inventories by shipping them out of the country prior to a potential evacuation.

(U) Finally, the plan did not include the estimated time that would be needed to destroy the sensitive security assets that remained at post—a deficiency exacerbated by the assumption that the number of items that would need to be destroyed would be smaller. Days before the evacuation, the latest iteration of Embassy Kabul's emergency destruction plan still included question marks as placeholders for the estimated time required to destroy assets. Developing clear time estimates for destruction activities is an essential part of emergency planning because it allows RSOs to decide when to initiate destruction procedures and can also help inform security personnel about when they should halt attempts to salvage equipment.

(U) Hesitancy To Implement Destruction Plan

(U) OIG also found that post officials were hesitant to proceed with the destruction of assets because of a lack of clarity about when the evacuation would occur and what equipment could possibly be exfiltrated, and thus salvaged, prior to an evacuation. A prior OIG report highlighted this lack of clarity, noting that embassy leadership expressed apprehension about taking overt actions in preparation for an evacuation. They expressed concern that such actions would undermine diplomatic support for the government of Afghanistan and cause panic within that

government, the broader Afghan population, and Embassy Kabul.⁵⁰ Kabul Management Officers noted, “Embassy Leadership did not wish to create panic and . . . ensured that Management Notices and informational emails did not address the truly dire situation.”⁵¹

(U) Because of the effort to avoid signaling a lack of support for the Afghan government, communication with embassy personnel about the timing and scope of a potential evacuation was unclear. The same OIG report noted that the Ambassador reprimanded embassy personnel during a meeting when they expressed concerns about their safety given the deteriorating security environment.⁵² Embassy personnel also told OIG that the lack of clarity caused confusion and made some personnel less prepared for an evacuation. In interviews with OIG, Embassy Kabul staff gave a wide variety of responses as to when the decision was made and how the evacuation message was communicated. For example, some embassy personnel learned about the evacuation from their superiors, while others learned about it from embassy loudspeakers.⁵³ Further, because of the administration’s stated plan to continue diplomatic relations, the embassy also dedicated considerable effort to planning for projects involving enhanced security and developing capacity, including alternatives to Department of Defense supply chains and support platforms, absorption of assets, and support for the augmentation of embassy defensive capacity.⁵⁴

(U) Even days before the evacuation, Embassy Kabul made efforts to retain firearms and AVs. For example, according to Embassy Kabul officials, Department of Defense personnel stated that they would be able to help exfiltrate some of Embassy Kabul’s firearms. Therefore, in the final hours of the evacuation, Embassy Kabul security personnel packed up the firearms instead of proceeding with planned destruction efforts. However, the Department of Defense did not end up exfiltrating the firearms and they were ultimately abandoned onsite. Some security staff believed that Department of Defense personnel ran out of time to finish the flights.

(U) Furthermore, DEAV recommended as late as August 13, 2021, that Embassy Kabul ship out 39 percent of its AVs that were still in Kabul.⁵⁵ At the time, DEAV officials acknowledged that efforts to ship out AVs on flights from Kabul would take weeks. Similarly, according to documentation, Department personnel at the Joint Afghan Training Center were prepared to destroy AVs that were at its location on August 13, 2021. However, on August 14, 2021, embassy security personnel directed personnel at the training center to “stand by” on destruction activities and to instead prepare to move the AVs to the Kabul International Airport for shipment out of the country. By the time the AVs were loaded onto transport vehicles, the

⁵⁰ (U) OIG, *OIG’s Review of the Department of State’s Evacuation of U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan*, page 8 (AUD-MERO-23-33, September 2023).

⁵¹ (U) *Ibid.*

⁵² (U) *Ibid.*

⁵³ (U) *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, page 7.

⁵⁵ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Taliban had entered the International Zone and personnel were ordered to leave the training center. The AVs at the training center were ultimately abandoned intact, and the Department was charged over \$145,000 from the vendor that arranged the last-minute, failed transport of AVs to the airport.

(U) Although the FAH now states that RSOs must coordinate and maintain a destruction and disposition plan for some sensitive security assets and report on the plan to the Chief of Mission and the post Emergency Action Committee, given the challenges Embassy Kabul experienced, OIG found there is room to improve on the requirement.⁵⁶ Therefore, OIG is offering the following recommendations to help prevent other posts that undergo an evacuation from facing the same challenges as those faced by Embassy Kabul.

Recommendation 3: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security update the Foreign Affairs Handbook to include a requirement that posts develop and maintain written disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for all special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will update the Foreign Affairs Handbook to include the requirement for posts to develop and maintain sensitive security asset emergency destruction plans.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has updated the Foreign Affairs Handbook to include a requirement that posts develop and maintain written disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for all special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles.

Recommendation 4: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop, implement, and distribute guidance to overseas posts on how to develop disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles. The guidance should include details on key considerations to make during the planning process, such as determining which stakeholders to involve in the planning process; planning for a variety of evacuation scenarios; considering timelines and resources needed to ship items out of the country; calculating the timelines needed to destroy assets at post; ensuring security personnel have access to all materials, tools, equipment, and vendors needed to execute the plan; identifying the number, type, and location of all assets to be destroyed; and developing trip wires to determine when to abandon efforts to ship assets out of post and instead pursue emergency destruction

⁵⁶ (U) 12 FAH-9 H-311.4, "Destruction and Disposition Planning."

procedures. If available, the guidance should also include best practices from disposition plans developed by other posts.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will update and distribute standardized guidance for posts to consider when developing scenario-based disposition plans for sensitive security assets.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed, implemented, and distributed guidance to overseas posts on how to develop disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles.

Recommendation 5: (U) Following the implementation of Recommendations 3 and 4, OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring post Emergency Action Committees to periodically review and approve post disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, and to determine whether updates or changes are needed.


Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that its Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division contributed to a recent revision of 12 FAH-1 H-030 Annex K requiring posts to review operational requirements for departure or evacuation related to the disposition of sensitive security assets. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security further stated that these revisions include links to applicable SharePoint sites where specific standard operating procedures will be housed and updated periodically.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed and implemented guidance requiring post Emergency Action Committees to periodically review and approve post disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, and to determine whether updates or changes are needed.

(U) Insufficient Guidance for Emergency Disposals

(U) OIG also found that insufficient guidance on emergency disposals of SPE, hazardous materials, and AVs also contributed to the challenges Embassy Kabul faced when attempting to manage, safeguard, and dispose of sensitive security assets. The guidance is summarized in Figure 10.

(U) Figure 10: Department Guidance on Emergency Destruction Methods

	(U) SPE	(U) Armored Vehicles	(U) Hazardous Materials
(U) Emergency Destruction Guidance 	+ (U) DEAV's "Destruction of State Assets" guidance includes only one method for destroying firearms, which, according to 12 FAM 041.2 "Definitions," is a type of SPE.	+ (U) DEAV's "Armored Vehicle Disposal [Standard Operating Procedures] – Modified Disposal Procedures" outlines the process for the emergency destruction of AVs, but requires multiple, time-consuming steps and does not indicate which steps should be prioritized over others given an exigent evacuation scenario.	X (U) There is no Department guidance related to emergency disposal of hazardous materials.

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sufficient	+ Needs Improvement	X Does Not Exist
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(U) Source: OIG-generated based on an analysis of DEAV guidance on the destruction of sensitive security assets.

(U) Guidance on Emergency Disposal of SPE and Hazardous Materials


~~(SBU)~~ DEAV has established and distributed guidance on the emergency disposal of firearms. However, OIG found that DEAV's emergency disposal guidance for destroying firearms only presents an option to destroy one firearm at a time, which may not be feasible in an exigent evacuation scenario. Furthermore, at the time of this report, the guidance only provided a single method for destroying firearms.⁵⁷ This guidance has been available since 2019 and had been distributed annually across DS channels. Embassy Kabul security personnel stated that they had not seen any DEAV guidance on how to quickly disable multiple firearms during an emergency evacuation scenario. However, several DS security personnel provided examples of possible alternative methods they might use for destroying firearms during exigent evacuation scenarios, ~~(b) (7)(E)~~

(U) When presented with these alternative methods to dispose of firearms, a DEAV official acknowledged that there are in fact several acceptable ways to destroy SPE in the field and that it depends on the resources available. However, none of these alternative destruction methods are formally documented in DEAV's destruction guidance.

~~(SBU)~~ In addition, OIG found that DEAV has not developed guidance on disposing of hazardous materials in an exigent evacuation scenario. For example, DEAV's 2011 guidance only describes the process for disposing of ~~(b) (7)(E)~~ under routine circumstances. However, multiple Department security personnel stated that routine disposition methods are time consuming

⁵⁷ ~~(SBU)~~ ~~(b) (7)(E)~~

and therefore, are not viable in an exigent evacuation scenario. (b) (7)(E)



(U) Establishing guidance that addresses a variety of acceptable destruction methods for SPE and hazardous materials in a range of evacuation scenarios would assist security personnel in designing effective and efficient emergency destruction plans. Accordingly, OIG is offering the following recommendations.

Recommendation 6: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its emergency destruction procedures to describe all acceptable methods to destroy special protective equipment, including methods that can be employed in a limited evacuation timeframe, as well as the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has revised its emergency destruction procedures to describe all acceptable methods to destroy special protective equipment, including methods that can be employed in a limited evacuation timeframe, as well as the equipment and time needed to execute each step, and distributed the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

Recommendation 7: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance on the disposition of hazardous materials in an emergency evacuation scenario. The guidance should include steps that can be implemented in a limited evacuation timeframe and outline the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed and implemented guidance on the disposition of hazardous materials in an emergency evacuation scenario, including steps that can be implemented in a limited evacuation timeframe and an outline of the equipment and time needed to execute each step, and has distributed the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

(U) Guidance for Armored Vehicles

(U) In the event an embassy is operating in contingency or emergency circumstances and is unable to destroy AVs in accordance with routine disposition guidance outlined in the FAM, the embassy is allowed to use “modified disposal” methods with advance Department approval. Specifically, DEAV has established disposal guidance for AVs which outlines a destruction procedure intended to substantially damage an AV and document the destruction during an emergency.⁵⁸ However, multiple security personnel at both Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv stated that DEAV’s AV emergency disposal guidance contains steps that are time consuming and unrealistic for an exigent evacuation scenario.

~~(SBU)~~ For example, the emergency disposal guidance in place at the time of the Embassy Kabul evacuation directed personnel to carry out multiple steps for disposing of each AV, including

(b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

Additionally, the procedures require advance approval prior to initiating destruction procedures. One official noted that the approval process alone can be time consuming, which is unfeasible for an exigent evacuation scenario. Additionally, DEAV guidance that was available at the time of the Embassy Kabul evacuation did not include visual aids for all types of AVs maintained by the Department.

(U) The DEAV guidance also does not contain estimates of the time needed to complete each step, list the equipment required to carry out each step, or indicate which steps should be prioritized over others in a condensed evacuation timeframe. One Embassy Kyiv security official estimated that, once approvals were given, executing the emergency disposal guidance would take a team at least 60–90 minutes per vehicle but could take even longer for staff unfamiliar with the procedures or the vehicles.⁵⁹ Embassy Kabul security personnel stated that the DEAV guidance was not practical for a short evacuation timeline.⁶⁰

~~(SBU)~~ When asked about the fastest way to disable an AV, one DEAV official stated that (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

⁵⁸ ~~(SBU)~~ DEAV, “Armored Vehicle (AV) Disposal [Standard Operating Procedures] – Modified Disposal – Abandonment Method” (Version 20190204): (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

OIG refers to this guidance as “emergency disposal guidance” throughout the report.

⁵⁹ (U) One DEAV official estimated that the current AV emergency disposal procedures would take a total of about 1 hour for one individual to perform or 40 minutes for a team of two to perform. However, Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv security personnel noted that staff who are not familiar with AVs would require more time to execute the steps outlined in the modified disposition guidance.

⁶⁰ ~~(SBU)~~ (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

(b) (7)(E)

However, current emergency disposal guidance does not indicate that any of these steps would be sufficient on its own or that some steps may be prioritized over others if time is short.⁶¹

(U) Security personnel from Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv stated that the DEAV guidance needs to include easier steps that could be accomplished by anyone, including inexperienced staff, during an exigent evacuation. One official also stated that having reasonable step-by-step time estimates would help officials determine well in advance of an evacuation how long it would take to manage their fleet in the event of an emergency.

(SBU) In addition to the previously established emergency disposal guidance, DEAV also issued supplemental AV “Temporary Deactivation” guidance in June 2023 (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

However, multiple post security officials stated that this process would not be feasible for an average person unfamiliar with AV maintenance to execute quickly during an evacuation. In fact, the guidance itself notes that protective equipment, such as safety glasses, safety shoes, and cut resistant gloves, should be used and that training in chemical hazards, handling, and disposal is required. Finally, DEAV’s updated procedures do not include visual aids for all models of AVs that the Department manages.

(U) Future evacuation scenarios are likely to leave Department security personnel with little time, few resources, and a host of competing priorities that will prevent them from fully conducting and documenting the disposal of AVs in accordance with established procedures. Updating and distributing emergency disposal guidance will better prepare the Department for the future management of AVs in a crisis. To assist Department personnel in preparation for AV disposal in a range of evacuation scenarios, OIG is offering the following recommendations.

Recommendation 8: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its armored vehicle disposal procedures to better guide Department of State personnel on how

⁶¹ (SBU) (b) (7)(E)

⁶² (U) DEAV, “Armored Vehicle (AV) Temporary Deactivation – Abandonment [Standard Operating Procedures]” (June 2, 2023).

to efficiently disable or destroy armored vehicles in an exigent evacuation scenario. These procedures should include details on the estimated time needed to complete each required step, which steps should be prioritized over others, and which steps may be skipped given limited time and resources. The procedures should also include guidance and visual aids applicable to all models of Department of State armored vehicles maintained worldwide.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that its Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division will update guidance to include timelines for completion from start of the request until the action is complete and will continue to add platforms to the visual aids as they are made available.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has revised its armored vehicle disposal procedures to better guide Department of State personnel on how to efficiently disable or destroy armored vehicles in an exigent evacuation scenario, to include details on the estimated time needed to complete each required step, which steps should be prioritized over others, and which steps may be skipped given limited time and resources.

(U) Lack of Training

(U) Finally, OIG found that the lack of training on disposing of equipment during an evacuation also contributed to some of the deficiencies identified. DEAV periodically distributes sensitive security asset disposition guidance through cables, and the guidance is also accessible on DEAV's internal website. DEAV also distributed emergency AV disposal guidance directly to Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv RSOs prior to their respective evacuations. However, Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv security personnel stated that they were not confident in their ability to execute the guidance. One official stated that the DEAV emergency AV disposal methods, in particular, would need an experienced, trained team to execute in a timely manner.

(U) Neither DEAV nor post officials were aware of any formal training offered on how to dispose of sensitive security assets during an exigent evacuation scenario. Security personnel in Kabul and Kyiv acknowledged that they were familiar with routine FAM disposition requirements and that they had been trained on how to properly dispose of an AV under normal circumstances. However, personnel also noted that the training did not address disposals in emergency situations. To ensure that Department security personnel are better informed about how to manage sensitive security assets in an exigent evacuation scenario, OIG is offering the following recommendation.

Recommendation 9: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement training for post security personnel on acceptable practices for the

disposition of special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles in an emergency evacuation scenario.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will develop trainings on disposition of assets for evacuation procedures, adding that its Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division has developed a streaming library for armored vehicles guidance that will be updated to include a training for temporary deactivation and modified disposal standard operating procedures.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed and implemented training for post security personnel on acceptable practices for the disposition of special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles in an emergency evacuation scenario.

(U) Impact of the Deficiencies Identified at Embassy Kabul

(U) Sensitive security assets should be managed, safeguarded, and potentially disposed of when a post is faced with an evacuation because these assets are inherently sensitive in nature and, if lost, could be used by hostile forces. The absence of a process requiring posts to consider whether existing quantities of sensitive security assets are appropriate to meet day-to-day operational needs coupled with the flaws in the VAM process, increased Embassy Kabul's risk of abandoning sensitive security assets. Because Embassy Kabul was not able to fully manage, safeguard, and dispose of sensitive security assets before the evacuation, it is likely that hostile forces acquired the equipment.⁶³ For example, as shown in Figure 11, satellite imagery shows that equipment was taken from the helicopter landing zone (where it was abandoned) by September 4, 2021. Similarly, as shown in Figure 12, satellite imagery shows that, despite the efforts of Embassy Kabul security personnel, all of the AVs that were abandoned at Camp Eggers were eventually taken from the camp.⁶⁴

(U) In its response to a draft of this report, DS maintained that the recommendations in this report may not have benefitted Embassy Kabul given unique policy circumstances.⁶⁵ However, had these recommendations been applied to Embassy Kabul, the Department could have been better positioned to manage, safeguard, and dispose of its firearm and AV inventories in advance of the evacuation. In addition, OIG identified a number of other situations faced by

⁶³ (U) For more information on what happened to the firearms and AVs that were abandoned in Kabul, see AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024.

⁶⁴ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

⁶⁵ (U) See Appendix C.

Embassy Kabul that could have been addressed through the application of lessons learned from prior evacuations. The discussion of the Department’s approach to lessons learned is addressed in a related report issued in September 2024.⁶⁶

(U) Figure 11: Embassy Kabul Equipment Removed From Helicopter Landing Zone



(U) Source: © 2021 MAXAR.

(U) Figure 12: Embassy Kabul AVs Removed From Camp Eggers



(U) Source: © 2021 MAXAR.

⁶⁶ (U) OIG, *Management Assistance Report: The Department Would Benefit From a Formal, Systematic Methodology to Capture and Utilize Lessons Learned Following Post Evacuations*, (AUD-GEER-24-32, September 2024).

(U) Managing and Safeguarding Embassy Kyiv’s Sensitive Security Assets During the Evacuation

(U) OIG found that Embassy Kyiv adequately managed and safeguarded all of its sensitive security assets.^{67,68} Embassy Kyiv security personnel reported that they did not have to disable or destroy any assets prior to the suspension of operations. This occurred both because Embassy Kyiv had a relatively small number of sensitive security assets and because Embassy Kyiv officials had sufficient time to execute their established disposition plan. However, a senior Embassy Kyiv security official acknowledged they may have been forced to abandon assets onsite if they had faced an accelerated evacuation timeline similar to the one faced by Embassy Kabul.

(U) An Embassy Kyiv official stated that the embassy developed an official drawdown schedule before the evacuation and that personnel started to prepare SPE for shipment out of the country in late 2021. By February 2022, Embassy Kyiv had shipped a portion of its SPE to DEAV headquarters.⁶⁹ Embassy Kyiv security officials were able to carry the remaining SPE out of Kyiv during the final phase of the Embassy drawdown. In addition, all of Embassy Kyiv’s AVs were driven out of the country during the evacuation.⁷⁰ Assets were temporarily relocated to Poland where Mission Poland officials assisted Embassy Kyiv by identifying a location to house Embassy Kyiv’s sensitive security assets. Mission Poland officials also sent some additional sensitive security assets to DEAV or other Department facilities in the region.

(U) Although Embassy Kyiv security personnel stated that they had not developed a written destruction plan for sensitive security assets, security personnel stated that they had talked about a plan of action in the event of a “hasty” evacuation.⁷¹ For example, security personnel noted that they had the tools needed to destroy sensitive security assets if they were faced with an exigent evacuation scenario and had to leave equipment behind. For example, security personnel reported that they had acquired a corrosive agent that they planned to pour into the gas tanks of AVs if they were forced to abandon AVs in Kyiv. Finally, post had also identified a team of security personnel who would take the lead in executing AV destruction efforts.

⁶⁷ (U) OIG further discussed the fate of these assets in *Supplemental Classified Report to the Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine* (AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024).

⁶⁸ (U) OIG independently verified the retention of Embassy Kyiv’s sensitive security assets during a January 2023 site visit to Embassy Kyiv.

⁶⁹ (U) Specifically, Embassy Kyiv shipped 30 percent of its SPE to DEAV headquarters by February 2022.

⁷⁰ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

⁷¹ (U) Although Embassy Kyiv did not have a written destruction plan for all of its sensitive security assets, it had a formal evacuation plan that detailed how it would exfiltrate AVs in an evacuation scenario.

(U) Finding B: The Department Did Not Fully and Promptly Account for Firearms and Armored Vehicles Following the Evacuation of Embassy Kabul

(U) OIG found that although DEAV made efforts to account for Embassy Kabul's firearms and AVs following the suspension of operations, there were flaws in its approach. Specifically, DEAV prematurely declared some assets as abandoned that were later recovered. For example, some firearms were recovered over a year after the evacuation. This occurred, in part, because the Department does not have a formal requirement to fully reconcile the status of a post's sensitive security assets following a suspension of operations. In addition, DS's records management practices were not conducive to the timely reconciliation of assets. The failure to fully and promptly account for sensitive security assets following a suspension of operations prevents the Department from determining in a timely manner if assets were lost, stolen, or misappropriated.

(U) Firearm Accountability

(U) OIG found that the Department did not appropriately account for Embassy Kabul's firearms after the completion of the NEO. As noted in Finding A of this report, Embassy Kabul exfiltrated approximately 74 percent of its firearms from Afghanistan during the NEO. Most of the exfiltrated firearms were hand-carried out of the country by Embassy Kabul security personnel.

(U) The security personnel were initially evacuated to other sites across the region, including military bases. At the military bases, security personnel turned in their firearms. U.S. military personnel at each base then prepared interim inventories of the firearms that were turned in.⁷² According to a DEAV official, DEAV, in coordination with officials at the military bases, sought to account for the recovered firearms using the interim inventories prepared by military personnel.

(U) DEAV officials stated that although they used the interim inventories to obtain a general idea of where the firearms were located, they did not consider these inventories definitive or fully reliable. Specifically, DEAV officials stated that much of the information received was in Excel documents, in emails, or obtained during verbal conversations; none of which was sufficient documentation for the firearms to be considered "accounted for." Rather, DEAV officials stated that they do not consider assets to be officially recovered until they are physically returned to DEAV's headquarters in the United States.

⁷² (U) Additionally, during the evacuation, one of the contract oversight personnel who managed a team of security contractors in Kabul recorded information on those firearms that were carried out of Kabul by members of his team on a DS-584. The DS-584 is the official form used by the Department to record property transactions. The form was provided to DS's Office of Overseas Protective Operations, which is responsible for overseeing contract security forces. However, OIG could not determine if the form was provided to or reviewed by DEAV.

(SBU) (b) (7)(E)

73 (b) (7)(E)

(U) However, OIG found that all efforts to account for Embassy Kabul's assets had not been exhausted at that point in time and the memorandum did not represent an accurate final inventory of Embassy Kabul's firearms. Although DEAV officials took some action to account for Embassy Kabul's assets following the suspension of operations, OIG found that the actions were not sufficiently comprehensive or timely.⁷⁴ For example, DEAV did not leverage all available resources to determine the status of firearms that were listed in interim inventories but had not yet been physically returned to DEAV. After the DS memorandum was issued in January 2022, firearms initially identified by DEAV as unrecoverable were later located and returned to DEAV.

(U) Some of these firearms were not returned to DEAV until March 2023, more than a year and a half after the evacuation. However, of those firearms identified as unrecoverable in January 2022, 62 percent were in fact documented in September 2021 interim inventories from military bases. In addition, some of the firearms were found unexpectedly. For example, an RSO assigned to the Afghanistan Affairs Unit⁷⁵ said that while at one of the military bases in September 2022, he was informed by military personnel that they had located DS equipment from Kabul at the base. The RSO subsequently took action to return those firearms to DEAV.

(U) As of June 2024, additional efforts may still be needed to locate some of Embassy Kabul's firearms. For example, OIG identified three Embassy Kabul firearms that were included in interim inventories that were never returned to DEAV and were considered lost by DEAV at the time. DEAV officials stated that they performed due diligence within the scope of DEAV's

⁷³ (SBU) Firearms that were not returned to DEAV headquarters by January 2022 were presumed abandoned in Kabul (b) (7)(E)

⁷⁴ (U) DEAV also did not attempt to obtain information on Embassy Kyiv SPE or AVs following the suspension of operations. According to DEAV officials, it was not necessary to seek information on the status of Embassy Kyiv's assets because post reported that no assets had been destroyed or lost. However, many of these assets were transported to a temporary safe haven and were never officially inventoried at their new interim location.

⁷⁵ (U) Following the suspension of operations of Embassy Kabul, the Department established the Afghanistan Affairs Unit as the official U.S. diplomatic mission to Afghanistan.

responsibilities.⁷⁶ However, DEAV had not followed up with officials at least one military base to determine if the firearms might still be located there. When OIG asked security personnel at the location in question about the items, they reached out to their Department of Defense counterparts in an attempt to track down the lost firearms. Although Department of Defense personnel were ultimately unable to provide further information on the firearms, it is noteworthy that DEAV did not similarly reach out to security personnel onsite or to Department of Defense personnel to attempt to locate the lost items.

(U) Armored Vehicle Accountability

(U) OIG also found that DEAV did not maintain accountability over all of Embassy Kabul AVs in Department data systems until OIG made inquiries about them in June 2023. Specifically, DEAV did not fully account for AVs that were part of a group of AVs at Embassy Kabul that could not be used because they required a type of fuel that was not widely available in Afghanistan. Embassy Kabul shipped all of the unused AVs back to DEAV in March 2021, which OIG confirmed through shipping records that the AVs had returned to the United States.⁷⁷ However, OIG could not locate records in ILMS documenting the physical location of all of the vehicles that were returned. In fact, one-third of the AVs that were returned due to their fuel type were not recorded in ILMS for more than 2 years.⁷⁸ After OIG requested information on these AVs, DEAV confirmed the physical location of the vehicles in the United States and added the assets back into ILMS. Although this error pre-dates the evacuation, it had a direct impact on DEAV's ability to accurately account for all of Embassy Kabul's sensitive security assets following the August 2021 evacuation. Had DEAV taken steps to account for all of Embassy Kabul's AVs following the suspension of operations, these missing AVs may have been identified sooner.

(U) Insufficient Procedures

(U) One reason for the shortcomings in DEAV's efforts to fully account for all assets after the NEO was that the Department does not have a defined requirement for DEAV or post security personnel to track all sensitive security assets following an evacuation and subsequent suspension of operations.⁷⁹ The FAM and FAH outline controls for the routine management of

⁷⁶ (SBU) (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] ith regard to Kabul's missing equipment, DEAV said that they fulfilled the extent of their responsibilities per Department guidance.

⁷⁷ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

⁷⁸ (U) The error initially occurred because a staff member at Embassy Kabul completed AV disposal paperwork instead of transfer paperwork; thus, removing AVs from ILMS. However, the disposal paperwork for the AVs noted that the vehicles were "sent back to DEAV." Despite shipping records indicating that the AVs had been returned to DEAV, DEAV did not upload related documentation to ILMS, nor did it notice that the AVs were erroneously removed from Department data systems.

⁷⁹ (U) DEAV officials stated that DEAV sometimes conducts accountability reviews of post assets following a significant change in post status.

SPE⁸⁰ and AVs,⁸¹ as these assets are inherently sensitive in nature and, if lost, could be used by hostile forces. However, the Department does not have defined guidance on what resources should be used to track sensitive security assets after an evacuation or suspension of operations at a post, the timeframe in which a reconciliation should be initiated, or how this information should be reported.

(U) The Government Accountability Office requires management to implement control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risk.⁸² According to the Government Accountability Office,⁸³ management should perform “ongoing monitoring of the design and operating effectiveness of the internal control system” including supervision, comparisons, and reconciliations. As part of this monitoring, management should identify changes to the internal control system that are needed because of environmental changes. In this case, the lack of an effective monitoring system to determine the status of sensitive security assets following a post’s suspension of operations was a breakdown in internal control.

(U) DEAV officials stated that they performed their due diligence within the scope of their responsibilities. DEAV officials noted that, according to the FAH, RSOs are responsible for sensitive security assets at their respective posts.⁸⁴ However, the FAM also states that DEAV is responsible for managing the Department’s domestic and overseas AV and SPE programs.⁸⁵ The Department’s guidance does not address how these respective responsibilities may be altered during and after a suspension of operations. Specifically, the FAH does not address who becomes responsible for tracking, reporting, and reconciling the status of sensitive security assets in the event that security personnel are displaced from a post.

(U) DEAV officials also noted that the FAM’s procedures for closing a post state that the “principal officer” is responsible for completing the final business of the post, including the disposition of supplies and equipment, prior to departure.⁸⁶ OIG determined that this requirement is generally focused on a normal post closure, unrelated to an evacuation. The complete disposition of supplies and equipment addressed in this FAM section may not be feasible during a chaotic evacuation resulting from political instability or other security threats. In fact, former Embassy Kabul personnel stated that there were efforts to reduce supplies and


⁸⁰ (U) 12 FAH-9 H-300, “Special Protective Equipment (SPE) Security and Controls.”

⁸¹ (U) 12 FAM 380, “Armored Vehicle Program.”

⁸² (U) Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, pages 45, 56–57 (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

⁸³ (U) *Ibid.*, pages 65–67.

⁸⁴ (SBU) (b) (7)(E)



⁸⁵ (U) 1 FAM 262.1-1(D), “Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division (DS/PSP/DEAV).”

⁸⁶ (U) 2 FAM 435, “Administrative Procedures.”

equipment in the year leading up to the evacuation; however, because they evacuated in a day, most of the FAM requirements could not be completed prior to departure.

(U) To remediate internal control deficiencies and to improve accountability practices in the wake of future suspensions of operations, OIG is offering the following recommendations.

Recommendation 10: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual, that, in the event of a suspension of operations, a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles must be conducted. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period following the suspension of operations in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles; and, if applicable, include a means to facilitate their return to the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Administration concurred with the intent of the recommendation but stated that the current policy is sufficient. Specifically, 14 FAM 428 states that the Custodial Officer must report to the accountable property officer missing, damaged, or destroyed property within 15 calendar days of discovering the loss or damage. A written explanation of the circumstances surrounding any missing, damaged, or destroyed property will be provided on Form DS-132, Property Disposal Authorization and survey report, by the custodial officer, accountable property officer, and principal custodial officer. In the case of a post in suspended operations, the properties can be designated as "missing" provisionally until a full reconciliation can be completed when post resumes operations.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Administration's concurrence with the intent of the recommendation, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. Based on the Bureau of Administration's response, OIG revised the recommendation language to emphasize that this requirement is specifically applicable to posts that have suspended operations. OIG recognizes that, under normal circumstances, the custodial officer at post is responsible for reporting missing, damaged, or destroyed property. However, in the event of a suspension of operations, the custodial officer and other key officials may not be able to fulfill their responsibilities to report missing, damaged, or destroyed property in the lead up to the evacuation. Furthermore, once the custodial and property officers are evacuated from post, they may no longer have access to information that would allow them to fulfill their responsibilities under 14 FAM 428. In the case of Embassy Kabul, post personnel did not have time to fulfill their responsibilities under 14 FAM 428 because of the accelerated evacuation timeline, and DEAV did not identify the assets abandoned in Afghanistan until 5 months after the suspension of operations. Some assets were not reconciled in Department data systems until more than a year after the evacuation. OIG's recommendation is intended to address the need for a comprehensive

and timely reconciliation of a post's SPE and AVs following a suspension of operations in which post officials are unable to fulfill their responsibilities under 14 FAM 428.

(U) This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, has defined and implemented a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual, that, in the event of a suspension of operations, comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles must be conducted. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period following the suspension of operations in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles, and, if applicable, include a means to facilitate their return to the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division.

Recommendation 11: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to, in the event of a suspension of operations, issue a report to the Department's Accountable Property Officer detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations. The report would follow the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Administration concurred with the intent of the recommendation and stated that the current policy is sufficient. Specifically, 14 FAM 428 states that the Custodial Officer must report to the accountable property officer missing, damaged, or destroyed property within 15 calendar days of discovering the loss or damage. In the case of a post in suspended operations, the properties can be designated as "missing" provisionally until a full reconciliation can be completed when post resumes operations.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Administration's concurrence with the intent of the recommendation, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. Based on the Bureau of Administration's response, OIG revised the recommendation to emphasize that this requirement is specifically applicable to posts that have suspended operations. OIG recognizes that, under normal circumstances, the custodial officer at post is responsible for reporting missing, damaged, or destroyed property. However, in the event of a suspension of operations, the custodial officer and other key officials may not be able to fulfill their responsibilities to report missing, damaged, or destroyed property in the lead up to the evacuation. Furthermore, once the custodial and property officers are evacuated from post, they may no longer have access to information that would allow them to fulfill their responsibilities under 14 FAM 428. In the case of Embassy Kabul, post personnel did not have time to fulfill their responsibilities under 14 FAM 428 because of the accelerated evacuation timeline, and DEAV did not identify the assets abandoned in Afghanistan until 5 months after the suspension of operations. Some assets were not reconciled in Department data systems until more than a year after the evacuation. OIG's recommendation is

intended to address the need for a comprehensive and timely reporting on the status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations in which post officials are unable to fulfill their responsibilities under 14 FAM 428.

(U) This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, has implemented a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to, in the event of a suspension of operations, issue a report to the Department's Accountable Property Officer detailing the final status of a post's assets following the suspension of operations. This report would follow the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles. The requirement should also define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

(U) Insufficient Records

(U) Another challenge impacting the Department's ability to account for firearms after the Embassy Kabul NEO was that the Department's data management practices were not conducive to a timely and efficient reconciliation of assets following an evacuation and subsequent suspension of operations. S-ILMS⁸⁷ serves as the Department's official system of record for SPE; it provides an overall snapshot of Department SPE and general information on individual assets. Specifically, S-ILMS can be used to track the post to which the asset is assigned, whether the asset is currently in service, and the asset's basic profile. However, S-ILMS is not a useful tool for the day-to-day management of assets at post since post security officials are unable to edit or update information recorded in S-ILMS.⁸⁸ As an alternative, post security officers often use local records, such as Excel spreadsheets, to track more detailed information on the SPE assigned to their post, such as the section at post to which a particular piece of equipment is assigned and the specific location where the equipment is kept.

(U) In the event of a major change in operating status, such as an evacuation and suspension of operations, post records are a useful tool to record the temporary physical locations of assets. For example, Embassy Kyiv security personnel updated locally maintained spreadsheets with information on the SPE that had been temporarily relocated after the assets were exfiltrated from Ukraine. However, because post officials do not have access to S-ILMS, it was not similarly updated to reflect the new locations of these assets following the Embassy Kyiv evacuation. Instead, S-ILMS data only showed that the SPE remained assigned to Embassy Kyiv, with no other new information on the actual physical locations of the assets following the evacuation.⁸⁹ According to Embassy Kabul security personnel, they also maintained their own local

⁸⁷ (U) ILMS, which is the unclassified version of the property management system, is used to record AVs. ILMS includes the same data fields as S-ILMS. S-ILMS can only be accessed on the Department's classified network and is used to record SPE-related data.

⁸⁸ (U) Post security officials may edit and update information in ILMS but not S-ILMS.

⁸⁹ (U) Because ILMS does not contain a field to record the physical location (or temporary relocation) of an asset, Embassy Kyiv officials indicated in the ILMS "Notes" field that some of their AVs had been moved to a third country location. However, because RSOs do not have the ability to edit to S-ILMS, Embassy Kyiv had no way to note that some of its SPE had also been temporarily relocated to another country in that data system.

spreadsheets with detailed information on the firearms and AVs assigned to Kabul. However, many of those records were lost because they were stored on local servers that were intentionally destroyed during the evacuation.

(U) Without the timely efforts of Embassy Kyiv officials to track sensitive security assets in local spreadsheets, the Department may have lost track of the vehicles and equipment that were temporarily relocated as it did Embassy Kabul's firearms. Further, because there is no Department-wide guidance on maintaining post-specific records, security personnel at each post may take a different approach to how they record information on the assets assigned to their post. As a result, any number of circumstances could arise that might lead to the loss of local records that may be essential to supplement the data recorded in S-ILMS following an evacuation.

(U) DEAV officials confirmed that there is no requirement or defined process for post officials to document the temporary relocation of assets following an evacuation. Further, Department guidance does not require overseas posts to maintain their own records on the status of post-assigned sensitive security assets. The Department also has not provided guidance to posts on how to maintain their own records on the status of assets following a suspension of operations so that they may be available for review. Maintaining detailed information on the status of sensitive security assets assigned to each post is essential to providing accurate and timely information about the location, number, types, and status of assets at post and any changes that may occur following a suspension of operations.

(U) To improve Department recordkeeping practices and facilitate the Department's ability to fully account for a post's sensitive security assets following a suspension of operations, OIG is offering the following recommendation.

Recommendation 12: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.

Management Response: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will coordinate with the Bureau of Administration on this effort.

OIG Reply: (U) Based on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's concurrence with the recommendation and planned actions, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed and implemented detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of

information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.

(U) Impact of Inadequate Accounting for Sensitive Security Assets After the Embassy Kabul Evacuation

(U) Every evacuation presents a unique set of circumstances, and the safety and security of U.S. government employees and citizens should be the primary focus. However, the failure to fully and consistently account for sensitive security assets following a suspension of operations presents a risk to U.S. interests by preventing the Department from quickly determining if assets were lost, stolen, or fell into the hands of hostile forces. The nature of these sensitive security assets presents a high risk to the security of U.S. and allied personnel because of how the assets could be misappropriated.

(U) The absence of a requirement defining who is responsible for tracking sensitive security assets after an evacuation and suspension of operations raises questions about whether the Department has adequate safeguards to ensure that sensitive security assets are accounted for in a timely manner. Assets moved to an alternate location are at risk of being temporarily misplaced or permanently lost if they are not identified, inventoried, and recovered quickly following a suspension of operations. By not actively following up on the status of these assets following a suspension of operations, the Department risks falsely reporting the loss of assets and potentially losing custody of assets that were actually recovered.

(U) OTHER MATTERS

(U) Department Transferred Armored Vehicles to the Government of Ukraine, Contrary to Policy

(U) According to the FAM, “to reduce the possibility of unauthorized use and because testing requirements for armoring . . . vehicles [are] classified, all [AVs] must be destroyed. . . . They may NOT be sold, donated or transferred to persons, governments, or organizations outside of the U.S. Government.”⁹⁰ Although Embassy Kyiv retained its entire AV fleet during the evacuation, it subsequently transferred half⁹¹ of its AVs to the government of Ukraine in March 2022, during the suspension of operations of the embassy.⁹² Shortly following this transfer, the Under Secretary for Management issued a waiver to the FAM prohibition on AV transfers to non-U.S. government entities authorizing the embassy’s transfer action.⁹³

⁹⁰ (U) 12 FAM 388, “Disposal and Transfer.”

⁹¹ (SBU) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

⁹² (U) Operations at Embassy Kyiv were suspended from February 2022, when all embassy personnel were evacuated, until May 2022, when some personnel returned to Kyiv and resumed operations on a limited basis.

⁹³ (U) The waiver was not signed and approved until 2 days after the transfer occurred.

(U) According to multiple Embassy Kyiv officials, one reason that the transfer occurred was that some Embassy Kyiv personnel were sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause following Russia's full-scale invasion and advocated for the transfer of vehicles to help with the Ukrainian defense effort. DEAV officials stated that the transfer was approved, in part, because of the change in Embassy Kyiv's operating status following the evacuation. Specifically, at the time of the transfer, the AVs were determined to be less essential to embassy operations because the vehicles had been temporarily relocated to a third country following the evacuation. Regardless, Embassy Kyiv security officials stated that they did not agree with the decision because they were concerned that when operations resumed, post would not have enough capacity to move personnel in the event of another evacuation.

(U) When Embassy Kyiv resumed operations, following the withdrawal of Russia's troops from the area surrounding the capital, Embassy Kyiv security officials stated that they did not have enough AVs to support day-to-day operations. Embassy Kyiv subsequently requested additional AVs to supplement its reduced fleet in July 2022, noting that due to the change in security circumstances, ground movements in Kyiv now required the increased use of AVs. DEAV officials stated that the transfer was "convenient" because of the circumstances at the time of the evacuation, but that they would not necessarily support the transfer of Department AVs to non-U.S. government agencies again.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ (U) This issue is discussed in more detail in AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and update the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments. This evaluation should consider the relative weight of each factor within the criticality score and consider requiring justifications for the retention of low-usage, high-criticality vehicles to achieve a balanced score.

Recommendation 2: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring overseas posts to periodically assess the volume of special protective equipment and hazardous materials. The guidance should take into consideration usage rates and the criticality of each asset in order to determine the appropriate quantities needed for post operations and provide instructions for adjusting asset holdings based on the outcomes of the assessment.

Recommendation 3: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security update the Foreign Affairs Handbook requirement that posts develop and maintain written disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for all special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles.

Recommendation 4: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop, implement, and distribute guidance to overseas posts on how to develop disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles. The guidance should include details on key considerations to make during the planning process, such as determining which stakeholders to involve in the planning process; planning for a variety of evacuation scenarios; considering timelines and resources needed to ship items out of the country; calculating the timelines needed to destroy assets at post; ensuring security personnel have access to all materials, tools, equipment, and vendors needed to execute the plan; identifying the number, type, and location of all assets to be destroyed; and developing trip wires to determine when to abandon efforts to ship assets out of post and instead pursue emergency destruction procedures. If available, the guidance should also include best practices from disposition plans developed by other posts.

Recommendation 5: (U) Following the implementation of Recommendations 3 and 4, OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring post Emergency Action Committees to periodically review and approve post disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, and to determine whether updates or changes are needed.

Recommendation 6: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its emergency destruction procedures to describe all acceptable methods to destroy special protective equipment, including methods that can be employed in a limited evacuation timeframe, as well as the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

Recommendation 7: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance on the disposition of hazardous materials in an emergency evacuation scenario. The guidance should include steps that can be implemented in a limited evacuation timeframe and outline the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

Recommendation 8: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its armored vehicle disposal procedures to better guide Department of State personnel on how to efficiently disable or destroy armored vehicles in an exigent evacuation scenario. These procedures should include details on the estimated time needed to complete each required step, which steps should be prioritized over others, and which steps may be skipped given limited time and resources. The procedures should also include guidance and visual aids applicable to all models of Department of State armored vehicles maintained worldwide.

Recommendation 9: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement training for post security personnel on acceptable practices for the disposition of special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles in an emergency evacuation scenario.

Recommendation 10: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to conduct a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles in the event of a suspension of operations. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the period following the suspension of operations in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles; and, if applicable, include a means to facilitate the return of equipment and vehicles to the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division.

Recommendation 11: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to, in the event of a suspension of operations, issue a report to the Department's accountable property officer detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations. The report would follow the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

Recommendation 12: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.

(U) APPENDIX A: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine, managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation at each post in accordance with Department of State (Department) guidance.

(U) OIG conducted this audit from January 2023 to September 2024 in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area and at U.S. Embassy Kyiv. OIG reviewed how each embassy managed, safeguarded, and disposed of special protective equipment (SPE) and armored vehicles (AV) in the lead-up to Embassy Kabul's evacuation in August 2021 and Embassy Kyiv's evacuation in February 2022. OIG reviewed sensitive security assets under the Department's purview. OIG included other U.S. government agencies' assets in the review if the assets were included in data maintained by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division (DEAV), or Department systems.¹ During the course of this audit, OIG also identified deficiencies related to technical security at Embassy Kyiv after the embassy's reestablishment of operations following the February 2022 evacuation. OIG conducted work related to that issue between January and August 2023. OIG separately reported on these deficiencies in two classified reports.^{2,3}

(U) OIG conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that OIG plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objective. OIG believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objective. This report relates, in part, to Overseas Contingency Operations Freedom's Sentinel and Enduring Sentinel and was completed in accordance with OIG's oversight responsibilities described in Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.^{4,5}

¹ (U) For example, some U.S. Agency for International Development AVs at Embassy Kyiv were tracked by DEAV in the lead-up to the evacuation. Embassy Kyiv security personnel reported that they assumed responsibility for the AVs during the evacuation. For Embassy Kabul, seven pre-evacuation AVs were labeled as "Other Government Agencies" vehicles within the Department's Integrated Logistics Management System and were, therefore, included in OIG's audit.

² (U) OIG, *Management Alert: Technical Security Issues at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine* (MA-23-01, March 2023).

³ (U) OIG, *Audit of Technical Security Following Reestablishment of Operations at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine* (AUD-MERO-23-24, August 2023).

⁴ (U) 5 United States Code § 419, "Special provisions concerning overseas contingency operations."

⁵ (U) On October 1, 2021, the Department of Defense terminated the Operation Freedom's Sentinel mission and initiated Operation Enduring Sentinel, a new mission to protect U.S. national interests by disrupting violent extremist organizations and their external operations that threaten the U.S. homeland, partners, and allies from Afghanistan. The Operation Freedom Sentinel mission began in January 2015, when the United States joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan to develop the capacity of Afghan security ministries and to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This audit is about the Department's accountability of sensitive security assets that supported Mission Afghanistan.

(U) To obtain background information, OIG reviewed relevant requirements outlined in the Department's Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign Affairs Handbook and bureau-specific standard operating procedures and guidance. OIG also obtained, reviewed, and analyzed data on the status of sensitive security assets assigned to Embassy Kabul⁶ and Embassy Kyiv from Department data systems, including the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS) and the Secure Integrated Logistics Management System (S-ILMS).

(U) OIG interviewed relevant Department personnel who had been stationed at Embassy Kyiv and Embassy Kabul, and personnel from the Bureau of Administration, the Office of Crisis Management and Strategy, and DS, including officials from DEAV, the International Programs directorate, and the High Threat Programs Directorate. In addition, OIG conducted a site visit at DEAV's armory in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area to verify the status of sensitive security assets. Furthermore, OIG coordinated its work with other agency OIGs that were conducting reviews involving various aspects of U.S. government activities following the evacuation and suspension of operations at Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv through participation in the OIG Afghanistan Project Coordination Group and OIG Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

(U) OIG used Department inventory documentation,⁷ local embassy records, DEAV tracking data, and asset disposal records to identify the number and types of sensitive security assets that were assigned to Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv in advance of each evacuation.⁸ To determine the extent to which the Department managed, disposed of, and maintained accountability over assets following each evacuation, OIG reviewed the sensitive security assets assigned to each embassy at the time of the evacuations.

(U) Data Reliability

(U) OIG used computer-processed data from the Department's ILMS and S-ILMS systems to determine the number of pre-evacuation assets at Embassies Kabul and Kyiv. Specifically, the Department's ILMS system contained contemporary status-tracking data, asset inventories, asset transfer data, and asset disposal documentation. AV data are processed by the

⁶ (U) Embassy Kabul's SPE inventory included firearms. For the purposes of this audit, OIG focused its review of Embassy Kabul's SPE inventory on firearms only.

⁷ (U) Specifically, OIG used official Department inventories conducted at Embassies Kabul and Kyiv from the year preceding each evacuation. According to December 2011 version of 12 FAH-9 H-312.2, "Annual Inventory Check," RSOs must accurately and completely complete inventories of their assets. The annual inventory requirement was moved to 12 FAH-9 H-311.2, "Annual Inventory Check" in April 2022, and updated in August 2023 to specify that RSOs must scan the assets and provide the inventory to DEAV as a .csv file. The Department maintains these inventory records in ILMS. OIG obtained both Embassy Kabul's scanned inventory of serialized SPE (completed December 2020) and its motor vehicle certified inventory (completed February 2021). OIG also obtained Embassy Kyiv's scanned inventory of serialized SPE (completed November 2021) and motor vehicle certified inventory (completed March 2021).

⁸ (U) OIG met with DEAV officials in May 2023 to explain OIG's methodology for establishing the audit universe of sensitive security assets that existed at Embassies Kabul and Kyiv in advance of the evacuations. DEAV officials indicated that they concurred with OIG's proposed methodology.

Department on ILMS, and SPE data are managed by DEAV on S-ILMS.⁹ The ILMS and S-ILMS data are based, in part, on the Department's annual inventory of SPE and AVs. Because SPE and AVs may be transferred to or from post following the annual inventory, OIG also obtained data from Department cables, internal data managed by DS and the Bureau of Administration, and documentation provided by post security personnel to build a complete universe of all assets located at Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv prior to each respective evacuation. Additionally, OIG used this supplementary data to validate data obtained from ILMS and S-ILMS.

(U) To further validate the information obtained from ILMS and S-ILMS, OIG performed spot-check inventories at Embassy Kyiv in January 2023 and at DEAV's armory in September 2023 to confirm the status of retained sensitive security assets. Based on its testing, OIG concluded that Department data records related to sensitive security assets contained consistent information for the period audited. Accordingly, OIG concluded that the data obtained were sufficiently reliable and were of adequate quality to support the findings and conclusions described in this report.

(U) Work Related to Internal Control

(U) During the audit, OIG considered a number of factors, including the subject matter of the project, to determine whether internal control was significant to the audit objective. Based on its consideration, OIG determined that internal control was significant for this audit. OIG then considered the components of internal control and the underlying principles included in the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*¹⁰ to identify internal controls that were significant to the audit objective. Considering internal control in the context of a comprehensive internal control framework can help auditors to determine whether underlying internal control deficiencies exist.

(U) For this audit, OIG concluded that two of five internal control components from the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, Control Activities and Monitoring, were significant to the audit objective. The Control Activities component includes the actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system, which includes the entity's information system. The Monitoring component relates to activities management establishes and operates to assess the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews. OIG also concluded that three principles related to the selected components were significant to the audit objective, as described in Table A.1.

⁹ (U) S-ILMS can only be accessed on the Department's classified network.

¹⁰ (U) Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

(U) Table A.1: Internal Control Components and Principles Identified as Significant

(U) Components	(U) Principles
Control Activities	Management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks.
Control Activities	Management should implement control activities through policies.
Monitoring	Management should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results.

(U) Source: OIG-generated from an analysis of internal control components and principles from the Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

(U) OIG reviewed Department policies and procedures and analyzed data from Department data systems and conducted inventories to obtain an understanding of the internal controls related to the components and principles identified as significant for this audit. OIG performed procedures to assess the design of key internal controls.

- (U) To determine whether the Department designed controls to ensure overseas posts’ stockpiles of sensitive security assets were appropriate to meet day-to-day operational needs, OIG:
 - (U) Analyzed the Vehicle Allocation Methodology as the Department’s primary internal control governing the size and composition of overseas posts’ vehicle fleets.
 - (U) Tested the design of the methodology through an analysis of Embassy Kabul’s 2019 vehicle data.
 - (U) Reviewed the “Annual Inventory Check” sections of 12 FAH-9 H-300, from December 2011 to present, which requires SPE to be inventoried annually.
- (U) To determine whether the Department designed controls through policies to ensure overseas posts developed actionable emergency destruction plans for their sensitive security assets, OIG:
 - (U) Reviewed Department policies requiring the development of overseas emergency destruction plans.
 - (U) Determined whether Embassies Kabul and Kyiv developed emergency destruction plans in line with established policies.
 - (U) Analyzed the extent to which those plans were comprehensive and actionable.
- (U) To determine whether the Department implemented controls through policies to ensure sensitive security assets were properly disposed of, OIG:
 - (U) Analyzed Department disposition guidance, including emergency destruction guidance, to assess whether the guidance covered all types of sensitive security assets and described all accepted destruction methods.
 - (U) Analyzed Embassy Kabul’s sensitive security asset disposition documentation, including photographs and ILMS forms, to assess compliance with Department policy.
- (U) To determine whether the Department established and implemented monitoring activities to ensure that it maintained accountability over sensitive security assets

following a post closure or suspension of operations to minimize the risk of unaccounted assets being lost or falling into the hands of hostile forces, OIG:

- (U) Analyzed sensitive security asset management data from ILMS and S-ILMS and supplementary sensitive security asset management data to assess the status of post sensitive security assets following suspensions of operations.
- (U) Compared Embassy Kabul sensitive security asset management data from ILMS following the suspension of operations to data from other sources, including locally maintained inventories, to assess whether the Department maintained accountability over Embassy Kabul assets.
- (U) Reviewed Department policies and procedures to assess whether the Department established requirements to determine the status of these assets.

(U) Internal control deficiencies identified during the audit that are significant within the context of the audit objective are presented in the Audit Results section of this report.

(U) Sampling Methodology

(U) OIG reviewed Embassy Kabul's firearms inventory and determined how many of the firearms were retained or lost during the evacuation. To validate Department records and data systems related to Embassy Kabul firearms, OIG designed a stratified random sample that allowed OIG to confirm the status of equipment that was recorded as retained. Specifically, OIG determined that Embassy Kabul firearms had three outcomes following the suspension of operations: the firearms were immediately returned to DEAV, abandoned in Afghanistan, or initially thought to be abandoned but later found and returned to DEAV. Therefore, OIG divided Embassy Kabul's firearms into three strata: (1) firearms that were returned to DEAV immediately following the suspension of operations, (2) firearms abandoned in Afghanistan at the time of evacuation, and (3) firearms initially thought to have been abandoned in Afghanistan but later returned to DEAV long after the suspension of operations. OIG then randomly selected firearms from each stratum for testing. OIG determined the final location of these firearms using S-ILMS data, supplementary documentation from DEAV, and a physical inventory of the DEAV Armory. By using this stratified sample, OIG was able to confirm which firearms were recovered and to validate the final location of assets in each of the three categories.

(U) Prior Office of Inspector General Reports

(U) Management Assistance Report: The Department Would Benefit from a Formal, Systematic Methodology to Capture and Utilize Lessons Learned Following Post Evacuations (AUD-GEER-24-32, September 2024). OIG reported that although the Department produces two types of reports to document lessons learned following a post evacuation, the Department has not established clear requirements as to when these reports must be produced. The Department has also not established procedures to systematically review the lessons learned reports or determine when lessons learned should necessitate changes to Department policies, procedures, or guidance. OIG made three recommendations to address the deficiencies identified in the report.

(U) Supplemental Classified Report on the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine (AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024). OIG reported on further information regarding the management, safeguarding, and disposition of sensitive security assets at Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv.¹¹

(U) Information Brief: OIG's Review of the Department of State's Evacuation of U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (AUD-MERO-23-33, September 2023).¹² OIG reported that Embassy Kabul developed its emergency action plan in accordance with established guidance but was not adequately prepared for the full scope of challenges encountered while executing the evacuation. In the corresponding classified report, OIG made 10 recommendations. As of March 2024, the 10 recommendations were resolved, pending further action.

(U) Audit of Technical Security Following Reestablishment of Operations at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine (AUD-MERO-23-24, August 2023). OIG reported on technical security issues identified at Embassy Kabul following the February 2022 evacuation.¹³

(U) Management Alert: Technical Security Issues at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine (MA-23-01, March 2023). OIG reported on technical security issues identified at Embassy Kyiv in a management alert which accompanied AUD-MERO-23-24.¹⁴

(U) Audit of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Administration of the Armored Vehicle Program (AUD-SI-17-21, February 2017). OIG found that DS did not effectively administer the AV program in accordance with Department policies and guidelines because DS had not developed appropriate procedures, guidance, or processes. OIG made 38 recommendations to address the deficiencies identified in the report. All 38 recommendations were closed by November 2023.

¹¹ (U) AUD-GEER-24-31 is a classified report and is not available for public viewing.

¹² (U) OIG also issued a classified report, *Review of the Department of State's Evacuation of U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-23-15, May 2023), related to the evacuation of Embassy Kabul.

¹³ (U) AUD-MERO-23-24 is a classified report and is not available for public viewing.

¹⁴ (U) MA-23-01 is a classified report and is not available for public viewing.

(U) APPENDIX B: BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE



United States Department of State

Washington, DC 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

October 4, 2024

TO: Mike Vennemann, Director, Global Emergencies and Emerging Risks

FROM: A/LM – Jess Osterberger, (Acting) Deputy Assistant Secretary /s/ Jess Osterberger

SUBJECT: (U) Management Response to the Audit Draft of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine.

(U) Recommendation 1: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and update the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments. This evaluation should consider the relative weight of each factor within the criticality score and consider requiring justifications for the retention of low-usage, high-criticality vehicles to achieve a balanced score.

(U) A/LM Management Response: A/LM concurs with this recommendation. A/LM will work with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology (VAM) to understand the underlying cause(s) for high threat environment AV retention bias, and will make any necessary updates to the criticality scoring system.

(U) Recommendation 10: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to conduct a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles following a post's suspension of

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operations. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles, and, if applicable, include a means to facilitate their return to the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division.

(U) A/LM Management Response: Please see the combined response below Recommendation 11.

(U) Recommendation 11: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual that, following the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles, a report detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations is issued to the Department's Accountable Property Officer. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

(U) A/LM/PMP/PM Management response to recommendations 10 and 11: A/LM/PMP/PM concurs with the intent of the OIG recommendation; however, the current policy is sufficient. Per 14 FAM 428, the Custodial Officer (CO) must report missing, damaged, or destroyed property to the accountable property officer through the principal custodial officer within 15 calendar days of discovering the loss or damage. A written explanation of the circumstances surrounding any missing, damaged, or destroyed property will be provided on Form DS-132, Property Disposal Authorization and survey report, by the by the custodial officer, accountable property officer and the principal custodial officer. Agency Property Disposal Specialist's Comment: Realistically, the affected Post usually requires more than 15 calendar days to reconcile and report the loss of personal property since suspended operation doesn't ascertain the loss of properties in question. The properties can be designated as "missing" provisionally until a full scope of reconciliation can be completed when the Post's day-to-day

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operation is fully resumed. In the case of post Kabul, Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP) packet was completed by the post to document all properties that were abandoned or destroyed before and after the emergency evacuation.

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Cleared:

Bureau	Name	Clearance Status
A/LM	JOsterberger	[OK]
A/LM/PMP	OHooks	[OK]
DS	WShishak	[OK]
A/LM/PMP/PM	JLewis	[OK]
A/LM/PMP/OF	EBonet	[OK]

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(U) APPENDIX C: BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY RESPONSE



United States Department of State


Washington, DC 20520

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October 7, 2024

Read by _____

Info Memo for Inspector General Richardson

FROM: DS – Gentry O. Smith 

SUBJECT: (U) AUD-GEER-XX-XX Draft Report Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine

~~(SBU)~~ The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has reviewed the OIG draft report of the Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets for Kabul and Kyiv, and the Bureau generally concurs with its recommendations. However, DS flags that the report omits key context, which in addition to its overall tone, diminishes the report's credibility and value of the recommendations, particularly as it relates to Kabul.

~~(SBU)~~ The nature of the U.S. government's exit from Afghanistan and Embassy Kabul was historically unprecedented – unlike anything the U.S. government has seen since the fall of Saigon in 1975. In providing context, the report fails to acknowledge that most post closures occur during a protracted deterioration in the security environment followed by a systematic drawdown of personnel and property from an embassy.

(b) (7)(E)



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(b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

The report highlights that 26 percent of firearms were abandoned in Kabul while overlooking the photographic evidence and personal accounts by DS personnel that a significant portion of this number was destroyed on the ground. The report goes on to say that the DS Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division (DS/PSP/DEAV) did not fully and accurately account for sensitive security assets exfiltrated from Embassy Kabul, and that DS/PSP/DEAV prematurely declared some assets as abandoned that were later recovered. Again, these comments fall short of recognizing the complexity of the logistical operations required to evacuate one of the largest embassies in the world and Department's reliance on DoD aircraft to transport personnel and equipment [REDACTED]

(b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

~~(SBU)~~ While DS generally agrees that the OIG recommendations will benefit all posts in overall planning for the disposition of sensitive assets in the event of a suspension of operations, these recommendations may still have not benefitted Kabul given unique policy circumstances. [REDACTED]

(b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

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(b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

It was not apparent until the last days that the assets required for Embassy Kabul to sustain key security functions would need to be liquidated. Overall, the report does not provide sufficient acknowledgement of the unique nature of the situation or the impossible circumstances faced by U.S. government personnel in Kabul.

~~(SBU)~~ DS has highlighted these omissions and lack of context to OIG on numerous occasions, including most recently in the August exit conference. Although DS was promised the context would be in the final report, it is not. This glaring omission results in recommendations based on unrealistic precedence with limited applicability and a report that lacks credibility in general. (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

The report related to Kyiv and subsequent recommendations are generally useful. To this end, the two scenarios are so fundamentally unique that they should not be included in the same report. Doing so is disingenuous and diminishes the uniqueness of the situation faced by those that evacuated Kabul.

(U) Below is the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's response to Recommendations 1-12 of the subject report.

(U) **Recommendation 1:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and update the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments. This evaluation should consider the relative weight of each factor within the criticality score and consider requiring justifications for the retention of low-usage, high-criticality vehicles to achieve a balanced score.

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(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024):** DS concurs with this recommendation. DS will work with the Bureau of Administration (A Bureau) to reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology (VAM) to understand the underlying cause(s) for high threat environment AV retention bias, and will make any necessary updates to the criticality scoring system.

(U) **Recommendation 2:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring overseas posts to periodically assess the volume of sensitive security assets. The guidance should take into consideration usage rates and the criticality of each asset in order to determine the appropriate quantities needed for post operations and provide instructions for adjusting asset holdings based on the outcomes of the assessment.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024):** DS concurs with this recommendation. DS will develop and formalize specific guidance for posts to 1) periodically evaluate sensitive security asset holdings based on a calculated criticality and usage methodology, and 2) provide instructions to adjust sensitive security asset holdings based on the resulting assessment.

(U) **Recommendation 3:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security update the Foreign Affairs Manual to include a requirement that posts develop and maintain written disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for all sensitive security assets.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024):** DS concurs with this recommendation. DS will update the FAH to include the requirement for posts to develop and maintain sensitive security asset emergency destruction plans.

(U) **Recommendation 4:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop, implement, and distribute guidance to overseas posts on how to develop disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for sensitive security assets. The guidance should include details on key considerations to make during the planning process, such as determining which stakeholders to involve in the planning process; planning for a variety

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of evacuation scenarios; considering timelines and resources needed to ship items out of the country; calculating the timelines needed to destroy assets at post; ensuring security personnel have access to all materials, tools, equipment, and vendors needed to execute the plan; identifying the number, type, and location of all assets to be destroyed; and developing trip wires to determine when to abandon efforts to ship assets out of post and instead pursue emergency destruction procedures. If available, the guidance should also include best practices from disposition plans developed by other posts.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation. DS will update and distribute standardized guidance for posts to consider when developing scenario-based disposition plans for sensitive security assets.

(U) **Recommendation 5**: Following the implementation of Recommendations 3 and 4, OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring post Emergency Action Committees to periodically review and approve post disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, and to determine whether updates or changes are needed.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation. DS/PSP/DEAV included edits to the Management (M)-initiated revisions to 12 FAH-1 H-030 Annex K requiring posts to review operational requirements for departure or evacuation as it relates to the disposition of sensitive security assets. The revisions include links to applicable SharePoint sites where specific standard operating procedures (SOP) will be housed and updated periodically.

(U) **Recommendation 6**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its emergency destruction procedures to describe all acceptable methods to destroy sensitive security assets, including methods that can be employed in a limited evacuation timeframe, as well as the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of

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Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation.

(U) **Recommendation 7**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance on the disposition of sensitive security assets in an emergency evacuation scenario. The guidance should include steps that can be implemented in a limited evacuation timeframe and outline the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation.

(U) **Recommendation 8**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its armored vehicle disposal procedures to better guide Department of State personnel on how to efficiently disable or destroy armored vehicles in an exigent evacuation scenario. These procedures should include details on the estimated time needed to complete each required step, which steps should be prioritized over others, and which steps may be skipped given limited time and resources. The procedures should also include guidance and visual aids applicable to all models of Department of State armored vehicles maintained worldwide.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation. DS/PSP/DEAV will update guidance to include timelines for completion from start of the request until the action is complete. DS/PSP/DEAV will continue to add platforms to the visual aids as they are made available.

(U) **Recommendation 9**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement training for post security personnel on acceptable practices for the disposition of sensitive security assets in an emergency evacuation scenario.

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(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation. DS will develop trainings on disposition of assets for evacuation procedures. DS/PSP/DEAV has developed a streaming library for armored vehicles guidance that will be updated to include a training for temporary deactivation and modified disposal SOPs.

(U) **Recommendation 10**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to conduct a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles following a post's suspension of operations. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles, and, if applicable, include a means to facilitate their return to the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with the recommendation.

(U) **Recommendation 11**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual that, following the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles, a report detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations is issued to the Department's Accountable Property Officer. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with the recommendation.

(U) **Recommendation 12**: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective

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equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.

(U) **DS Response (10-07-2024)**: DS concurs with this recommendation and will coordinate with Bureau of Administration on this effort.

Attachment

Tab 1 – Technical Comments

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(U) Attachments and tabs are available upon request, consistent with applicable law.

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Approved: DS – Gentry O. Smith, A/S



Analyst: DS/MGT/PPD – Adriana Ray

Cleared:

Bureau	Name	Clearance Status
DS/EX:	WTerrini	OK
DS/MGT/PPD:	CSatre	OK
DS/C:	RStuart	OK
DS/HTP	TOsterhout	OK
M:	CRaines	OK
M/SS:	HJiminez	OK
A:	JYoung	OK
EUR-IO/EX:	DMark	OK
NEA-SCA/EX:	AOsla	OK

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(U) ABBREVIATIONS

AV	Armored Vehicle
DEAV	Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
ILMS	Integrated Logistics Management System
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
OIG	Office of Inspector General
RSOs	Regional Security Officers
S-ILMS	Secure Integrated Logistics Management System
SPE	Special Protective Equipment
VAM	Vehicle Allocation Methodology



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