Audit of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program

What OIG Audited
Established in 2005, the Department of State (Department) Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program is intended to be a whole-of-government approach to combating terrorism and violent extremism in North and West Africa by balancing security activities with diplomatic and developmental efforts to address political, socioeconomic, governance, and developmental challenges. The TSCTP Program Act of 2022 (TSCTP Act) was enacted by Congress in March 2022 and required the development of a comprehensive 5-year strategy for TSCTP program counterterrorism efforts (TSCTP strategy).

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether the Department (1) planned and executed an effective TSCTP strategy in accordance with the TSCTP Act and applicable guidance and (2) implemented appropriate modifications in the execution of the TSCTP program to advance performance monitoring, evaluation, and the reporting of TSCTP results.

What OIG Recommends
OIG made four recommendations in this report to improve the development and implementation of the comprehensive TSCTP strategy and to promote TSCTP program leadership and accountability. Based on the Department’s response to a draft of this report, OIG considers all the recommendations offered resolved, pending further action. A synopsis of the Department’s comments and OIG’s reply follow each recommendation in the Audit Results section of this report. The Department’s response to a draft of this report is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B.

What OIG Found
The Department provided a TSCTP strategy to Congress that did not fully address required elements specified in the TSCTP Act and in the Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). In addition, OIG found that the TSCTP strategy did not fully incorporate applicable guidance from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. OIG determined that the TSCTP strategy was incomplete, in part, because the Department did not formally designate and authorize a bureau or office to lead the planning, development, and execution of the TSCTP program. Moreover, the TSCTP strategy was incomplete because it was submitted to Congress without the required approval from the Department’s Strategic Planning and Performance Team, co-managed by the Bureau of Budget and Planning and Office of Foreign Assistance, which serves as the Department’s mandatory clearing office for any strategy documents that qualify with the standards and requirements listed in 18 FAM 301.2, “Department of State Strategic Planning.”

OIG determined that the incomplete TSCTP strategy limited the Department’s ability to execute a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to combating terrorism and violent extremism in North and West Africa. Furthermore, due to the incomplete TSCTP strategy, OIG was unable to determine whether the Department made performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting improvements to the TSCTP program. Similarly, missing elements from the TSCTP strategy prevented OIG from determining whether TSCTP program foreign assistance projects were achieving their objectives and contributing to the overarching desired results of the TSCTP program. Until the Department incorporates all required elements and guidance in the TSCTP Act, FAM, and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 into the TSCTP strategy, the Department will remain ill-equipped to effectively advance security, diplomatic, and developmental counterterrorism goals in North and West Africa.