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Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

ISP-I-25-12

Office of Inspections

May 2025

Inspection of Embassy Doha, Qatar

BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED



HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

ISP-I-25-12

What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Doha.

What OIG Recommends

OIG made 18 recommendations to Embassy Doha. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy concurred with 15 recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with 3 recommendations. OIG considers all 18 recommendations resolved. The embassy's response to each recommendation, and OIG's reply, can be found in the Recommendations section of this report. The embassy's formal response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B.

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What OIG Found

- The Ambassador modeled some but not all the Department of State's leadership and management principles.
- Embassy Doha's Political, Economic, and Public Diplomacy Sections advanced Integrated Country Strategy and Department of State priorities.
- The embassy had consular issues related to visa advocacy, access to the Consular Section workspace, and controlled item inventories.
- Embassy Doha had internal control issues in general services, facility management, human resources, and financial management programs.
- The embassy had information management internal control deficiencies related to training, records management, and the development of a mobile application.

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CONTEXT



Figure 1: Map of Qatar (Source: CIA World Factbook).

Qatar is a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally¹ of the United States. It is a high-income economy country, backed by the world's third-largest natural gas reserves and fourteenth-largest oil reserves.

The United States and Qatar have a strong bilateral relationship and coordinate on a wide range of regional and global policy issues such as trade and investment, counterterrorism, energy, security, and the Israel-Hamas conflict.

In 2023, U.S. bilateral trade in goods and services with Qatar totaled \$6.69 billion, with \$4.65 billion in imports and \$2.04 billion in exports, making the United States Qatar's largest single source of imports. The United States is also Qatar's largest source of foreign direct investment, totaling more than \$63 billion since 2015.

Qatar hosts the Al Udeid Air Base, which is the largest U.S. Air Force installation outside of the United States and home to the United States Central Command and the Air Force Central Command Forward Headquarters.² Additionally, as of 2024, Qatar was one of the largest U.S. Foreign Military Sales partners with more than \$25 billion in sales under the Foreign Military Sales program.³

Embassy Doha's four strategic goals, as outlined in the FY 2024 Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), are to:

¹ A major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally is a designation given by the U.S. government to countries that have strategic working relationships with the U.S. Armed Forces while not being members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

² The Al Udeid Air Base facilitates U.S. and coalition partners operations in the Middle East and beyond and provides operational support to U.S. forces based in the region. The air base hosts approximately 6,000 U.S. military, civilian, and contract personnel.

³ Foreign Military Sales is a government-to-government program through which the U.S. government sells conventional military weapons, equipment, and services to allied and friendly nations. See 22 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 2751. Under Section 3, of the Arms Export Control Act, the U.S. may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace.

- Broaden the U.S.-Qatar military partnership and support Qatar's contribution to regional security.
- Increase trade and investment and support initiatives that reinforce U.S. policy goals.
- Enhance the effectiveness and good governance of institutions through sustained and increased bilateral cooperation focused on participation and institutional development.
- Work with Qatar to promote regional security and protect national security interests.

At the time of the inspection, Embassy Doha had 142 authorized U.S. direct-hire positions, 26 eligible family member positions, and 1 personal services contractor. Of the 142 U.S. direct-hire positions, 77 were with the Department of State (Department) and 65 were with other U.S. government agencies, which included the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice. The embassy also had 209 locally employed (LE) staff members, of whom 179 worked for the Department and 30 for other agencies. Additionally, Embassy Doha provided security, management, and information technology support to the Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU)⁴ and the Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts (CARE) at Camp As Sayliyah.^{5,6}

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated Embassy Doha's executive direction, policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.⁷ A related classified inspection report discusses the security program, certain aspects of the embassy's execution of foreign policy goals and objectives, and certain aspects of the information management program.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

OIG assessed leadership based on interviews, staff questionnaires, OIG's review of documents, and observations of office meetings and activities during the on-site portion of the inspection.⁸

Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

The Ambassador, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, was confirmed as Ambassador in August 2022. He previously served as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State and as

⁴ The Department suspended operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul, effective August 31, 2021, and in February 2022, established the AAU in Doha, Qatar as the U.S. diplomatic mission to Afghanistan. The AAU manages U.S. diplomacy with Afghanistan, including consular affairs, administering humanitarian assistance, and working with allies, partners, and regional and international stakeholders to coordinate engagement and messaging to the Taliban.

⁵ In October 2021, the Department established CARE within the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, to facilitate relocation of Afghan citizens, including Afghan special immigrant visa applicants.

⁶ See OIG, *Report of Inspection of the Afghanistan Affairs Unit* (ISP-I-23-05, November 2022).

⁷ See Appendix A.

⁸ During the inspection, OIG requested questionnaire responses and additional documentation from the Ambassador, but none were provided.

Consul General in Basra, Iraq. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), also a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, arrived in August 2024, just prior to the inspection. She served previously as the Counselor for Public Affairs at Embassy Amman, Jordan.

The Ambassador and DCM, along with embassy staff, told OIG the two were still working out their defined roles and responsibilities. Both the Ambassador and DCM said that he focused on external affairs while she focused on internal management of the embassy. OIG did not survey embassy employees regarding the DCM because she arrived in Doha just prior to the inspection. However, employees generally told OIG she had gotten off to a good start by making herself accessible and learning about the programs and priorities of embassy sections and agencies.

OIG determined that the Ambassador demonstrated integrity consistent with the Department's principle on standards of conduct, 3 FAM 1214b(1). Embassy staff told OIG that the Ambassador frequently raised in meetings the importance of adhering to ethical guidelines, especially on the acceptance of gifts. The Ambassador told OIG he made this a priority and reached out to the Department's Office of the Legal Adviser in the wake of Qatar's hosting of the 2022 Fédération Internationale de Football Association World Cup, when he became concerned that some embassy staff might not be following Department guidelines on the acceptance of gifts. As a result, the Ambassador referred to the Department reports of alleged improprieties by former embassy employees. During the inspection, the embassy corrected gaps in reporting in its gifts registry and issued a new management notice on accepting gifts to comply with Department guidance.

However, based on responses to questionnaires, interviews of current and former embassy staff, and observation of embassy meetings, OIG concluded the Ambassador's leadership style created an environment that did not fully exemplify the Department's leadership and management principles related to communication, collaboration, and self-awareness. OIG surveys and interviews documented that the Ambassador had a small circle of senior embassy U.S. direct-hire and interagency staff who had ready access to him and generally felt they could express their views freely. However, a large portion of U.S. direct-hire staff told OIG they found the Ambassador inaccessible, unapproachable, and that his closed-door policy inhibited communication. Additionally, a small number of embassy U.S. direct-hire staff told OIG they witnessed the Ambassador openly express his displeasure with employees. Finally, OIG observed embassy interagency meetings chaired by the Ambassador where there was little discussion or exchange of ideas.

The Ambassador told OIG that, in an effort to empower middle managers, he discouraged embassy staff from coming directly to him with issues and problems. The Ambassador said that prior to his arrival, the embassy had been run for 6 years by a series of chargés d'affaires who were sent to carry out specific tasks rather than "take care" of the embassy. He said that he led by example, action, and word. The Ambassador also told OIG he discouraged lower-level employees, including First- and Second-Tour (FAST) personnel from seeking to meet with him before engaging with the DCM. The Ambassador told OIG that that he did not have an open-door policy as he believed that staff should work with their managers. Finally, although the

Ambassador told OIG he believed that embassy morale was high, OIG questionnaires found widespread dissatisfaction with his leadership.

Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

Although OIG found that the Ambassador led the country team in accordance with 1 FAM 013.2a requirements to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Executive Branch employees in the country, and with 2 FAM 113.1b(7) requirements to obtain support for U.S. policies or positions, he had not fully prepared the DCM to do so in his absence. Prior to the DCM's arrival, the Ambassador reallocated the previous DCM's Qatari government contacts to the Political and Economic Section chiefs. OIG asked the Ambassador about the effects the reallocation of contacts might have on the ability of the DCM to serve as Chargé d'Affaires in his absence. The Ambassador told OIG that some of the previous DCM's contacts had been inappropriate, and that the DCM did not have time to meet with external contacts. The DCM told OIG that she and the Ambassador had not yet talked about her external duties. The Ambassador told OIG he had introduced the DCM to some of his contacts but had not told them that the DCM should have the same access in his absence.

The embassy's ICS was approved in 2022 and updated in April 2024, through an embassy-wide process that incorporated input from all sections and agencies, consistent with Department guidance in 18 FAM 301.2-4(D) on progress reviews of strategic plans. Among other changes, the revised ICS incorporated new Administration economic and commercial initiatives and strengthening cybersecurity to support the embassy goal that the United States and Qatar enjoy a strategic economic and robust commercial relationship.

Embassy Doha provided support for U.S. officials engaged in indirect talks, brokered by Qatar, between Israel and Hamas following the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. Providing such support furthered the embassy's ICS goal to work with Qatar to promote regional stability. Although the embassy had no direct role in the talks, Washington officials told OIG they welcomed the Ambassador's feedback on his discussions with Qatari officials. Additional details on the embassy's advancement of ICS goals are contained in the classified inspection report.

Adherence to Internal Controls

OIG determined that Embassy Doha generally complied with Department management control guidelines in 2 FAM 022.7, 2 FAM 024d, and cable 24 STATE 334.⁹ The Ambassador and acting DCM reviewed and signed the annual Statement of Assurance, and the embassy included no reportable deficiencies or issues. The embassy issued a mission notice on manager roles and responsibilities for management controls and another mission notice for managers and supervisors on identifying fraud.

⁹ Cable 24 STATE 334, "Your Role and Responsibilities for Management Controls and Oversight over Post Operations," January 2, 2024.

The DCM scheduled regular meetings with her AAU counterpart, consistent with the requirements in the embassy-AAU memorandum of understanding for coordination on management issues.¹⁰ However, prior to the inspection, the DCM did not review the Consular Section Chief's nonimmigrant visa adjudications, contrary to Department guidance in 9 FAM 403.12-4a. The Department requires such reviews to protect national security, ensure compliance with laws and procedures, protect against fraud, and help maintain the highest professional standards of visa adjudication. During the inspection, the DCM began reviewing the Consular Section chief's nonimmigrant visa adjudications in accordance with Department guidance. Therefore, OIG did not make a recommendation to address this issue.

Embassy staff told OIG the Front Office made no internal allocations of FY 2024 representational funds until September 2024, contrary to Department guidance in 3 FAM 3246.1 to allocate such funds and periodically review representation activities to ensure effective use of available funds. At the end of the inspection, the embassy issued a policy on proper usage of representational funds. During the inspection, OIG also found other internal control issues, which are addressed in the Consular Operations, Resource Management, and Information Management sections of this report.

Security and Emergency Planning

The Ambassador's oversight of the embassy's security and emergency preparedness programs generally was consistent with 2 FAM 113.1b(5) and 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-036c(6)(d). OIG interviews and reviews of documentation found that the Ambassador carried out his duties in accordance with Department guidelines to develop policies and programs to protect U.S. government personnel and their dependents and advise, protect, and assist U.S. citizens abroad. The Ambassador led by example by participating in security drills. He also provided opening remarks at a town hall held by the Consular Section for American citizens in June 2024, consistent with guidance in 2 FAM 113.1b(13), to assist U.S. citizens abroad.

The embassy submitted its annual review of the security memorandum of agreement between the Ambassador and the Geographic Combatant Commander as required by 2 FAH-2 H-116.4b.¹¹ However, OIG found a deficiency in the agreement, which is described in the classified inspection report.

Equal Employment Opportunity

OIG determined that the embassy generally complied with Department guidance in 2 FAM 1511.1a on Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policy and procedures. The embassy had

¹⁰ Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Affairs Unit and U.S. Embassy Doha, February 27, 2022.

¹¹ The memorandum of agreement between the Department of State and Department of Defense assigns security responsibility for Department of Defense personnel in foreign areas. Under the terms of the agreement, the chief of mission is responsible for providing security to all Department of Defense personnel in country who are not under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander. The agreement is required to be reviewed and signed annually.

three EEO counselors and three LE staff EEO liaisons and posted on-line and physical notices to inform employees on EEO procedures. The DCM initiated monthly meetings with the EEO counselors and the LE staff committee.

Changes to the embassy's local compensation plan¹² in early 2024, prompted several dozen EEO and harassment reports from LE staff members. OIG determined that poor communication between embassy management and LE staff employees prompted many of the reports. Specifically, embassy management did not notify LE staff in advance of the details of the changes, which principally affected a protected EEO class. LE staff told OIG the Ambassador had been supportive in rolling back the changes once they brought the issue to his attention. During the inspection, the embassy was implementing further revisions to the local compensation plan to comply with informal EEO resolution agreements reached among LE staff, embassy leadership, and the Department's Office of Civil Rights. The local compensation plan is discussed further in the Resource Management section of the report.

Developing and Mentoring Foreign Service Professionals

OIG found that the embassy, in conjunction with the AAU and CARE, had an active mentoring and professional development program in accordance with guidance in 3 FAM 1214b(8) and 3 FAM 2242.5a and b. The embassy and AAU DCMs jointly oversaw the FAST program, which included both Foreign Service generalists and specialists.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

OIG assessed Embassy Doha's policy and program implementation through a review of the advocacy and analysis work of the Political, Economic, and Public Diplomacy Sections, and the U.S. citizen and visa services provided by the Consular Section. OIG found the embassy generally met Department requirements for policy and program implementation. However, OIG made recommendations to address an issue in the Consular Section as discussed below.

Political and Economic Sections

OIG reviewed Embassy Doha's Political and Economic Sections' leadership and management, policy implementation, reporting, and Leahy vetting,¹³ and found the sections functioned in accordance with Department standards. OIG reviewed 62 political and economic reporting cables drafted between January and June 2024. During interviews with OIG, Washington end

¹² A local compensation plan forms the legal basis for all salary, bonus, and other payment to LE staff members under guidelines in 3 FAM 7521.

¹³ The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the United States from furnishing certain assistance to a unit of a foreign security force if the Department has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d and 9 FAM 303.8-5(B). Leahy vetting is the process of determining whether the Department has credible information that units or individuals proposed to benefit from certain assistance have committed a gross violation of human rights. The Department helps implement a similar law applicable to "amounts made available to the Department of Defense" for assistance to foreign security forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 362.

users described Embassy Doha's reporting as of good quality, responsive to their needs, timely, and in line with embassy strategic objectives.

The sections maintained constructive relationships with one another, with the AAU, CARE, and with interagency partners. For example, the sections coordinated on Foreign Military Sales applications by drafting Country Team assessments for host country equipment requests. The sections also frequently provided support for cabinet and other senior level visits. OIG determined that both sections also implemented U.S. foreign policy priorities. For example, the Economic Section worked with Qatari counterparts on trusted 5G telecom vendor issues in furtherance of U.S. policy objectives.¹⁴ Additionally, the Political Section's reporting and engagement informed discussions on human rights issues like the rights of migrant workers and trafficking in persons during the March 2024 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue talks.¹⁵

Public Diplomacy

OIG reviewed the Public Diplomacy Section's leadership, strategic planning and reporting, resource and knowledge management, federal assistance awards, education and cultural programs, media engagement, and American Spaces.¹⁶

OIG determined that the Public Diplomacy Section's operations and programs supported the embassy's ICS goals and generally complied with Department standards and guidance. Washington and embassy counterparts told OIG the section's public diplomacy programming and media outreach was of good quality and responsive to their needs. For example, the section provided frequent media and logistical support for several cabinet and other senior-level visits and highlighted the Ambassador and embassy's initiatives. The section also supported the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue's education and cultural initiatives and preparation efforts to open an American Corner in Qatar, promoted Qatari student attendance in U.S. universities and Fulbright exchanges.¹⁷ Additionally, the section's grants operations were well managed, demonstrating several best practices, such as combining a grants orientation for the recipient with monitoring the launch of the project.

¹⁴ "Trusted vendors" are those whose 5G systems or undersea cable networks are less susceptible to surveillance or interference.

¹⁵ The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue process, begun in Washington in 2018, underlines the commitment of Qatar and the United States to increase cooperation in fields that provide the greatest mutual and practical benefit cooperation. The March 2024 talks were the sixth in the series.

¹⁶ American Spaces are the U.S. government's primary public cultural and information centers abroad that provide free and open access for communities worldwide interested in learning more about the United States.

¹⁷ The Fulbright Program is a bilateral agreement between the U.S. government and the government of another country pursuant to the provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act. The Act established a binational commission to conduct a program of educational and cultural exchange between two countries using funds made available by both governments.

Consular Operations

OIG reviewed Embassy Doha's consular operations, including U.S. citizen services, fraud prevention programs, nonimmigrant and immigrant visa services, training, management controls, communications and outreach, consular cashiering and fees, consular space, and crisis preparedness.

Qatar was admitted to the Visa Waiver Program in November 2024, allowing Qatari citizens to travel to the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa for business or tourism. However, the Bureau of Consular Affairs told OIG that Qatar's admission to the program was unlikely to substantially impact the Consular Section's workload due to the high volume of third-country nationals who made up Embassy Doha's nonimmigrant visa workload in FY 2024. With the Doha airport serving as a regional transit hub, the Consular Section's workload remained complex due to non-resident immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicants traveling to Qatar for their visa interviews.

OIG found the Consular Section employed innovative solutions to improve operations. For example, employees created an online appointment system for internal embassy customers. Additionally, the Consular Section hosted five exchanges and sent five LE staff on exchanges in FY 2024, sharing best practices and innovations with other consular sections in the region.

Except as noted below, OIG found the embassy's consular programs generally complied with guidance in 7 FAM, 9 FAM, 7 FAH, applicable statutes, and other Department policies.

Embassy Doha Did Not Follow Visa Advocacy and Consular Section Access Procedures

OIG identified deficiencies in Embassy Doha's adherence to visa advocacy standards and consular access control procedures. OIG found that consular staff were routinely contacted by embassy and other U.S. government colleagues inquiring about pending nonimmigrant visa cases, advocating for visa issuance, and protesting visa denials. Although the embassy conducted visa referral and priority appointment request programs,¹⁸ consular staff still received regular visa inquiries from the Front Office and other embassy staff outside the strictures of those programs.

Despite clear guidance posted on the Consular Section door and a newly installed customer window for embassy staff, non-consular embassy personnel routinely tried to access the Consular Section to inquire about visa cases and drop off visa applications, in violation of physical access regulations in 7 FAH-1 H-644.1.¹⁹ Attempts to influence visa case processing

¹⁸ According to 9 FAM 601.8-3(A), a referral is a request by an authorized U.S. government official for a priority appointment, other courtesies, and issuance of a visa. Guidance in 9 FAM 601.8-4(A) defines a priority appointment request as a formal request by an authorized U.S. government official for an earlier interview or other courtesies for an individual when U.S. national interest or a compelling mission priority would be served by expediting the appointment.

¹⁹ According to 9 FAM 601.8-3(A), a referral is a request by an authorized U.S. government official for a priority appointment, other courtesies, and issuance of a visa. Guidance in 9 FAM 601.8-4(A) defines a priority

outside the nonimmigrant visa referral or priority appointment request programs are prohibited under 9 FAM 601.8-2(A). Consular staff told OIG that some embassy colleagues attempted to influence the visa process because they were pressured by their local contacts for help with their visa cases. Embassy Doha staff acknowledged a need to reinforce internal messaging about appropriate advocacy channels to ensure compliance with existing policies, which are designed to support fair and consistent visa processing. Outside influence over the nonimmigrant visa process could lead to unlawful visa decisions and detrimentally affect national security.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Doha should bring visa advocacy and Consular Section access procedures into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Embassy Doha Consular Section Did Not Complete Quarterly Audits of Controlled Consular Supplies

Embassy Doha’s Consular Section did not complete quarterly audits of controlled consular supplies as required by 7 FAH-1 H-655.2. Consular staff completed inventory audits of controlled consular supplies semi-annually in 2023 and 2024²⁰ rather than quarterly. Consular managers told OIG that staffing gaps and turnover contributed to this deficiency. Additionally, Embassy Doha staff mentioned that their shared inventory with AAU—which operates from a separate facility approximately 30 minutes from the embassy—required staff to coordinate joint audits, creating additional logistical challenges.

Failure to conduct regular inventory audits of controlled consular supplies leaves the embassy vulnerable to theft or misuse of sensitive national security documents.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Doha should bring inventory audits of controlled consular supplies into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OIG reviewed Embassy Doha’s internal control systems in general services, facility management, human resources, and financial management operations. During the inspection, Embassy Doha corrected seven issues identified by OIG. Specifically, the embassy:

- Completed a mandatory annual review of blanket purchase agreements²¹ (Department of State Acquisition Regulation, Section 613.303-6).

appointment request as a formal request by an authorized U.S. government official for an earlier interview or other courtesies for an individual when U.S. national interest or a compelling mission priority would be served by expediting the appointment.

²⁰ Inventory audits were completed on May 3, 2023; October 2, 2023; May 21, 2024; and October 21, 2024.

²¹ A blanket purchase agreement is a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies and services by establishing “charge accounts” with qualified sources of supply.

- Updated the embassy's confined spaces inventory and entry permit requirements (Confined Space Program Procedures,²² 29 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 1910.146(c)).
- Closed post-funded travel advances for individual temporary duty travel that had been open for more than 30 days (4 FAM 495d, 4 FAM 495.2a, and 4 FAM 033.5-1(1)).
- De-obligated \$76,000 worth of invalid unliquidated obligations (4 FAM 225a).
- Justified the provision of accommodation exchange services in a memorandum signed by the Front Office (4 FAM 361.5a).
- Updated its representation funds policy (3 FAH-1 H-3244.1(1)). The embassy's management of representation funds is discussed further in this section and in the Executive Direction section of this report.
- Reviewed and updated the embassy's post report²³ (2 FAM 172.1a).

OIG found that the embassy's Management Section generally implemented required processes and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and Department guidance, apart from those described below. Management Section staff attributed most deficiencies to inadequate staffing, an increased workload and competing work priorities due to an increase of the number of official visits and a growing customer base, and unfamiliarity with Department standards.

General Services

Contracting Officer Did Not Review Locally Employed Staff Contracting Officers' Transactions

OIG found that the embassy's U.S. direct-hire contracting officer supervisor did not review the LE staff contracting officers' transactions as required.²⁴ Guidance in 14 FAH-3 H-342.1a states the U.S. direct-hire contracting officer supervisor serves as the approving official for transactions completed by an LE staff contracting officer by reviewing and signing a monthly transaction log. The same guidance also states the Department will hold the U.S. direct-hire contracting officer supervisor responsible, from an administrative standpoint, for any contractual documents erroneously issued by an LE staff contracting officer. Management Section staff told OIG this issue occurred because the U.S. direct-hire contracting officer supervisor was unaware of this requirement. Failure of the U.S. direct-hire contracting officer supervisor to regularly review the procurement transactions of the LE staff contracting officers increases the risk of waste, fraud, and mismanagement.

²² Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management, Confined Space Program Procedures, 2022.

²³ According to 2 FAM 171.2a, post reports serve as a general information booklet on foreign government affairs and conditions in each country where the U.S. has a diplomatic presence. Foreign Service personnel use these reports to help determine their choice of assignments. Also, newly assigned employees and families use them to help orient themselves before arrival at a new post.

²⁴ The embassy had two LE staff contracting officers who held \$25,000 contracting warrants.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Doha should perform regular reviews of locally employed staff contracting officers' transactions, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Contracting Officer's Representative Program Did Not Comply With Department Standards

Embassy Doha's contracting officer's representative (COR)²⁵ program did not fully comply with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found that:

- None of the embassy's CORs maintained COR files in the Integrated Logistics Management System's²⁶ COR e-Filing module, as required in 14 FAH-2 H-142b(16)(b).
- Neither the CORs nor the Contracting Officer completed mandatory performance assessments in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System²⁷ for three of the embassy's contracts, contrary to guidance in 14 FAH-2 H-572a, c, and d, and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 42.1502(a) and (b).
- CORs did not implement preventing trafficking in persons monitoring plans, as required in 14 FAH-2 H-524g(2).

Despite these issues, OIG's interviews with embassy staff and reviews of other documentation showed the embassy monitored contracts, received goods and services for which it had contracted, and addressed contractors' performance when issues arose. Management staff told OIG they were in the process of transitioning COR files to the Integrated Logistics Management System's COR e-Filing; however, the timeline for completion was unclear. Regarding the lack of performance assessments in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System and preventing trafficking in persons monitoring plans, CORs told OIG they were unfamiliar with the requirements. A non-compliant COR program increases the risk of contract mismanagement.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Doha should bring its contracting officer's representative program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

²⁵ The embassy had 15 CORs who oversaw a total of 26 contracts worth approximately \$8.3 million.

²⁶ The Integrated Logistics Management System is a unified web-based information system designed to integrate the Department's supply chain by improving processing in areas such as purchasing, procurement, warehousing, transportation, receiving, property management, personal effects, and diplomatic pouch and mail. It is the only Department-approved system for property management accountability and consists of several modules.

²⁷ The Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System is the government-wide evaluation reporting tool for all past performance on contracts and orders. An annual performance assessment must be done in the system for each contract above the simplified acquisition threshold of \$250,000, according to 48 C.F.R. § 42.1502(b) and 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.

Embassy Did Not Systematically Require Vendors To Register in the System for Award Management

Embassy Doha did not systematically require vendors to register in the System for Award Management.²⁸ According to FAR 52.204-7(b) and FAR 52.204-13(c), a vendor is required to be registered in the System for Award Management when submitting an offer or quotation and must continue to be registered through the time of award; performance; and final payment of any contract, basic agreement, basic ordering agreement, or blanket purchasing agreement resulting from the solicitation. Management Section staff told OIG the System for Award Management registration requirement was not enforced because local vendors considered the registration process complex and burdensome, and procurement staff could not always assist vendors due to workload issues and competing priorities. Failure to require vendors to register in the System for Award Management hinders the embassy's ability to identify vendors who may have been excluded from receiving federal contracts.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Doha should enforce the requirement for vendors to register in the System for Award Management. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Embassy Did Not Close Out Procurement Files Within Required Timeframes

The embassy did not close out procurement files in the Integrated Logistics Management System within the required timeframes. Specifically, the embassy did not close out 400 procurement files from FY 2016 to FY 2023. In addition, another 702 procurement files could not be closed out until procurement staff and financial management staff completed all required steps. Guidance in 14 FAH-2 H-573.2b²⁹ states that contracts under the simplified acquisitions procedures should be closed out immediately after the contracting officer receives evidence of receipt of property and final payment. Management Section staff told OIG this issue occurred because their heavy workload limited the amount of time available to perform contract closeout processes. Failure to close out procurement files within required timeframes increases the risk of inaccuracies in procurement records and of internal control issues in procurement operations.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Doha should close out procurement files in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

²⁸ The System for Award Management (SAM.gov) is the official government website for entities, including potential federal assistance awardees, to register to do business with the U.S. government. The site also can be used to determine whether an entity is excluded, suspended, or debarred from receiving federal grants, contracts, or other forms of federal financial and non-financial assistance and benefits.

²⁹ Guidance in 14 FAH-2 H-573.2b also cites 48 C.F.R. § 4.804-1.

Embassy Lacked a Contract for Cellular Phone Services

OIG found the embassy did not have a contract for cellular phone services. Instead, the embassy handled these services as a utility service³⁰ without a contract. According to FAR 41.102(b)(3), the policies and procedures for the acquisition of utility services do not apply to the procurement of telecommunications services. Guidance found in the Department of State Acquisition Manual, section 613.101-82, states that contracting personnel at overseas posts must use the Department's overseas contract models when preparing a solicitation. These templates include solicitation models for acquisition of commonly purchased supplies and services, such as cellular phone services. Management Section staff told OIG they were aware of the issue, but they had yet to develop a plan to bring the embassy into compliance. Absent a formal solicitation of cellular phone services and a negotiated contract, the embassy cannot guarantee that it is receiving the best terms and conditions.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Doha should bring its practices for procurement of cellular phone services into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Embassy Did Not Manage Its Furniture and Appliance Pool Program in Accordance With Department Standards

The embassy did not manage its furniture and appliance pool (FAP)³¹ program in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found that:

- The embassy had not reviewed its FAP policy since April 2013. According to 6 FAH-5 H-512.2-2b, it is the responsibility of embassy management to prepare and update the FAP policy at least every 2 years to ensure it remains current.
- The embassy did not factor landlord-provided furniture and appliances in its calculation of FAP buy-in³² costs. At the time of the inspection, approximately 50 percent of embassy residences were fully furnished by landlords, and the embassy was planning on adding additional fully furnished residences to its housing pool. Because these residences were furnished, the embassy only provided a few additional furnishings, such as bookcases, as needed. Guidance in 6 FAH-5 H-515.1b states that a post should review FAP buy-in costs whenever there is a significant change to the housing profile or other circumstances that may impact FAP requirements.

³⁰ Utility services include electricity, natural or manufactured gas, water, sewage, thermal energy, chilled water, steam, hot water, or high temperature hot water.

³¹ A furniture and appliance pool program includes the purchase, replacement, refurbishment, maintenance, inventory control, warehousing, pick-up and delivery, and eventual disposal of non-expendable residential furniture, furnishings, appliances, and equipment. The program can achieve economies of scale and greatly reduce the time and effort required to oversee and manage residential furnishings.

³² When a new position subscribes to FAP, the responsible agency must pay the post's approved buy-in amount. The buy-in is a one-time startup cost intended to enable the post to acquire a new set of furniture to furnish an additional residence.

Management Section staff told OIG these issues occurred because of inadequate oversight of the program and competing priorities. The lack of comprehensive reviews and planning of the FAP program increases the risk of inefficiencies, unnecessary purchases, and excessive charges to participating agencies.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should implement a plan to bring its furniture and appliance pool into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with CGFS)

Employees Did Not Pay for Landlord Provided Services in Leased Residences

OIG found the embassy lacked a standard operating procedure to ensure that employees paid for landlord-provided services that should be a resident's responsibility. At the time of the inspection, approximately 50 percent of the embassy's residential leases included services such as weekly cleaning service or internet service. Because they were bundled into the lease costs, the U.S. government paid for these services. This was contrary to 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a),³³ which states that appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law. Management Section staff told OIG the landlords for these residences would not be amenable to separating the costs of the additional services. Staff also told OIG that excluding serviced residences from the housing pool would hinder the embassy's ability to provide adequate housing to employees assigned to the embassy. However, allowing these services to remain part of the lease agreement without seeking reimbursement from residents, results in excessive costs to the U.S. government.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should implement a standard operating procedure to identify potential landlord-provided costs of a personal nature, document those that may be recovered, and implement a plan, where appropriate, to recover the costs of landlord-provided services of a personal nature. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with OBO)³⁴

Facility Management

Embassy's Real Estate Property Inventory Was Inaccurate

OIG found the embassy's real estate property inventory was inaccurate. Specifically, the embassy did not account for all structures in the Department's Real Property Application (RPA).³⁵ According to guidance in 15 FAM 141.1a,³⁶ the embassy must use the RPA to manage

³³ Also known as the purpose statute, this statute prohibits charging authorized items to the wrong appropriation, and unauthorized items to any appropriation.

³⁴ OIG revised the recommendation in response to comments on the draft report received from Embassy Doha.

³⁵ The Real Property Application is the Department's single comprehensive database for all real property abroad and serves as a sub-ledger to the Department's financial system.

³⁶ The standards in 15 FAM 141.1a apply to all land, buildings, and structures owned or leased by the U.S. government abroad.

its real property inventory and is required to update RPA as real property transactions occur. OIG's review of RPA data showed that, for example, the embassy had not inventoried a repurposed container used as a breakroom for the local guard force, a bathroom trailer, several repurposed shipping containers used for permanent storage of embassy property, and a solar panel array. Management Section staff told OIG this occurred because of unfamiliarity with Department standards. OIG issued an audit in September 2023³⁷ that found the Department could not provide an accurate or complete inventory of temporary structures at overseas posts due to widespread deficiencies and inconsistencies in the use of RPA. Inaccurate reporting in RPA increases the risk of mismanagement of the embassy's real property assets.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Doha should conduct a review of all structures on the embassy compound and ensure that they are reported in the Real Property Application. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Human Resources

Local Compensation Plan Did Not Comply With Qatari Labor Law

The embassy's local compensation plan for LE staff did not comply with Qatari labor law. For example, the embassy needed to update several provisions related to annual leave and maternity leave to bring its local compensation plan into full compliance with Qatari law. Standards in 3 FAM 7224.2-1a, require that LE staff programs conform as closely as feasible to local law and prevailing practice but must be based on and administered in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations. Human resources staff told OIG they did not perform a comprehensive review of the local compensation plan when it was updated in March 2024 due to inadequate staffing, staff turnover, workload issues, and competing priorities. Without a local compensation plan that conforms to local labor law, LE staff may not receive the benefits they are entitled to.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update the embassy's local compensation plan in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with GTM)

Locally Employed Staff Handbook Was Outdated

Embassy Doha had not updated its LE staff handbook since July 2004. OIG found that the handbook contained incomplete information. For example, the embassy did not include its reduction in force plan in the handbook.³⁸ Department standards in 3 FAM 7155a require each overseas mission to develop and maintain an LE staff handbook that documents LE staff employment policies and procedures, as well as LE staff responsibilities and expected conduct.

³⁷ OIG, *Audit of Physical Security Standards for Department of State Temporary Structures at Selected Overseas Posts* (AUD-SI-23-30, September 2023).

³⁸ In 2017, the Department issued guidance instructing posts to include reduction in force plans in LE Staff handbooks. See cable 17 STATE 83954, "Revisions to HR/OE Policies: (1) Substituting Experience For Education; (2) Priority Placement; (3) Reduction in Force (RIF)," August 14, 2017.

Human resources staff told OIG they did not update the LE staff handbook due to inadequate staffing, workload issues, and competing priorities. Absent an updated handbook with accurate policies and procedures, LE staff may not be fully aware of their benefits, and the risk of litigation may increase for the Department.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Doha should update the locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Embassy Did Not Authorize Locally Employed Staff Overtime in Advance

The embassy did not comply with requirements for authorizing overtime in advance. In FY 2024, the embassy incurred approximately \$501,000 in LE staff overtime. OIG reviewed overtime records for pay periods 3 and 4 of FY 2024 for three embassy sections and found that none of the 48 overtime forms submitted contained documentation demonstrating overtime was approved in advance. According to 4 FAH-3 H-523.2 and 3 FAM 2332.4(5), supervisors must approve overtime in writing and in advance. OIG determined that the embassy did not comply with advance overtime approval for LE staff because it did not establish management controls to monitor compliance with Department standards on overtime. Failure to approve overtime in advance is an internal management control weakness and may lead to fraud, waste, and abuse of resources.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Doha should require supervisors to approve locally employed staff requests for overtime in advance and maintain written documentation of prior approval with requests, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)³⁹

Embassy Did Not Maintain Hard Copies of Locally Employed Staff Personnel Folders

OIG found the embassy did not maintain hard copy official personnel folders for all LE staff. The embassy began using digital files in 2020, when it scanned all existing official personnel folders and destroyed the hard copies. Since that time, the embassy has only maintained digital files. However, the Department issued guidance in November 2020,⁴⁰ stating electronic records cannot be used as a replacement for official personnel folders for LE staff. Human resources staff told OIG they were unaware of this requirement. Not having hard copy official personnel folders, as required, can negatively affect the Department or LE staff in litigation and other situations where hard copy documents maintained in official personnel folders serve as evidence.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Doha should manage locally employed staff official personnel folders in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

³⁹ OIG revised the recommendation in response to comments on the draft report received from Embassy Doha.

⁴⁰ Cable 20 STATE 112408, "Managing Locally Employed (LE) Staff Official Personnel Folders," November 18, 2020.

Financial Management

Embassy Did Not Manage Representation Funds in Accordance With Department Standards

The embassy did not manage its representation funds in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found the embassy:

- Lacked an approved allocation of funds and a continuing review process of representation activities. Standards in 3 FAM 3246.1 require that each overseas post have an allocation of funds and a continuing review of representation activities to provide effective use of representation funds.
- Did not systematically ensure that representation vouchers included adequate supporting documentation or were approved by the appropriate approving official. OIG reviewed 20 representation vouchers submitted for payment in FY 2024 and found that 10 were incorrectly processed, contrary to standards in 4 FAM 423.4-3(A) and 4 FAM 433.1c.

OIG determined that these issues occurred because financial management staff were unaware of these requirements. Without an approved allocation of funds and continuing review of representation activities, embassy leadership cannot ensure that the funds are used efficiently. Additionally, approving representation vouchers that lack adequate supporting documentation or approval from the appropriate approving official may result in incorrect payments.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Doha should manage representation funds in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

OIG reviewed Embassy Doha's Diplomatic Technology (DT) operations, including classified, unclassified, and non-enterprise network⁴¹ computer operations; physical and environmental protection of IT resources; mobile device management; classified communications security; emergency communications preparedness; telephone programs; and pouch and mail services at the embassy and at Camp As Sayliyah. During the inspection, Embassy Doha corrected two issues identified by OIG. Specifically, the embassy:

- Clearly marked the emergency electrical power shutoff switch in the server room (12 FAH-10 H-272.8-1(1) through (3)).
- Separated outside vendor telecommunications equipment from embassy equipment in the demarcation room (12 FAH-6 H-651.5-2).

⁴¹ A non-enterprise network is a Department-procured and locally managed computing environment. Non-enterprise networks are used by a specific entity to meet their mission requirements that cannot be achieved using an enterprise managed solution.

Overall, OIG determined DT programs and services generally complied with Department standards, with the exceptions described below.

Some Diplomatic Technology Staff Lacked Information Assurance Training

Some DT staff lacked mandatory information assurance training for system administrators and system owners, as required by 12 FAM 623.5a(2) and 12 FAH-10 H-212.2-1.⁴² Training records showed that one U.S. direct-hire DT officer had not completed information assurance training since 2013; another, since 2011. Additionally, the LE Information Systems Center supervisor had not completed the required information assurance training at any point during 19 years of employment with the embassy. Guidance in 8 FAH-1 H-1101.3-3b(4) and 8 FAH-1 H-602.9-8b and c, requires that these staff receive information assurance training every 3 years. Lack of required information assurance training impedes the embassy's ability to protect and secure technical resources and to perform essential duties.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Doha should require all Diplomatic Technology staff to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Embassy Doha's Records Management Program Did Not Comply With Department Standards

OIG found Embassy Doha's records management program did not comply with Department standards, specifically for records oversight and retirement. OIG found that Embassy Doha did not retire its paper and electronic records in accordance with foreign records disposition schedules, as required by 5 FAM 451b. Before the inspection, the embassy took some steps to bring the records management program into compliance. For example, the Management Counselor assigned a post records coordinator, and each section chief appointed personnel to manage their section's records activities and sent reminders to section staff. However, these steps did not result in compliance with records disposition and retirement requirements. OIG found that these deficiencies occurred because personnel assigned to manage and retire records did not carry out their responsibilities as instructed by the post records coordinator, in accordance with 5 FAM 418.9b(4)(a). OIG issued management assistance reports in September 2020 and June 2022,⁴³ that highlighted deficiencies in records management, including records retirement, across the Department. Without a records management program that follows Department requirements for organization, records retirement disposition, and oversight, the embassy risks inefficient information retrieval and loss of critical documentation.

⁴² According to 12 FAM 623.5a(2), the Department must ensure that personnel having significant information system security roles and responsibilities are adequately trained to carry out their information security related assigned duties. Additionally, 12 FAH-10 H-212.2-1, outlines the Department responsibility for ensuring the availability of cybersecurity role-based training to users identified as having significant information security roles and responsibilities.

⁴³ OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Deficiencies in Overseas Records Management* (ISP-20-25, September 2020); and OIG, *Management Assistance Report: The Department of State's Records Retirement Process* (ISP-22-20, June 2022).

Recommendation 17: Embassy Doha should implement a records management program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Embassy Doha Developed and Implemented an Application Without Conducting a Privacy Impact and a Risk Assessment

Embassy Doha developed and implemented a mobile application (Doha Lebanon Evacuation application) without conducting a privacy impact and a risk assessment,⁴⁴ as required by 5 FAM 466.2c(1) and 12 FAH-10 H-332.2-1c. The DT staff developed the application to collect information on U.S. citizens arriving in Doha on U.S. government-chartered flights from Lebanon. This information included personally identifiable information in passports, logistical information, and records of U.S. government cash disbursements for tracking and accountability. OIG found that the DT staff developed the application quickly to address the evacuation efforts and were not aware of Department requirements to conduct a privacy impact and risk assessment before deploying the application to users. Using locally developed applications that are not properly vetted could risk unauthorized use, disclosure, and modification of personally identifiable information and Sensitive But Unclassified data.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Doha should complete a privacy impact and a risk assessment for its Doha Lebanon Evacuation application in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

⁴⁴ A Privacy Impact Assessment is an analysis of how information is handled: (1) To ensure compliance with applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; (2) To determine the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form; and (3) To examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to the Embassy Doha. The embassy's complete response can be found in Appendix B. The embassy also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Doha should bring visa advocacy and Consular Section access procedures into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha's visa advocacy and Consular Section access procedures complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Doha should bring inventory audits of controlled consular supplies into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha's inventory audits of controlled consular supplies complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Doha should perform regular reviews of locally employed staff contracting officers' transactions, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha performed regular reviews of locally employed staff contracting officers' transactions, in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Doha should bring its contracting officer's representative program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha's contracting officer's representative program complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Doha should enforce the requirement for vendors to register in the System for Award Management. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha enforced the requirement for vendors to register in the System for Award Management.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Doha should close out procurement files in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha closed out procurement files in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Doha should bring its practices for procurement of cellular phone services into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha's practices for procurement of cellular phone services complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should implement a plan to bring its furniture and appliance pool into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with CGFS)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha implemented a plan to bring its furniture and appliance pool into compliance with Department standards.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should implement a standard operating procedure to identify potential landlord-provided costs of a personal nature, document those that may be recovered, and implement a plan, where appropriate, to recover the costs of landlord-provided services of a personal nature. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with OBO)¹

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy noted that landlords would not be amenable to separating the costs of additional services as the costs are fixed. The embassy also noted that excluding serviced residences would hinder the embassy's ability to provide adequate housing for embassy employees.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha implemented a standard operating procedure to identify potential landlord-provided costs of a personal nature, document those that may be recovered, and implement a plan, where appropriate, to recover the costs of landlord-provided services of a personal nature.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Doha should conduct a review of all structures on the embassy compound and ensure that they are reported in the Real Property Application. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha conducted a review of all structures on the embassy compound and ensure that they are reported in the Real Property Application.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update the embassy's local compensation plan in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with GTM)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha updated the embassy's local compensation plan in accordance with Department standards.

¹ OIG revised the recommendation in response to comments on the draft report received from Embassy Doha.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Doha should update the locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha updated the locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Doha should require supervisors to approve locally employed staff requests for overtime in advance and maintain written documentation of prior approval with requests, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)²

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy noted that overtime requests and approval were documented in emails or electronic messages but were not attached to the overtime forms. The embassy noted that going forward the approval documentation would be printed and attached to overtime request forms.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha required supervisors to approve locally employed staff requests for overtime in advance and maintain written documentation of prior approval with requests, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Doha should manage locally employed staff official personnel folders in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha managed locally employed staff official personnel folders in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Doha should manage representation funds in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

² OIG revised the recommendation in response to comments on the draft report received from Embassy Doha.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha managed representation funds in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Doha should require all Diplomatic Technology staff to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha required all Diplomatic Technology staff to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Doha should implement a records management program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha implemented a records management program that complies with Department standards.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Doha should complete a privacy impact and a risk assessment for its Doha Lebanon Evacuation application in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In its April 9, 2025, response, Embassy Doha neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy noted that application was developed as part of rapid response efforts to facilitate the smooth transfer and flow of evacuees. The embassy also noted that it has now received confirmation of approval from the Office of the Legal Affairs and Bureau of Administration, Privacy Office.

OIG Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Doha completed a privacy impact and a risk assessment for its Doha Lebanon Evacuation application in accordance with Department standards.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Agency/Section/Title	Name	Arrival Date
Chiefs of Mission:		
Ambassador	Timmy Davis	9/2022
Deputy Chief of Mission	Stephanie Altman-Winans	8/2024
Chiefs of Sections:		
Consular	Carolyn Ratzlaff	9/2022
Economic	Breeann Songer	7/2022
Management	Gary D. Anderson	12/2023
Political	Mohammad Barghouty	8/2023
Public Diplomacy	Evan Davis	7/2023
Regional Security	Jeffery Crockett	8/2024
Other Agency Representatives:		
Legal Attaché	Kevin Miller	7/2024
Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché	Col. Patrick Self	8/2023
U.S. Commercial Service	Janelle Weyek	1/2023

Source: OIG generated from data provided by Embassy Doha.

APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted from September 5, 2024, to January 21, 2025, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspections Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).

Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chief Executive Officer of USAGM, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and USAGM. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved and U.S. interests are accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy; and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; and whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

OIG used a risk-based approach to prepare for this inspection. OIG conducted portions of the inspection remotely and relied on audio- and video-conferencing tools in addition to in-person interviews with Department and other personnel. OIG also reviewed pertinent records; circulated surveys and compiled the results; and discussed the substance of this report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the inspection. OIG used professional judgment and analyzed physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence to develop its findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

UNCLASSIFIED

THRU: NEA – Tim Lenderking, Senior Bureau Official

TO: OIG – Arne Baker, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: Embassy Doha – Ambassador Timmy Davis

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Embassy Doha, Qatar

Embassy Doha has reviewed the draft OIG inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

OIG Recommendation 1: Embassy Doha should bring visa advocacy and Consular Section access procedures into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 2: Embassy Doha should bring inventory audits of controlled consular supplies into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 3: Embassy Doha should perform regular reviews of locally employed staff contracting officers' transactions, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation. Post notes that the local employee staff contracting authority is back up and emergency only and no transactions have been made in the past six months. A log has been established and is signed monthly by the USDH supervisor.

OIG Recommendation 4: Embassy Doha should bring its contracting officer's representative program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation and is implementing COR e-filing and CPARs. Post is evaluating the requirements for trafficking in persons monitoring plans to determine how best to implement in the local environment.

OIG Recommendation 5: Embassy Doha should enforce the requirement for vendors to register in the System for Award Management. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation and is implementing this for all new awards.

OIG Recommendation 6: Embassy Doha should close out procurement files in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 7: Embassy Doha should bring its practices for procurement of cellular phone services into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation. Post postponed solicitation of a contract until Econ section efforts to move companies from Huawei to USG approved equipment could be confirmed. Post is moving forward with the contract solicitation now that the local provider has agreed to cooperate with USG systems affecting the U.S. Embassy.

OIG Recommendation 8: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should implement a plan to bring its furniture and appliance pool into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with CGFS)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 9: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should implement a standard operating procedure to recover the costs of landlord-provided services of a personal nature. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with OBO)

Management Response: Embassy Doha submits a request for factual and editorial changes.

OIG Recommendation 10: Embassy Doha should conduct a review of all structures on the embassy compound and ensure that they are reported in the Real Property Application. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 11: Embassy Doha, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update the embassy's local compensation plan in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha, in coordination with GTM)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation. Post is in the process of soliciting new legal counsel for the comprehensive review.

OIG Recommendation 12: Embassy Doha should update the locally employed staff handbook in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation. Post is in the process of soliciting new legal counsel for the comprehensive review.

OIG Recommendation 13: Embassy Doha should require supervisors to approve locally employed staff requests for overtime in advance, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha submits a request for factual or editorial changes.

OIG Recommendation 14: Embassy Doha should manage locally employed staff official personnel folders in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation. Human Resources has developed new SOPs and is actively engaged in a comprehensive review of all local staff personnel folders for compliance.

OIG Recommendation 15: Embassy Doha should manage representation funds in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 16: Embassy Doha should require all Diplomatic Technology staff to complete required information assurance training in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation. Staff are aware of gaps and seeking virtual opportunities in light of course cancellations and travel restrictions.

OIG Recommendation 17: Embassy Doha should implement a records management program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: Embassy Doha concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 18: Embassy Doha should complete a privacy impact and a risk assessment for its Doha Lebanon Evacuation application in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Doha)

Management Response: In addition to editorial remarks submitted for this recommendation, post has received confirmation of approval from L and PRV for the app.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAU	Afghanistan Affairs Unit
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CARE	Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DT	Diplomatic Technology
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAP	Furniture and Appliance Pool
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FAST	First- and Second-Tour
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
LE	Locally Employed
RPA	Real Property Application



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