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Office of Inspector General United States Department of State

ISP-I-25-09

Office of Inspections

June 2025

Inspection of Embassy Ankara and Constituent Posts, Türkiye

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS

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HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

ISP-I-25-09

What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Ankara. The inspection included Consulate General Istanbul, Consulate Adana, Consular Agency Izmir, and Branch Office Gaziantep.

What OIG Recommends

OIG made 27 recommendations to Embassy Ankara. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy concurred with all 27 recommendations. OIG considers all 27 recommendations resolved. The embassy's response to each recommendation and OIG's reply can be found in the Recommendations section of this report.

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What OIG Found

- The Chargé d'Affaires and acting Deputy Chief of Mission led Mission Türkiye in a professional and collaborative manner. They had good coordination and cooperation with the leadership at Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana.
- The mission played a key role in facilitating approval by Türkiye for the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- The mission provided essential support to regional crises such as assisting Syrian refugees, assisting U.S. citizens, and responding to a devastating earthquake in Türkiye.
- Mission Türkiye's consular operations were generally well led and coordinated; however, crisis management and workload growth strained limited managerial capacity.
- The mission had internal control deficiencies related to property management, contract administration, and procurement.
- The mission's local compensation plan and human resources policies required updates, and the mission was missing required facility and residential safety inspections.
- Spotlight on Success: Consular staff developed an automated electronic screening tool to evaluate visa applicants for affiliation with sanctioned entities. This innovation subsequently was adopted by other missions.

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CONTEXT



Figure 1: Map of Türkiye (Source: CIA World Factbook).

The U.S.-Türkiye bilateral relationship dates to 1831, when the United States established diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. After World War I and the founding of the Turkish Republic, the United States established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Türkiye in 1927. The Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement—signed July 12, 1947, between the United States and Türkiye—advanced the relationship

further. The agreement implemented the Truman Doctrine and its policy “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Türkiye joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.

The United States condemned the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Türkiye, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries and thousands of people detained. The Turkish government’s response to the coup attempt included changes to military and civilian agencies and the takeover of businesses, schools, and media outlets. The United States continues to emphasize the importance of the Turkish government’s adherence to policies and actions that build public trust in the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law, as well as upholding human rights commitments. In 2021, the Department of State (Department) issued a press statement objecting to assertions by senior Turkish officials that the United States was involved in the 2016 coup attempt, calling them “unfounded and irresponsible.”¹

As a NATO ally, Türkiye is also a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a candidate for European Union membership, a G20 country,² and a long-standing partner in meeting regional and global challenges. Türkiye has been a beneficiary of the Department’s International Military Education and Training account, which increased from \$624,000 in FY 2022 to \$900,000 requested in FY 2024. The American and Turkish people enjoy broad and deep ties, stemming from tens of thousands of academic exchanges; commercial, cultural, and scientific collaboration; and civil society cooperation.

Since 1984, Türkiye has faced an armed insurgency from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which the United States has designated as a terrorist organization. Members of Türkiye’s ethnic Kurdish community, estimated at 19 percent of the population, have been subject to

¹ Department of State Press Statement, *Response to Turkish Statements on the 2016 Attempted Coup in Turkey*, February 4, 2021.

² The Group of 20 (G20) is an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 sovereign countries, the European Union, and the African Union. It works to address major issues related to the global economy, such as climate change mitigation, international financial stability, and sustainable development.

discrimination. Pro-Kurdish civil society organizations, political parties, and publications have faced restrictions.

The U.S. Mission to Türkiye, in coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), facilitated an emergency response to the devastating earthquake in Türkiye and Syria on February 6, 2023, that killed more than 50,000 people and left millions homeless. The mission helped to coordinate disaster assistance teams, helicopter transportation, and relief supplies, and communicated with United Nations (UN) agencies and nongovernmental organizations. By March 2023, the United States provided \$235 million in humanitarian assistance in response to the earthquake.

Mission Türkiye outlined the following strategic objectives in the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) approved in May 2022:

- A robust U.S.-Türkiye partnership that advances shared regional and global security and stability priorities.
- A robust U.S.-Türkiye economic relationship characterized by increasing U.S. exports, bilateral trade and investment, more open markets, and collaboration in climate, energy, science, and technology.
- Sustained U.S. engagement that strengthens Turkish democracy and respect for international human rights, including religious freedom, rule of law, protection for refugees and asylum seekers, and the freedom of expression.
- U.S. engagement that builds ties between the Turkish and American peoples and leads to more balanced and honest treatment of the United States, American citizens, and all mission personnel by the Turkish government.

The U.S. diplomatic mission to the Republic of Türkiye consists of Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, Consulate Adana,³ a consular agency⁴ in Izmir, and a branch office in Gaziantep.⁵ At the time of the inspection, Mission Türkiye had 322 authorized U.S. direct-hire positions. Of these positions, 236 were Department U.S. direct-hire positions. The remaining 86 U.S. direct-hire positions were employed by other U.S. agencies present in the mission—the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and USAID. The mission had 892 locally employed (LE) staff and 42 eligible family member positions.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the embassy’s executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management consistent

³ Adana is a critical portal into southeast Türkiye, which is home to more than 20 million people, including large portions of Türkiye’s Kurdish minority and Syrian refugee populations.

⁴ According to 7 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-137, “a consular agent may be appointed by the Secretary [of State] to provide limited consular services at a location with a consular district. Consular agents are limited, non-career appointees of the Foreign Service already residing abroad, who act under the supervision and direction of the supervisory consular officer. They are generally employed on a part-time intermittent basis.”

⁵ During the inspection, the Department was completing the notification process for closing the embassy branch office in Gaziantep.

with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.⁶ A related classified inspection report includes discussion of the embassy's security program, issues affecting the safety of embassy personnel and facilities, and some aspects of the mission's consular operations.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The Embassy Engaged With Türkiye To Support Ukraine and Strengthen the NATO Alliance

Embassy Ankara engaged with Türkiye in response to the Ukraine crises, to strengthen the NATO alliance, and to advance important U.S. government goals. A long-standing NATO ally,⁷ Türkiye accepted the admission of Sweden and Finland into the security alliance, an action supported by Embassy Ankara's substantial diplomatic engagement. Additionally, in February 2022, Türkiye invoked the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits,⁸ closing the Dardanelles Strait and Bosphorus Strait to Russian warships. Türkiye and the UN brokered the 2022 Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, also known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which facilitated the shipment of Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs to the world, including food insecure regions. In his remarks at the mission's 2024 Independence Day celebration in Istanbul, the U.S. Ambassador expressed appreciation to the government of Türkiye for this support to Ukraine. Additionally, promoting awareness and compliance with sanctions requirements is an important embassy priority in Türkiye.

Middle East Conflicts Added Pressure on the Mission

The Israel-Hamas war and its expansion to Lebanon placed added pressure on the mission. The President of Türkiye called upon the United States and others to end their support to Israel and repeatedly called for Palestinian statehood during the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. There were anti-American protests outside Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana in 2023 and 2024, which affected mission operations. Turkish police maintained a security presence outside mission facilities to deter violence and maintain public order. Additionally, during the inspection, the mission engaged in regional crisis planning to assist U.S. citizens. Türkiye also provided for the evacuation of its own citizens and sent a naval contingent to move Turkish citizens from Beirut.

Türkiye has also been the largest host for Syrian refugees since the conflict erupted in Syria in 2011. The number of Syrian refugees in Türkiye peaked at approximately 3.7 million in 2021. However, the country's economic challenges and increasing domestic resentment toward

⁶ See Appendix A.

⁷ Türkiye and the United States share complementary defense industrial base projects and cooperate closely on NATO interoperability and training initiatives. However, in 2020, the government of Türkiye was excluded from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program due to its announcement that it was pursuing the Russian S-400 air defense missile system.

⁸ The (Montreux) Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, often known simply as the Montreux Convention, is an international agreement governing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits in Türkiye.

refugees have shaped its policies aimed at reducing the number of Syrians under temporary protection.⁹

Since 2012, Consulate General Istanbul has supported the Syria Regional Platform (SRP),¹⁰ an office that performs functions resulting from the closing of the U.S. embassy in Damascus. At the time of the inspection, the SRP had 26 staff members in Consulate General Istanbul and additional staff members in other locations. The SRP staff reports to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs due to its Syria focus and includes USAID personnel, although it is administratively supported by the consulate general. The SRP oversees humanitarian assistance in Syria¹¹ and provides for frequent engagement with Turkish officials on Syrian issues.

Mission Türkiye implements refugee programs funded by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). PRM coordinates with regional partners, including UN agencies that use U.S. voluntary contributions,¹² and communicates their activities with the mission and Washington. The PRM office in Embassy Ankara handles humanitarian assistance, and PRM personnel in Consulate General Istanbul oversee refugee repatriation programs.

In 2024, the United States and Türkiye expanded efforts against terrorism and related organized crime and drug trafficking networks. The United States and Türkiye expressed a joint commitment to the enduring defeat of extremist groups such as the Islamic State (also referred to as Daesh) of Iraq and Syria and discussed cooperation to counter the threat of these groups and al-Qa'ida affiliates in Africa and Central Asia. During the inspection, a terrorist group attacked a defense industrial complex, north of Ankara, which killed 5 civilians and injured 22 others. The government of Türkiye responded by bombing suspected Kurdistan Workers' Party targets in Syria.

Declining Value of Locally Employed Staff Salaries Affected Mission Operations

Salaries for Mission Türkiye's LE staff have been stagnant since 2019, despite cost-of-living increases. Most recently, 4 years of high inflation in Türkiye have compounded the issue. As a

⁹ Temporary protection is the status established by the government of Türkiye's Temporary Protection Regulation, dated October 22, 2014. This is applied to foreigners who were forced to leave their country and cannot return. Syrian nationals, Palestinians, and other stateless persons from Syria who have arrived in Türkiye have been granted temporary protection status.

¹⁰ Previously called the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team, SRP employees are under chief of mission authority for administration and support but report to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs' Deputy Assistant Secretary to coordinate their activities.

¹¹ The United States is the largest single donor of assistance to the Syrian people, and SRP's Türkiye-based personnel oversee humanitarian and stabilization assistance across Syria. Total U.S. humanitarian assistance in FY 2023 included more than \$468 million in USAID funding and \$360 million from the Department. Mission Türkiye does not have financial responsibility for these programs; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance are responsible.

¹² Voluntary contributions finance UN funds and programs, such as UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Program.

result, the mission reported that many LE staff struggled financially and reported dissatisfaction with the declining value of their salaries.

- Mission Türkiye reported an increase in LE staff resignations since 2022 to obtain better employment, salaries, or benefits. Additionally, the mission reported difficulty in attracting new qualified applicants.¹³
- The mission faced an increased workload that was shared by LE staff. This included the Syrian refugee crisis, a humanitarian response to the devastating earthquake in 2023, regional crisis planning in 2024, terrorist attack threats, and large protests outside mission facilities in 2023 and 2024 related to the Israel-Hamas war.
- Since the attempted 2016 coup attempt, mission LE staff faced added scrutiny by the Turkish government, including the 2020 criminal conviction of an LE staff employee on what the Department, in a press statement, described as baseless charges.
- LE staff disbanded their representatives' councils at Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana in protest of the declining value of their salaries, which limited communication with Front Office leadership.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

OIG assessed Mission Türkiye's leadership based on interviews, staff questionnaires, and OIG's review of documents and observations of Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana meetings and activities during the onsite portion of the inspection.

Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

The Ambassador, a non-career chief of mission, departed Mission Türkiye on September 1, 2024, and the new Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), who arrived in June 2024, became Chargé d'Affaires (Chargé), ad interim. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, he previously served as DCM and Chargé in Canberra, Australia, from 2020 to 2023, and in Suva, Fiji, from 2017 to 2020.

The acting DCM, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, arrived at Mission Türkiye in August 2022, and was the Public Affairs Officer at Embassy Ankara before assuming the duties of acting DCM in September 2024. Her previous postings included New Delhi, India, and Nairobi, Kenya.

The Principal Officer at Consulate General Istanbul, a consulate general larger than many embassies, is a career Senior Foreign Service member and has served in Istanbul since

¹³ A Department review of the mission's LE staff wages was completed in 2023. The results of this review did not support an increase in total compensation for mission LE staff. In February 2024, the Under Secretary for Management visited the mission and conducted a town hall presentation to explain the Department's awareness of LE staff compensation issues.

November 2022. Before transferring to Istanbul, she was the spokesperson for Mission Türkiye at Embassy Ankara.

The Principal Officer at Consulate Adana is a career Senior Foreign Service member who has led the consulate since August 2023. Before arriving in Adana, she served as DCM and Chargé for the U.S. Embassy to Yemen.¹⁴

The Chargé and the acting DCM said they had good coordination and cooperation with the leadership at the two consulates and regularly visit them to meet with staff. The Principal Officers of Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana are regular participants in the embassy's senior staff and Country Team meetings, and they have weekly scheduled conference calls and ad hoc calls, as needed. The Principal Officer in Istanbul and the Principal Officer in Adana affirmed that close cooperation existed among the three posts.

OIG determined that the Chargé and the acting DCM generally led Mission Türkiye consistent with the Department's leadership and management principles laid out in 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214b.¹⁵ Both were new to their present positions, and they divided up their responsibilities as is done typically at embassies, with the Chargé focusing on external affairs and the acting DCM managing internal matters in the mission.

The Chargé and the acting DCM met every morning, and both attended the daily senior staff huddles, weekly Country Team meetings, and a more formal weekly senior staff meeting with the participation of Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana. Embassy staff told OIG that the Chargé and the acting DCM worked well together and were approachable to staff.

OIG found, through interviews with mission staff and reviews of supporting documentation, that the Chargé developed mission priorities in coordination with the staff. These priorities, including ideas on building the community and how to address issues of concern for LE staff, such as salary issues, were discussed in a senior staff offsite meeting held in Ankara on September 9 to 10, 2024.

U.S. direct-hire employees and LE staff told OIG that the Chargé and acting DCM showed a commitment to communicating with mission staff. Besides the regularly scheduled meetings discussed above, they interacted with staff in town halls, informal meetings with embassy sections, and the weekly Country Team meetings that are open to all mission staff, including LE staff.

¹⁴ The U.S. embassy in Sanaa is closed due to the ongoing conflict and high level of insecurity within Yemen. Since February 2015, the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and Yemen Affairs Unit staff have been based at the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

¹⁵ The Department's leadership and management principles outlined in 3 FAM 1214 are (1) model integrity, (2) plan strategically, (3) be decisive and take responsibility, (4) communicate, (5) learn and innovate constantly, (6) be self-aware, (7) collaborate, (8) value and develop people, (9) manage conflict, and (10) foster resilience.

Embassy staff reported to OIG that the Chargé frequently asked for feedback and took necessary follow-up actions. For example, based on discussions about the Department's review of LE staff compensation during the senior staff offsite held in September, the Chargé held a subsequent town hall to share the information with all LE staff.

Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

Although he departed Mission Türkiye on September 1, 2024, the former Ambassador's interactions with the government of Türkiye helped achieve two major foreign policy successes: Türkiye's concurrence for Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024 to join NATO, and the approval for the sale of F-16s to the Turkish military in January 2024, helping tie Türkiye closer to the NATO alliance.

Following these achievements, the U.S.-Türkiye relationship became more positive and the frostiness of the 2016 post-coup attempt era eased somewhat. Examples of the improved relationship include the resumption of Trade and Investment Framework Agreement¹⁶ talks in spring 2024 after a break since 2017, and increased contacts between the U.S. and Turkish militaries. These efforts have been complemented by commercial advocacy efforts by the embassy Front Office and the Principal Officer in Istanbul. In September 2024, the Chargé hosted a reception for a delegation of American business representatives of the U.S.-Türkiye Business Council and arranged meetings for them with senior Turkish government officials. In Istanbul, the Under Secretary for Commerce and the Principal Officer hosted the Trade Winds program, the Department of Commerce's largest annual trade mission and business development forum, which brought over 120 U.S. companies to Istanbul.¹⁷

A Department advisory team scheduled a review of the ICS at the embassy in October 2023, but the review was canceled because of security concerns. The Chargé told OIG that the ICS needed to be updated, and he started the review process at the September 2024 senior staff offsite, which included the Principal Officers from Istanbul and Adana. A comprehensive review was also planned for later in 2024.

Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana have their own strategic planning offsites twice yearly and contribute to the overall mission ICS. Additionally, OIG observed that Consulate General Istanbul's senior staff meetings are structured around how each agency and section advanced the ICS goals and objectives. For example, OIG observed the objectives prominently displayed in the senior staff conference room, to guide participant briefings on their activities and plans using the ICS goals as the structure.

¹⁶ Trade and Investment Framework Agreements provide strategic frameworks and principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues between the United States and the other parties to the agreement. See "Trade & Investment Framework Agreements," <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements>.

¹⁷ Trade Winds is a multifaceted program designed to help companies achieve growth and exposure in specific markets or regions around the world.

Adherence to Internal Controls

OIG found that the previous Ambassador and DCM generally oversaw the preparation of the FY 2024 Annual Chief of Mission Management Control Statement of Assurance in accordance with 2 FAM 022.7 and 2 FAM 024d, which requires chiefs of mission to develop and maintain appropriate systems of management control of their organizations.

As noted above, the Chargé and acting DCM have been in their current positions only since September 2024. The Chargé said he wanted the Statement of Assurance for FY 2025 to be completed early so that he could be personally briefed by the Management Section and other offices on their areas. These reviews will take place in spring 2025, and the Management Counselor will have the primary responsibility for its preparation.

Mission staff reported that the Chargé and acting DCM frequently emphasized the need to be mindful of any possible instances of waste, fraud, or mismanagement.

Although she has not had instances to do so yet, the acting DCM reported that she will review the nonimmigrant visa issuances and refusals by the Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs, who has affirmed that the acting DCM will do so in accordance with 9 FAM 403.12-1a and 9 FAM 403.12-2b.

Security and Emergency Planning

OIG determined that the Chargé, the acting DCM, and the Principal Officers in Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana fulfilled their responsibilities for security and emergency preparedness programs consistent with the Department's guidelines in 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-762a.

Mission leadership emphasized the importance of security and emergency preparedness during Country Team and other meetings and through mission security notices. These messages were repeated by leadership at Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana, and they ensured emergency drills and checks of the radio network took place on a regular basis.

Though supported by mission leadership, the radio check program participation rates at Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana were low.¹⁸ After being informed by OIG of the low participation rates, the Chargé and the acting DCM, along with the Principal Officer in Adana, initiated plans to improve the rates of participation in the radio check programs. OIG determined that mission leadership participated in the security and emergency drills and encouraged staff participation in accordance with 12 FAH-1 H-036c(6)(d).

The mission's Emergency Action Committee reviewed the security memorandum between the chief of mission and the geographic combatant commander that detailed their division of security responsibilities, as required by 2 FAH-2 H-116.4b.

¹⁸ OIG reviews radio check records for compliance with 12 FAH-1 H-761b(11).

Equal Employment Opportunity

OIG found that Mission Türkiye's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program complied with Department standards found in 3 FAM 1212.1. The mission named an EEO counselor and LE staff EEO liaisons and publicized it in a mission-wide management notice in November 2024. The Chargé and the Principal Officers in Istanbul and Adana stressed the importance of following EEO requirements in meetings with mission staff.

The embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana posted the appropriate EEO notices on bulletin boards to inform their staff of EEO procedures. Soon after his arrival in Ankara, the Chargé outlined his expectations for a respectful workplace that hewed to EEO standards at a senior staff meeting and a Country Team meeting. The mission held mandatory EEO and harassment training for all U.S. direct-hire employees and LE staff in April 2024.

Developing and Mentoring Foreign Service Professionals

OIG determined that the Chargé d'Affaires and the acting DCM oversaw the mission's First- and Second-Tour (FAST) program as required in 3 FAM 2242.5. There was one FAST program for the entire mission, but Consulate General Istanbul operated a separate program under the umbrella of the mission-wide program. The mission's FAST program was led by volunteer coordinators, and the embassy Front Office provided guidance and advice, with the acting DCM as the primary advisor.

The FAST program held several events in 2024, including opportunities for professional development and meetings with Department visitors. The Chargé issued a management notice encouraging participation in the program and offering Front Office support. Embassy staff told OIG that the Chargé and the acting DCM encouraged FAST employees to participate in the program and are viewed as supporters of it.

The advisor for the FAST program at Consulate General Istanbul was the Deputy Principal Officer, but the Principal Officer was also an active participant in the program. Consulate general staff reported strong Front Office support for the program. Some of the activities of the Istanbul FAST program included sessions designed to improve professional skills, such as how to manage visits and develop public diplomacy skills. At Consulate Adana, the Principal Officer met regularly with the FAST officers and provided career path advice. FAST employees typically had opportunities to meet with visitors to the consulate.

Executive Direction at Constituent Posts

OIG found that the Principal Officers in Istanbul and Adana managed and led the consulate general and consulate, respectively, consistent with 3 FAM 1214b leadership and management principles. Consulate General Istanbul personnel said the Principal Officer was accessible to her staff, meeting with them on a regular basis formally and informally and holding open office hours for staff to stop by to talk. The Principal Officer also received feedback in individual and group meetings with U.S. direct-hire employees, LE staff, eligible family members, and the

community. She also hosted small group events at her residence. Because of the small size of Consulate Adana, the Principal Officer frequently used informal means to communicate with her U.S. direct-hire employees and LE staff. Consulate Adana staff also confirmed that the Principal Officer was easily accessible to them.

Coordination among the Front Offices of the embassy, the consulate general, and the consulate worked well, according to mission leadership and staff. The embassy's Country Team and senior staff meetings included the Principal Officers. The acting DCM discussed issues with the Principal Officers in weekly telephone calls, and the Principal Officers traveled to the embassy for consultations as needed. The leadership at the embassy, the consulate general, and the consulate participated together in the embassy's September 2024 senior staff offsite that discussed mission strategy and policies and was designed to increase coordination within the mission.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

OIG assessed Mission Türkiye's policy and program implementation through a review of the advocacy and analysis work of the Political, Economic, and Public Diplomacy Sections, and the U.S. citizen and visa services provided by the Consular Section. OIG found the mission generally met Department requirements for policy and program implementation. However, OIG made recommendations to address issues in the Consular Section, as discussed below.

Political and Economic Sections

OIG reviewed Mission Türkiye's Political and Economic Sections, including the political and economic work performed at the constituent posts. OIG assessed leadership and management, policy engagement and coordination, reporting, Leahy vetting,¹⁹ commercial promotion, and end-use monitoring functions, and found the sections generally complied with Department standards.

Interagency Stakeholders Praised Sanctions Cooperation

Washington and interagency stakeholders praised the mission's strong interagency coordination in ensuring adherence to sanctions imposed on Russian entities under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.²⁰ Mission offices involved in this effort included the Economic Section; the Political Section, which includes an Export Control and Related Border Security Programs unit headed by a regional advisor; the Political-Economic Section in Istanbul; and the Istanbul-based Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security office. Mission staff members worked together in engaging with government ministries and private sector entities to promote awareness of and compliance with sanctions

¹⁹ The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the Department from furnishing assistance to foreign security forces if the Department receives credible information that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. See 22 U.S. Code § 2378d and 9 FAM 303.8-5(B).

²⁰ Public Law 115-44 (August 2, 2017).

requirements. At the time of the inspection, the Economic Section was responsible for coordination of these efforts. Previously, short-term Department of the Treasury attachés provided coordination, but due to budgetary constraints, the Department of the Treasury did not send another attaché following the most recent incumbent's departure in September 2024. Washington interlocutors and mission staff members expressed concern that not having a Department of the Treasury advisor at the mission would reduce its ability to promote sanctions awareness and compliance with the Turkish government and other partners.

End Users Found Mission Reporting Useful and Relevant

In interviews with OIG, end users said the Political and Economic Sections and constituent posts produced high-quality reporting, including scene-setters and other reporting in advance of high-level visits; sanctions-related reporting; reporting on maritime issues, including the Black Sea Grain Initiative; and coverage of the municipal elections that took place throughout Türkiye in March 2024. OIG reviewed 317 cables drafted by the mission from May to October 2024 and found the reporting to be relevant to ICS policy goals and other U.S. strategic objectives. However, cables were not always timely; the mission sent some reports on meetings weeks after they took place. Mission staff members told OIG that the Front Office recognized there was a problem and, under the leadership of the Chargé, put in place procedures to improve the cable clearance process. For example, the Chargé set aside time to routinely review and clear cables. The timeliness of mission reporting had improved at the time of the inspection. Therefore, OIG did not make a recommendation to address this issue.

Embassy Complied With Leahy Vetting Standards But Did Not Meet Deadlines for Blue Lantern Export Checks

The Political Section is responsible for conducting Leahy vetting and Blue Lantern checks of certain U.S. defense articles and services.²¹ The section complied with Leahy vetting standards but did not meet Department deadlines on Blue Lantern checks. In 2023, the embassy received six requests for Blue Lantern checks that required, on average, 149 days to complete. At the time of the inspection, four checks were pending completion, one dating from 2022. The Department's Blue Lantern Guidebook calls for a 30- to 45-day timeframe for completion of Blue Lantern checks. The embassy cited delayed responses from local officials and staffing gaps as contributing factors to the long response times. During the inspection, OIG observed that the Political Section, which had just hired an eligible family member whose portfolio included Blue Lantern cases, took action to improve its processes and followed up on outstanding cases. OIG concluded that the embassy's process improvements should enhance its ability to conduct checks in a timely manner. As a result, OIG did not make a recommendation to address this issue.

²¹ Blue Lantern is a Department-managed end-use monitoring program established to implement the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations and verify the legitimacy of the export of items on the United States Munitions List. To detect and deter illegal and unauthorized arms transfers, the Department may request embassy officers to conduct inquiries with foreign government and business representatives and make site visits. See 22 U.S. Code § 2785(a)(2)(A).

Embassy Sections Coordinated Closely With Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana

OIG observed that Embassy Ankara's Political and Economic Sections coordinated closely with Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana and the interagency community to advance mission and Department priorities. The Political and Economic Sections in Ankara ensured effective communication with political and economic officers at constituent posts through regularly scheduled calls and meetings. Political and economic officers from constituent posts also took part in offsites led by the Chargé and section heads.

Public Diplomacy

OIG reviewed Mission Türkiye's public diplomacy operations, including leadership, strategic planning, reporting, resource and knowledge management, federal assistance awards, educational and cultural programs, and media engagement, at Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana. Interlocutors in the Department told OIG they viewed Mission Türkiye's public diplomacy operations positively, commenting specifically on good communication, reporting, and cooperation between Washington offices and the mission. OIG determined the mission's Public Diplomacy Section operations supported the mission's ICS goals and public diplomacy efforts were integrated mission wide. The sections were generally well led and organized around achievement of ICS objectives. However, staff told OIG local economic conditions, security concerns, the ongoing implementation of the Public Diplomacy Staffing Initiative,²² and anti-American sentiment in Türkiye contributed to low staff morale. OIG concluded that the mission's public diplomacy operations and programs generally complied with Department standards and guidance, with one exception as described below.

Federal Assistance Award Files Were Missing Documentation

OIG reviewed 20 of the embassy's 119 federal assistance awards, with a total value of \$2.57 million for the period from October 1, 2022, to September 30, 2024, and found they generally complied with Department standards. However, OIG found that 10 grant files lacked evidence of monitoring and evaluation. The Federal Assistance Directive requires federal assistance award files include evidence of grant monitoring activity and evaluations, which is necessary to ensure proper use of award funds.²³ Because the section found and added the missing documentation to the files during the inspection, OIG did not make a recommendation to address this issue.

²² The Public Diplomacy Staffing Initiative is a comprehensive reorganization of the Department's overseas public diplomacy sections. The initiative provides new roles for public diplomacy LE staff to better meet the 21st century information environment.

²³ Federal Assistance Directive, Chapter 4, Section D, "Monitoring and Reporting" (October 2021 and later revisions).

Mission Türkiye Could Increase Efficiencies by Using Public Diplomacy Tools To Track and Report on Its Activities

OIG found that the embassy did not consistently use the PD Tools²⁴ application to track and report public diplomacy activities and programs. Although section leadership acknowledged to OIG the benefits of PD Tools, they had not yet prioritized its use. While not mandatory, the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy cited reporting through PD Tools as a best practice for public diplomacy sections worldwide. This best practice increases efficiencies by permitting public diplomacy stakeholders to access reports and analyze progress on the mission's strategic goals and objectives. Use of PD Tools also reduces duplicative efforts by consolidating strategic planning, budgeting, program activities, and reporting. During the inspection, the embassy took steps to encourage use of PD Tools going forward. For example, it offered two training sessions on PD Tools that were open to all staff.

EducationUSA Program Advanced Mission Strategic Goals

OIG observed that Mission Türkiye's EducationUSA²⁵ program furthered the mission's public engagement and advanced bilateral engagement in support of the ICS. According to the Institute of International Education's 2024 Open Doors²⁶ report, Türkiye sent 9,148 students to the United States in 2023 and 2024, the third highest number of students in the European region and the twentieth highest number globally. The total number of Turkish students also increased from 2022 to 2024. The mission funded eight educational advisors located in Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, and Izmir. Of note was the success of the program in Adana, which conducted outreach to rural communities in Türkiye's southeast border region, an area that has difficult security issues due to its proximity to the Syrian border.

Consular Operations

OIG reviewed Mission Türkiye's consular operations, including U.S. citizen services, crisis preparedness, management controls, visa services and processing, and fraud prevention programs at Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, Consulate Adana, and Consular Agency Izmir.

In FY 2024, Mission Türkiye issued 124,495 nonimmigrant visas and 5,418 immigrant visas. Due to heavy post-pandemic demand for U.S. visas, at the time of the inspection, Mission Türkiye had some of the longest wait times globally for nonimmigrant visa interview appointments,

²⁴ PD Tools is an online application that coordinates components of public diplomacy work: strategic planning, budgeting, activity tracking, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting.

²⁵ EducationUSA is a Department-funded network of international student advising centers that promote U.S. higher education opportunities by offering accurate, comprehensive, and current information about opportunities to study at accredited post-secondary institutions in the United States. EducationUSA is funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs through a cooperative agreement with the Institute of International Education.

²⁶ The Institute for International Education's Open Doors report is the only long-standing, comprehensive information resource on international students and scholars in the United States and American students studying abroad for academic credit.

with a wait of nearly 2 years (713 days) in Istanbul. Embassy Ankara is one of three U.S. embassies designated to process immigrant visas for Iranian citizens,²⁷ and Iranian applicants comprised 44 percent of the embassy's FY 2024 immigrant visa workload. Because Türkiye lies at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and given that Istanbul is one of the world's busiest air transit hubs, U.S. citizen services represent a major component of the mission's consular workload and are notable both for their volume and complexity.

OIG found that mission consular operations were generally well led and coordinated, although crisis management and workload growth strained limited managerial capacity in Ankara and Adana. For several months prior to the inspection, Embassy Ankara's Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs led the mission's preparations to receive U.S. citizen evacuees from Lebanon. Evacuation flights from Lebanon to Türkiye started just days before OIG arrived in Ankara. This planning effort limited the Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs' ability to attend to routine consular management activities, resulted in the cancelation of regular staff meetings, and placed additional responsibilities on other consular managers. Consulate Adana's sole consular officer, who is also the consulate's economic officer, spent 80 percent of his time on crisis preparedness and responding to complex U.S. citizen emergencies, limiting his availability for routine consular services and other assigned duties. To address this situation, the Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs requested from the Bureau of Consular Affairs two additional consular manager positions—one for Embassy Ankara and one for Consulate Adana. At the time of the inspection, these requests remained pending.

During the inspection, the mission's three consular sections corrected the following issues identified by OIG:

- All three sections updated consular systems user roles to comply with the requirements of 7 FAH-1 H-660.
- Embassy Ankara installed in its consular waiting room the U.S. government Fact Sheet on Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting in English and Turkish, as required by 9 FAM 504.10-4(A)(1).
- Embassy Ankara procured an automatic cash counting machine for the consular agent in Izmir to detect potentially counterfeit currency, in accordance with 7 FAH-1 H-748.
- Consulate General Istanbul updated procedures for deleting duplicate nonimmigrant visa cases in the automated visa processing system, as required by 9 FAM 403.2-7(C).
- Consulate General Istanbul updated guidance to officers adjudicating nonimmigrant visas to ensure that all applicants requiring a "Wilberforce"²⁸ briefing received the required pamphlet and that officers entered case notes confirming receipt in the nonimmigrant visa processing system, as required by 9 FAM 402.3-9(C)(2).

²⁷ The other two are the U.S. embassies in Yerevan, Armenia and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

²⁸ The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, codified at 8 U.S. Code § 1375b, requires consular officers to ensure that applicants for certain categories of exchange and temporary work travel are made aware of their legal rights under federal immigration, labor, and employment laws.

- Embassy Ankara and Consulate General Istanbul aligned their processing of nonimmigrant visa referrals²⁹ to comply with the requirements of 9 FAM 601.8-3(D) and (E).

Except for the issues discussed below, OIG found consular programs generally complied with guidance in 7 FAM, 7 FAH-1, 8 FAM, 9 FAM, applicable statutes, and other Department policies.

Consular Sections Lacked Outside Signage With Consular Information

The public entrances at Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana all lacked signage with information about consular services, such as emergency after-hours phone numbers, the embassy's internet address, and operating hours. At all three locations, staff told OIG that supervisors instructed the local guard force to contact consular or security officials for instructions when a U.S. citizen approached them requesting information about consular services. Guidance in 7 FAH-1 H-263.8b states that consular sections should use outside signs to provide visitors with current and helpful information about consular services, including phone numbers for after-hours emergency services for U.S. citizens. Consular managers in all three sections told OIG they were unaware of this requirement. Requiring visitors to request this information from the local guard force could inconvenience visitors, including U.S. citizens in distress, and increases the risk that local guards might provide erroneous information without the knowledge or guidance of U.S. consular officials.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Ankara should install outside signage at the public entrances of the three consular facilities at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana, providing consular information in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Walkway for Consular Applicants Did Not Comply With Department Standards

The walkway between Embassy Ankara's public entrance and the consular waiting room did not provide weather protection. Guidance in 7 FAH-1 H-281a states that every effort should be made in consular lines and waiting areas to accommodate the public as efficiently, safely, and pleasantly as possible. In addition, 7 FAH-1 H-282(1)(e) specifically recommends a dedicated, covered pedestrian walkway for consular applicants. OIG observed that visitors to the embassy's consular section needed to walk approximately 80 meters (262 feet) from the public entrance to the consular waiting room entrance with no overhead protection, leaving visitors exposed to rain and snow. Section leadership told OIG the embassy was not allowed to make any modifications to the embassy compound for the first 2 years after construction was completed, and that the 2-year period had just passed in August 2024. Failure to provide shelter for consular applicants leaves them exposed to the weather and limits the use of the walkway as an overflow waiting area.

²⁹ According to 9 FAM 601.8-3(A)a, "a referral is a request by an authorized U.S. government official (the referring officer) for a priority appointment, other courtesies, and issuance of a visa. All relevant immigration law and policy applies to the visa adjudication; the consular section will take the advocacy of the referring officer into consideration when adjudicating the visa."

Recommendation 2: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should provide protection from the elements for consular applicants in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with CA and OBO)

Consulate Adana Did Not Make U.S. Citizen Consular Services Appointments Available on a Consistent or Predictable Basis

OIG found Consulate Adana did not make appointments for routine U.S. citizen consular services available through its website on a consistent or predictable basis. For example, a September 26, 2024, public message from Embassy Ankara informed U.S. citizens in Consulate Adana's consular district that they could drop off absentee ballots for the 2024 U.S. presidential election in person at the consulate, by scheduling an online notarial appointment; however, OIG found that no such appointments were available. Consular staff told OIG they released appointments based on the availability of Consulate Adana's consular officer. Appointments were therefore made available only a few weeks in advance on 1 or 2 days each month. When the consular officer was unavailable, staff advised U.S. citizens with a time-bound need for passport, citizenship, or notarial services to schedule appointments in Ankara, which is a 5-hour drive from Adana.

Guidance in 7 FAM 050 Appendix Bc(1) requires that consular sections manage appointments for passport and citizenship services to minimize wait times. Guidance in 7 FAH-1 H-821 states that public services should be provided in a timely and transparent manner, and information about services provided should be clear, accurate, and meet the public's needs. This deficiency occurred because of the limited availability of Consulate Adana's primary consular officer and his designated backup, Consulate Adana's political officer. Failure to make appointments available for U.S. citizen consular services on a consistent and predictable basis increases the risk of miscommunication and inconvenience for U.S. citizens and may contribute to poor customer service.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should ensure appointments for U.S. citizen consular services are made available in Consulate Adana on a regular and predictable basis in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with CA)

Consulate General Istanbul Failed To Address Locally Employed Staff Misconduct

OIG found that consular managers at Consulate General Istanbul failed to take proper action regarding serious, ongoing misconduct that included allegations of bullying in the nonimmigrant visa unit. Multiple current and former staff members reported to OIG a pattern of bullying behavior by an LE staff supervisor that had been ongoing for more than 5 years. According to these employees, this behavior contributed to the departure of several staff members from the visa unit. Department guidance in 3 FAM 7720 describes bullying as misconduct that creates a hostile, intimidating, or abusive work environment, which a reasonable person would consider

humiliating, intimidating, exclusionary, retaliatory, or threatening. Supervisors who become aware of such misconduct are responsible for taking action or reporting such incidents or allegations. OIG determined that the new Consular Section chief and the visa chief were unaware of the behavior by the LE staff member because of a practice of not conducting meetings with visa unit employees. Failure to properly address conduct issues, such as bullying, risks serious and long-lasting harm to morale and workplace performance. After OIG reported this misconduct to the Consular Section chief and visa chief, they began to address it during the inspection; therefore, OIG did not make a recommendation.

Spotlight on Success: Consular Team Developed Script To Screen Visa Data Against Sanctioned Entities

Consular Team Türkiye developed an AutoHotKey³⁰ script that automates the screening of electronic visa application data against the International Trade Administration’s Consolidated Screening List.³¹ This process evaluates individual visa applicants and their potential affiliation with companies or other entities sanctioned by the U.S. government—a key concern in Türkiye given that the mission’s applicant pool includes applicants from many countries. Consular officers are alerted to any potential “hits” prior to the visa interview, so the officer can tailor interview questions to determine if the applicant may be ineligible for a visa under U.S. law. This tool was subsequently adopted by several other embassies and consulates.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OIG reviewed Mission Türkiye’s internal control systems in general management, general services, facility management, human resources, financial management, and health unit operations. During the inspection, Mission Türkiye corrected a variety of issues identified by OIG, for example:

- Consulate General Istanbul implemented a boat safety policy and performed a safety check on its cultural heritage boat in accordance with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management’s generic embassy boat policy and boat safety notice.
- Consulate Adana implemented a confined space program³² (Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards, 29 Code of Federal Regulations § 1910.146).

³⁰ AutoHotKey is a scripting language for Windows that allows users to automate repetitive tasks, create custom keyboard shortcuts, and perform various system automation tasks.

³¹ The Consolidated Screening List is a list of parties for which the U.S. government maintains restrictions on certain exports, re-exports, or transfers of items. It is maintained by the International Trade Administration online at: <https://www.trade.gov/consolidated-screening-list>.

³² A confined space is a work location that is large enough and configured so that an employee can enter and perform assigned work, has limited or restricted openings for entry, and is not designed for continuous occupancy.

- Embassy Ankara provided fire safety mitigation letters,³³ which contain actions that are intended to reduce the likelihood or impact of fire risks, to occupants of its high-rise residences (15 FAM 813.7-5h).
- Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana submitted separate cables to OBO's Office of Fire Protection for their posts' exceptions to fire standards (15 FAM 813.7-4a).
- Consulate General Istanbul submitted an updated license agreement with its employee association³⁴ to the Department's Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs (6 FAM 525a and c).
- Embassy Ankara updated its designation memos for the property management officer, accountable property officer, and property disposal officer (14 FAM 411.2-1a).
- Embassy Ankara adjusted timekeepers' access permissions in the Department's time and attendance system to prevent timekeepers from editing their own records (4 FAH-3 H-525.3-4a).
- Consulate General Istanbul submitted its hotel and restaurant report, and Embassy Ankara submitted a hotel and restaurant report for Izmir (Department of State Standardized Regulations, Section 074.2).
- Consulate General Istanbul updated and published its post report (2 FAM 172.1a and 2 FAM 172.2).
- Consulate Adana submitted an updated education allowance survey (Department of State Standardized Regulations, Section 072.12C).
- Embassy Ankara updated Consulate Adana's Health Information Handbook (16 FAM 133.5).

Overall, OIG found the mission's Management Sections generally implemented required processes and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and Department standards, with the exceptions noted below.

General Management

Embassy Ankara Did Not Adhere to Its Schedule of Support Visits to Mission Posts

OIG determined that Embassy Ankara's Management Section officers did not adhere to their schedule of support visits to Consulate General Istanbul, Consulate Adana, Consular Agency Izmir, and the branch office in Gaziantep. According to the Mission Türkiye Inter-Post International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS),³⁵ Support Memorandum of

³³ The Office of Fire Protection provides mitigation letters to posts that lease apartment buildings that do not meet minimum fire safety standards. These letters provide safety mitigation actions and compensating controls that provide post management and the occupants with additional means to maintain a level of safety to compensate for the risk.

³⁴ According to the Department's Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs, an employee association is a non-profit, private organization created for the morale, welfare, and recreation purposes of U.S. government employees and their eligible family members assigned to U.S. missions abroad.

³⁵ ICASS is the principal means by which U.S. government agencies share the cost of common administrative support services at most diplomatic and consular posts overseas. Through the ICASS working capital fund, service providers recover the cost of delivering administrative support services to other agencies at overseas missions.

Understanding, members of Embassy Ankara's management team were to visit Istanbul, Adana, Izmir, and Gaziantep at various prescribed intervals. From 2022 to 2024, the embassy management team made fewer than half of the site visits prescribed in the memorandum. OIG attributed the insufficient number of visits to staffing gaps at the embassy and competing mission priorities (e.g., Embassy Ankara's 2022 move to a new embassy compound, the February 2023 earthquakes near Gaziantep and Adana, and the 2-month relocation of Consulate Adana-assigned personnel to Incirlik Air Base due to security concerns). Failure to follow through on the prescribed visits to mission posts jeopardizes the goal to optimize the management platform and, instead, risks inconsistencies and inefficiencies in management operations and internal controls.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Ankara should fulfill its support visit schedule in accordance with Mission Türkiye's memorandum of understanding. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Consulate Adana Did Not Submit Its Post Hardship Survey as Required

OIG found Consulate Adana did not submit its hardship differential³⁶ survey by the required deadline. According to the Bureau of Administration's Office of Allowances, Consulate Adana last submitted a differential survey in February 2019. Department of State Standardized Regulations, Section 075.1, states hardship differential reporting should be done on a quadrennial basis, which means Consulate Adana's survey was due in 2023. OIG determined that the consulate did not complete the survey due to a series of external events that took priority (e.g., the February 2023 earthquakes near Gaziantep and Adana and the 2-month relocation of Adana-assigned personnel to Incirlik Air Base). Failure to submit a timely hardship survey to the Department increases the risk of overpayments or underpayments to U.S. government employees.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Ankara should submit the hardship differential survey for Consulate Adana in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

General Services

Mission Did Not Manage Its Motor Vehicle Operations in Accordance With Department Standards

The mission did not manage its motor vehicle program in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found that:

- The mission's motor vehicle and motor vehicle safety policies were last issued in February 2020 and October 2019, respectively. Guidance in 14 FAM 435.1 requires that the embassy review the mission-wide motor vehicle policy annually, incorporate all

³⁶ Post hardship differential compensates employees for service in foreign areas where environmental conditions differ substantially from those in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. The differential is paid as a percentage of basic compensation and can range from 5 to 35 percent.

updates to the Department's vehicle control policy, and integrate Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program requirements into the mission-wide policy. Management Section staff told OIG they were aware of the issue but had not gained consensus among the mission on proposed changes to update the mission policy. Failure to update the mission motor vehicle policy, which incorporates the motor vehicle safety policy, increases the risk of injury to drivers, passengers, and the public, as well as damage to U.S. government property.

- Embassy Ankara did not account for all operating costs of its motor vehicle fleet. Specifically, the embassy did not account for the electricity used to charge its electric vehicles. According to 14 FAM 437.1a, motor vehicle data must be entered and routinely reviewed for effective fleet management and management controls. Furthermore, fuel records³⁷ must be maintained on file in the Department's Fleet Management Information System³⁸ for all official vehicles. Management Section staff told OIG these deficiencies occurred because the mission did not have metered charging stations to track electricity consumption. Incomplete motor vehicle data hinders effective fleet management and oversight, increasing the risk of potential fraud and mismanagement of U.S. government resources.
- Consulate Adana did not conduct preventive maintenance on its official vehicles as required. As of November 2024, OIG found that 11 of 19 of the consulate's official vehicles were past due for preventive maintenance. Guidance in 14 FAM 435.2a requires the consulate to conduct preventive vehicle maintenance to ensure operational reliability, maximize the vehicle life cycle, and reduce factors that can contribute to vehicle collisions and mishaps. Motor pool staff told OIG, and Embassy Ankara confirmed, that the consulate delayed preventive maintenance due to a lack of funding. Failure to perform preventive maintenance puts mission vehicles at risk of not meeting safety, security, and warranty requirements.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Ankara should manage its motor vehicle program in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission's Property Management Practices Did Not Comply With Department Standards

The mission's property management program did not comply with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found that:

- Although Embassy Ankara had a full inventory of its facility spare parts and materials entered into a stand-alone application, it had not entered the information into the

³⁷ Guidance in 14 FAM 431.4 defines fuel as the energy source needed to power vehicles and includes electricity.

³⁸ The Fleet Management Information System, a module within the Integrated Logistics Management System, is the Department's enterprise system for managing all fleet operations. It is designed to capture key operational data on vehicle dispatch, maintenance, and fuel.

Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS)³⁹ as required. In addition, Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana did not have an inventory of facility expendables.⁴⁰ According to 14 FAM 414.2-1a(1) and (2), ILMS is the Department-approved property record system for nonexpendable property⁴¹ and expendable supplies.

- Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana did not have adequate controls in place to protect spare parts and supplies, which were scattered across the respective compounds with little or no access control to the items. Guidance in 14 FAM 411.4 states that adequate safeguards and controls should be established to assure that expendable supplies or materials are issued for official uses only.
- The mission transferred nonexpendable property between locations, but did not document the transfers in ILMS,⁴² as required by 14 FAM 414.3a. OIG reviewed data in ILMS and found that Mission Türkiye transferred \$1.74 million in nonexpendable property between locations in 2023 and 2024 without the required documentation.
- Embassy Ankara, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana did not consistently conduct quarterly spot checks of their property in accordance with Department standards. Standards in 14 FAM 411.2-2b(8) require the accountable property officer to conduct quarterly, unannounced spot check inventories of personal property to verify the accuracy of property records in ILMS.
- Consulate Adana did not account for and control uniforms and personal protective equipment⁴³ issued to its staff as required. Guidance in 14 FAM 446.1a states that all uniforms and personal protective equipment issued to employees remain the property of the U.S. government, and 14 FAM 446.1c requires that nonexpendable personal protective equipment be accounted for and controlled in the Department's ILMS loanable property module.

Management Section staff attributed many of these issues to unfamiliarity with Department standards, staffing gaps of warehouse staff in recent years, and a lack of management oversight. Failure to manage property in accordance with Department standards leaves the mission vulnerable to theft and can hinder accurate property inventories.

³⁹ ILMS is an integrated web-based system that encompasses all Department supply chain functions in one system. ILMS is designed to upgrade Department supply chain management by improving operations in areas such as purchasing, procurement, warehousing, transportation, property management, personal effects, and diplomatic pouch and mail.

⁴⁰ Examples of expendable property include office supplies (e.g., toner, paper, pens), tires, filters, facility equipment (e.g., HVAC, plumbing), and installed computer parts (e.g., keyboards).

⁴¹ Nonexpendable property includes furniture, office machines, information technology equipment, and communications equipment.

⁴² Nonexpendable property transfers are recorded in ILMS using the DS-584, Nonexpendable Property Transaction form.

⁴³ Personal protective equipment includes respirators, gloves, safety shoes, eye, and head gear.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Ankara should bring its property management program in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission's Furniture and Appliance Pool Program Did Not Adhere to Department Standards

The mission's furniture and appliance pool (FAP)⁴⁴ program did not adhere to Department standards. Specifically, OIG found that:

- The mission had not updated its FAP policy since 2018. According to 6 FAH-5 H-512.2-2b, the mission is responsible for preparing and updating the FAP policy at least every 2 years to ensure it remains current and the financial and operational aspects of FAP policy are addressed adequately.
- Mission property staff routinely removed standard and supplemental FAP furniture from housing units at the occupants' requests throughout the duration of their tenancy. Both the mission housing handbook and 6 FAH-5 H-514.1d(7) state that a basic set of standard and supplemental FAP furniture must remain in each housing unit.⁴⁵
- Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana had excess FAP stock in their respective warehouses. As of November 2024, FAP warehouse stock was 18.2 percent (\$1.15 million worth of FAP assets) in Embassy Ankara and 40.3 percent (\$361,543 worth of FAP assets) in Consulate Adana, which are both higher than the Department target of 10 percent. According to 6 FAH-5 H-514.1d(5), the general services office should seek to maintain minimal warehouse stock levels.
- According to ILMS data, Mission Türkiye incorrectly classified 291 FAP assets valued at \$81,334. These are items that should have been classified in ILMS as FAP property but were classified under different agency codes,⁴⁶ contrary to guidance in 6 FAH-5 H-514.1d(3).
- Mission Türkiye incorrectly issued 99 FAP assets valued at \$41,548 to office locations or designated residences,⁴⁷ contrary to guidance in 6 FAH-5 H-514.1d(2) and 6 FAH-5 H-514.2-3c(1).
- Mission Türkiye disposed of 169 assets worth \$62,257 from 2022 to 2024 prior to one-third of the assets' life cycle. Common early disposals included humidifiers,

⁴⁴ The furniture and appliance pool program furnishes overseas housing through the purchase, replacement, refurbishment, maintenance, inventory control, warehousing, pick-up and delivery, and eventual disposal of nonexpendable residential furniture, furnishings, appliances, and equipment. Pooled furniture programs can achieve economies of scale and greatly reduce the time and effort required to oversee and manage residential furnishings.

⁴⁵ A basic set of standard and supplemental FAP furniture (as defined in post's FAP policy) must remain in each housing unit. All incoming employees should be advised not to include such basic furniture items in their household effects shipment and should be provided with post's policy on removal of FAP items from residences. Post may authorize a one-time removal of specialized furniture items and moving or rearranging items in the residence.

⁴⁶ Agency codes identify ownership of assets in the system. According to 6 FAH-5 H-514.1d(3), all residential inventory assets must be identified in ILMS with the agency code "FAP."

⁴⁷ Designated residences include the residence for the Ambassador. Furniture and furnishings for designated housing and offices are funded through other allotments.

transformers, and mattresses. Guidance in 14 FAM 412.3a requires that all agencies use U.S. government-wide minimum replacement standards for furniture, and 14 FAM 412.3b and 14 FAH-1 H-213d establish Department minimum replacement standards for different types of property.

OIG determined these deficiencies occurred due to a lack of management oversight. Inefficient management practices such as allowing residents to return furniture multiple times, unnecessarily replacing legacy model furniture sets, or ordering full sets of furniture for residential units that could not accommodate it caused increased workload for warehouse staff, risked excessive wear and tear on FAP items, and resulted in early disposals. Failure to manage FAP assets in accordance with Department standards risks mismanagement of the embassy's FAP holdings and incorrectly charging agencies for the cost of participating in the program.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Ankara should bring the mission's furniture and appliance pool program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Consulate General Istanbul Did Not Train Employees in the Use of Powered Industrial Trucks

OIG found that Consulate General Istanbul did not train employees in the use of powered industrial trucks, including forklifts. The consulate general's four property forklift operators did not receive required training in operating, maintaining, and caring for powered industrial trucks before being assigned to operate the forklifts. Standards in 14 FAH-1 H-313.6-2c and d, and 14 FAH-1 H-313.4a(1) through (3) require that forklift operators be properly trained to care for, operate, and maintain forklifts or other powered industrial trucks and take refresher training at least every 3 years. Management Section staff told OIG they had planned to train forklift operators in FY 2024 but did not have sufficient funds available for the training. Failure to ensure proper employee training increases the risk of injury, loss of life, and damage to property.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Ankara should comply with Department training standards in the use of powered industrial trucks, such as forklifts, at Consulate General Istanbul. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission's Contract Administration Program Did Not Adhere to Department Standards

Mission Türkiye's contract administration program did not adhere to Department standards. OIG reviewed all 29 of Mission Türkiye's contracts with an assigned contracting officer's representative (COR), which were valued at approximately \$26 million, and found that:

- Neither contracting officers nor CORs completed mandatory annual performance reviews in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) for the six contracts above the simplified acquisition threshold.⁴⁸ Performance reviews for only one

⁴⁸ CPARS is the government-wide evaluation reporting tool for all past performance reports on contracts and orders. A performance assessment must be done in the system, annually, for each contract over the simplified acquisition threshold of \$250,000.

of the six contracts had been entered into CPARS for each year the contract was exercised. Guidance in 14 FAM 222c(1)(2) states that the COR is the primary individual assigned to monitor a contract and evaluate the contractor's performance. In addition, Federal Acquisition Regulation 42.1502(a) requires past performance evaluations to be prepared annually and entered in CPARS. Failure to properly evaluate the performance of contractors increases the risk of contract mismanagement.

- The mission's CORs did not maintain all the required documentation as outlined in 14 FAH-2 H-517. For example, of the 29 contracts with CORs:
 - Only two COR files included some level of documented acceptability of deliverables.
 - Fifteen COR files did not include invoices or vouchers from the contractors.
 - Twenty-two COR files did not document correspondence with the contractors.
 - No COR files included a certification to the contracting officer that documentation for the COR file was complete.
- Designated CORs did not maintain their contract files as required in ILMS e-Filing. According to standards in 14 FAH-2 H-142b(16)(b), a COR must use the e-Filing module for COR file management; this provides the contracting officer visibility of the COR's file and management of the contract. Instead, the CORs maintained the documents in a variety of locations in either paper contract files, electronic files, or both.

Some of the mission's CORs told OIG that they were not aware of these requirements for a COR's standard working file or felt that they were meeting expectations outlined for them. Without proper documentation, it is unclear if CORs are adequately performing their contract administration responsibilities.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Ankara should bring the mission's contract administration program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission's Purchase Card Program Did Not Adhere to Department Guidelines

Mission Türkiye's purchase card program did not adhere to Department guidelines. For example, OIG found that:

- Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana did not perform an annual review of the purchase card program for FY 2023. Standards in 4 FAM 455.3a(10) and (11) require purchase card approving officials to complete annual reviews in a timely manner and for purchase card program coordinators to certify the review in the Purchase Card Management and Reporting System.⁴⁹ Management Section managers in Embassy Ankara stated the approving official left the mission around the time the review was due, and the process was never passed along for review by the program coordinator for final certification. The program coordinator role for Consulate Adana's purchase card program was being

⁴⁹ The Purchase Card Management and Reporting System is a web-based application that provides Department users world-wide with a single portal to accomplish purchase card related tasks and oversight in a highly efficient and streamlined manner including establishing accounts, making changes to accounts, and submitting requests.

managed by someone assigned to Embassy Ankara, and that person stated the requirement was likely missed because of other responsibilities.

- Embassy Ankara did not review monthly cardholder statements of account as part of the monthly purchase card reconciliation process. Standards in 4 FAM 455.3b(8) require purchase card approving officials to review and approve the monthly cardholder statements of account. This deficiency occurred because Embassy Ankara's approving official was not fully aware of all responsibilities required of a purchase card approving official.
- Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana did not remove a purchase card holder who was no longer employed with Mission Türkiye from the Purchase Card Management and Reporting System. The Worldwide Purchase Card Program Manual requires purchase card approving officials to ensure all cardholder accounts are properly closed and canceled in the Purchase Card Management and Reporting System upon departure of a cardholder. Mission purchase card administrators were unaware of this requirement.
- Consulate Adana did not have a designated program coordinator for its purchase card program. The program coordinator role, according to 4 FAM 455.2, is responsible for the oversight of an embassy or consulate's purchase card program. Consulate Adana's General Services Officer stated that Embassy Ankara was supporting the oversight of the program because of previous staffing gaps at Consulate Adana but was not sure why the role was currently vacant. Embassy Ankara told OIG they were working to get staff at Consulate Adana assigned roles for its purchase card program.

Failure to adhere to purchase card program requirements, including ensuring that reviews are performed and designations are assigned, increases the risks of misuse of purchase cards and loss of government resources.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Ankara should bring the mission's purchase card program into compliance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission Türkiye Did Not Perform Acquisition Planning in Accordance With Department Standards

OIG determined that Mission Türkiye did not perform acquisition planning in accordance with Department standards. OIG reviewed Mission Türkiye's use of acquisition planning for its six active contracts over the simplified acquisition threshold, totaling approximately \$24 million, and found that the mission lacked proper documentation. Standards in the Department of State Acquisition Manual 607.102-80(b) require the mission to complete the Department's streamlined acquisition plan for acquisitions greater than the simplified acquisition threshold. The standards also require a formal acquisition plan for all acquisitions greater than or equal to \$5 million. Embassy Ankara and Consulate General Istanbul told OIG that, while they planned for acquisitions that are over the simplified acquisition threshold, they used an informal process that they did not document. Without proper acquisition planning prior to entering into contracts, Mission Türkiye created risk that its acquisitions do not meet U.S. government needs in the most effective, economical, and timely manner.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Ankara should conduct acquisition planning in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana Did Not Perform Annual Blanket Purchase Agreement Reviews

OIG found that Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana did not perform annual blanket purchase agreement (BPA) reviews.⁵⁰ Standards in Federal Acquisition Regulation 8.405-3(e) require that, at least once per year, the contracting officer review BPAs and determine in writing that they still represent the best value for the U.S. government. Instead, the contracting officers at Consulate General Istanbul performed an oral review of the BPAs, while Consulate Adana approved a list of BPAs provided via email by the consulate's procurement team, but neither performed a documented review of the consulate's BPAs in accordance with Department guidance. Both consulates believed their reviews to be sufficient. Without a proper, documented review of their BPAs, Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana cannot guarantee they are obtaining the highest quality goods or services at the most competitive prices.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Ankara should require Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana to conduct and document annual blanket purchase agreement reviews, in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission's Local Travel Management Center Did Not Adhere to Department Standards

OIG found that Mission Türkiye's local travel management center (TMC) did not adhere to Department standards. The TMC used the mission's centrally billed account travel card when booking lodging on behalf of embassy staff and listed itself, rather than the lodging company, as the vendor for these payments. As a result, the TMC did not provide invoices directly from the lodging vendors, as it did for airfare tickets; instead, it provided only an invoice in the name of the TMC. Guidance in 14 FAM 543.1d states that, when using a centrally billed account, the TMC may not be the merchant for travel-related purchases.

Management Section staff told OIG that they were aware of this issue prior to the inspection and explained they experienced challenges when using the lodging company as the vendor. They had the TMC be the vendor as a solution. Without detailed invoices from the vendors, the mission lacks transparency in what the TMC is charging, which can create opportunities for fraud, waste, and overcharging.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Ankara should require the local travel management center for Mission Türkiye to operate in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

⁵⁰ A blanket purchase agreement is a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing "charge accounts" with qualified sources of supply.

Facility Management

Mission Did Not Perform High-Risk Workplace Hazard Inspections

Mission Türkiye did not inspect its high-risk workplaces for hazards in accordance with Department standards.⁵¹ Specifically, Embassy Ankara performed its most recent high-risk workplace inspections from April to June 2024 but could not provide any evidence of any of its previous high-risk workplace inspections prior to that date. In addition, Consulate Adana could not provide any of its documented high-risk inspection checklists from previous years or 2024. Furthermore, both Embassy Ankara and Consulate Adana had never performed or documented an inspection of their mail-screening rooms, which are considered high-risk workplaces.

According to 15 FAM 962a, all high-risk workplaces must be inspected at least twice a year. In addition, guidance in 15 FAM 962g states that inspections of all workplaces and activities must be documented in writing. Management Section staff told OIG they were not aware of all the Department's workplace hazard inspection and documentation requirements and therefore had overlooked some of them. Failure to perform and document regular high-risk workplace hazard inspections increases the risk that the mission would not identify all workplace hazards and would not adequately mitigate all deficiencies.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Ankara should perform and document workplace hazard inspections of its high-risk workplaces in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission's Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer Certifications of Its Real Property Did Not Adhere to Department Standards

OIG found that Mission Türkiye's certifications of its real property were not in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, the mission lacked post occupational safety and health officer (OSHO) certifications for its residential and non-residential properties. OIG's analysis of the embassy's data in the OSHO certification application⁵² found that Embassy Ankara had 16 expired residential certifications that the embassy had not recertified as of November 2024. In addition, the embassy had not performed a new OSHO certification for Consular Agency Izmir, whose certificate had expired in June 2024. Department standards in 15 FAM 971.4 state that, if a property is to remain occupied after a certificate expires, a new OSHO certification must be completed within 30 days after the certificate's expiration.

⁵¹ According to 15 FAM 962c, "high-risk activity involves the potential for serious injury, illness or fatality, or significant exposure to a physical, chemical, or biological hazard. This includes activities involving, but not limited to, construction, electrical work, work at heights above six feet, confined spaces, trenching or excavating, chemical use, materials storage and handling and maintenance work."

⁵² The OSHO certification application generates and documents the form used by OSHOs to certify that a residence meets the requirements of 15 FAM 252.5. The form lists the safety requirements that must be certified prior to occupancy. The application allows relevant documentation to be electronically attached to the form.

In addition, OIG found that the mission's POSHOs were not using the Residential Safety, Health, and Fire Prevention Awareness Checklist to comprehensively identify and document residential safety inspections. Department standards in 15 FAM 252.5b state that the POSHO must use the Department of State Residential Safety, Health, and Fire Prevention Awareness Checklist, which identifies unsafe conditions to resolve, either prior to occupancy or immediately after occupancy. Additionally, guidance in 15 FAM 252.5c states that missions must complete the POSHO inspections and maintain active certifications in OBO's POSHO certification application as part of the property record.⁵³

Embassy staff acknowledged to OIG that they were behind on the residential and non-residential certification renewals, due to inadequate management oversight. Staff also noted that they thought the questions on the POSHO certification application were sufficient when certifying properties and did not realize that the more comprehensive Residential Safety, Health, and Fire Prevention Awareness Checklist was also required. Failure to correctly conduct the required safety and health certifications of all the mission's residential and non-residential properties could lead to safety and health vulnerabilities for mission staff.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Ankara should complete post occupational safety and health officer certifications for all residential and non-residential properties in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Embassy Ankara Had Not Requested an Exception to the Department's Fire Standards Procedures

OIG found that Embassy Ankara had not requested an exception to the Department's fire standards⁵⁴ procedures as required. Two of the embassy's high-rise properties, which contain 171 of the embassy's 180 residential units (95 percent), did not adhere to Department fire standards. Specifically, the properties lacked a complete fire sprinkler system and an automatic fire alarm system. Although the embassy had already requested and received property-specific mitigation measures from the Department, the embassy had yet to request a mission-wide exception,⁵⁵ as required. Guidance in 15 FAM 813.7-3c(1) states that the embassy must request a mission-wide exception if at least 25 percent of the embassy's residences do not adhere to a standard or guidance because that particular standard or equivalency cannot be met.

⁵³ This section of the FAM was updated in December 2024, after OIG concluded fieldwork for this inspection. The requirements are still incorporated within 15 FAM 252.5.

⁵⁴ Department fire standards are the mandatory fire requirements that require compliance unless equivalencies are adopted, or exceptions are approved through the Office of Fire Protection in OBO's Directorate for Operations (OBO/OPS/FIRE). "Fire equivalencies" refers to the acceptable level of variance from the established standard approved through OBO/OPS/FIRE. Fire equivalencies represent an accepted degree of risk tolerance.

⁵⁵ To request a post-wide exception to fire standards, the appropriate post officer (e.g., general services officer, facility manager, POSHO, etc.) must recommend the exception to the fire standards or equivalencies, the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) must concur, the EAC must obtain chief of mission concurrence/acceptance of risk for the exception request, and post must submit a cable to OBO requesting approval (15 FAM 813.7-4a).

Management Section staff told OIG that they were aware of the requirement but that the recent turnover in facility management due to the summer transfer season had created a temporary knowledge gap in the section; this resulted in a delay in convening the embassy's Emergency Action Committee to discuss this issue. By delaying the process to identify and assess fire risks, the embassy risks delaying decision-making related to the key elements of its facility fire and life safety infrastructure.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Ankara should request a mission-wide exception to Department fire standards in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Embassy Ankara and Consulate General Istanbul Did Not Implement and Practice a Confined Space Management Program

OIG found that Embassy Ankara and Consulate General Istanbul did not implement and practice a confined space management program. OBO's Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management requires embassies to implement a confined space program for all government-owned, and long-term and short-term leased properties in accordance with its Safety Occupational Health and Environmental Management Resource Guide,⁵⁶ noted in 15 FAM 957.1, and 29 Code of Federal Regulations § 1910.146. This guidance requires embassies to protect employees from the hazards of entry into permit-required confined spaces by determining whether any spaces are permit-required confined spaces. They inform exposed employees of the existence, location, and danger posed by the confined spaces. Management Section staff told OIG that they were either unaware of the Department's confined space requirements or believed that their compounds did not have any confined spaces.⁵⁷ Non-adherence to the confined space requirements increases the likelihood of injuries and fatalities during confined space entries.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Ankara should implement and practice a confined space management program in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission Did Not Fully Comply With Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Standards

OIG found that Mission Türkiye did not comply with standards in the Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management program. Specifically, OIG found:

- The mission's chauffeurs and incidental drivers were missing both driver safety training and medical certifications as required in 14 FAM 433.5a, and 14 FAM 433.4a through c. For example, at the time of the inspection, Consulate Adana had 19 medical certifications and 7 safety training certifications that had either expired or were missing

⁵⁶ The Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management, in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' Directorate of Operations, develops additional standards, as necessary, to address specific issues or problems not covered by the standards listed in 15 FAM 950, which are contained in the resource guide.

⁵⁷ During the onsite portion of the inspection, OIG observed confined spaces at both Embassy Ankara and Consulate General Istanbul including fuel tanks, drainage and sewage pits, and elevator pits.

for its 37 drivers. Embassy Ankara had 75 medical certifications and 39 safety training certifications that had either expired or were missing for its 271 drivers.

- The mission did not fully track its chauffeurs and incidental drivers' safety training and medical certifications using the Department's Fleet Management Information System,⁵⁸ as required in 14 FAM 433.4e and 14 FAM 433.5e.⁵⁹
- The mission's chauffeurs did not consistently adhere to the Department's 10-hour limit on duty shifts (or 12-hours, for Marine Security Guard drivers) as required by 14 FAM 433.8a and 14 FAM 433.8e. OIG examined overtime records for the mission's chauffeurs⁶⁰ over four pay periods⁶¹ in FY 2024 and found that they exceeded the Department's duty limits in 251 of 1,640 shifts (15 percent of the total shifts in the 8-week period).
- The mission did not have a clear and communicated set of infractions of safe driving standards and penalties for failure to comply with operational safety standards as part of its motor vehicle safety management program and required by 15 FAM 957.3(2) and 14 FAM 433.2a.

Motor pool staff told OIG they had been tracking the required certifications in informal spreadsheets and via paper record files but were unaware of the requirements to enter this data into the Department's system of record, which is the Fleet Management Information System. Motor pool staff said the heavy and constant demand for motor pool services, multiple high-level visitors, and visits by congressional delegations, made it challenging to adhere to the 10-hour duty limits.

In addition, gaps in Embassy Ankara's human resources officer position resulted in several policies and processes being out of date or simply missing. During the inspection, the embassy was updating and implementing its disciplinary processes for driving infractions. Failure to enforce Department motor vehicle safety standards increases the risk of injury to drivers and the public as well as damage to U.S. government property. It also increases the potential for motor vehicle mishaps caused by operator sleep deprivation and fatigue.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Ankara should comply with all Department Motor Vehicle Safety Management program standards for chauffeurs and incidental drivers. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

⁵⁸ The Fleet Management Information System, a module within the Integrated Logistics Management System, is the Department's enterprise system for managing all fleet operations. It is designed to capture key operational data on vehicle dispatch, maintenance, and fuel.

⁵⁹ This section of the FAM was updated in January 2025, after OIG concluded fieldwork for this inspection. The requirement is now incorporated within 14 FAM 433.5d.

⁶⁰ The mission's chauffeurs included Embassy Ankara's, Consulate General Istanbul's, and Consulate Adana's motor pool drivers, front office chauffeurs, and Marine Security Guard drivers.

⁶¹ Pay periods 17, 18, 19, and 20 in FY 2024.

Consulate Adana Did Not Obtain Approval To Construct a Structure on the Consulate Compound

OIG found that Consulate Adana did not obtain approval to construct a structure on the consulate compound. The consulate constructed a stand-alone structure, which it used as a breakroom for LE staff, without obtaining the required approval.⁶² According to 15 FAM 686.1a, the mission must obtain prior OBO approval for actions that involve U.S. government-owned or -leased real property, regardless of cost or funding source. Approval includes a review to ensure that the project conforms to building codes adopted by the Department. OIG determined the consulate completed the work outside of the approval process due to consulate staff's misunderstanding of the requirements. The construction and subsequent use of structures without ensuring compliance with building code requirements and Department approval poses significant life safety risks to employees working in or accessing these structures.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should request approval for the construction project at Consulate Adana in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with OBO)

Human Resources

Embassy Ankara Had Not Updated the Mission's Locally Employed Staff Handbook

Embassy Ankara had not updated the mission's LE staff handbook since 2015. OIG found the handbook contained inaccurate information. For example, it detailed an additional bonus allowance that was discontinued in 2016, outlined a separation for age policy that had been removed from the local compensation plan⁶³ in 2021, and contained a required waiting period for LE staff promotions, despite the Department abolishing that practice in 2017. Department standards in 3 FAM 7155a require each mission to develop and maintain an LE staff handbook that documents the mission's LE staff employment policies and procedures, LE staff responsibilities, and expected conduct. Embassy staff told OIG that the embassy had not updated the handbook due to lack of staff available to do so and they recognized that they needed to complete a thorough update. Absent an updated handbook with accurate policies and procedures, LE staff may receive erroneous information about the benefits to which they are entitled, and the risk of litigation may increase for the Department.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Ankara should update Mission Türkiye's locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

⁶² Because the consulate did not have any documentation or record of the drawings or plans used for the construction of this structure, OIG was unable to determine when the consulate built the unauthorized structure or how it was funded.

⁶³ According to 3 FAM 7521, a local compensation plan forms the legal basis for all compensation payments to LE staff, such as salary, direct benefit payments, premium compensation, and U.S. government contributions to host government social insurance or private insurance plans.

Embassy Ankara Did Not Maintain Updated Human Resources Policies or Standard Operating Procedures

Embassy Ankara did not maintain updated human resources policies or standard operating procedures. Specifically, the mission lacked a documented grievance program,⁶⁴ as required by 3 FAM 7741a. Additionally, OIG found:

- The mission’s disciplinary policy did not incorporate progressive discipline for official vehicle safety policy violations.⁶⁵
- The mission’s 2016 recruitment policy did not incorporate changes in pre-employment testing practices.
- The mission did not have a documented process for establishing starting salaries for newly hired LE staff or maintaining personnel files.

As stated in the Government Accountability Office’s *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*,⁶⁶ Principle 3.10, effective documentation assists in promoting internal controls by establishing and communicating responsibilities to personnel and providing a means to retain organizational knowledge. OIG attributed the lack of current policies and procedures to the human resources team prioritizing operations over documentation. The absence of updated policies and standard operating procedures risks inconsistency in human resources practices throughout the mission and increases the risk of litigation.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Ankara should implement a process to document and regularly update its human resources policies and standard operating procedures. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Some Payments to Locally Employed Staff Were Not in Accordance With the Mission’s Local Compensation Plan

OIG determined some of Mission Türkiye’s payments to LE staff were not in accordance with the mission’s local compensation plan or local labor law. Specifically, OIG found:

- The mission requested payment of a “uniform allowance” for some LE staff in positions authorized the provision of a uniform. However, the local compensation plan does not contain a uniform allowance.
- The mission requested full severance pay for employees whose employment was terminated for cause, despite the local compensation plan specifically excluding employees separated for cause from severance pay eligibility.

⁶⁴ A grievance process supports LE staff who seek to resolve workplace disputes and complaints under the control of the mission, such as physical working environment, disciplinary actions, performance evaluations, and application of the local compensation plan or LE staff handbook.

⁶⁵ Cable 24 STATE 98210, “Promoting and Enforcing the Safe Operation of Official Vehicles,” September 10, 2024.

⁶⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

- The embassy did not seek Department approval⁶⁷ to update the local compensation plan to pay severance within 4-days of separation in compliance with local law.

Standards in 3 FAM 7521 state that all payments to LE staff shall be specifically authorized in the joint local compensation plan, while 3 FAM 7513.1(6) requires the ranking officer in each mission to adhere strictly to provisions of the plan in compensating LE staff. OIG determined these long-standing deficiencies had not been resolved due to staff turnover and the prioritization of other compensation issues. Not paying staff in accordance with the local compensation plan and not maintaining the local compensation plan could lead to litigation, costly settlements, and damage to the reputation of the U.S. government.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update its local compensation plan to comply with government of Türkiye labor law in accordance with Department standards, and should only make payments for benefits contained within the plan. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with GTM)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

OIG reviewed Mission Türkiye’s Diplomatic Technology (DT) computer network operations, information systems and administration of mobile computing devices, mail and pouch services, cybersecurity practices, records management, telephone, and emergency communications systems. During the inspection, OIG identified five internal control issues, which the mission corrected. Specifically, the mission:

- Updated the IT Contingency Plan and completed required plan testing (5 FAM 852.10 and 12 FAH-10 H-232.1-3).
- Established a local IT Configuration Control Board⁶⁸ to evaluate mission IT equipment (5 FAM 114.6-2a and 5 FAM 862.1a).
- Reassigned information systems security officer duties to improve operations (12 FAM 642.2a).
- Retired records in accordance with Department standards (5 FAM 451b).
- Relocated the server emergency power-off switch at Consulate Adana to meet Department standards (12 FAH-10 H-272.8-1(1)).

OIG determined Mission Türkiye’s DT programs and services generally met the mission’s day-to-day computing and communications needs except for the issues described below.

⁶⁷ See 3 FAM 7524a, “Development Procedures.”

⁶⁸ The IT Configuration Control Board manages standardization of the Department’s global IT environment and addresses issues of configuration tracking, change control, and network planning and operations.

Telecommunications Demarcation Point in Consulate General Istanbul Was Improperly Located

The telecommunications demarcation point that connected Consulate General Istanbul's communications systems and the public telecommunications circuits was improperly located in a server room that was rated as Sensitive But Unclassified. This configuration was not in compliance with 12 FAH-6 H-651.5-2a, which requires the demarcation point to be located in a separate, locked building within the perimeter of the grounds or in a separate, locked space outside the building hardline and at least 3 meters from any controlled access area.

Additionally, two circuits in the server room used Huawei devices, which the Department prohibited for use in cable 19 STATE 9266.⁶⁹

DT staff were aware of the Department standards and initiated two projects prior to the inspection to comply with them, but the staff had not completed these projects at the time of the inspection. Locating the public telecommunication equipment within the information systems server room creates security vulnerabilities when non-cleared, host-nation internet service provider employees access the room to service the public telecommunications circuits.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Ankara should relocate the telecommunications demarcation point outside the information systems server room in Consulate General Istanbul, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Ankara should remove prohibited devices in Consulate General Istanbul in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Mission Resources Intended for Official Use Supported Residential Internet Services

OIG found that Embassy Ankara and Consulate General Istanbul used mission resources intended for official use to support residential internet services. Except for the residences of senior mission officials (the Ambassador, the DCM, and the Principal Officers of Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana), the Department generally considers internet service to be a personal expense as stated in 15 FAM 723a and b. The embassy and consulate general used three DT staff to set up internet services, monitor billing, and perform maintenance at residences. These positions were funded with an ICASS account intended for the Department's telephone services and embassy data circuits. DT staff told OIG the mission authorized this support during the COVID-19 pandemic to help new arrivals during quarantine, but the support continued after the pandemic subsided. Tasking LE staff to support residential internet services uses resources that should be dedicated to official activities.

Recommendation 26: Embassy Ankara should cease using resources intended for official use to support residential internet services in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

⁶⁹ Cable 19 STATE 9266, "Mandatory Ceasing Inventory of ZTE, Huawei, and Xiaomi-branded products or anything affiliated," February 6, 2019.

System Administrators Lacked Required Information Assurance Training

OIG found that most Mission Türkiye system administrators at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana lacked information assurance training. Consistent with 5 FAM 845b and 12 FAH-10 H-212.2-1, system administrators are responsible for completing the information assurance training every 3 years. Section managers said the Foreign Service Institute, which provides information assurance training, could not provide the quantity of training needed to meet the needs of Mission Türkiye. Furthermore, the lack of information assurance courses that were available during the pandemic increased the demand for such training. Without information assurance training, system administrators may risk losing awareness of critical cybersecurity requirements.

Recommendation 27: Embassy Ankara should require information system administrators at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to Embassy Ankara.¹

Recommendation 1: Embassy Ankara should install outside signage at the public entrances of the three consular facilities at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana, providing consular information in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara installed outside signage at the public entrances of the three consular facilities at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana, providing consular information in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should provide protection from the elements for consular applicants in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with CA and OBO)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara provided protection from the elements for consular applicants in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should ensure appointments for U.S. citizen consular services are made available in Consulate Adana on a regular and predictable basis in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with CA)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

¹ Embassy Ankara did not submit a formal response to this report. In an April 30, 2025, email to OIG, the embassy noted it concurred with the recommendations in this report. In a subsequent email to OIG on May 22, 2025, the embassy confirmed it considered the emailed concurrence sufficient for the purpose of responding to the report.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara made appointments for U.S. citizen consular services in Consulate Adana available on a regular and predictable basis in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Ankara should fulfill its support visit schedule in accordance with Mission Türkiye's memorandum of understanding. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara fulfilled its support visit schedule in accordance with Mission Türkiye's memorandum of understanding.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Ankara should submit the hardship differential survey for Consulate Adana in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara submitted the hardship differential survey for Consulate Adana in accordance with Department guidelines.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Ankara should manage its motor vehicle program in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara managed its motor vehicle program in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Ankara should bring its property management program in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara's property management program complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Ankara should bring the mission's furniture and appliance pool program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara brought the mission's furniture and appliance pool program into compliance with Department standards.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Ankara should comply with Department training standards in the use of powered industrial trucks, such as forklifts, at Consulate General Istanbul. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara complied with Department training standards in the use of powered industrial trucks, such as forklifts, at Consulate General Istanbul.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Ankara should bring the mission's contract administration program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara brought the mission's contract administration program into compliance with Department standards.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Ankara should bring the mission's purchase card program into compliance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara brought the mission's purchase card program into compliance with Department guidelines.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Ankara should conduct acquisition planning in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara conducted acquisition planning in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Ankara should require Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana to conduct and document annual blanket purchase agreement reviews, in compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara required Consulate General Istanbul and Consulate Adana to conduct and document annual blanket purchase agreement reviews, in compliance with Department standards.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Ankara should require the local travel management center for Mission Türkiye to operate in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara required the local travel management center for Mission Türkiye to operate in accordance with Department guidelines.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Ankara should perform and document workplace hazard inspections of its high-risk workplaces in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara performed and documented workplace hazard inspections of its high-risk workplaces in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Ankara should complete post occupational safety and health officer certifications for all residential and non-residential properties in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara completed post occupational safety and health officer certifications for all residential and non-residential properties in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Ankara should request a mission-wide exception to Department fire standards in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara requested a mission-wide exception to Department fire standards.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Ankara should implement and practice a confined space management program in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara implemented and practiced a confined space management program in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Ankara should comply with all Department Motor Vehicle Safety Management program standards for chauffeurs and incidental drivers. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara complied with all Department Motor Vehicle Safety Management program standards for chauffeurs and incidental drivers.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should request approval for the construction project at Consulate Adana in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with OBO)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara requested approval for the construction project at Consulate Adana in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Ankara should update Mission Türkiye's locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara updated Mission Türkiye's locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Ankara should implement a process to document and regularly update its human resources policies and standard operating procedures. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara implemented a process to document and regularly update its human resources policies and standard operating procedures.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update its local compensation plan to comply with government of Türkiye labor law in accordance with Department standards, and should only make payments for benefits contained within the plan. (Action: Embassy Ankara, in coordination with GTM)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara updated its local compensation plan to comply with government of Türkiye labor law in accordance with Department standards and only made payments for benefits contained within the plan.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Ankara should relocate the telecommunications demarcation point outside the information systems server room in Consulate General Istanbul, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara relocated the telecommunications demarcation point outside the information systems server room in Consulate General Istanbul, in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Ankara should remove prohibited devices in Consulate General Istanbul in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara removed prohibited devices in Consulate General Istanbul in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 26: Embassy Ankara should cease using resources intended for official use to support residential internet services in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara ceased using resources intended for official use to support residential internet services in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 27: Embassy Ankara should require information system administrators at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Ankara)

Management Response: In its April 30, 2025, response, Embassy Ankara concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Ankara required information system administrators at the embassy, Consulate General Istanbul, and Consulate Adana to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

| Agency/Section/Title | Name | Arrival Date |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Chiefs of Mission: | | |
| Chargé d’Affaires | Michael Goldman ^a | 6/2024 |
| Deputy Chief of Mission (acting) | Viraj LeBailly | 8/2022 |
| Constituent Post(s): | | |
| Consulate General Istanbul, Principal Officer | Julie Eadeh | 8/2021 |
| Consulate Adana, Principal Officer | Cathy Westley | 8/2023 |
| Chiefs of Sections: | | |
| Consular | Nancy Abella | 7/2023 |
| Economic | Etienne LeBailly | 8/2022 |
| Management | Daley O’Neil | 8/2021 |
| Political | Desiree Baron | 8/2024 |
| Public Diplomacy | Viraj LeBailly ^b | 8/2022 |
| Regional Security | Paul Fiffeck | 8/2020 |
| Other Agency Representatives: | | |
| Drug Enforcement Administration | Chad Gatlin | 1/2024 |
| Legal Attaché | Kathryn Tillman | 7/2022 |
| Office of Defense Cooperation | Col. Edward Figueroa | 8/2023 |
| Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché | Col. Christian Lichter | 7/2023 |
| U.S. Commercial Service | Michael Lally | 6/2024 |

^a Michael Goldman became Chargé d’Affaires on September 2, 2024, after he arrived at the embassy.

^b At the time of the inspection, Viraj LeBailly was serving as the acting Deputy Chief of Mission.

Source: OIG generated from data provided by Embassy Ankara.

APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted from September 26, 2024, to January 17, 2025, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspections Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).

Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chief Executive Officer of USAGM, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and USAGM. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved and U.S. interests are accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy; and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; and whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

OIG used a risk-based approach to prepare for this inspection. OIG conducted portions of the inspection remotely and relied on audio- and video-conferencing tools in addition to in-person interviews with Department and other personnel. OIG also reviewed pertinent records; circulated surveys and compiled the results; and discussed the substance of this report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the inspection. OIG used professional judgment and analyzed physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence to develop its findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

This review was conducted consistent with the FY 2024 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Atlantic Resolve, Including U.S. Government Activities Related to Ukraine, which was released in October 2023 by the Inspectors General of the Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| BPA | Blanket Purchase Agreement |
| COR | Contracting Officer's Representative |
| DCM | Deputy Chief of Mission |
| DT | Diplomatic Technology |
| EEO | Equal Employment Opportunity |
| FAH | Foreign Affairs Handbook |
| FAM | Foreign Affairs Manual |
| FAP | Furniture and Appliance Pool |
| FAST | First- and Second-Tour |
| ICASS | International Cooperative Administrative Support Services |
| ICS | Integrated Country Strategy |
| ILMS | Integrated Logistics Management System |
| LE | Locally Employed |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OBO | Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations |
| POSHO | Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer |
| PRM | Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration |
| SRP | Syria Regional Platform |
| TMC | Travel Management Center |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |

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