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United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of Inspector General

# Report of Inspection

## Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq

Report Number ISP-C-11-08A, October 2010

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## PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE COMPLIANCE FOLLOW-UP REVIEW

This compliance follow-up review (CFR) was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

### PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. CFRs cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

The Office of Inspections may perform on-site CFRs to verify whether agreed-upon corrective actions for recommendations issued in previous reports were fully and properly implemented and to provide OIG with a quality assurance assessment of its work.

### METHODOLOGY

In conducting this compliance follow-up review, the inspectors have: 1) reviewed the previous inspection report and the reported corrective actions; 2) conducted on-site interviews and reviewed and collected documentation to substantiate reported corrective actions; 3) addressed new, significant deficiencies or vulnerabilities identified during the course of the on-site CFR and, where appropriate, issued new recommendations; and, 4) discussed the substance of the draft CFR report at a final meeting with the head of the inspected bureau/office or post.



**United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

***Office of Inspector General***

**PREFACE**

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel", written in a cursive style.

Harold W. Geisel  
Deputy Inspector General

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

- Compliance by Embassy Baghdad and Department of State (Department) offices with the recommendations contained in the 2009 inspection report was generally good and largely completed.
- The Department is planning to create two consulates and two temporary posts in the provinces, with their first priority to “mitigate and mediate” the Arab/Kurdish and Shi’a/Sunni conflicts. The United States risks overselling what these posts might accomplish.
- The cost of supporting diplomatic and consular personnel outside of Baghdad will be considerable. The Department should pay close attention to cost, benefit, and security when making decisions to commit such large resources, especially for temporary facilities.
- The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) will assume full responsibility for safety and security for the U.S. civilian presence in Iraq, after the withdrawal of the U.S. military in December 2011. The Department should stringently evaluate whether it has the capabilities and resources to ensure the safety of its personnel, and whether those personnel will be able to effectively pursue and accomplish U.S. policy goals in a nonpermissive security environment.
- Embassy Baghdad (and to a lesser extent the Department) has made impressive steps to ramp up the transition planning process, but it requires clearer and more timely high-level focus and policy guidance from Washington. For a successful outcome, it is crucial to coordinate this complex planning process among all players, including the White House. An important step toward making the planning process work is to have a single, senior-level figure in the Department with the institutional backing to oversee the process.
- With the future disbanding of 16 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the U.S. mission in Iraq will need to look comprehensively at how to safeguard and store the contacts and other information gleaned over the past 6 years.

- The Baghdad consular section is performing well, as it has smoothly made the transition to a full-service operation that provides a complete range of visa and other consular services. Considering how difficult it is to have face-to-face interactions with individual Iraqis, the mission would benefit from increased attention to the public diplomacy aspect of providing services to the 10,000 or more Iraqis who pass through the consular section each year.
- The Section 1244 Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program annually allows up to 5,000 Iraqis who have been employed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government to immigrate to the United States. The program so far has never come close to reaching its annual limit. The program requires extensive review.
- The management section has made great strides since 2009 to increase control over and accountability of its vast resources and to comply with the recommendations of the 2009 inspection. While many staff reductions have been made and are envisioned, a formal rightsizing has not yet been accomplished in Baghdad. A thorough rightsizing process is likely to find additional areas where positions could be reduced.
- Concerns persist about the management of the huge security vehicle fleet in Baghdad.

CFRs provide Department senior managers with progress reports on the status of inspection recommendations and provide the OIG with a quality assurance assessment of its work. Because the timing of this particular CFR coincided with a critical stage in the evolution of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the CFR team also looked very briefly at a wide range of issues, especially those related to transition planning.

The rapidly evolving nature of the transition planning process means that the funding and personnel projections discussed here will likely change, but the broader observations should remain valid. OIG's Middle East Regional Office (MERO) is beginning a further review of transition planning.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between July 26 and August 10, 2010, and in Baghdad, Iraq, between August 12 and 19, 2010. (b) (6)(b) (6)  
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## EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE

This CFR automatically closes all formal and informal recommendations from the inspection, but these may be reopened, revised, and/or reissued during the CFR, as appropriate. The CFR team found that Embassy Baghdad, with the exception of the public affairs section (PAS), had complied with most of the formal and informal recommendations from the 2009 inspection. Of the 70 formal recommendations in the 2009 report, 50 were closed before the CFR, and 20 remained resolved/open. The CFR team closed a further 13 of the resolved/open recommendations, revised and reissued 7 old recommendations, and issued 5 new recommendations.

Compliance with the recommendations contained in the 2009 inspection contributed to eliminating at least 10 positions at Embassy Baghdad; closing the constitutional and legislative affairs unit; enhancing management controls over motor vehicle inventory and overtime compensation; and standardizing the hiring, management, and evaluation of so-called “3161” employees.

The following is a listing of the disposition of the 20 recommendations that remained resolved/open at the start of the CFR:

**Recommendation 1**, dealing with rightsizing, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.

**Recommendation 13**, dealing with the Leahy Amendment vetting tracking, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 16**, dealing with the transition in the economic team, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 18**, dealing with the drawdown of the transition assistance office, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 21**, dealing with Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) decrees, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.

**Recommendation 22**, dealing with an integrated rule-of-law database, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 23**, dealing with civil judicial training, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 24**, dealing with public diplomacy resources, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.

**Recommendation 25**, dealing with public diplomacy planning, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.

**Recommendation 26**, dealing with public diplomacy staffing, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.

**Recommendation 27**, dealing with public diplomacy locally employed (LE) staff, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 33**, dealing with shuttling consular clients to the embassy, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 34**, dealing with LE consular staff, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 39**, dealing with an online system for visa applicants to check the status of their visa cases, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 50**, dealing with tours of duty in Iraq, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 51**, dealing with training of U.S.-based staff assigned to Iraq, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 61**, dealing with establishing a motor vehicle program, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 62**, dealing with reconciling its motor vehicle inventory, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was closed under the CFR.

**Recommendation 63**, dealing with administering its motor vehicle program, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.



**Recommendation 64**, dealing with planning for motor vehicle acquisition, which was resolved/open before the CFR, was reissued under the CFR.

All five of the informal recommendations in the 2009 report were closed by the CFR.

The 20 recommendations issued in the 2009 inspection's security annex are discussed in the companion security annex to this CFR report. The record of compliance with recommendations in the security annex was equally successful. The CFR security annex revises and reissues three of those recommendations.

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## INTRODUCTION

The U.S. mission in Iraq is in a time of transition. Embassy leadership has rotated twice since the 2009 inspection took place. Ambassador Ryan Crocker left shortly after the inspection; his successor, Ambassador Chris Hill, departed post before the CFR team arrived; and Ambassador James Jeffrey arrived in Baghdad the night the CFR team departed. Stuart Jones had recently arrived as deputy chief of mission, as had assistant chief of mission for assistance transition, Ambassador Peter Bodde. Most other positions, at all levels of the embassy, were also rotating during this period.

A more fundamental transition is now underway, as the U.S. combat mission in Iraq ended in August 2010 and the U.S. role shifts further to emphasize building normal civilian ties between the United States and Iraq. The remaining 50,000 U.S. forces will continue to provide training and mentoring until their departure at the end of 2011. The hard work of maintaining security and stability will become an Iraqi responsibility. Meanwhile, the Department is making maximum effort to assume the security and logistical responsibilities for the U.S. mission in Iraq, which have been exercised to date by the U.S. military.

This transition was foreseen at the time of the 2009 inspection and was at its foundation. The intent of that team's recommendations was to preserve the embassy leadership's focus on these transitions, as the personnel rotated. The CFR evaluated the embassy's efforts, paying particular attention to the impact of the drawdown of U.S. forces on programs under military control that will shift to civilian responsibility.

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must be imported at great cost or be produced on compound. The embassy generates its own electricity and potable water and treats its wastewater. Its fuel and food are imported by armed convoy. Almost all personnel live in 600 crowded apartments or in reinforced trailers.

Embassy Baghdad is unlikely to be a normal diplomatic post until Iraq itself stabilizes, and that may be years away. Iraq held free elections in March 2010, but by August 2010 still had not been able to form a government. Iraq has enormous oil reserves, but produces roughly 2.4 million barrels of oil daily, which is insufficient to give its government budget a surplus. Iraq is not expected to greatly increase its oil output, and thus contribute significantly to its own security and development needs, until 2013. Meanwhile, Iraqis suffer from poor government services, live insecure lives, and lack sufficient employment opportunities. Several million refugees remain abroad waiting for better times at home. Ethnic and religious tensions remain high.

Iraq's political and sectarian problems complicate the U.S. Government's planning efforts. The lack of a government with which to interact and from which to obtain decisions has interfered with the urgent task of planning for the end of 2011, when the U.S. military will depart Iraq and cease supporting the diplomats who remain.

## QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE CFR

CFRs normally are conducted to evaluate and ensure compliance with previously issued inspection reports. The rapid turnover in staff at Embassy Baghdad, combined with an equally volatile political environment, makes the shelf life of an OIG inspection report of this mission shorter than usual. While a full inspection is outside the scope or ability of this CFR report, a number of vital areas of concern emerged during the CFR visit. The OIG team used this opportunity to raise a number of questions that it believes need to be addressed in further reports and in the Department's policy decisions.

### Questions Related to the Transition Process

#### **CFR Question 1: Can the U.S. temporary provincial presence be expected to resolve centuries-old ethnic and religious rifts in Iraq?**

Public statements by U.S. officials indicate the two EBOs are intended to be temporary, fulfilling their mission and closing within 3 to 5 years. Strategic planning for the "civilianization" of the U.S. presence is being run from the National Security Council's Iraq Policy Group, under Vice Presidential direction.

Washington has approved mission statements for the EBOs that put mitigating and mediating Arab-Kurd, Sunni-Shi'a, and provincial-national tensions as the first priority.<sup>2</sup> These serious internal disputes have defied resolution for centuries. Recently, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq has studied and detailed the longstanding Arab-Kurd and other interethnic "fault line" problems, and it has attempted one mediation/mitigation effort already. The mission intends to conduct their work in an environment in which 95 percent of the Iraqi population holds unfavorable or ambivalent views of the United States.<sup>3</sup> By linking the three-to-five year timeline of the two small EBOs to mitigating and mediating these fundamental cultural conflicts, does the United States risk overselling what it can and will accomplish?

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<sup>2</sup> Other priorities include strengthening the capacity of provincial institutions in key flashpoint locations, balancing foreign interference, providing platforms to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and others, reporting, and promoting mutual understanding and U.S. values.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Embassy figures, based on Intermedia 2009 polling.

It appears that provincial staffing is now being driven by budget constraints, rather than an appraisal of what is needed to accomplish the mission; certainly there is no indication that the missions have been redefined or reduced as funding and staffing projections shrink. In June 2010, the Embassy provided the Department with its staffing requirements to achieve the defined provincial missions. After Congress approved the supplemental funding levels in August, the embassy was told to cut staffing levels for the provinces in half, but was given no amended policy guidance.

**CFR Question 2: Considering the substantial cost of supporting diplomatic and consular personnel outside of Baghdad, is the U.S. Government sufficiently weighing questions of cost, security, and benefit in making decisions to commit such large resources, especially for temporary facilities?**

The costs to establish and operate the civilian provincial presence<sup>4</sup> are enormous. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State have pointed out to Congress that the departure of U.S. combat troops will save \$15 billion from the DOD budget, but both have urged Congress to give the Department the funds it needs to operate safely and carry out its mission. In late November 2009, the Administration sent a supplemental budget request to Congress for \$1.7 billion. The Congress reduced the request by \$504 million: roughly the amount required for permanent construction of the two consulates (although no explicit linkage was made). Meanwhile, further refinement of program, staffing, and security costs identified a larger requirement that, combined with the reduced appropriation, left the civilian presence underfunded by over \$1 billion and prompted an instruction to the embassy in August 2010 to reduce proposed staffing levels by up to 50 percent.

The total planned U.S. Government civilian presence in Iraq at the end of 2011 will be approximately 13,000 people (although that number could change, depending on the size and mission of the DOD's Office of Security Cooperation). Of the 3,635 personnel to be located at the four provincial posts, only 59 direct-hire positions will address the mission statement priorities.<sup>5</sup> Assuming that the security situation does not change dramatically for the better, the direct-hires will be assigned to 1-year tours

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<sup>4</sup> In addition to the four provincial posts, police training activities will be operated out of Erbil, Basrah, and aviation support facilities. An alternative would be to stand up one or more consulates first, as Iraq sorts out its political problems, and then—depending on the security picture and other considerations—open the EBOs. In this scenario, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's police training program would be supported by air visits from Baghdad or the two consulates.

<sup>5</sup> These figures are based on embassy planning documents (dated September 8, 2010) and are subject to further revision. Numbers include personnel working under chief of Mission authority in Iraq, who were hired under 5 USC 3161 to fill temporary positions for subject matter experts not normally found in the ranks of the Department.



and have three rest-and-recuperation (R&R) trips, cutting their time at post by up to 66 days. Because of the number of personnel needed and the rapid turnover, they will be mid-level employees and probably won't speak Arabic or Kurdish. Some of the LE staff and subject matter expert personnel will provide language support.

The number of security and life support personnel required to maintain this limited substantive staff is huge: 82 management, 2,008 security, 157 aviation, and 1,085 life support personnel. In other words, depending on the definition of support staff, it takes a minimum of 15 and possibly up to 60 security and life support staff to support one substantive direct-hire position. To put this into perspective, a quick calculation of similar support ratios at three major embassies (Beijing, Cairo, and New Delhi) shows an average of four substantive officers to every three support staff (4:3) in contrast to 1:15 to 1:60 in Iraq.

**CFR Question 3: Can the President's priority of a safe and secure work environment for U.S. personnel in Iraq be met without U.S. military involvement?**

In announcing his Iraq policy of gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops in February 2009, President Obama stated that his highest priority during the transition was the safety and security of our military and civilian personnel. When the CPA turned over operations to U.S. civilians in June 2004, the DOD agreed that it would provide security, life, and logistical support to the embassy and to the then-33 PRTs. As a result of the November 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, however, the U.S. military must depart Iraq completely by the end of 2011. In February 2009, the President decided to withdraw all U.S. combat troops by August 31, 2010.

The embassy and its constituent posts are operating in a nonpermissive security environment. The Department cites the death of 34 of the top 42 al-Qaeda leaders in May to August 2010 as evidence of an improving security situation, and the civilian death toll is markedly reduced from 2006-07. As the United States withdraws its remaining 50,000 troops over the next 16 months, however, the security risks are expected to increase. The first 6 months of 2012 are widely expected to be especially dangerous, as extremists test U.S. resolve and Iraqi security forces' capabilities.

As DOD and the Department plan the handover of responsibilities from military to civilian control, security concerns loom large. Resources, structures, and approaches could hardly be more different. The military uses a large number of personnel to monitor the security environment and detect/counter hostile forces. At the tactical level, hundreds of soldiers accompany Iraqi security forces on patrols and at checkpoints. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

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The U.S. military has worked closely with the Iraqi police and military for years, as a part of its police training mission. Operating from more than 50 bases, the U.S. military has provided basic training (largely focused on counterinsurgency) to many of the 660,000 Iraqi police and military, while simultaneously conducting combat operations against insurgents. U.S. troops provided a great deal of operational equipment to their counterparts, who have gradually assumed responsibility for urban security.

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There has been speculation that the new Iraqi government (when formed) will ask the U.S. military to maintain some security forces and assets in Iraq to bolster its security and help protect U.S. diplomats.<sup>8</sup> This scenario would significantly alter both the security and logistical planning environment. Unless and until this situation occurs, however, planning and funding must continue to be based upon a non-permissive security environment without U.S. military support.

**CFR Question 4: Will the U.S. Government's transition timetable be maintained?**

While security of personnel is the President's stated highest priority, he has also made clear his intention that the United States and Iraq will work closely together and stay engaged in a strategic partnership over the coming years. That Presidential intent has guided embassy planning efforts. There are at least six linked planning transitions under way in Iraq, although they are discrete in terms of tasks and staffing. They are:

- the Joint Campaign Plan baton-passing exercise from the DOD to the Department;
- the Joint Campaign Plan baton-passing exercise from the United States to Iraq;
- the transition of assistance projects, from USAID to the private sector;
- the closure of PRTs and the completion of their remaining projects;
- the transition of embassy functions under new circumstances; and
- Iraq's transition from the current to a future Iraqi government.

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<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Gen. Ray Odierno, Commander U.S. Forces Iraq, on CBS' "Face the Nation" and CNN's "State of the Union," August 22, 2010.

## Process

The scope and complexity of these planning efforts are unprecedented for the Department. In a sense, transition planning has been going on for several years, as the U.S. presence transitioned from the CPA, to the embassy's presence in Saddam's palace, and the move to the new embassy compound. In July 2009, an OIG MERO team looked at embassy planning efforts and concluded that it was being conducted at the operational level without senior input or direction, with no single person in charge—a conclusion that was disputed at the time by post management. The CFR team found a markedly different situation during its August 2010 visit from what MERO had encountered in 2009.<sup>9</sup> Senior embassy leadership is deeply engaged in transition planning. The 2010 joint campaign plan, produced by joint embassy-military working groups, identified 310 activities the embassy will assume of the 1,127 tasks that the U.S. military had been performing (the rest were either concluded, terminated, or given to others for action).

Embassy Baghdad is doing an excellent job in trying to plan for the future without many of the key resource and cost-sharing decisions it still needs. The embassy's FY 2012 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (dated April 2010) calls for major personnel and resource commitments through 2015 and beyond. It just recently received its FY 2010 supplemental budget numbers and telephonic instructions to decrease planned EBO sites from three to two. The management section is coordinating most of the embassy's planning, which is difficult in an environment in which most of the post's personnel turns over each summer, and continuity and expertise are lost. Fortunately, the management counselor—who is experienced, a skilled planner, and detail-oriented—has extended for a second year to provide needed planning supervision and continuity.

## Unresolved Internal Issues

Unfortunately, in spite of weekly secure videoconferences, scores of conference calls, visits, meetings, and committees, planning progress is beginning to slip as the clock ticks. Significant uncertainty remained at the time of the CFR team's visit regarding the size and scope of two major programs, in addition to unresolved questions about DOD support.

Another of the important rationales for EBOs and consulates is to provide a base for Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) police training. The scope of INL's police training program remains unclear, largely

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<sup>9</sup> MERO-A-09-10, August 2009

due to budget uncertainties. INL received its Iraq funding figure in mid-August 2010. It had asked for \$517 million in the FY 2010 supplemental budget and \$295 million in the FY 2011 budget to cover 3 months of operating costs. (It will begin its program in October 2011). Congress approved \$450 million in start-up costs from the FY 2010 supplemental budget and forward-funded \$200 million for operating costs from the FY 2011 budget. INL is now refining what it can do with the new funding level. It had planned to have a substantial air wing of 20 helicopters to transport police trainers and mentors to Iraqi police and Ministry of the Interior sites.

It is imperative that the details of the logistical arrangements be finalized, so the embassy can plan security and other arrangements for these facilities and personnel: Will INL funds be sufficient to pay for the air wing and its share of construction and operational costs, or will it have to scale back? Will INL provide for its own security movements or require DS support? The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), DS, and INL are discussing cost-sharing, but as long as these key questions remain, they are holding back embassy planning.

Uncertainty also surrounds the proposed Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). Embassy planners have not been able to get information from DOD on what, if any, provincial support OSC will need. The size of an OSC support mission will depend in part on what kind of military equipment Iraq buys and where training for Iraqi personnel will take place.

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DOD also has not yet decided whether the military will give the Department access to its omnibus logistics civil augmentation program contract for life support services. The costs to the Department and availability of DOD assistance with contract management and oversight support have not been decided. Fortunately, military commanders in Iraq have been very supportive of their Department counterparts, offering excess equipment that would be useful for future civilian efforts in Iraq.

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Personnel at Embassy Baghdad are highly focused on transition issues, while in Washington many are involved, but leadership is a concern. The Deputy Secretary (Management) is focused on the issue, but he is responsible for the entire Department. A high level, full-time coordinator at the Department with a dedicated staff would be better placed to push through decisions and oversee the more detailed planning needed for the new mission in Iraq.

**CFR Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Under Secretaries for Management and Political Affairs, the Director General for Human Resources, and the Bureaus of Administration and Political-Military Affairs, should establish a dedicated ambassador-level coordinator with full-time staff, for Iraq civilian transition planning and implementation. (Action: NEA, in coordination with M, P, A, and PM)

## POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

### PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

During the compliance phase of the 2009 inspection, only two of six formal public diplomacy recommendations were closed.

#### Resources

The exact amount of public diplomacy funding being expended in Iraq has not been compiled. Public diplomacy programs in Iraq are funded through various appropriations by a variety of Department entities, each of which is fully cognizant of only its own activities.<sup>10</sup> The public affairs section (PAS) in Baghdad has kept informal records, which are not authoritative. Effective programming, based on coordinated effort, is possible only if all resources are known and taken into account; therefore, the inspection team issued a recommendation that the Bureau of Resource Management compile that data, since that bureau is the sole entity in a position to compile and circulate this information. However, the Bureau of Resource Management has not complied with this recommendation, so the CFR team is revising and reissuing it.

**CFR Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Resource Management, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and Embassy Baghdad, should produce a spreadsheet that details for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 the requested and actual funding sources for public diplomacy program funding for Iraq and the state of their obligation and expenditure. (Action: RM, in coordination with R/PPR, ECA, IIP, NEA, and Embassy Baghdad)

<sup>10</sup> In addition to public diplomacy programs managed by the Department, DOD has spent millions in Iraq for strategic communications programs. The CFR team did not examine whether any of this funding will continue after December 31, 2011.

## Planning

The long-term nature of public diplomacy, the multiyear funding of certain programs, and the significant changes in resources and mobility arising from the withdrawal of U.S. military forces by the end of 2011 mandate that PAS develop and adopt an operational and strategic plan. More fundamentally, budget and staffing decisions made in mid-August 2010 regarding field presences will have a significant effect on the scope and effect of public diplomacy programs throughout Iraq and must be reflected in planning for the future. In addition, the PAS organization reflects a war-time posture, with many U.S. press personnel and relatively fewer cultural affairs officers and LE staff.

Both of these issues were addressed in formal recommendations in the 2009 inspection. In response to the 2009 recommendation, the previous PAS leadership submitted a plan to Washington in the spring of 2010, but the plan was obviously derived from a similar document developed by Embassy Islamabad (the last four pages describe funding, staffing, and program information for Pakistan, not Iraq), and it received no substantive review and feedback from Washington. Department offices need to review and concur with these operational and strategic plans, so that out-year planning, staffing, and budgeting are coordinated. In addition, the CFR team reissued recommendations 25 and 26 for the PAS to submit and implement a strategic and operational plan for public diplomacy in Iraq, and as a part of the plan, to review staffing and section organization.

**CFR Recommendation 3:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Bureau of International Information Programs, and Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should draft and implement a strategic and operational plan for public diplomacy and communications in Iraq covering fiscal years 2010 through 2013. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with ECA, IIP and NEA)

**CFR Recommendation 4:** Embassy Baghdad should, as part of an operational and strategic plan for public affairs and public diplomacy in Iraq, review the staffing needs of the public affairs section in Baghdad and the constituent posts in Iraq and continue to move to a more traditional mix of American and Iraqi staff, allowing for eligible family member, third country national, and contractor positions. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)



**CFR Recommendation 5:** The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs' Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Bureau of International Information Programs, and Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should review and provide feedback on Embassy Baghdad's public diplomacy operational and strategic plan, confirming and coordinating resource availability and requests. (Action: R/PPR, in coordination with ECA, IIP, and NEA)

## LEGAL AFFAIRS

Among the embassy's files are original records from the CPA dating to 2004. Edicts issued by the CPA, including its dissolution of the Iraqi Army and restrictions on activity by senior members of the Baath Party, remain part of the Iraqi legal framework under its new constitution. Iraq has asked for the records to be transferred to its control. Return of the documents to Iraq would remove a potential bilateral irritant, demonstrate respect for Iraqi sovereignty, and promote the rule of law in Iraq. Inspection Recommendation 21 called for returning the documents to the Department pending a decision on their final disposition, but the recommendation remained open when the CFR began. The CFR team was unable to discern during its interviews in Washington and Baghdad any rationale why Embassy Baghdad had not complied with Recommendation 21, and hence has revised and reissued the recommendation.

**CFR Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should provide instructions to Embassy Baghdad regarding the disposition of the archived originals of Coalition Provisional Authority documents. (Action: NEA, in coordination with L)

## Contact Management

Embassy Baghdad does not have a consolidated database system for managing its contacts. Each embassy section has an independent approach, ranging from Microsoft Outlook address books to a commercial software program to a stack of business cards. In this regard, Embassy Baghdad does not differ from many other Foreign Service posts worldwide, which are only beginning to adopt a consolidated approach. However, several factors apply in Iraq that make implementing a countrywide system a matter of urgency:

- The overwhelming prevalence of one-year tours increases the likelihood that contacts are not passed on to successors.
- As the 16 PRTs are transitioned to two consulates and two embassy branch offices by the end of 2011, and as the embassy assumes greater responsibility for covering issues countrywide, the contacts developed by those PRTs must be preserved.
- Similarly, with the withdrawal of the U.S. military by the end of 2011, the contact and biographic information contained in its combined information data network exchange (CIDNE) database must remain available to the embassy.

**CFR Recommendation 7:** Embassy Baghdad should adopt a uniform, consolidated contact database management system and a timeline for system implementation that reflects the shutdown dates for the 16 PRTs and the U.S. military withdrawal. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

## CONSULAR AFFAIRS

Consular operations in Baghdad are well managed and have appropriate internal controls. The section chief, who had only been on the ground a month, had addressed compliance with all the recommendations from the 2009 inspection report. As noted in 2009, providing consular services in a conflict zone is a challenge. This situation was highlighted during the CFR team's visit, when two American citizens were detained by Iraqi authorities outside of Baghdad. While no specific action was required by the consular staff, the section chief spent hours on the phone over two days trying to ascertain the status of the two and determine how the embassy could help. In addition to the difficulties exposed, this incident showed the close coordination among disparate embassy components and the strong support of the front office for American citizens services.

### Staffing

Staffing in the consular section is generous, with 8 American officers, 17 Foreign Service nationals (FSN), and an eligible family member, which is an increase of 2 officers and 10 FSNs over the staffing in 2009. Five of the FSNs were Iraqi citizens and two were Jordanians. Three of the FSN positions were vacant, and a fourth FSN (one of the Iraqi citizens) had recently given notice. The seven remaining FSN positions were filled by local employees on temporary duty from consular sections in other U.S. embassies. These experienced TDY FSN employees formed the core of the Baghdad consular section.

According to Baghdad's 2009 consular package submission, only 2,900 hours of U.S. officer time was spent on nonimmigrant visa (NIV) processing, or about 1.4 officer-years. At the same time, the staffing pattern reflects that three officers were responsible for NIVs and that there was almost one half an officer-year of overtime worked. Looking at it this way, it appears that, in 2009, Baghdad had almost two surplus officers working on NIVs who were not reflected in the consular package.

In the past year, the workload for both immigrant visas and NIVs has increased dramatically. If those increases continue, the consular section should be staffed accordingly. If not, then a reduction might be warranted. Recognizing that measuring and predicting staffing in Baghdad is difficult because of short tours, multiple breaks from post, and frequent curtailments, the OIG team left an informal recommendation that Embassy Baghdad create a standard operating procedure to maintain accurate 2010 consular package staffing data, so managers can identify staff surpluses or shortages.

Three areas of concern are identified by the 2009 inspection: logistics, continuity, and security advisory opinions.

## Logistics

Of the nine recommendations in this area, all but one have been satisfied. Overall, the section has opened for full services, and is coping well with the added workload. The only unrealized recommendation is for a climate controlled overflow waiting area. This topic is addressed in a later section of this report. The CFR team closed one open recommendation, to create an online capability for visa applicants to monitor the status of their cases. Since the embassy receives only about three inquiries related to such monitoring per day, the CFR team concluded that creating a system just to handle such inquiries is not a good use of resources.

## Continuity

As a reflection of the overall mission, continuity in the consular section continues to be a challenge. Yearly turnover of most staff members means that institutional memory is a precious commodity. As soon as an employee learns the particularities of Iraqi visa processes, they are ready to leave. One negative result of the lack of continuity is the number of visa foils spoiled in production. Consular managers strive to not spoil any visa foils, but a 1 or 2 percent spoil rate is usually inevitable. However, the overall spoil rate in Baghdad for the preceding year before the CFR team visit was 8 percent, and the spoil rate for the almost 1,500 A-2 (government officials) visas was 14.9 percent.

**CFR Recommendation 8:** Embassy Baghdad should increase training and oversight of visa production with the goal of lowering the overall visa foil spoil rate to under four percent for at least a month. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

In the year since the 2009 inspection, the consular section has hired several Iraqi employees. As long as they do not receive SIVs after 1 year of work (as allowed under Section 1244 of P.L. 110-181) and depart Iraq, these LE staff could become the backbone of the consular section. The embassy's efforts to hire and retain Iraqi staff are laudable.

The relationship between the consular sections in Baghdad and at Embassy Amman has evolved over the past year since it was highlighted in the 2009 inspection report. Baghdad now offers a full range of consular services and does not rely on Amman for support. Amman now handles a small percentage of Iraqi NIV applicants, mainly those from the North who find it easier to fly from Erbil to Amman on a scheduled flight than to travel to Baghdad and gain access to the Green Zone and the U.S. embassy. Consultations in Amman for consular managers going to Baghdad are still advisable, but routine visits by all staff are not now required.

## Security Advisory Opinions

Fortunately, the security advisory opinion processing time, which in 2009 was measured in months and adversely affected almost all visa issuing posts worldwide, has been ameliorated. Worldwide, processing times are measured in weeks and are more predictable.

### **CFR Question 5: Does the present system of incorporating U.S. military information into the Consular Affairs visa lookout system require revision?**

A cursory review of the refusal workload statistics for all NEA visa issuing posts highlights a problem with security advisory opinions in Baghdad. NEA-wide, 18,594 applicants were refused visas in the month before the OIG team's visit to Baghdad. Of these refusals, 11,717 (or 63 percent) were overcome, mostly because they had been temporary 221(g) refusals pending a security advisory opinion; another 31 refusals (or 0.167 percent) were given a temporary waiver of ineligibility. In Baghdad during the same period, 593 applicants were refused and 534 (or 90 percent) of these refusals were overcome. Another 14 (or 2.63 percent) were given waivers, a significantly higher rate than the NEA-wide rate of 0.167 percent.

| NIV Summary Refusal Workload Statistics - All NEA Posts<br>July 16, 2010 to August 15, 2010 |                       |                        |                     |                      |                   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Jurisdiction                                                                                | Applicants<br>refused | Applicants<br>Overcome | Percent<br>overcome | Applicants<br>Waived | Percent<br>waived |
| All NEA Posts                                                                               | 18,594                | 11,717                 | 63                  | 31                   | 0.167             |
| Baghdad                                                                                     | 593                   | 534                    | 90                  | 14                   | 2.630             |

These data show that either Baghdad visa officers are refusing visas unnecessarily or that the quality of the visa lookouts on Iraqis is not as good as it is at other posts in the NEA area. A very quick review of a few cases indicated that some Iraqis were being refused based on information derived from U.S. military sources that did not document a basis for visa ineligibility. The high rate of waivers suggests that there are visa lookouts for certain people, but that it is in U.S. national interest that these individuals travel nonetheless. It appears that a number of these waivers may be due to the so-called “Tier III” ineligibilities, that is, Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212(a)(3)(B) ineligibilities based only upon membership in certain political parties, which are routinely waived by Washington.

**CFR Question 6: Is implementation of the Section 1244 special immigrant visa program meeting the interests of the U.S. Government and its Iraqi employees?**

Section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) created a class of SIV beneficiaries for Iraqis who have been employed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government in Iraq for not less than one year after March 20, 2003—and who are experiencing or have experienced an ongoing, serious threat because of such employment. This program allows for 5,000 visas per year, but the number of SIV visas processed under this law has never come close to the statutory limit. The CFR team identified three very different issues related to SIVs in Iraq that merit further review.

The first issue is the length of time it takes to process an individual case. The consular staff opined that processing was inefficient and, with some exceptions, can take up to 18 months from start to finish—an inordinate amount of time, especially if the applicant truly is in danger. It was unclear during the CFR team’s short visit to Baghdad where the biggest delays were taking place. The consular section is engaged with the other offices involved in processing these cases, including the National Visa Center; is working to speed processing; and is planning an outreach effort to explain the program to U.S. Government agencies where potential SIV beneficiaries work.

The second issue is the underlying premise of the SIV program, which is to safeguard individuals who have put themselves at risk for the U.S. Government. While there is no question that courageous service should be recognized, employment in 2010 with or on behalf of the U.S. Government is different than it was in previous years. Underutilization of the program (as well as embassy LE staff who already have received SIVs but have not gone to the United States) suggests that being associated with the U.S. Government is not the problem it was in the past.

The third issue is the effect of the SIV program on stable staffing. Since the 2009 inspection, the number of Iraqi LE staff at the embassy has grown from 30 to 130, a healthy and necessary increase. Indeed, the U.S. mission in Iraq will never operate normally until it has an LE staff composed largely of Iraqi employees who can provide experience and institutional memory. The present SIV program offers permanent U.S. residence (with refugee benefits) after just one year on the job; worldwide, service of 15 to 20 years (without refugee status) is the norm. The Department and Congress should consider whether the SIV program is effectively serving as an incentive to work at the embassy for only one year, rather than an appropriate reward for dangerous service.

## Other Consular Matters

The CFR team found several other consular issues that warrant attention.

- One of the most difficult parts of working in a conflict zone is that it is extremely difficult for embassy officials to directly interact with Iraqis face to face, since getting embassy officials out of the Green Zone is difficult and dangerous. However, in the 12 months ending in August 2010, some 10,000 Iraqis came to the embassy to apply for U.S. visas. The embassy's refusal rate of about 14 percent means that, for some 1,400 visa applicants, these Iraqis' only experience of the United States will be their visit to the embassy. It costs almost nothing to interact with these individuals, and the embassy should consider them (and all the Iraqi visa applicants) as public diplomacy targets of opportunity. For those 1,400 applicants in particular, it is important that their experience with the United States and its government is positive. The CFR team made several suggestions to the embassy and consular leadership on this topic, as well as an informal recommendation that Embassy Baghdad create a consular/public diplomacy working group to increase the public diplomacy value to the Iraqi consular clients who receive consular services.

- A review of the Visas Viper program found an exemplary system that had resulted in more than 100 submissions in the past 12 months. The Visas Viper program in Baghdad is a best practice. In most posts, the Visas Viper monthly meetings are used to solicit names for review and submission to Washington. In Baghdad, the consular section gathers the names in advance of the monthly meeting and distributes them via the monthly agenda. The Visas Viper committee then uses its monthly meeting to review the names that have already been vetted in advance by the various offices.
- On the other hand, the consular section coordinates a database with derogatory information from many sources with more than 500 names in it. This effort, while positive, is duplicative and time consuming, as officers must maintain both the “derog” database and information that must be entered into the consular lookout and support system database. The OIG team left an informal recommendation that the embassy take any visa ineligibility-related data from the “derog” system and enter it into the CLASS lookout system.

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## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The leadership of the management section has made great strides since 2009 to make the huge embassy more accountable. Coordination with the front office was strong. During consultations and interviews, the section's responsiveness was commented upon favorably. During the CFR, no formal complaints were made about management services. All but two formal recommendations were complied with and implemented.

The embassy has conducted a formal review of management controls and reported the results to the Department. Biweekly meetings were held to assess and improve management controls and to standardize processes. The section's most notable accomplishments were to improve internal controls over premium time compensation, performance, supply chain, property, and vehicle management. Management control weaknesses in these areas had been identified in the previous inspection report and had been the subject of a recent audit by the OIG's Office of Audits.<sup>11</sup>

Within the management section, several key officers have extended their tours, and other officers have returned for another tour. These extensions, as well as staggered tours, have improved continuity in all management areas.

The number of Iraqi LE staff members has increased from 30 to 130, which is a start, but it will take years to recruit, train, and retain the numbers of LE staff needed to provide reasonable continuity. Until a more capable LE staff is developed, the mission will have to depend on contractors and temporary duty local staff from other U.S. embassies. The mission has appropriately outsourced many of its functions to regional offices.

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<sup>11</sup> AUD/CG-10-25, June 2010.

## RIGHTSIZING

The number one cross-cutting issue from the 2009 inspection was rightsizing. Unfortunately, that keystone recommendation was still resolved/open at the beginning of the CFR. In the summer of 2010, transition planning has overtaken rightsizing as priority number one for Mission Iraq, but the need to determine the optimal level of staff still exists. To the embassy's credit, the planning for the four provincial posts has involved a good deal of careful planning and study of the appropriate staffing levels for the posts. In addition, ad hoc staffing reviews have resulted in the reduction of many positions in the embassy since 2009, and preliminary rightsizing analyses were initiated. Managers point to the 66 days lost in R&R travel and other staffing gaps as the reason for enhanced staffing levels (although the presumption of routine overtime, discussed below, also addresses these gaps).

One facet of rightsizing is the 20 percent special differential allowance, intended to compensate tenured mid-level officers for working long hours. Officers that receive this incentive pay are expected to work 30 hours of overtime per pay period. The CFR team observed in some sections that it was not necessary for employees to work this many hours. Because Iraq remains a highly dangerous location, employees really have few options apart from work. The CFR team heard anecdotal stories of people who came to the office because they did not have anything better to do. The embassy revised its overtime policy for those not receiving the differential and has incorporated better controls to prevent abuse. Supervisors have been reminded that overtime should be approved and justified in advance. For those who qualify, the mission instituted a 60-hour overtime cap per pay period. The Charleston Financial Service Center and the embassy monitor the number of hours charged by employees. These controls appear to be working, and the number of overtime hours charged has decreased.

Though transition planning is rightfully getting the attention it deserves at the embassy, rightsizing is also important to ensure that only the minimum number of Department employees working this extended workweek are exposed to the dangers of living and working in Iraq.

**CFR Recommendation 9:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary for Management and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should complete a program for rightsizing the embassy, in order to establish a baseline of positions that reflects the current requirements and funding realities in Iraq. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with M/PRI and NEA)

## MOTOR VEHICLE MANAGEMENT

Management of Baghdad's huge motor vehicle fleet was a serious concern in the 2009 inspection and resulted in four formal recommendations. At the beginning of the CFR, all four recommendations were still considered resolved/open.

In February 2010, the Bureau of Administration's Office of Logistics Management sent a team to assist the general services office and regional security office with the first mission-wide motor vehicle inventory. With its assistance, the embassy was able to submit a motor pool vehicle inventory on March 7, 2010. The motor vehicle inventory is 1,007 vehicles, with a total value of \$116.7 million.

The mission partially complied with the OIG report's Recommendations 63 and 64, to conduct a mission-wide fleet review and to establish a procurement plan. The general services office assumed that it was only responsible for completing a fleet review of the 86 vehicles used for motor pool operations and not the motor vehicles used for security. During the CFR team visit, there was a debate at post about which bureau or office was responsible for managing the 921 armored vehicles used for security.

Regulations (14 FAM 431.2-3) state that the Bureau of Administration's Office of Logistics Management has overall responsibility for management of the worldwide motor vehicle fleet for Department-owned vehicles and oversight of all other program and ICASS vehicles abroad. According to 14 FAM 431.2-4 b., posts must maintain a complete and accurate inventory of vehicles, manage the proceeds of their sale, handle the disposal of unusable vehicles, and submit requests for replacements or changes to fleet composition. Normally, this task is assigned to an embassy's general services office, with input from the program offices. As stated in 14 FAM 432.2, the fleet size and composition for other program vehicles must be supported by a statement of how the vehicle will be required to support an MSRP objective.

The CFR team found that the embassy has not completed a mission-wide fleet review. Inspectors were told the post was unable to conduct a meaningful fleet review of the security vehicles, because mission-wide program requirements were undefined, the embassy had not completed its rightsizing study, and the mission was in a period of transition. While the OIG team understands the unique circumstances under which Embassy Baghdad operates, the mission must follow the 14 FAM guidance to ensure the proper accountability of a \$100 million dollar U.S. Government resource.

During its visit, the CFR team found that it was not clear that the security fleet was being well utilized. A fleet review is needed to avoid perceptions of waste and mismanagement. Just as the Bureau of Administration and the mission worked together to complete the motor vehicle inventory, a similar effort is needed to complete a mission-wide fleet review.

The CFR team reissued Recommendations 63 and 64. It modified Recommendation 63, because although the mission did not complete a mission-wide fleet review, it had completed an inventory and was outsourcing its preventive maintenance, repairs, and disposal to contractors.

**CFR Recommendation 10:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a mission-wide motor fleet review of the vehicles under the operational control of the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with A/LM, DS)

**CFR Recommendation 11:** Embassy Baghdad should establish a comprehensive vehicle acquisition plan designed to maintain an appropriately sized vehicle fleet, including program, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services, and Diplomatic Security vehicles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

## LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF ASSOCIATION

Despite management's encouragement, the mission's LE staff members have not established an employee association. The human resources officer has given the local employees guidance on how to organize an association, but most of the LE staff has not taken advantage of the opportunity and is unfamiliar with how an association works. In order to foster communication between management and the LE staff, the post should further assist the Iraqi LE staff with organizing an association. The Iraqi LE staff has met with the Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission several times, but an LE staff association could serve as a formal conduit for ongoing information exchange between management and the broader LE staff community. Regulations (3 FAM 7293 a.) call for open communication between management and LE staff, including through FSN employee associations.

**CFR Recommendation 12:** Embassy Baghdad should assist the locally employed staff to establish a local employee staff association, in order to establish open lines of communication between management and staff. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

## AIRPORT LOGISTICS

The CFR team was struck by the complexity of the logistical efforts to safely transport employees between Amman and Embassy Baghdad. (b) (2)(b) (2)

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During both the 2009 inspection and the 2010 CFR, these transit modalities were cited as a \_\_\_\_\_ at least partially undoing the benefit of their R&R. More importantly, the CFR team is concerned about the lost productivity that the lengthy transits represent. Each inbound and outbound flight represents at least 30 people delayed for half a workday (or more). Assuming 100 days per year of flight operations, this mode of transit would consume an amount of time equal the loss of 3,000 workdays, or nearly 12 full-time equivalents. Since maintaining a direct-hire American employee in Iraq is estimated to cost between \$1.5 and \$2.3 million per year, the transit delays on the Amman routing alone represent a potential cost of between \$17.2 million and \$26 million per year.

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Although the team understands that employee safety while in transit is of the utmost importance, it left an informal recommendation that the embassy continue to look for ways to reduce the amount of lost time during these secure airport transits.

## FORMAL CFR RECOMMENDATIONS

**CFR Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Under Secretaries for Management and Political Affairs, the Director General for Human Resources, and the Bureaus of Administration and Political-Military Affairs, should establish a dedicated ambassador-level coordinator with a full-time staff, for Iraq civilian transition planning and implementation. (Action: NEA, in coordination with M, P, A, and PM)

**CFR Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Resource Management, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and Embassy Baghdad, should produce a spreadsheet that details for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 the requested and actual funding sources for public diplomacy program funding for Iraq and the state of their obligation and expenditure. (Action: RM, in coordination with R/PPR, ECA, IIP, NEA, and Embassy Baghdad)

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**CFR Recommendation 11:** Embassy Baghdad should establish a comprehensive vehicle acquisition plan designed to maintain an appropriately sized vehicle fleet, including program, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services, and Diplomatic Security vehicles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**CFR Recommendation 12:** Embassy Baghdad should assist the locally employed staff to establish a local employee staff association, in order to establish open lines of communication between management and staff. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)



## INFORMAL CFR RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

### Consular Affairs

In the past year, the workload for both immigrant visas and NIVs has increased dramatically. If those increases continue, the consular section should be staffed accordingly.

**Informal Recommendation 1:** Embassy Baghdad should create a standard operating procedure to maintain accurate 2010 consular package staffing data, so managers can identify staff surpluses or shortages.

More than 10,000 Iraqi citizens enter the embassy annually to obtain consular services.

**Informal Recommendation 2:** Embassy Baghdad should create a consular/public diplomacy working group to address the public diplomacy opportunity represented by Iraqi consular clients.

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A local database of derogatory information on visa clients is redundant and time-consuming.

**Informal Recommendation 4:** Embassy Baghdad should migrate the derogatory information database that applies to visa ineligibility into the consular lookout and support system.

## Resource Management and Management Controls

Employees arriving or leaving via the Baghdad International Airport are subjected to long waits for transport, costing millions of dollars in lost productivity each year.

**Informal Recommendation 5:** Embassy Baghdad should continue to look for ways to reduce the amount of down time during airport transits.

## CFR QUESTIONS

**CFR Question 1:** Can the U.S. temporary provincial presence be expected to resolve centuries-old ethnic and religious rifts in Iraq?

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**CFR Question 5:** Does the present system of incorporating U.S. military information into the Consular Affairs visa lookout system require revision?

**CFR Question 6:** Is implementation of the Section 1244 special immigrant visa program meeting the interests of the U.S. Government and its Iraqi employees?

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## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

| Position                                                  | Name               | Arrival |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| Ambassador                                                | James Jeffrey      | 9/10    |
| Deputy Chief of Mission                                   | Stuart Jones       | 7/10    |
| Assistant Chief of Mission for<br>Assistance Coordination | Peter Bodde        | 8/10    |
| <b>Chiefs of Section</b>                                  |                    |         |
| Management                                                | Jeanine Jackson    | 5/09    |
| Consular                                                  | Mark Mayfield      | 7/10    |
| Political                                                 | Marc Sievers       | 8/10    |
| Political/Military                                        | Luis Moreno        | 5/10    |
| Economic                                                  | Kenneth Fairfax    | 8/10    |
| Public Affairs                                            | Martin Quinn       | 6/10    |
| Regional Security                                         | Scott Bultrowicz   | 7/10    |
| Iraq Transition Assistance Office                         | Mark Prokop        | 5/10    |
| Office of Provincial Affairs                              | Alcy Frelick       | 5/10    |
| International Narcotics and<br>Law Enforcement            | Francisco Palmieri | 7/10    |
| Regional Medical Officer                                  | Mark Cohen         | 6/10    |

### Other Agencies

|                                           |                       |       |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| Foreign Agricultural Service              | Ronald Verdonk        | 10/09 |
| Foreign Commercial Service                | Brian McCleary        | 9/09  |
| U.S. Agency for International Development | Robert Wuertz, Acting | 11/09 |
| Department of Transportation              | Julie Abraham         | 10/09 |
| Department of Treasury                    | Dennis Flannery       | 3/10  |
| Department of Justice (Rule of Law)       | Michael Gunnison      | 1/10  |
| Department of Homeland Security           | Royce Walters         | 3/10  |
| Special IG for Iraq Reconstruction        | Paul Cooksey          | 3/10  |

## ABBREVIATIONS

|            |                                                                  |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| BBG        | Broadcasting Board of Governors                                  |
| CFR        | Compliance follow-up review                                      |
| CPA        | Coalition Provisional Authority                                  |
| Department | U.S. Department of State                                         |
| DOD        | U.S. Department of Defense                                       |
| DS         | Bureau of Diplomatic Security                                    |
| EBO        | Embassy branch office                                            |
| ECA        | Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs                       |
| FSN        | Foreign Service National                                         |
| IIP        | Bureau of International Information Programs                     |
| INL        | Bureau of International Narcotics and Law<br>Enforcement Affairs |
| ISPO       | Iraq Strategic Partnership Office                                |
| LE         | Locally employed                                                 |
| M          | Under Secretary for Management                                   |
| MERO       | Middle East Regional Office                                      |
| NEA        | Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs                                   |
| NIV        | Nonimmigrant visa                                                |
| OIG        | Office of Inspector General                                      |
| OSC        | Office of Security Cooperation                                   |
| PAS        | Public affairs section                                           |
| PRT        | Provincial Reconstruction Team                                   |
| R          | Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public<br>Affairs       |
| R&R        | Rest and recuperation                                            |
| SIV        | Special immigrant visa                                           |
| USAID      | United States Agency for International Development               |

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## APPENDIX I

### STATUS OF 2009 INSPECTION FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** The Under Secretary for Management, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should devise and implement a rightsizing of the Embassy, establishing a new baseline of positions that meets the requirements of the President's policy on Iraq. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** The CFR team reissued a recommendation that Embassy Baghdad conduct a formal rightsizing exercise.

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Director of United States Foreign Assistance and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the assistance programs the embassy is implementing to determine which should be continued, phased out, or expanded. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with F and NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Human Resources should include training on reporting tradecraft in the pre-deployment training of officers and employees assigned to Provisional (sic) Reconstruction Teams whose duties will include political or economic reporting. (Action: HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, should review political reporting to determine which reports can be combined or discontinued.

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Baghdad should transfer positions dedicated to reporting on Iran from its political/military to its political section. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should eliminate its special advisers for North and South Iraq, and transfer the positions and the responsibility for these issues to its political section. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with NEA and HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should eliminate at least eight officer positions in the political section that had been added during the civilian surge of 2007. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with NEA and HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Baghdad should reorganize its political section to create a deputy responsible for management who would develop tools to support reporting officers, such as standard operating procedures, “smart books” on portfolios, and a unified contact management system. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Baghdad should revive its working group on democracy and governance and use it to coordinate programs in these areas by all agencies within the mission. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Baghdad should develop a plan for the closure of its constitutional and legislative affairs unit after the holding of national elections in Iraq now scheduled for the end of 2009, initiating no new programs or contracts and bringing existing ones to conclusion. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, should develop a package of information for its employees on working with military units in Iraq; distribute it to incoming personnel; and share it with the Foreign Service Institute to be included in training for Iraq-bound personnel or as part of a broader module for personnel bound for conflict zones. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with FSI and PM)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Baghdad should implement a process to coordinate with the U.S. military on issuing written instructions clarifying contact policy for both civilian and military officers in the mission. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Baghdad should obtain software for the Department International Vetting and Security Tracking System (INVEST) and begin building a database to carry out required Leahy Amendment vetting. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. INVEST will be installed in Baghdad later in 2010 as part of the Bureau of Human Rights and Labor's long-standing bureau-by-bureau roll-out plan.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should abolish the position of deputy supervisory desk officer in the office of provincial affairs at the end of the incumbent's assignment. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Baghdad should prepare a plan for the phased reduction of positions in the office of provincial affairs as a contribution to embassy-wide rightsizing process. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Baghdad should identify which programs should continue in the event of the departure of agency heads under the coordinator for economic transition in Iraq and determine how the United States Agency for International Development could best incorporate programs of existing agencies into its own work program. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. The embassy does not currently anticipate that any economic agencies at post will close in the near future and thus require disposition of assistance programs they are implementing. However, should such a circumstance arise, the embassy concurred with the OIG finding, that USAID would be the most appropriate agency to integrate such programs, whenever possible. If any agency should be forced to depart post and leave behind assistance programs, the economic minister counselor, the departing agency, and the appropriate USAID experts would consult to determine whether USAID had the authority, capacity, and

expertise to take on implementation of that agency's programs. If not, it would be determined whether responsibility could be turned over to another embassy agency or Department section. Any programs that could not be implemented by USAID, another agency at post, or a Department section would be discontinued. The embassy does not anticipate that any agencies implementing such programs will depart in the near future, and so it does not anticipate asking USAID to take over any programs in the foreseeable future.

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Baghdad should, within the coordinator for economic transition in Iraq cluster, develop a plan that tracks the priorities set forth in the Strategic Framework Agreement, a work schedule to support the priorities, and a reporting protocol and monitoring mechanism for assessing implementation of the plan. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should provide as soon as possible a proposal for the number, function, and organizational affiliation of any legacy personnel from the Iraq transition assistance office to oversee after May 10, 2010. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. The Iraq transition assistance office has been replaced by the Iraq strategic partnership office (ISPO), which is implementing a drawdown plan. Until its closure, ISPO-Baghdad will continue to report directly to the assistant chief of mission for assistance transition. Direct-hire staff hired under 5 U.S.C. 3161 authority remaining after May 2010 will consist of the deputy director, one water senior consultant, two electricity senior consultants, two budget/accounting personnel, and two project monitors. The final staff (projected to consist of one senior consultant, two budget personnel, and one project monitoring staff) are planned to depart, in 2011, upon completion of fiscal closeout of all Iraq transition assistance office funds<sup>12</sup> and records retirement, which will end the ISPO-Baghdad presence.

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<sup>12</sup> Including economic support funds and Iraq relief and reconstruction funds.

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Baghdad should design and implement a plan to ensure that the records of departing employees of the Iraq Transition Assistance Office are handled in accordance with the Foreign Affairs regulations on records management. (Action: Embassy Baghdad).

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Baghdad should determine the appropriate staffing level and structure for the anticorruption coordinator office in order to manage the programs for which it will receive funding and develop a plan to retain current staff or hire new employees. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should send the archived originals of Coalition Provisional Authority orders to the Department of State for safekeeping and request a ruling on whether they should be turned over to the Government of Iraq. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with L)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Reissued.

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Baghdad should create an integrated database of programs in the rule of law cluster. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team, which obtained a 107-page database detailing Rule of Law programs in Iraq and their U.S. Government, American, and Iraqi implementing partners.

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Baghdad should conclude a memorandum of agreement with Multi-National Force/Iraq outlining areas of responsibility and coordination on the conduct of civil judicial training and capacity building in the Iraqi civil judiciary system. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and a U.S. Forces-Iraq planner developed a transition plan that has been incorporated into the joint campaign plan.

**Recommendation 24:** The Bureau of Resource Management, in coordination with the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and Embassy Baghdad, should produce a simple multilayer spreadsheet for accurate tracking of the multiple sources of public affairs program funding Iraq. (Action: RM, in coordination with R/ PPR, NEA, and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Reissued.

**Recommendation 25:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Near Eastern Affairs, should draft and implement an operational and strategic plan for public affairs and public diplomacy in Iraq covering the next two to three fiscal years. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in coordination with ECA, IIP and NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Reissued.

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Baghdad should, as part of an operational and strategic plan for public affairs and public diplomacy in Iraq, realign the staffing needs of the public affairs section to a more traditional mix of American and Iraqi staff, allowing as necessary for eligible family member, third country national, and contractor positions. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Reissued.

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Baghdad should, as part of an operational and strategic plan for public affairs and public diplomacy in Iraq, create position descriptions and recruit and hire no more than four locally employed staff positions at the appropriate grade to liaise and coordinate with the management section on budget, procurement, logistics, human resources and other needed administrative support. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. Two locally employed exchange program assistants joined the public affairs/cultural section in late spring 2010. Two more locally employed positions (an English language assistant and senior cultural affairs assistant) are in the process of being filled.

**Recommendation 28:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureaus of Human Resources and Near Eastern Affairs, should reassess the need for spoken and written Arabic language skills for Foreign Service generalists and specialists in the public affairs section and, if needed, increase or decrease the number of language-designated positions. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with HR and NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 29:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should identify, recruit, and assign Arabic-language-qualified candidates to positions in the public affairs section of Embassy Baghdad. (Action: HR, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and NEA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should continue to conduct regularly scheduled conference calls to improve communication and strengthen the educational exchange programs in Iraq. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with ECA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Baghdad should design and implement a plan to ensure that Foreign Service officers and temporary duty locally employed staff from other embassies create checklists and standard operating procedures, especially for programs in the cultural section, to reduce the learning curve and to increase the productivity of their successors. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)



**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 32:** Embassy Baghdad should establish a reliable on-line appointment system for consular services prior to any further expansion of consular services. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 33:** Embassy Baghdad should establish an escorted shuttle service to run throughout the day, providing access and egress by applicants to the consular entrance, prior to any further expansion of consular services. The service should begin operation early in the day, in coordination with opening the consular entrance, to permit clients to be screened and present in the consular section at opening of business. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. The consular section brings applicants in by a bus that essentially operates three times a day, at 8:30, 11:00, and 13:00. While this schedule is sufficient to satisfy the 2009 recommendation, in light of the informal recommendation regarding the public diplomacy aspects of consular operations, the team urges the embassy to operate more shuttles in order to reduce inconvenience to the consular clients.

**Recommendation 34:** Embassy Baghdad should hire two additional consular locally employed staff (Arabic/Kurdish speakers) prior to any further expansion of consular services. One person can be stationed at the consular entrance throughout the day to provide reception and document checking services, allowing the guards to focus solely on security screening. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. The consular section had five Iraqi locally employed staff members in August 2010.

**Recommendation 35:** Embassy Baghdad should establish signage in English and Arabic that briefly explains basic consular procedures, directs applicants to have certain documents ready for presentation, and provides directions on where to go. These signs should be placed at each stage, including any interim waiting areas and at the compound access control. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 36:** Embassy Baghdad should identify a queuing system service provider in the region which could provide personnel to activate, maintain, and support the consular section system prior to any further expansion of consular services. The service provider should extend connections to support the system inside the consular compound access control. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 37:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should establish a climate-controlled holding area to handle overflow from the consular section waiting room. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with OBO)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed Compliance. This issue also has been addressed in a new informal recommendation relating to the public diplomacy posture of the consular section.

**Recommendation 38:** Embassy Baghdad should establish, prior to any further expansion of consular services, a standard fee collection contract for machine readable visas to cover multiple locations in Iraq. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 39:** Embassy Baghdad should establish, prior to any further expansion of consular services, an on-line method for applicants to check the status of their pending visa cases. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. In the 15 months since the OIG inspection, several improvements in handling security advisory opinions have reduced the processing time from months to weeks, for most cases. As a result of the processing improvements, during the month of July 2010, the consular section received fewer than 50 inquiries related to processing security advisory opinions. This number is not high enough to warrant establishing and maintaining a tracking system.

**Recommendation 40:** Embassy Baghdad should, prior to any expansion of consular services, contract with a courier service to establish a method for returning travel documents without requiring a second personal trip to the Embassy. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 41:** Embassy Baghdad should designate a training officer in the consular section, design and implement an in service formal training program for contract and long-term locally employed staff, and facilitate locally employed staff enrollment in the Foreign Service Institute consular distance learning courses. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 42:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should add 2 or 3 days of consultations at Embassy Amman to all orders for consular personnel, both officer and locally employed staff, en route to assignment in Baghdad for any duration. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 43:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with Embassy Amman, should establish a schedule for the Embassy Amman employees in the Iraq support position to travel to Baghdad on a regular (quarterly) basis for two weeks of temporary duty. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with Embassy Amman)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 44:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should request the members of the interagency Security Advisory Opinion Requirements Review Board to undertake a full review of the existing security advisory opinion requirements for Iraqi citizens, weighing changed security conditions with the full range of foreign policy interests. (Action: CA)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 45:** Embassy Baghdad should designate one of the deputies of the senior refugee coordinator to serve as acting coordinator in the senior coordinator's absence and include this responsibility to the designee's work requirements. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 46:** Embassy Baghdad, in cooperation with the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, should upgrade position 13001034 for the refugee admissions coordinator FS-03 to FS-02. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with PRM)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 47:** Embassy Baghdad should designate an additional or alternate person with Chief of Mission authority to approve or deny recommendations for special immigrant visa status. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 48:** Embassy Baghdad should conduct a review of standard operating procedures to determine whether there are additional functions that off-shore centers could handle, thus reducing the number of management personnel resident in Baghdad. (Action: Embassy Baghdad).

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 49:** Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish and manage its personnel assets using the Department of State's standard automated application, WebPASS Post Personnel. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 50:** The Bureau of Human Resources should extend the tour of duty in Iraq from 12 months to 18 months or 24 months as soon as each direct-hire employee can be housed without having to share apartments. In the meantime, the Department should encourage employees to volunteer for 18 or 24 month assignments and make necessary adjustments in linked assignments. (Action: HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by the CFR team. In Washington, during consultations with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources' Office of Career Development and Assignment, the OIG team was advised that two-year assignments are not feasible at this time. These bureaus appreciate the need for continuity, but believe that employee mental and physical health, burnout from stress and long hours, and time away from family outweigh the need for more continuity.

In addition, the extension of the tour of duty to 24 months will not be granted until each direct-hire employee can be housed without having to share a one bedroom apartment. The embassy estimates it will take 3 to 5 years to resolve the housing shortage. The extension to an 18-month tour of duty also is not feasible because of Department staffing shortages. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs continues to use incentives to attract bidders and to encourage tour extensions.

**Recommendation 51:** The Bureau of Human Resources should adjust training to keep as many assignments as possible in the summer cycle when the tour of duty is extended. Additional functional area training, language training, and are studies should be used to fill as much as 6 months before or after an 18-month tour should that become the norm while the Department transitions to two-year tours of duty. (Action: HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. The Director General of the Bureau of Human Resources advised the OIG team that 18-month tours are not feasible. Eighteen-month tours require individuals to fill approximately 6 months with training, in order to remain on the summer transfer schedule. The additional 6 months of training for a Baghdad staff would be difficult to cover in light of existing staff shortages within the Foreign Service ranks.

**Recommendation 52:** Embassy Baghdad should publish a single policy on extension requests that describes the process by which extension requests will be reviewed and approved or denied. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 53:** Embassy Baghdad should establish a strict review process, under the supervision of the minister counselor for management, for hiring, extending, or transferring employees hired under 3161 authority, and requiring the deputy chief of mission to approve or disapprove recommendations in writing. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 54:** The Bureau of Human Resources should develop a written rating system for employees hired temporarily under 3161 authority to make possible a vetting system for reemployment. (Action: HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 55:** Embassy Baghdad should review procedures for managing and controlling overtime and standardize time and attendance and overtime reporting to reflect the pay period just ending. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 56:** Embassy Baghdad should review a representative sample of time and attendance reports from the fourth quarter of calendar year 2008 and the first quarter of calendar year 2009. The review should focus on individuals who reported more than 40 hours of overtime per pay period and determine whether inappropriate payments were made. The Embassy should report to the Department whether the results of the sample survey study merit an audit of all overtime payments. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 57:** Embassy Baghdad should develop and implement a plan to complete, process, and submit work requirement statements and employee evaluation reports in a timely manner. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 58:** The Bureau of Human resources should conduct a review of the policy on linked assignments to determine whether it continues to serve the needs of the Foreign Service. (Action: HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 59:** Embassy Baghdad should establish receiving procedures for found property and unidentified deliveries to collect available data and establish inventory records. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 60:** Embassy Baghdad should require that each subordinate unit in the general services office create process maps and establish standard operating procedures. These should be provided to incoming staff and updated regularly to ensure efficiency and continuity in the General Services operations. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 61:** Embassy Baghdad should establish a motor vehicle program in accordance with 15 FAM 957.3 (sic), including naming a motor vehicle accountable officer. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. Embassy Baghdad established a motor vehicle program in accordance with 14 FAM 430. The general services section drafted a mission policy on the use of official vehicles and motor pool operations. The draft will become official upon the Chief of Mission's approval. The assistant general services officer was assigned as the general services operations motor pool manager and was designated the motor vehicle accountable officer. A memorandum of agreement outlines the motor vehicle accountable officer's responsibilities.

**Recommendation 62:** Embassy Baghdad should conduct and reconcile an inventory of its motor vehicles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Closed August 2010 by CFR team. In February 2010, the Bureau of Administration's Office of Logistics Management sent a team to the embassy, to assist the general services office and regional security office with conducting the first mission-wide motor vehicle inventory. With the Bureau's assistance, the embassy was able to submit its motor pool vehicle inventory on March 7, 2010, meeting the Department's deadline of March 15, 2010.

**Recommendation 63:** Embassy Baghdad should, upon completion of its motor vehicle inventory, carry out a fleet review of the vehicles on hand and develop plans to keep, repair, or dispose of inoperable units. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)



**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Reissued August 2010 by CFR team. While Embassy Baghdad's general services office has estimated what their fleet size should be over the next 5 years, the security fleet has not been managed with the same accountability. The current motor vehicle inventory is 1,007 vehicles. The regional security office controls the majority of vehicles (921 vehicles, or 91.4 percent of the inventory). These vehicles are used for protection operations and other security support. The size of the regional security fleet size is difficult to predict because of undefined and changing requirements. Preventive maintenance, repairs, and disposal were outsourced to contractors. The motor pool vehicle maintenance and fuel contract was modified to require keeping records of vehicle maintenance, repair, and fuel cost.

**Recommendation 64:** Embassy Baghdad should suspend acquisition of additional vehicles until completion of a fleet review and establishment of an acquisition plan designed to maintain a stable vehicle fleet appropriately sized to meet the genuine needs of post. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Resolved/open.

**CFR Finding:** Reissued August 2010 by CFR team. Embassy Baghdad had completed its inventory and fleet review and established an acquisition plan of management vehicles, but it had not conducted a similar review of the security vehicles.

**Recommendation 65:** The office of Medical Services, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should develop and implement a plan to evaluate and monitor personnel before, during, and after assignment to what it determines to be high stress posts for post traumatic stress disorder and other mental health disorders. (Action: MED, in coordination with HR)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 66:** Embassy Baghdad should conduct a comprehensive and formal review of management controls including, but not limited to, premium time management, performance management, supply chain management, property management, and vehicle management. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 67:** Embassy Baghdad should develop and implement a plan to improve internal controls and mitigate vulnerabilities identified in its comprehensive and formal review of management controls. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 68:** Embassy Baghdad should amend its visa referral policy to mandate that all visa case advocacy should be handled through the Embassy Baghdad referral system and the Embassy should scan into the electronic visa case file any communications on behalf of a visa application by any part of the mission. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 69:** Embassy Baghdad should establish standard operating procedures for granting access to the consular consolidated database for employees designated by the regional security office and for notifying the consular section when employees with consular access depart from the Embassy. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed October 2009.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Recommendation 70:** Embassy Baghdad should establish a process in which the deputy chief of mission performs the required adjudication reviews of the consular chief's visa decisions. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

**Pre-CFR Status:** Closed June 2010.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

## APPENDIX II

### STATUS OF 2009 INSPECTION INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

**Informal Recommendation 1:** Embassy Baghdad should use quarterly summaries to recapitulate key developments and identify important trends.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Informal Recommendation 2:** Embassy Baghdad should make greater use of front-channel cables to ensure continuous reporting on key issues.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Informal Recommendation 3:** Embassy Baghdad should maintain its hostage affairs unit in its current form in mission strategic planning documents for FY 2010.

**CFR Finding:** The office of hostage affairs was abolished, and its functions were reassigned to the regional security office in the summer of 2009.

**Informal Recommendation 4:** Embassy Baghdad should create an administrative assistant position in the political/military section, reprogramming within existing staffing levels or using the eligible family member program.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

**Informal Recommendation 5:** Embassy Baghdad should review procedures for deleting electronic files to ensure that it is done in consultation with affected sections.

**CFR Finding:** Confirmed compliance.

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