Report Contents
What OIG Audited
The Department of State (Department) established the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2005 as a mechanism to work with willing countries in West and North Africa to build counterterrorism capacity, improve regional coordination, and address the underlying drivers of radicalization. Intended to be a U.S. whole-ofgovernment initiative, the TSCTP is expected to draw on diplomatic, defense, and development tools and programs to build capacity and assist counterterrorism efforts. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF) within the Department is responsible for formulating, managing, and overseeing TSCTP projects.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether AF is monitoring and coordinating TSCTP projects in accordance with Federal and Department requirements. OIG reviewed eight TSCTP awards, consisting of six contracts, one cooperative agreement, and one grant implemented in Africa between FY 2015 and FY 2020. These awards had a combined value of $209.6 million.
What OIG Recommends
OIG made 13 recommendations to AF that are intended to improve the monitoring and coordination of TSCTP projects. AF concurred with all 13 recommendations. On the basis of AF’s response to a draft of this report, OIG considers the 13 recommendations resolved, pending further action. A synopsis of AF’s comments regarding the recommendations offered and OIG’s reply follow each recommendation in the Results section of this report. AF’s response to a draft of this report is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B.
What OIG Found
AF is not monitoring TSCTP contracts in accordance with Federal and Department requirements. Specifically, OIG found that contracting officer’s representatives (COR) had approved invoices for four contracts without adequate supporting documentation. In addition, they relied on Department of Defense (DoD) partners to monitor contractor performance; however, these DoD partners were not delegated authority to serve in this role, nor were they trained to be government technical monitors or alternate CORs. Furthermore, none of the six TSCTP contracts reviewed had the required monitoring plans, and five contracts were missing Government quality assurance surveillance plans; both plans are essential oversight tools. Lastly, AF was not ensuring that the assistance provided to the host countries was being used to build counterterrorism capacity. AF officials stated that the lack of clear guidance and limited staff contributed to these weaknesses. Because of these weaknesses, OIG considers the $201.6 million spent on these six contracts as potential wasteful spending due to mismanagement and inadequate oversight. OIG is specifically questioning almost $109 million because the invoices lacked supporting documentation. With respect to the grant and cooperative agreement reviewed, both had required monitoring plans included in the files.
OIG also found that AF is not effectively coordinating with stakeholders to execute a whole-of-government initiative. Although TSCTP partner agencies meet to formulate strategic priorities, the execution of activities among the partners in the host countries receiving assistance is insufficient. For example, U.S. Air Force officials said they were not consulted on the plans and construction of a C-130 aircraft hangar on a base that they share with the Nigerian military. Government officials stated that undefined roles and responsibilities, the lack of knowledge management, and staffing shortfalls hinder effective coordination.
The deficiencies identified in this audit have occurred, in part, because AF has not adequately attended to longstanding challenges with the execution of foreign assistance, including the TSCTP. AF officials acknowledged the lack of progress made to address these challenges but stated that the Department has not appropriately prioritized the bureau’s needs. Until these deficiencies are addressed, the Department will have limited assurance that TSCTP is achieving its goals of building counterterrorism capacity and addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization in West and North Africa.
Report Terms
Report Recommendations
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs develop and implement bureau-wide standard operating procedures for conducting invoice reviews that include (a) steps to independently verify contractor performance is acceptable; (b) methods to ensure payments are authorized, accurate, legal, and correct and that the goods were actually received or services were actually performed; and (c) validation that the certifying officer makes payments only after receiving approval from an officer with knowledge of the receipt of the goods or services covered by the voucher.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs develop and implement procedures that ensure personnel charged with monitoring and overseeing the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership projects in the countries of performance are formally authorized to perform these functions through designation as a government technical monitor or alternate contracting officer’s representatives in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Handbook Section 14 FAH-2 H-140.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs (AF), in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, (a) develop a monitoring plan template that can be tailored to each contract, a quality assurance surveillance plan template that can be tailored to each contract, and include these plans in the contract requirements checklist used by contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) overseeing the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership projects; and (b) ensure that CORs use these plans and other monitoring methods described in 14 FAH-2 H-520 to perform oversight of contracts.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs develop a process to monitor assistance provided to host nations participating in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. In doing so, the Bureau should consider the methods described in 14 FAH-2 H-522.8, “Creative Monitoring,” such as global positioning systems units to track the locations and travel of contractors, badge readers to determine number of individuals served at an event, and the use of radio frequency identification to track property, deliveries, and locations.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, (a) determine whether $89,511,708 in questioned costs related to the G5 Force Support Task Order (contract 19AQMM18F3925) were allowable and/or supportable; and (b) recover any costs determined to be unallowable and/or unsupported.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, (a) determine whether $10,165,351 in questioned costs related to the Regional Boat Capability Program (contract SAQMMA17F4534) were allowable and/or supportable; and (b) recover any costs determined to be unallowable and/or unsupported.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, (a) determine whether $3,302,260 in questioned costs related to the Salak Air Base Expansion (contract SAQMMA17F3555) were allowable and/or supportable; and (b) recover any costs determined to be unallowable and/or unsupported.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, (a) determine whether $5,984,138 in questioned costs related to the Niger C-130 Hangar (contract 19AQMM18F4856), were allowable and/or supportable; and (b) recover any costs determined to be unallowable and/or unsupported.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs develop a written framework and work with other Government entities to achieve a whole-of-government approach in the execution of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program that includes elements such as roles and responsibilities, organizational structure, and coordination mechanisms.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs establish and implement memoranda of understanding with the Office of Security Cooperation and other partners, as applicable, to describe roles and responsibilities for coordinating, executing, and monitoring Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) projects in the countries where TSCTP is implemented, including establishment of a structure for communicating and coordinating in-country.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with relevant bureaus, establish, populate, and maintain a central repository of all Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership projects, accessible to those involved with the execution of projects, that includes project name and identification number, the project proposal, the award mechanism, a detailed description of the project, and project documentation needed for implementation.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs determine and take steps to hire the appropriate number of staff needed to manage, administer, and support the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership projects.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of African Affairs establish and lead a working group to develop and implement an action plan to address the longstanding challenges associated with monitoring and coordinating the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership projects.