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Office of Inspector General  
United States Department of State

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ISP-I-26-11

Office of Inspections

December 2025

# **Inspection of U.S. Embassy to Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines**

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

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# HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General  
United States Department of State

ISP-I-26-11

## What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados. The inspection also included Embassy St. George's, Grenada; Consular Agency Antigua and Barbuda; and Consular Agency Martinique.

## What OIG Recommends

OIG made 30 recommendations: 29 recommendations to Embassy Bridgetown and 1 recommendation to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. In its comments on the draft report, the Department concurred with 24 recommendations, partially concurred with 2 recommendations, and neither agreed nor disagreed with 4 recommendations. OIG considers all 30 recommendations resolved. The Department's formal responses are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix B.

December 2025

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

Inspection of Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados

## What OIG Found

- Embassy Bridgetown's Front Office generally complied with Department of State standards for tone at the top and standards of conduct, execution of foreign policy goals and objectives, security and emergency planning, and equal employment opportunity. The Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim, engaged all elements of the workforce, provided useful guidance, and responded to employee concerns.
- Embassy Bridgetown did not have a clear delineation of chief of mission security responsibilities for British and French territories in the Eastern Caribbean.
- The embassy had deficiencies in consular oversight.
- Embassy Bridgetown had several safety issues related to elevator mechanical deficiencies, fire protection, and workplace safety inspections.
- The embassy's contract file management and contracting officer's representative program did not fully comply with Department standards.
- The embassy had deficiencies related to the security of information systems and information technology assets, the emergency communications program, and mobile device management in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's.

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## INTRODUCTION

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The Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados,<sup>1</sup> consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.<sup>2</sup> A related classified inspection report includes discussion of the security program, issues affecting the safety of embassy personnel and facilities and information management operations.

On January 21, 2025, the Secretary issued guidance to the Department of State (Department) on the administration's priorities.<sup>3</sup> The Department subsequently disseminated initial guidance on foreign assistance, public diplomacy, consular operations, personnel evaluation, planning and policy documents, and other Department activities. At the time of this inspection, the Department was developing detailed implementation guidance for these and other policy initiatives. Therefore, OIG did not assess the embassy's implementation of the new guidance as part of this inspection.

## BACKGROUND

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Barbados is an independent nation and a member of the British Commonwealth. Located in the Lesser Antilles island chain, Barbados is the easternmost Caribbean island. The United States and Barbados have enjoyed friendly bilateral relations since Barbados' independence from the United Kingdom in 1966.

Barbados has an open economy that is dependent on imports, 40 percent of which come from the United States, and is a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.<sup>4</sup> Barbados and U.S. authorities cooperate closely in the fight against narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational crime. To aid in this work, the two countries have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, signed in 1996, that addresses cooperation in criminal investigations, prosecutions, and prevention. In November 2024, the Export-Import Bank of the United States signed two memoranda of understanding: one with Barbados for up to \$500 million in financing, and another with Saint Kitts and Nevis for up to \$300 million in financing for focused efforts that include cybersecurity, infrastructure, critical minerals, and maritime domain awareness.

At the time of this inspection, Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados had 56 authorized U.S. direct-hire Department positions and 24 U.S. direct-hire employees working for other U.S. government agencies: the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Justice,

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<sup>1</sup> OIG's inspection also included Embassy St. George's, Grenada; Consular Agency Antigua and Barbuda; and Consular Agency Martinique.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix A.


<sup>3</sup> Cable 25 STATE 5156, "New Administration Priorities," January 21, 2025.

<sup>4</sup> The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a collection of trade programs intended to facilitate the development of stable Caribbean Basin economies by providing beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods. The initiative was launched in 1983 through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and expanded in 2000 by the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and again in the Trade Act of 2002.

and Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The embassy also had 141 locally employed (LE) staff, of whom 126 were Department employees, and 15 were employed by other agencies. Additionally, the embassy had 15 eligible family member employees. Embassy St. George's, Grenada, had one U.S. direct-hire and five LE staff.

## OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

### Embassy Responsibilities Across the Region



**Figure 1:** Map of the Eastern Caribbean. Embassy Bridgetown's ambassador is accredited to the countries in red, and the embassy provides support to the islands in blue (Source: CIA World Factbook, as of May 2025; OIG modified the map to focus on the islands in the Eastern Caribbean).

Embassy Bridgetown is responsible for facilities and staff at several locations in the Eastern Caribbean, and its ambassador is accredited bilaterally to seven countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada,<sup>5</sup> Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. U.S. facilities in the region include the chancery in Bridgetown, Embassy St. George's in Grenada; consular agencies in Antigua and Barbuda and Martinique; and Peace Corps offices in Saint Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In addition to their day-to-day roles and responsibilities in Barbados, both Department and

other agency personnel were tasked with parallel responsibilities in the six other independent countries in the embassy's jurisdiction. For example, the Public Diplomacy Section was responsible for educational and cultural programming and media outreach from Embassy Bridgetown and oversight of programming at two American Corners,<sup>6</sup> one in Antigua and one in Dominica. Officers from the Political, Economic, and Commercial Affairs Section were assigned to report on political, economic, and trade issues in the other six countries, with officers typically traveling more than once a month to their designated island nations. The Management

<sup>5</sup> Embassy St. George's was established on February 2, 1984. The embassy is staffed by a Principal Officer who reports to the ambassador in Bridgetown.

<sup>6</sup> American Spaces, in this case titled American Corners, are the U.S. government's primary public cultural and information centers abroad that provide free and open access for communities worldwide interested in learning more about the United States.

Section coordinated eCountry Clearance requests from official visitors to all seven countries and provided support services for Embassy St. George's.

In addition, Embassy Bridgetown staff provided a range of consular services and outreach programming to several islands that were not independent nations. Consular personnel delivered and oversaw a range of routine and emergency services to U.S. citizens, both resident and vacationing, in three British overseas territories,<sup>7</sup> two French overseas departments,<sup>8</sup> and two French overseas collectives,<sup>9</sup> as well as visa services for residents of three Dutch overseas territories.<sup>10</sup> U.S. citizens in Grenada received services from Embassy St. George's, and U.S. citizens in Antigua and Barbuda and Martinique received services from the consular agencies on those islands, with oversight from Embassy Bridgetown's Consular Section. Because both embassy personnel and official U.S. government visitors regularly traveled to these islands, Embassy Bridgetown's security personnel had expanded areas of responsibility for the security of those official travelers.

## INSPECTION RESULTS

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OIG found Embassy Bridgetown's Front Office generally complied with Department standards for tone at the top and standards of conduct,<sup>11</sup> execution of foreign policy goals and objectives, adherence to internal controls, security and emergency planning, professional development for first- and second-tour professionals, and equal employment opportunity. The Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim (Chargé), a Senior Foreign Service officer, assumed leadership of the embassy after the January 2025 departure of the former Ambassador. At that time, the embassy's Management Counselor became the acting Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). OIG found the Chargé d'Affaires, who served as the DCM since May 2024 before assuming her current role, fostered collaboration by engaging all elements of the workforce, providing useful guidance, and responding to employee concerns. In interviews with OIG and written surveys, embassy U.S. direct-hire and LE staff told OIG the Chargé's efforts improved morale and sharpened the embassy's focus on its key policy objectives. In particular, staff welcomed the Chargé's emphasis on mutual respect and empathy, as well as her addressing the concerns expressed by some staff members regarding their work-life balance.

OIG assessed Embassy Bridgetown's Political, Economic, and Commercial Affairs Section's leadership and management, policy implementation, reporting and advocacy, and Leahy

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<sup>7</sup> Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat.

<sup>8</sup> Guadeloupe and Martinique.

<sup>9</sup> St. Barthelemy and St. Martin.

<sup>10</sup> Saba, Sint Eustatius, and Sint Maarten.

<sup>11</sup> The Department's leadership and management principles outlined in 3 FAM 1214b are (1) model integrity, (2) plan strategically, (3) be decisive and take responsibility, (4) communicate, (5) learn and innovate constantly, (6) be self-aware, (7) collaborate, (8) value and develop people, (9) manage conflict, and (10) foster resilience.

vetting<sup>12</sup> and found the section generally functioned according to Department standards. OIG also found the embassy's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section's coordination of foreign assistance and end-use monitoring<sup>13</sup> generally complied with Department standards. Additionally, OIG reviewed the Public Diplomacy Section's leadership, strategic planning and reporting, resource and knowledge management, grants management, program management and exchanges, media engagement, and oversight of the embassy's American Spaces and found the section generally complied with Department standards.

During the inspection, Embassy Bridgetown addressed the following issues:

- The Public Diplomacy Section corrected grants management issues by closing 59 expired grants, updating online files to document monitoring and evaluation, and establishing a new standard operating procedure to institutionalize grants operations.
- The Regional Security Office shared its emergency and evacuation radio testing results with the embassy's Diplomatic Technology (DT) unit and started weekly high-frequency radio testing with Embassy St. George's.
- The DT unit:
  - Updated its list of embassy personnel authorized to have unescorted access to limited access areas.
  - Updated user access and ensured only section staff had access to section files on the classified network.
  - Created standard operating procedures for cybersecurity incident response and spillage handling procedures.
  - Conducted tabletop exercises of the IT Contingency Plan on the Sensitive But Unclassified and classified networks.

OIG also identified Embassy Bridgetown's warehouse was too small to receive and accommodate its contents safely. Large items were stored on top shelves, presenting a fall hazard. The warehouse was also located on a busy road and lacked a loading area, space for forklifts to safely maneuver, and an outdoor space to store a dumpster. The dumpster was brought into the warehouse, which led to rodent and pest issues. The embassy identified a larger and safer warehouse for relocation, but at the time of this inspection, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) had not approved the additional funding needed to lease the larger warehouse.

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<sup>12</sup> The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the United States from furnishing certain assistance to a unit of a foreign security force if the Department has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. See 22 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 2378d and 9 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 303.8-5(B). Leahy vetting is the process of determining if the Department has credible information that units or individuals proposed to benefit from certain assistance have committed a gross violation of human rights. The Department helps implement a similar law applicable to "amounts made available to the Department of Defense" for assistance to foreign security forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 362.

<sup>13</sup> The Department requires certain property purchased with foreign assistance funds or through commercial defense exports be monitored to ensure the property is used for its intended purposes, known as end-use monitoring. Such end-use monitoring fulfills the requirements of Section 484(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; Chapter 3A, Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act; and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291c(b) and 22 U.S.C. § 2785.

OIG found deficiencies in certain aspects of the embassy’s executive direction, consular operations, resource management, and information management operations, as detailed in the Findings section of this report.

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department entities for review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued 29 recommendations to Embassy Bridgetown and 1 recommendation to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. The Department’s complete response can be found in Appendix B.<sup>14</sup>

**Findings**

Executive Direction: Support to Constituent Posts	
<b>Issue</b>	<i><b>Embassy Bridgetown Did Not Adequately Support Embassy St. George’s</b></i> Employees at both Embassy Bridgetown and Embassy St. George’s reported that Embassy Bridgetown did not fully meet management, security, and information technology needs of Embassy St. George’s. For example, although tasked with overseeing the DT unit at Embassy St. George’s, which had one LE staff member, Embassy Bridgetown’s DT unit U.S. direct-hire staff did not perform this function, as discussed later in this report. In addition, OBO ordered three generators for Embassy St. George’s, valued at approximately \$20,000 each, without coordinating with Embassy St. George’s and confirming what was needed in advance. As a result, Embassy Bridgetown delivered generators to Embassy St. George’s that were found unfit for local conditions because they were designed to run on voltage that is not the norm in Grenada.
<b>Criteria</b>	2 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 113.1a, b
<b>Significance</b>	Without improved coordination and support from Embassy Bridgetown, operations at Embassy St. George’s risk not conforming to Department standards regarding management, information technology, and security functions.
Recommendation 1	
Embassy Bridgetown should coordinate and consult with counterparts at Embassy St. George’s regarding management, information technology, and security functions. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>14</sup> Embassy Bridgetown and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs provided a joint response to the draft report.

Executive Direction: Emergency Preparedness	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Delineation of Embassy Responsibilities for British and French Territories Was Unclear</i></b></p> <p>The delineation of responsibilities between Embassies Bridgetown, London, and Paris was unclear and could impede the embassies' ability to meet chief of mission security responsibilities for British and French territories<sup>15</sup> in the Eastern Caribbean.<sup>16</sup> Embassy Bridgetown's staff told OIG they generally did not have problems coordinating with the U.S. embassies in London and Paris for routine visits to the British and French territories. Staff noted these visits were important for emergency preparedness to meet with local emergency contacts and to support consular services. However, staff also said they did not have a clear understanding of the full scope of responsibilities in the event of an emergency. In addition, OIG found there was no written agreement outlining the tasks that Embassy Bridgetown employees were expected to perform during an emergency. Therefore, in the event of a natural disaster or security instability that affected one or more of the British and French territories, Embassy Bridgetown lacked an understanding of the actions it should immediately undertake with British and French government officials.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	1 FAM 013.2k(5)(c), 3 FAM 1427d, cable 25 STATE 130562 <sup>17</sup>
<b>Significance</b>	The lack of a written agreement delineating Embassy Bridgetown's security and consular responsibilities in the British and French territories could delay the embassy's timely response in the event of an emergency.
Recommendation 2	
<p>The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop a written agreement delineating the responsibilities of Embassy Bridgetown with respect to the British and French territories in the Eastern Caribbean. (Action: WHA, in coordination with EUR, DS, CA, and L)</p>	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>15</sup> British territories were Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat. French territories were Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Barthelemy, and St. Martin.

<sup>16</sup> As of December 2025, OIG had an open recommendation regarding the delineation of responsibilities for the Dutch territories of Saba, Sint Eustatius, and Sint Maarten. See OIG, *Inspection of the U.S. Mission to the Dutch Caribbean*, page 4 (ISP-I-22-04, December 2021).

<sup>17</sup> Cable 25 STATE 13056, "Message from Secretary Rubio to Chiefs of Mission," February 13, 2025.

Policy and Program Implementation: Consular Operations	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown's Consular Chief Did Not Provide Strategic Direction and Leadership</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown's consular chief did not provide clear focus, direction, or goals to guide the section's activities. Staff told OIG the section lacked team cohesion as well as an understanding of the larger embassy mission and the goals to which each individual effort contributed.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	3 FAM 1214b(2)
<b>Significance</b>	Absent strategic direction and leadership, the Consular Section's contributions to the embassy's goals and objectives, and to the achievement of Department priorities, may be compromised.
<b>Recommendation 3</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should require the Consular Section chief to strategically direct and lead the section in accordance with Department leadership and management principles. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

Policy and Program Implementation: Consular Operations	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown’s Cashiering Operations Did Not Comply With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown’s consular managers did not retain complete cashier records and did not perform all required quarterly random cash verifications for the designated consular subcashiers. Specifically, half of the required cash counts were not performed in 2024, and although all consular subcashiers had received the required training, not all believed they were fully able to perform their duties without errors.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	7 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-743.2a–d, 7 FAH-1 H-746.1, 7 FAH-1 H-733.1d
<b>Significance</b>	Incomplete cashier records and not performing quarterly cash verifications impair the embassy’s ability to detect and correct errors when they occur. Additionally, failure to fully train and regularly monitor consular subcashiers may result in errors in cash collection and reconciliation.
<b>Recommendation 4</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should bring its consular cashier operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

Policy and Program Implementation: Consular Operations	
<b>Issue</b>	<b><i>Embassy Bridgetown's Duty Officer Guide Lacked Required Consular Content</i></b> The consular portion of Embassy Bridgetown's Duty Officer Guide lacked required information. <sup>18</sup> Specifically, the guide lacked instructions for assisting U.S. citizens involved in a road accident or for responding to incidents of an international parental child abduction involving U.S. citizens.
<b>Criteria</b>	2 FAM 113.8-1a, 7 FAH-1 H-291.2, 7 FAH-1 Exhibit H-291.2
<b>Significance</b>	Without complete information in the Duty Officer Guide, embassy personnel may be unprepared to assist U.S. citizens involved in a road accident or respond to incidents of child abduction.
<b>Recommendation 5</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should update its Duty Officer Guide to include all consular information required by Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>18</sup> Embassy and consulate personnel rotate responsibility to be on call outside of regular business hours. Each overseas post compiles and maintains a guide that affords assistance to duty officers in matters beyond the scope of their service experience or usual duty assignment, including assisting U.S. citizens in emergency situations. See 2 FAM 113.8-1.

<b>Policy and Program Implementation: Consular Operations</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown's Consular Section Interview Facilities Did Not Meet Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown's public service windows for consular interviews did not meet Department standards for a dignified, efficient, and comfortable space. Specifically, the malfunctioning or non-working microphones in these windows forced Consular Section staff and visa applicants to speak in raised voices through open portions of the interview windows, which made the interviews audible throughout the waiting area.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	7 FAH-1 H-281a, 7 FAH-1 H-463
<b>Significance</b>	Without a fully functioning microphone and sound system, the ability of consular officers to conduct consular business in a manner consistent with Department public service standards is compromised.
<b>Recommendation 6</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should bring its consular interview facilities into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

Policy and Program Implementation: Consular Operations	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown’s Consular Section Did Not Archive Electronic Communications on Department Systems</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown’s Consular Section used the electronic messaging system WhatsApp<sup>19</sup> to conduct Department business but did not archive these communications on Department systems as required. Consular Section staff told OIG they used WhatsApp to engage with and provide services to U.S. citizens but did not subsequently archive these communications on the Department’s network.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	5 FAM 435c, d
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to properly archive records of Department business risks the availability of information related to official decisions and activities for future use.
<b>Recommendation 7</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should archive Consular Section communications in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred. The embassy noted that the issue has been mitigated. According to the embassy, a recent upgrade to mobile phone software required all users to archive all text messages, including WhatsApp data. Furthermore, the embassy has provided guidance to Consular Section staff on archiving text messages.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. OIG acknowledges that recent updates to mobile phone software and the embassy’s guidance to Consular Section staff could mitigate the electronic message archive deficiency. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown archived Consular Section communications in accordance with Department standards.

<sup>19</sup> WhatsApp, owned by Meta, is a free electronic application that lets users send end-to-end encrypted messages, photos, and videos.

Resource Management: Facility Management	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown Elevators Malfunctioned</i></b></p> <p>During the inspection, OIG, accompanied by embassy facility management staff, observed two incidents where elevators malfunctioned and stopped between floors and a dozen incidents where the elevator doors did not open properly. Although OBO staff told embassy personnel the three elevators were safe to use, OBO had not provided the safety certificates—referred to as certificates of use<sup>20</sup>—since at least December 2023 despite several requests by the embassy. Embassy staff routinely used all three elevators.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	15 FAM 672.3, 15 FAM 672.6d(2)
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to address elevator malfunctions and the lack of certificates of use could result in injury or death of embassy personnel, contractors, or visitors.
Recommendation 8	
Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should inspect its elevators and obtain certificates of use for them in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with OBO)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

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<sup>20</sup> According to 15 FAM 672.6d(2), a certificate of use “results from successful testing and inspection that [the elevator] is free of deficiencies or code violations.”

<b>Resource Management: Facility Management</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Fire Protection Program Did Not Fully Comply With Department and Federal Standards</i></b></p> <p>The fire protection program did not fully comply with Department and federal standards. Specifically, OIG found:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Embassy Bridgetown did not perform hydrostatic testing and service of 70 of the 112 fire extinguishers in Bridgetown and St. George's at the required intervals,<sup>21</sup> and 62.5 percent of the extinguishers were expired (Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Part 1910.157; 15 FAM 813.6a; 15 FAM 843e).</li> <li>Both Embassy Bridgetown staff and residents in Bridgetown and St. George's told OIG that the embassy did not consistently conduct and document monthly inspections of residential fire extinguishers and smoke alarms. This lapse resulted in fire extinguishers that were expired and smoke alarms that did not work when OIG tested them (15 FAM 843c, d; 15 FAM 842b).</li> <li>Embassy Bridgetown's mitigation program for non-high-rise buildings did not fully comply with Department standards. In March 2024, the Department issued new standards for non-high-rise residences and functional buildings,<sup>22</sup> requiring these spaces to have two exits and fire alarm and fire suppression systems. If unable to meet these standards, embassies should obtain OBO approval of mitigation measures and inform occupants. During the inspection, embassy staff confirmed they had not begun implementation of the new requirements (15 FAM 813.7-3, 15 FAM 813.7-4, 15 FAM 813.7-6).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to comply with fire protection standards could limit the ability of the embassy to protect against hazards and increases the risks of property damage or injury to staff and visitors.
<b>Recommendation 9</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should bring the fire protection program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's into compliance with Department and federal standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with OBO)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>21</sup> The intervals, which depend on the type of fire extinguishers, are set forth in Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Part 1910.157.

<sup>22</sup> According to 15 FAM 813.7-6a, non-high-rise buildings are buildings with an occupied floor located less than 75 feet above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access. Embassy officials told OIG all 68 of the U.S. government-owned and leased residences and functional buildings in Bridgetown and St. George's were non-high-rise buildings. As such, they are all subject to the new standards.

<b>Resource Management: Facility Management</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Safety, Health, and Environmental Management Program Did Not Fully Comply With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>OIG found the safety, health, and environmental management (SHEM) program did not fully comply with Department and federal standards. Specifically,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OIG staff observed unsafe practices at the warehouse in Bridgetown, such as forklift drivers not wearing seat belts (14 FAH-1 H-313.6-2q; Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Parts 1910.28 and 1910.29). Additionally, OIG observed boxes, furniture, and a large fan blocking access to the sole functioning eyewash station at the warehouse (14 FAH-1 H-313.1-2g; Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Part 1910.151(c)).</li> <li>• Swimming pool pumps at the Chief of Mission Residence, Deputy Chief of Mission Residence, and Marine Security Guard Residence in Bridgetown were not protected by ground fault circuit interrupters (15 FAM 971.1(6)(h)).</li> <li>• OIG observed a fall hazard near the heating and air conditioning unit by the service controlled access center facility in Embassy Bridgetown (Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Part 1910.28).<sup>23</sup></li> <li>• The garage door at the Deputy Chief of Mission Residence was not equipped with an automatic reverse mechanism to prevent crushing injuries (16 Code of Federal Regulations § 1211.7).</li> <li>• The diesel fuel underground storage tank at Embassy St. George’s had inadequate spillage protection and leak detection (15 FAM 673.4a(4)–(5), b; 15 FAM 926(4); 15 FAH-1 H-117.5a(4)).</li> </ul> <p>OBO’s SHEM staff reported these deficiencies in March 2023, and OIG observed they were still unresolved during the inspection.</p>
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to address SHEM issues in a timely manner could result in injury of Department personnel or visitors.
<b>Recommendation 10</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should bring the safety, health, and environmental management program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with OBO)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred. The embassy requested further details on the OIG observed fall hazard.

<sup>23</sup> As noted in the 2023 OBO report, “The parapet near the HVAC unit on the service [controlled access center facility] was lower than 42 inches,” increasing the risk of a potential fall. Furthermore, OIG observed a 15 to 20 feet drop near this HVAC unit.

<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. OIG revised the finding to include additional details on the fall hazard. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the safety, health, and environmental management program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's complied with Department standards.
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<b>Resource Management: Facility Management</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Did Not Conduct and Document Workplace Safety Inspections in Compliance With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>OIG found Embassy Bridgetown staff did not conduct and document workplace safety inspections in Bridgetown and St. George's in accordance with Department standards. These inspections are required annually for low-risk workplaces and semi-annually for high-risk workplaces, but embassy staff were unable to provide any documentation that safety inspections had been done.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	15 FAM 962a, g, h
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to conduct workplace safety inspections as required could lead to an increased risk of injury.
<b>Recommendation 11</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should conduct and document workplace safety inspections in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Partially concurred. Embassy Bridgetown noted it did not fully concur with the recommendation as it conducts yearly self-assessments and could provide those results. Embassy Bridgetown concurred that this same assessment is not being completed as required in Embassy St. George's and will correct this deficiency upon the post occupational safety and health officer's next scheduled visit.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. During this inspection, OIG did not receive any documentation of Embassy Bridgetown's annual safety inspections of its low-risk workplaces or semi-annual inspections of its high-risk workplaces. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown conducted and documented safety inspections of low- and high-risk workplaces in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards.

<b>Resource Management: Facility Management</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Playground Did Not Fully Comply With Safety Standards</i></b></p> <p>OIG found the playground at Embassy Bridgetown did not fully comply with federal safety standards for playgrounds. Specifically, the playground was in a location where children could encounter motor vehicles, and it did not have a fence or barrier as required. Some embassy staff told OIG that parents would let their children play there without direct supervision, creating a risk for children and legal liability for the embassy.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	Consumer Product Safety Commission Public Playground Safety Standards, Section 2.1
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to address this issue could result in the injury or death of children at the embassy.
<b>Recommendation 12</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should bring its playground into compliance with federal safety standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Partially concurred. The embassy noted it did not fully concur with the recommendation as there are no clear Department standards published for playground equipment. The embassy stated it will create a sign to remind parents of their responsibilities to supervise their children while on the compound, will send a notice to the community with requirements for use of the playground equipment, and will require parents to sign a form releasing the embassy from any liability.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. OIG acknowledges that the Department does not have specific requirements for playground equipment. However, consistent with 15 FAM 911a and 15 FAM 912, overseas posts must comply with the Department's "policies governing the overall safety, health, environmental, and environmental health programs for the Department's overseas real property and the community serving abroad under the authority of the chiefs of mission, as mandated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)-specific requirements and environmental laws, as well as Federal laws and standards." Furthermore, 15 FAM 913 establishes 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1960 as one of the authorities for the Department's safety, health, and environmental management program abroad, and, according to 29 CFR 1960.30(a), "The agency shall ensure prompt abatement of unsafe and unhealthful conditions." The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown's playground complied with federal safety standards.

<b>Resource Management: Financial Management</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Did Not Review and De-Obligate Unliquidated Obligations in a Timely Manner</i></b></p> <p>OIG found the embassy did not review and de-obligate unliquidated obligations in a timely manner. The embassy had \$6.2 million in open unliquidated obligations, and 345 obligations worth \$1,656,734 had no activity for an average of more than 400 days.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	4 FAM 221.3d, 4 FAM 212b, 4 FAM 654, 4 FAM 654.2
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to review and de-obligate unliquidated obligations in a timely manner may result in an accumulation of funds that could be put to better use.
<b>Recommendation 13</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should review and de-obligate or validate all open unliquidated obligations without activity for an extended period, in accordance with Department standards, so funds up to \$1,656,734 can be put to better use. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<b>Resource Management: Human Resources</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Pension Plan for Locally Employed Staff Was Underfunded</i></b></p> <p>The embassy's pension plan for LE staff had a deficit of \$335,909 for the 3-year period from 2019 to 2022, with a similar deficit anticipated for 2023 to 2026. In accordance with the government of Barbados' pension guidelines, the pension plan must have adequate assets to cover its accrued liabilities. Furthermore, according to 3 FAM 7113.3, all agencies under chief of mission authority follow host country labor laws as long as those laws do not violate U.S. law and are consistent with U.S. public interest.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	Cable 04 STATE 037953; <sup>24</sup> 3 FAM 7113.3; Occupational Pension Benefits Regulations, 2011 (Barbados)
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to adequately fund the pension plan for LE staff puts the Department at risk of incurring unfunded liabilities and non-compliance with Barbados' labor laws.
<b>Recommendation 14</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureaus of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, Personnel and Training, and Western Hemisphere Affairs, should implement a plan to fund current liabilities and reduce future liabilities in the locally employed staff pension plan in order to comply with local labor law and address long term funding concerns. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with CGFS, PERT, and WHA)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>24</sup> Cable 04 STATE 037953, "Evaluating FSN Retirement Plans," February 4, 2004.

<b>Resource Management: General Services</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Contract File Management Did Not Fully Comply With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown’s contract file management did not fully comply with Department and federal standards. OIG reviewed contract files for all seven embassy contracts worth approximately \$4.5 million and found the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual contractor performance assessments in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System were missing for all four contracts over the simplified acquisition threshold<sup>25</sup> (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 42.1502(a), (b); 14 FAH-2 H-572a, c, d, f).</li> <li>• System for Award Management<sup>26</sup> registration was missing for one of the seven contracts (FAR Subpart 4.11).</li> <li>• National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019, Section 889 documentation from the vendor, which stated that they were not using equipment or services from any prohibited sources or had a waiver, was missing for one of the seven contracts (FAR 52.204-25(a), (b); FAR 52.204-26; FAR 4.2102(a), (c); FAR 4.2104).</li> <li>• Defense Base Act worker’s compensation insurance was missing for one of the two contracts where it was required (FAR 52.228-3).</li> <li>• Contracting officer’s representative (COR) certifications to the contracting officer that COR files were being properly maintained were missing for all seven contracts (14 FAH-2 H-517a, c).</li> <li>• The Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS)<sup>27</sup> COR eFiling module was not used for any of the seven contracts (14 FAH-2 H-142b(16)(b); Department of State Acquisition Manual 604.802-80(b), (c)).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	<p>Although OIG determined the embassy monitored contracts, received goods and services for which it had contracted, and addressed contract performance when issues arose, failure to comply with contract file requirements can adversely impact the embassy’s management and oversight of its contracts.</p>
<b>Recommendation 15</b>	
<p>Embassy Bridgetown should bring its contract files into compliance with Department and federal requirements. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)</p>	

<sup>25</sup> The Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System, or CPARS, is the government-wide evaluation reporting tool for all past performance reports on contracts and orders. A performance assessment must be done in the system, annually, for each contract over the simplified acquisition threshold of \$250,000. See FAR 2.101’s definition of simplified acquisition threshold and FAR 42.1502(a) and (b).

<sup>26</sup> The System for Award Management is the primary government repository for federal awardee information and serves as the centralized government system for certain contracting, grants, and other assistance-related processes. Information includes the identification of parties excluded from receiving federal contracts.

<b>Management Response</b>	Neither agreed nor disagreed. The embassy noted the General Services Officer is working to bring the files into compliance with required standards.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown's contract files complied with Department and federal requirements.

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<sup>27</sup> ILMS is an integrated web-based system that encompasses all Department supply chain functions in one system.

<b>Resource Management: General Services</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Contracting Officer's Representative Program Did Not Fully Comply With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown's COR program did not fully comply with Department standards. OIG found that none of the seven CORs were fully qualified to monitor and administer contracts, as described below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All seven CORs were missing or had expired COR certifications (14 FAH-2 H-143.1a, g, h; 14 FAH-2 H-113).</li> <li>• All seven CORs lacked COR training or training had expired; three lacked annual ethics training; and two lacked training to combat trafficking in persons (14 FAH-2 H-143.1, 11 FAM 622a(2)(a), Department of State Acquisition Manual 622.1780(b)).</li> <li>• Five of the seven CORs lacked the required delegation memos (14 FAH-2 H-143.2).</li> <li>• Two of the seven CORs did not complete annual financial disclosures (11 FAM 611.4).</li> <li>• A level I certified COR oversaw a large, complex contract for both Embassy Bridgetown and Embassy St. George's, which exceeded their COR training and qualifications (14 FAH-2 H-113c(1), (3)).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	Although OIG determined the embassy monitored contracts, received goods and services for which it had contracted, and addressed contract performance when issues arose, a noncompliant COR program increases the risk of contract mismanagement.
<b>Recommendation 16</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should bring its contracting officer's representative program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Neither agreed nor disagreed. The embassy noted the General Services Officer has reviewed all COR requirements to ensure that standards are met. All CORs are currently up to date with their requirements but those updates have not been entered into the new global warrant system. The incoming General Services Officer will update the new system to reflect his information as well as that of the CORs for all active contracts.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown's contracting officer's representative program complied with Department standards.

Resource Management: General Services	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Some Furniture and Appliance Pool Assets Were Misclassified or Were Used in Unapproved Locations</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown did not manage its furniture and appliance pool (FAP) assets in accordance with Department standards. According to ILMS data, \$37,345 of the embassy's FAP assets were flagged as potentially misclassified in the system. OIG's review of the data showed the embassy did not classify some residential furniture assets as FAP and showed the embassy used FAP assets, such as refrigerators, microwaves, and furniture, in official residences and offices, which are not approved locations. Management Section staff acknowledged some FAP assets were misclassified and other FAP assets were used in unapproved locations but said assistance from the Bureau of Administration in getting misclassified assets reclassified in ILMS was sometimes slow.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	6 FAH-5 H-513b(4)-(5), c; 6 FAH-5 H-514.1d(2); 6 FAH-5 H-514.2-3c(1)
<b>Significance</b>	By not properly classifying FAP assets in ILMS and managing those assets in accordance with Department standards, the embassy risks incorrectly charging customers for costs associated with the FAP program.
<b>Recommendation 17</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should manage its furniture and appliance pool assets in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with A)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

Resource Management: General Services	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Did Not Manage Fuel Deliveries as Required</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown did not manage its generator fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, OIG determined the receiving clerk, the person designated to receive all assets on behalf of the embassy, including generator fuel deliveries, was not receiving the fuel deliveries and entering them into ILMS. Management Section staff told OIG that facility management staff, who had not been designated to receive the fuel or to enter it into ILMS, were the ones receiving the generator fuel deliveries. In March 2022, OIG issued an information report that highlighted widespread fuel management deficiencies at overseas posts.<sup>28</sup></p>
<b>Criteria</b>	14 FAM 413.1a, b; 14 FAM 413.3a
<b>Significance</b>	Although OIG found no evidence of fuel theft during the inspection, allowing unauthorized staff to receive generator fuel deliveries increases the risk of mismanagement and theft.
<b>Recommendation 18</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should manage its generator fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Neither agreed nor disagreed. The embassy noted it is now managing the generator fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards, and the General Services Office receiving clerk is now present during all fuel deliveries.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown managed its generator fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards.

<sup>28</sup> OIG, *Information Report: Systemic Deficiencies Related to the Department of State's Fuel Management From FY 2016 Through FY 2020* (AUD-MERO-22-20, March 2022).

Resource Management: General Services	
<b>Issue</b>	<b><i>Embassy Did Not Close Out Procurement Files Within Required Timeframes</i></b> The embassy did not close out procurement files in ILMS within the required timeframes. <sup>29</sup> At the time of this inspection, the embassy had not closed out 1,032 procurement files from FY 2016 to FY 2025. In addition, OIG identified another 1,487 procurement files that could be ready for closeout once the embassy's procurement or financial management staff complete all required actions.
<b>Criteria</b>	14 FAH-2 H-573.2b, FAR 4.804
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to close out procurement files within required timeframes increases the risk of inaccuracies in procurement records.
<b>Recommendation 19</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should review and close out procurement files in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Neither agreed nor disagreed. The embassy noted that procurement file closeouts are currently in progress.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown reviewed and closed out procurement files in accordance with Department standards.

<sup>29</sup> According to 14 FAH-2 H-573.2, contracts that use simplified acquisition procedures must be closed out immediately upon the contracting officer (CO) receiving evidence of receipt of the property and final payment. For firm-fixed price contracts not using simplified acquisition procedures, the contract is required to be closed out within 6 months after the date the CO receives evidence of physical completion of the contract. All other contracts are required to be closed out within 20 months of the date on which the CO received evidence of physical completion of the contract. Contracts requiring settlement of indirect cost rates must be closed out within 36 months after the date on which the CO received evidence of physical completion.

<b>Resource Management: Financial Management</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Did Not Recover Costs for Excessive Personal Use of U.S. Government-Issued Cellular Telephones</i></b></p> <p>Although Embassy Bridgetown had a policy on recovering the costs of personal calls made on U.S. government-issued cellular telephones,<sup>30</sup> in accordance with Department standards,<sup>31</sup> OIG found the embassy failed to implement the policy consistently. Consequently, financial management staff were unable to determine amounts due and from whom, with evidence of only one embassy employee paying such charges in 2024.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	U.S. Mission Bridgetown Mobile Device Policy MP-004/2021
<b>Significance</b>	Without consistent implementation of requirements for the recovery of the costs of excessive personal use of government-issued cellular telephones, the U.S. government will continue to bear the cost of personal phone calls.
<b>Recommendation 20</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should implement a plan to recover the costs for personal calls on U.S. government-issued cellular telephones, in accordance with embassy policy. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Mission Bridgetown Mobile Device Policy MP-004/2021, Section 7 states if the total amount of personal usage exceeds \$50 on a monthly bill, the individual should reimburse the U.S. government within 10 working days.

<sup>31</sup> See 5 FAM 524.1b, c.

Information Management: General Management	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Diplomatic Technology Unit Lacked Budget and Training Plans</i></b>                      Embassy Bridgetown did not manage the DT unit in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, the embassy did not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have a budget plan that included replacement costs for the DT unit’s program and International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS)<sup>32</sup> equipment, and existing or future projects identified in the Mission Resource Request for both Embassy Bridgetown and Embassy St. George’s (5 FAM 124.2b(1)).</li> <li>• Have a training policy or plan for DT unit staff at Embassy Bridgetown and Embassy St. George’s (13 FAM 101.2-2(E), 3 FAH-2 H-135.5, 5 FAM 124.2b(3)(d), 5 FAM 124.4c(3)(a)).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	Without a budget plan for equipment and a functional training plan for DT unit staff, Embassies Bridgetown and St. George’s risk operational inefficiencies, security vulnerabilities, and service disruptions that can hinder productivity, increase costs, and compromise IT operations.
<b>Recommendation 21</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should create budget and training plans for the Diplomatic Technology unit in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>32</sup> ICASS is the principal means by which U.S. government agencies share the cost of common administrative support services at most diplomatic and consular posts overseas. Through the ICASS working capital fund, service providers recover the cost of delivering administrative support services to other agencies at overseas missions.

<b>Information Management: Information Systems Security</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Information Systems Security Officers Did Not Perform All Required Duties</i></b></p> <p>The designated primary and alternate Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) did not consistently perform ISSO duties for Embassy Bridgetown’s classified, OpenNet, and non-enterprise networks (NEN)<sup>33</sup> or Embassy St. George’s unclassified networks. Specifically, OIG found the ISSOs did not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review user access annually to verify if access was still needed or had been updated at either embassy (12 FAH-10 H-112.1-3b, c).</li> <li>• Brief employees at both embassies on cybersecurity responsibilities prior to granting access to Department resources (12 FAH-10 H-212.1-3(1)).</li> <li>• Apply the principle of least privilege<sup>34</sup> to LE staff system administrators when they allowed full unmonitored access to every section’s shared files at both embassies (12 FAH-10 H-112.5; National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Section AC-6).</li> <li>• Ensure there were no password files saved on OpenNet shared folders at either embassy (12 FAH-10 H-132.4-2(8), 12 FAH-10 H-132.4-3).</li> <li>• Brief users at both embassies on mobile device cybersecurity awareness when issued mobile devices or annually thereafter (14 FAM 414.3b(1)(a)).</li> <li>• Monitor access to areas where IT systems reside (12 FAH-10 H-272.5-3(1)).</li> <li>• Use the ISSO checklist to perform duties (5 FAH-11 H-116a).</li> </ul> <p>The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) identified similar issues with the ISSO programs at Embassies Bridgetown and St. George’s.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, OIG issued reports that highlighted widespread failures to perform ISSO duties.<sup>36</sup></p>
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to perform required ISSO responsibilities leaves Department networks vulnerable to potential unauthorized access and malicious activity.
<b>Recommendation 22</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should require the Information Systems Security Officers to perform all duties in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>33</sup> OpenNet is the Department’s Sensitive But Unclassified network. A NEN is a Department-procured and locally managed computing environment.

<sup>34</sup> The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the principle of least privilege as “allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks.” See NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5, “Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations,” page 36 (December 2020).

<b>Information Management: Emergency Communications</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Emergency Communications Program Did Not Meet Department Standards</i></b>                      The emergency communications program did not meet Department standards. During the inspection, OIG found:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Embassy Bridgetown did not have a standard operating procedure to track issuance, maintenance, and disposal of inventory for the radio program (5 FAM 544.1(5), 14 FAM 411.4).</li> <li>• Embassy St. George’s lacked documentation that it conducted monthly tests of the emergency and evacuation radio system (5 FAH-2 H-733a).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	An emergency communications program that does not meet Department standards raises the risk that emergency communications will not be available or severely limited in functionality during an emergency.
<b>Recommendation 23</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should bring the emergency communications program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred. Embassy Bridgetown noted that Embassy St. George’s has one U.S. direct-hire staff member, and, therefore, there is no emergency and evacuation radio system in place. However, Embassy St. George’s will implement a monthly check of emergency communications using cell phones.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. OIG acknowledges that Embassy St. George’s has just one U.S. direct-hire staff member. However, as noted in this finding, Department standards in 5 FAH-2 H-733a state that emergency and evacuation radio systems must be tested monthly, or more frequently, as directed by the chief of mission. Furthermore, according to 5 FAH-2 H-733b, the Emergency Action Committee must establish procedures for the monthly radio tests, and 5 FAM 541c states that any exception must be approved by the chief of mission. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown brought the emergency communications program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s into compliance with Department standards or obtained an exception to the standards.

<sup>35</sup> DS, “Cybersecurity Assessment US Embassy Bridgetown – Bridgetown ESC FRC 2020-003,” March 2020; “Cybersecurity Assessment US Embassy St. George’s – St. George’s ESC FRC 2024-014,” August 2024.

<sup>36</sup> OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Non-Performance of Information Systems Security Officer Duties by Overseas Personnel* (ISP-17-24, May 2017); *Management Assistance Report: Continued Deficiencies in Performance of Information Systems Security Officer Responsibilities at Overseas Posts* (ISP-21-07, December 2020).

<b>Information Management: Physical Protection of IT Assets</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Sensitive But Unclassified Server Rooms at Embassy Bridgetown and Embassy St. George's Did Not Meet Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassies Bridgetown and St. George's Sensitive But Unclassified server rooms did not meet Department standards. Specifically, OIG found:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Both embassies placed non-Department-owned modems and routers, which supplied internet access to OpenNet, inside Sensitive But Unclassified server rooms instead of in a demarcation room (12 FAH-6 H-651.5-2a).</li> <li>• Embassy St. George's did not have functioning DS-approved locks for its server room (12 FAH-10 H-272.2-1(1)).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	<p>Placing non-Department-owned telecommunications equipment in the Sensitive But Unclassified server room creates security vulnerabilities of electronic surveillance and confidentiality risks when non-cleared technicians access the room for technical support. Additionally, without functional DS-approved locks and access monitoring by Embassy Bridgetown ISSOs, the risk of unauthorized access and tampering of Sensitive But Unclassified equipment increases.</p>
<b>Recommendation 24</b>	
<p>Embassy Bridgetown should bring the Sensitive But Unclassified server rooms in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)</p>	
<b>Management Response</b>	<p>Concurred.</p>

Information Management: Internal Control	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown and Embassy St. George’s Did Not Manage Mobile Devices in Accordance With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassies Bridgetown and St. George’s did not manage mobile devices in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The embassies did not have a written procedure that addressed receiving, inspecting, and accepting mobile devices into the inventory (14 FAH-1 H-312g).</li> <li>• At both embassies, the same staff members who received mobile devices and entered the information into ILMS also supported the inventory reconciliation and disposal processes (14 FAH-1 H-112.2j(2), (4)).</li> <li>• The DT unit’s accountable property officer did not conduct quarterly unannounced spot checks to verify the accuracy of mobile device property records in ILMS at either embassy (14 FAM 411.2-2b(8)).</li> <li>• At both embassies, enterprise mobile devices were loaned more than 90 days at a time without the approval of the DT unit’s accountable property officer (14 FAM 412.4-2c).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	Failure to implement the Department’s mobile device management standards increases the risk of compromise of Department information and loss of U.S. government property.
<b>Recommendation 25</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should manage the mobile device program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<b>Information Management: Mail and Pouch</b>	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Mail and Pouch Program Did Not Meet Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>Embassies Bridgetown and St. George's did not manage the mail and pouch program in accordance with Department standards. Specifically, OIG found:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LE staff in both embassies were listed as authorized users for diplomatic pouch and diplomatic post office in the mail customer directory (14 FAM 724.2b, c; 14 FAM 761.3a).</li> <li>• Embassy Bridgetown routinely used the unclassified pouch to receive official items (14 FAM 723.2b).</li> <li>• Embassy Bridgetown did not have a mail screening room with negative air pressure or protective gear such as goggles (14 FAH-4 H-121.1d(1), 15 FAM 957.6a, b; 14 FAH-4 H-331.2c).</li> <li>• Embassy St. George's did not have a mail screening facility or protective gear such as goggles (14 FAH-4 H-121.1d(1), 15 FAM 957.6, 14 FAH-4 H-331.2c).</li> <li>• Embassy St. George's did not have a standard operating procedure to examine letters and packages for biological threats (14 FAM 767.3; 14 FAM 717a, c, d).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	<p>Listing unauthorized users in the mail customer directory raises the risk of unauthorized use and abuse of the pouch and diplomatic post office services. The lack of proper mail screening facilities and standard operating procedures raises the risks of contamination and safety concerns from malicious mail and packages.</p>
<b>Recommendation 26</b>	
<p>Embassy Bridgetown should manage the mail and pouch program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)</p>	
<b>Management Response</b>	<p>Concurred.</p>

Information Management: Information Security	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassies Bridgetown and St. George's Did Not Implement a Local Configuration Management Protocol</i></b></p> <p>Although Embassy Bridgetown had a local IT configuration control board (local configuration management protocol)<sup>37</sup> charter dated February 2016, OIG found no evidence that the embassy had used the protocol to ensure that the hardware, software, or network components installed on its networks did not adversely affect the local IT infrastructure under the embassy's operational control. Furthermore, the charter did not include a local configuration management protocol for Embassy St. George's. At both embassies, OIG observed locally procured, unapproved network devices on NENs, as well as locally developed applications, that had not received Department or local approval.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	5 FAM 862.1b, <sup>38</sup> 5 FAM 114.6-2a, 5 FAM 864c
<b>Significance</b>	Without a functioning local configuration management protocol, the embassies cannot manage risks to the Department's information stemming from unapproved hardware and software on its networks.
Recommendation 27	
Embassy Bridgetown should establish and implement a local configuration management protocol in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred. The embassy noted it is working to implement a local configuration control board for Embassy St. George's and updating Bridgetown's, and it is reviewing the diplomatic note tracker, which is a workflow developed using Power Apps. The embassy also noted that Power Apps is an application already approved by the Department's IT configuration control board with a current authorization to operate, and therefore, should not require local configuration control board approval.
<b>OIG Reply</b>	OIG considers the recommendation resolved. OIG notes that a local configuration management protocol will outline how Embassy Bridgetown will review the products it uses that are approved by the Department's IT configuration control board (now referred to as the Technical Review Board). The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Bridgetown established and implemented a local configuration management protocol in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards.

Information Management: Information Security	
<b>Issue and Criteria</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown Developed Applications Without a Life Cycle Management Plan</i></b></p> <p>Embassy Bridgetown developed applications for Bridgetown and Embassy St. George’s without implementing a systems development life cycle management plan. Specifically, OIG found the embassy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Used Microsoft’s O365 Power Platform and SharePoint to develop software but did not document access control requirements, application architecture, data types and sources, routine application management tasks, and support requirements to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements and sustainability (12 FAH-10 H-342.2-1, 12 FAH-10 H-342.4-1, Department’s O365 Power Platform Developer Guide<sup>39</sup>).</li> <li>• Developed applications that stored personally identifiable information without conducting a privacy impact assessment<sup>40</sup> (5 FAM 466.2c(1), (5)).</li> </ul>
<b>Significance</b>	Not having a systems development life cycle management plan increases risk to the security, compliance, and sustainability of Department information.
<b>Recommendation 28</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should implement a systems development life cycle management plan for the applications it develops in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>37</sup> In November 2024, the Department updated FAM references to the “local IT configuration control board” to “local configuration management protocol.” For example, see 5 FAM 114.6-2, “Local Configuration Management.” At the time of this inspection, the references in 5 FAM 862.1b and 5 FAM 864c, last updated in June 2024 and October 2018, respectively, continued to refer to the “local IT configuration control board.”

<sup>38</sup> The Department updated 5 FAM 862 in June 2025, after OIG completed fieldwork for this inspection, to require Bureau of Diplomatic Technology Technical Review Board approval for all hardware and software on Department networks.

<sup>39</sup> Department of State, DOS-O365, Power Platform Developer Guide, Version 1.0, March 23, 2023.

<sup>40</sup> According to 5 FAM 463, a privacy impact assessment is “[a]n analysis of how information is handled to ensure handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; to determine the risks and effects of creating, collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining, disseminating, disclosing, and disposing of information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; and to examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy concerns.”

Information Management: Telephone Operations	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Embassy Bridgetown's and Embassy St. George's Lacked Procedures To Review Telephone Charges</i></b></p> <p>Embassies Bridgetown and St. George's lacked procedures to review telephone charges. Specifically, OIG found the embassies had no evidence of a call accounting<sup>41</sup> standard operating procedure and had not configured their call accounting system to identify and seek repayment for personal calls made from desk telephones.</p>
<b>Criteria</b>	5 FAM 527a, c; <sup>42</sup> 5 FAM 511c(4)
<b>Significance</b>	Without procedures to review telephone charges, the embassies risk using government funds to pay for personal calls made from desk telephones.
<b>Recommendation 29</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should develop and implement procedures to review telephone charges for Bridgetown and Embassy St. George's. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>41</sup> According to 5 FAH-2 H-114, call accounting is the process by which call detail records for specific, or groups of, telephone extensions are collected and recorded for billing and traffic monitoring purposes.

<sup>42</sup> The Department updated and renumbered this section of the FAM in May 2025, after OIG completed fieldwork for this inspection. The requirement can be found at 5 FAM 525a, c.

<b>Information Management: Records Management</b>	
<b>Issue</b>	<p><b><i>Records Management Program Did Not Comply With Department Standards</i></b></p> <p>The records management program at Embassies Bridgetown and St. George's did not comply with Department standards. The records coordinator did not regularly review the embassies' records systems and records management practices, regularly apply the appropriate records disposition schedules to the embassy's files, and did not establish guidance and procedures to advise management of the records held within each section. According to data from the Department's Records Management Office and OIG's onsite review, Embassy Bridgetown had not archived economic and political records since 2007 and 2016, respectively. In addition, Embassy Bridgetown had not sent any personnel records<sup>43</sup> to the Department since 2013. The Department's Records Management Office also reported that Embassy St. George's had never retired any Economic Section or personnel records. Finally, Embassy St. George's had not retired Political Section or principal officer records since 1992 and 2005, respectively. OIG issued a management assistance report in 2022 that highlighted issues with the Department's records retirement process.<sup>44</sup></p>
<b>Criteria</b>	5 FAM 418.9-3, 5 FAM 451b, 5 FAH-4 H-312.1b, 5 FAH-4 H-312.2
<b>Significance</b>	Without a records management program that follows Department requirements for organization, records retirement, disposition, and oversight, the embassy is vulnerable to inefficient information retrieval and loss of critical documentation.
<b>Recommendation 30</b>	
Embassy Bridgetown should implement a records management program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)	
<b>Management Response</b>	Concurred.

<sup>43</sup> When a post is the personnel office for a separated employee, the employee's personnel files must be sent to the Department's Records Management Records Service Center 1 year after the employee's separation date. The Department then manages and disposes the personnel files as required by the appropriate records control schedule. See Department of State Legacy Records Disposition Schedules, "Personnel Folders of Non-American Employees."

<sup>44</sup> OIG, *Management Assistance Report: The Department of State's Records Retirement Process* (ISP-22-20, June 2022).

## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Agency/Section/Title	Name	Arrival Date
<b>Chiefs of Mission:</b>		
Ambassador	Vacant	
Deputy Chief of Mission	Karin Sullivan <sup>a</sup>	5/2024
<b>Constituent Post:</b>		
Embassy St. George's, Principal Officer	Frances Herrera	8/2023
<b>Chiefs of Sections:</b>		
Consular	Darrien Haney	8/2022
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Management	Russell Comeau	9/2024
Political, Economic, and Commercial Affairs	Peter Anthes <sup>b</sup>	9/2022
Public Diplomacy	Ari Nathan	9/2023
Regional Security	Donald Maynard	8/2022
	Rodney Collins	8/2023
<b>Other Agency Representatives:</b>		
Drug Enforcement Administration	Doug Waters	7/2024
Department of Homeland Security	Annette Joseph	5/2021
Internal Revenue Service	Keniel Ledgister	6/2021
Legal Attaché	Gabriel Gunderson	8/2024
Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché	CDR Steve Hulse	6/2024
U.S. Agency for International Development	Mervyn Farroe	4/2023

<sup>a</sup> Karin Sullivan became Chargé d'Affaires on January 20, 2025, when Ambassador Roger Nyhus departed Embassy Bridgetown.

<sup>b</sup> At the time of this inspection, Peter Anthes was serving as the acting Deputy Chief of Mission.

**Source:** Generated by OIG from personnel data provided by Embassy Bridgetown.

## APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

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This inspection was conducted from January 2 to April 9, 2025,<sup>1</sup> in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspections Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).

### Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chief Executive Officer of USAGM, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and USAGM. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved and U.S. interests are accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy; and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; and whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### Methodology

OIG used a risk-based approach to prepare for this inspection. OIG conducted portions of the inspection remotely and relied on audio- and video-conferencing tools in addition to in-person interviews with Department and other personnel. OIG also reviewed pertinent records; circulated surveys and compiled the results; and discussed the substance of this report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the inspection. OIG used professional judgment and analyzed physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence to develop its findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

OIG assessed executive direction based on interviews, staff questionnaires, and OIG's review of documents and observations of embassy meetings and activities during the on-site portion of the inspection. OIG assessed the embassy's policy and program implementation, which includes political and economic, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, and consular operations, through a review of the embassy's advocacy and analysis work, section leadership, strategic planning and

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<sup>1</sup> The issuance of this report was delayed due to the lapse in appropriations, which began October 1, 2025, and ended November 12, 2025.

reporting, knowledge management, grants administration, program management and exchanges, media engagement, and oversight of American spaces. OIG also reviewed Embassy Bridgetown's provision of U.S. citizen services, crisis preparedness, management controls, visa services and processing, and fraud prevention programs. To address resource management, OIG reviewed internal control systems in facility management, general services, financial management, and human resources. Finally, OIG assessed Embassy Bridgetown's computer network operations, information systems and administration of mobile computing devices, mail and pouch services, cybersecurity practices, records management, and telephone and emergency communications systems.

## APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

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*Embassy of the United States of America*

*Bridgetown, Barbados*

September 3, 2025

UNCLASSIFIED

THRU: WHA – Senior Bureau Official Mike Kozak

TO: OIG – Lisa Rodely, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: Embassy Bridgetown – Chargé d’Affaires Karin Sullivan

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados

Embassy Bridgetown has reviewed the draft OIG inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

**OIG Recommendation 1:** Embassy Bridgetown should coordinate and consult with counterparts at Embassy St. George’s regarding management, information technology, and security functions. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The recent arrival of the new Principal Officer for St. George’s means we are well placed to reinforce the need for enhanced coordination. Embassy Bridgetown’s ability to fully support Embassy St. George’s requires adequate financial resources to allow for regular travel to perform training and consultations. WHA will need to support post’s requests for budgetary resources that allow for coordination to continue.

**OIG Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop a written agreement

delineating the responsibilities of Embassy Bridgetown with respect to the British and French territories in the Eastern Caribbean. (Action: WHA, in coordination with EUR, DS, CA, and L)

**Response:** WHA concurs with the recommendation and will convene a working group with EUR, DS, CA, and L to delineate the responsibilities.

**OIG Recommendation 3:** Embassy Bridgetown should require the Consular Section chief to strategically direct and lead the section in accordance with Department leadership and management principles. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. As of July 2025, the Consular Section chief position is vacant. In evaluating candidates for open positions, post management is seeking applicants who can articulate a plan for strategic leadership to guide our team towards achieving our goals effectively and sustainably, and who will prioritize team cohesion. We hope to have a new Consular Chief in place by September 2025.

**OIG Recommendation 4:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring its consular cashier operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. To address deficiencies in record keeping, Post has implemented a plan to ensure regular unannounced cash counts for all three cashiers, rather than prioritizing the primary consular cashier as was previously the case (resulting in delayed or missed cash counts for backup cashiers). The Accountable Consular Officer has added these unannounced cash counts to his calendar. As of July 2025, post is up to date with required cash counts for the fourth quarter of FY2025.

One issue post identified was that the two backup cashiers felt unprepared to perform all cashing functions due to the infrequency of their duties. Backup cashiers were used sometimes less than once per month. To address this, post has developed a cashier rotation schedule. While the primary cashier will continue to handle most days, the two alternate cashiers will each take a turn at least twice per month to ensure consistent practice and readiness.

**OIG Recommendation 5:** Embassy Bridgetown should update its Duty Officer Guide to include all consular information required by Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with this recommendation. Post has updated duty officer resources to include guidance for assisting U.S. citizens involved in road accidents and responding to incidents of international parental child abduction involving U.S. citizens. Additionally, post has emphasized the importance of all duty officers completing the FSI distance learning course on duty officer responsibilities. By September 2025, post plans to conduct the first training for duty officers to include information on assistance to road accident victims appropriate under local laws; and an overview of the duty officer's role in cases of international parental child abduction.

**OIG Recommendation 6:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring its consular interview facilities into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Management concurs with the recommendation. CONS and FAC are in the process of drafting a Facilities Work Plan to submit to OBO to seek funding support. CONS will add the required funding to its FY2026 budget submission. As a temporary measure, CONS will ensure each employee that wants/needs a headset will have one available.

**OIG Recommendation 7:** Embassy Bridgetown should archive Consular Section communications in accordance with Department standards.

**Management Response:** Post concurs with this recommendation. However, we assess that the issue has been mitigated. A recent upgrade to mobile phone software required all users to archive all their text messages, including all WhatsApp data. Post has provided guidance to consular staff on archiving text messages going forward. Post considers this recommendation resolved.

**OIG Recommendation 8:** Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should inspect its elevators and obtain certificates of use for them in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with OBO)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The embassy had OBO supported elevator inspections occur in April 2025. Post has corrected 5 out of 15 deficiencies and are awaiting shipment of orders for remaining deficiencies correction. Certificates will automatically populate once all deficiencies have been resolved and entered the system.

**OIG Recommendation 9:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring the fire protection program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's into compliance with Department and federal standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with OBO)

**Management Response:** Embassy Bridgetown concurs with the recommendation. The embassy has ordered and received all new fire extinguishers and is in the process of replacing all expired units. The Embassy has released a management notice as well as published within the housing handbook that residents are responsible for monthly inspections of their fire extinguishers and all smoke detectors within their homes, this has been further documented in a semi-recurring article in the monthly newsletter. The Embassy is in the process of implementing new requirements brought forth within the mitigation program for non-high-rise buildings.

**OIG Recommendation 10:** Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should bring the safety, health, and environmental management program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with OBO)

**Management Response:** Embassy Bridgetown concurs with the recommendation. The embassy is working with warehouse personnel on safe practices. The Embassy has replaced the breakers at the aforementioned pools with proper GFCS breakers. The Embassy requires further details on the OIG observed fall hazard. The Embassy is sourcing the correct product for the DCMR garage door. The Embassy is working with OBO for funding and procurement of the proper fuel storage solutions for Embassy St. George's.

**OIG Recommendation 11:** Embassy Bridgetown should conduct and document workplace safety inspections in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Bridgetown does not concur completely with the recommendation. Embassy Bridgetown does yearly self-assessments as required and can produce the results on demand. Embassy Bridgetown does concur that this same assessment is not being completed as required in Embassy St. George's and will correct this deficiency upon the POSHO's next scheduled visit.

**OIG Recommendation 12:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring its playground into compliance with federal safety standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post does not fully concur with the recommendation as there are no clear Department standards published for playground equipment as there are for swimming pools. The Embassy will have a sign created reminding parents of their responsibilities to supervise their children while on the compound, will send a notice to the community with requirements for use of the playground equipment and management will require parents to sign a form releasing the Embassy from any liability.

**OIG Recommendation 13:** Embassy Bridgetown should review and de-obligate or validate all open unliquidated obligations without activity for an extended period, in accordance with Department standards, so funds up to \$1,656,734 can be put to better use. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. GSO and FMO are identifying all open unliquidated obligations for validation or de-obligation, in line with Department standards. This process is scheduled for completion by September 1, 2025.

**OIG Recommendation 14:** Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureaus of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, Personnel and Training, and Western Hemisphere Affairs, should implement a plan to fund current liabilities and reduce future liabilities in the locally employed staff pension plan in order to comply with local labor law and address long term funding concerns. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with CGFS, PERT, and WHA)

**Management Response:** Embassy Bridgetown concurs with the recommendation. Post is currently reviewing annual payments. The current plan includes consideration of an increase in the employer contribution rate. Finalization of payments will focus on reducing outstanding liabilities, contingent upon the availability of funds. Implementation of decisions will be made promptly once the new ICASS Council is constituted, and the latest actuarial report is received.

**OIG Recommendation 15:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring its contract files into compliance with Department and federal requirements. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** GSO is working to complete a review and make corrections to contract files which will bring the files into compliance with required standards by September 30, 2025.

**OIG Recommendation 16:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring its contracting officer's representative program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** GSO has reviewed all Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) requirements to ensure that standards are met. All CORs are currently up to date with their requirements but they have not been entered into the new FAC-COR system. In order to do this update, the incoming GSO will have to make adjustments within the new Global Warrant system so that they reflect his information as well as theirs on contracts active at post. Estimated completion is September 30, 2025.

**OIG Recommendation 17:** Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should manage its furniture and appliance pool assets in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown, in coordination with A)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation and will manage FAP furniture according to policy guidance provided by not removing it from residences until it has reached full depreciation or is damaged beyond repair and FAP will not be issued to MSGR, DCMR or CMR. Estimated completion date: September 30, 2025.

**OIG Recommendation 18:** Embassy Bridgetown should manage its generator fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Bridgetown is now managing the generator fuel deliveries in accordance with Department standards. The GSO Receiving clerk is now present during all fuel deliveries.

**OIG Recommendation 19:** Embassy Bridgetown should review and close out procurement files in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Procurement file closeouts are currently in progress with over 1000 closed in July and the estimated date for completion of all files to be closed that are ready to close is September 1, 2025.

**OIG Recommendation 20:** Embassy Bridgetown should implement a plan to recover the costs for personal calls on U.S. government-issued cellular telephones, in accordance with embassy policy. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The Embassy is reviewing the current management policy and working on creating a plan to identify and recover personal calls on government issued cell phones that will not incur additional staff costs.

**OIG Recommendation 21:** Embassy Bridgetown should create budget and training plans for the Diplomatic Technology unit in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The Embassy is working on creating a training budget specifically for the DT staff – assuming their continue to be budgetary resources to support it - and identifying the appropriate DT training available at FSI.

**OIG Recommendation 22:** Embassy Bridgetown should require the Information Systems Security Officers to perform all duties in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The Embassy will implement the use of ISSO checklist; will add briefings to employees as they are issued radios and mobile devices (cell phones and EMDs); is reviewing system administrator rights and shared folders to ensure they are complying with all duties and requirements in accordance with Department standards.

**OIG Recommendation 23:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring the emergency communications program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. Embassy St. George's has one USDH staff member, therefore there is no E&E system in place. However, Embassy St. George's will implement a monthly check of emergency communications using cell phones. Embassy Bridgetown has rectified and brought its EMP into compliance.

**OIG Recommendation 24:** Embassy Bridgetown should bring the Sensitive but Unclassified server rooms in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The Embassy has been Working with the DTO-CE team to identify and replace the equipment in question in our SBU

server rooms and work with the ISP providers to move them to the DEMARC. DT has spoken with the Technical Security Officer (TSO) regarding installing DS-Approved locks in Post Grenada and will install it when he is scheduled to service the Post.

**OIG Recommendation 25:** Embassy Bridgetown should manage the mobile device program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response** Post concurs with the recommendation. We have switched our GFE tracking over to Apple Business Management (ABM), which the Department has chosen to provide better service and track Government Mobile devices. We are also improving receiving practices (ILMS training) and updating our SOPs for receiving.

**OIG Recommendation 26:** Embassy Bridgetown should manage the mail and pouch program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation and considers this recommendation closed. The Bridgetown Mail Screening Room is now operational, and a new Mail Screening Room for Grenada has been installed.

**OIG Recommendation 27:** Embassy Bridgetown should establish and implement a local configuration management protocol in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The Embassy is working on implementing a local IT Configuration Control Board (IT LCCB) for Grenada and updating Bridgetown's. We are currently reviewing the Dip Note Tracker, which is a workflow developed using Power Apps. Power App is an application already approved by the IT Configuration Control Board (ITCCB) with a current ATO and should not require LCCB approval for its use. Regarding the NEN Network, all devices at Post Bridgetown have ITTCB approved devices connected. Post Grenada has removed the items in question and submitted 2 ITCCB change requests.

**OIG Recommendation 28:** Embassy Bridgetown should implement a systems development life cycle management plan for the applications it develops in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response** Post concurs with the recommendation. DT is reviewing current applications, determining if they are still needed and can be eliminated from use. For those applications that are still needed, DT will review and document access control requirements, application architecture, data types and sources, routine application management tasks, and support requirements.

**OIG Recommendation 29:** Embassy Bridgetown should develop and implement procedures to review telephone charges for Bridgetown and Embassy St. George's. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. The FMO will create a policy and a process to review desk telephone usage and bill for personal calls.

**OIG Recommendation 30:** Embassy Bridgetown should implement a records management program in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George's that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Bridgetown)

**Management Response:** Post concurs with the recommendation. Post issued a records management policy in November 2024 (MP 17) and is working with all sections to ensure they are correctly managing records per the appropriate records management schedules.



# HELP FIGHT

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