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Special Review of the Department of State’s Handling of the Security Clearance Suspension of the Special Envoy for Iran

ESP-24-01
    Report Contents
    Unclassified

    What OIG Reviewed
    At the request of several U.S. Senators, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed whether Department of State (Department) officials complied with all relevant laws and regulations regarding the suspension of the security clearance of Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley and whether the Department followed standard practices following the suspension of the clearance.

    What OIG Recommends
    OIG made three recommendations to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure prompt notification of security clearance actions, to amend its guidance on Information Facilities and Access Restrictions, and to consider whether guidance is needed regarding notice to supervisors and colleagues when an employee’s security clearance is suspended. OIG made one recommendation to the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Global Talent Management to develop standard procedures for when a political appointee’s security clearance is suspended. Finally, OIG recommended that the Under Secretary for Management send periodic reminders of the requirement to report allegations of serious or criminal misconduct to OIG.

    What OIG Found
    Department officials generally followed standard procedures in the suspension of Special Envoy Robert Malley’s security clearance. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security immediately assessed and acted upon the adverse information it received regarding Mr. Malley. The Department deviated from the way that suspensions are typically delivered by delaying notification to Mr. Malley until senior Department officials were apprised of his suspension. The delay allowed him the opportunity to participate in a classified conference call after the suspension was approved, but before he was notified. Also, Department officials restored his access to Sensitive But Unclassified information systems, although such access is usually restricted for individuals in circumstances similar to Mr. Malley. A key justification for the restoration of access was concern that, if Special Envoy Malley was restricted from accessing his Department email account, he might use a personal email account as his primary means of conducting government business, which is explicitly prohibited by Department policy.

    OIG also found that the lack of standard policies for political appointees and the lack of supervision of Special Envoy Malley led to significant confusion as to what work Mr. Malley was authorized to do following the suspension. The Department failed to consistently notify employees who regularly interacted with Mr. Malley that he was no longer allowed to access classified information. These conditions likely led to Special Envoy Malley engaging on issues outside the limited scope of issues on which he was authorized to work. Finally, OIG found that the Department did not report the allegations against Mr. Malley to OIG, as required by the Department of State Authorities Act.

    Recommendation Number
    1
    Closed Implemented

    The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should adhere to standard notification processes of security clearance suspension without regard to the individual’s position in the Department.

    Recommendation Number
    2
    Closed Implemented Significant

    The Bureaus of Global Talent Management and Diplomatic Security should develop standard operating procedures for political appointees whose security clearances are suspended.

    Recommendation Number
    3
    Open Resolved

    The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should amend its guidance regarding the Information Facilities and Access Restriction (IFAR) process to include criteria as to which type of IFAR should be issued and to emphasize that a “Typical” IFAR allows the employee continued access to a substantial amount of Sensitive But Unclassified information.

    Recommendation Number
    4
    Open Resolved

    The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should amend its processes to ensure that supervisors and colleagues are notified when an employee’s security clearance is suspended and the employee is permitted to continue working in the same position in order to ensure that classified information is not shared.

    Recommendation Number
    5
    Closed Implemented

    The Under Secretary for Management should issue regular reminders to all Department employees that the law requires them to report allegations of criminal or serious misconduct to OIG.