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Evaluation of the Department’s 2023 Evacuation of Embassy Khartoum

ESP-25-02
    Report Contents
    Unclassified

    What OIG Evaluated 

    In April 2023, U.S. Embassy Khartoum, Sudan, suspended its operations, and the Department of State (Department) ordered the departure of U.S. direct-hire employees and their dependents due to the continued threat from armed conflict in Sudan. U.S. forces evacuated 76 American staff of the embassy. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this evaluation to assess whether the Department followed lessons learned from other recent evacuations in the evacuation of Embassy Khartoum, what challenges existed to Department officials in the evacuation, and what support was provided to individuals whose consular documents were in the embassy’s possession.

    What OIG Found 

    The Department has generally improved its crisis preparedness policies, infrastructure, and training in response to embassy evacuations and applied these lessons to the evacuation of Embassy Khartoum. For example, Embassy Khartoum made significant improvements to its emergency preparedness based on lessons learned from an authorized departure due to civil unrest in October 2021. Specifically, Embassy Khartoum expanded its communications capability and the Alternate Command Center’s medical capability. However, Embassy Khartoum did not incorporate some lessons learned from previous evacuations that were reflected in challenges the embassy faced in the evacuation. For example, the embassy’s emergency planning did not incorporate regional coordination with appropriate U.S. embassies. In addition, the emergency planning did not account for the significant amount of SBU materials that required destruction prior to the evacuation. Finally, OIG found the Department could not provide a definitive accounting of the passports and other documents in Embassy Khartoum’s possession that were destroyed prior to the evacuation. Individuals who had left their documents with the embassy for visa processing, including U.S. citizens, thus lost critical documents during the crisis and faced challenges in securing replacements. 

    What OIG Recommends

     OIG made two recommendations to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that all emergency action planning and drills fully account for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) material that must be destroyed in a crisis and that Emergency Action Plans fully address coordination with nearby posts in crisis-response operations. OIG also recommended to the Bureau of Consular Affairs to develop and implement guidance to ensure that consular sections at U.S. embassies fully account for all passports in their possession for processing and return passports to the owner while waiting for documentation or approvals. 

    Recommendation Number
    1
    Open Resolved

    The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that high threat posts conduct a full inventory of the sensitive documents in their possession that would require destruction in the event of evacuation and incorporate the volume of sensitive documents into their respective emergency action training, drills, and planning, including an explicit estimate of the time it would take to destroy current and actual holdings of Sensitive But Unclassified materials.

    Recommendation Number
    2
    Open Resolved

    The Bureau of Consular Affairs should develop and implement guidance to ensure that consular sections at U.S. embassies fully account for all passports in their possession for processing and return passports to the owner while waiting for documentation or approvals.

    Recommendation Number
    3
    Open Resolved Significant

    The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Office of Crisis Management and Strategy, should review post Emergency Action Plans to ensure that they fully and comprehensively address coordination with nearby posts in crisis-response operations.