Report Contents
What OIG Audited
U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, suspended operations on August 31, 2021, and U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, suspended operations on February 28, 2022. In accordance with Department of State (Department) requirements and guidance established by the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division (DEAV) within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), both posts were required to remove or destroy sensitive security assets—to include special protective equipment (SPE) and armored vehicles (AVs)—in advance of the suspensions of operations to prevent their potential use by hostile forces. (U)The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Embassies Kabul and Kyiv managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation at each post in accordance with Department guidance. (U)OIG has also prepared a classified report, Supplemental Classified Report on the Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine (AUD-GEER-24-31, September 2024).
What OIG Recommends
OIG made three recommendations to the Bureau of Administration and nine recommendations to DS. Based on Management’s responses to a draft of this report, OIG considers all 12 recommendations resolved, pending further action. A synopsis of Management’s comments and OIG’s reply follow each recommendation in the Results section of this report. Management’s responses to a draft of this report are reprinted in their entirety in Appendices B and C.
What OIG Found
OIG found that Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv faced different challenges that impacted their ability to manage, safeguard, and dispose of sensitive security assets in advance of their respective evacuations. For example, OIG found that 26 percent of Embassy Kabul’s firearms and 63 percent of Embassy Kabul’s AVs were left in Afghanistan. Many of those assets were abandoned intact, although some were disabled using ad hoc methods. OIG identified several issues that contributed to assets being abandoned intact, including Embassy Kabul maintaining more assets than needed for daily operations, inadequate disposition planning, inadequate guidance, and insufficient training. When intact sensitive security assets are left behind, hostile forces may use them against the United States, its allies, or civilian populations. In contrast to Embassy Kabul, Embassy Kyiv staff were able to remove all of the embassy’s sensitive security assets prior to the suspension of operations. However, a senior Embassy Kyiv security official acknowledged that they had a smaller inventory of sensitive security assets than Embassy Kabul and may have also had to abandon or destroy assets if they had faced a more exigent evacuation scenario.
OIG also found that DEAV did not fully and accurately account for sensitive security assets exfiltrated from Embassy Kabul. For example, DEAV prematurely declared some assets as abandoned that were later recovered. This occurred, in part, because the Department did not have a formal requirement to reconcile a post’s assets following a suspension of operations. In addition, DS’s records management practices were not conducive to the timely reconciliation of Kabul’s assets. The failure to fully and promptly account for assets following a suspension of operations prevents the Department from determining if assets were lost, stolen, or misappropriated.
Finally, OIG found that the Department issued a waiver allowing for the transfer of half of Embassy Kyiv’s AV fleet to the government of Ukraine after the suspension of operations, in February 2022. As a result of the transfer, Embassy Kyiv did not have sufficient AVs after resuming operations.
Report Terms
Report Recommendations
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and update the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments. This evaluation should consider the relative weight of each factor within the criticality score and consider requiring justifications for the retention of low-usage, high-criticality vehicles to achieve a balanced score.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring overseas posts to periodically assess the volume of special protective equipment and hazardous materials. The guidance should take into consideration usage rates and the criticality of each asset in order to determine the appropriate quantities needed for post operations and provide instructions for adjusting asset holdings based on the outcomes of the assessment.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security update the Foreign Affairs Handbook to include a requirement that posts develop and maintain written disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for all special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop, implement, and distribute guidance to overseas posts on how to develop disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles. The guidance should include details on key considerations to make during the planning process, such as determining which stakeholders to involve in the planning process; planning for a variety of evacuation scenarios; considering timelines and resources needed to ship items out of the country; calculating the timelines needed to destroy assets at post; ensuring security personnel have access to all materials, tools, equipment, and vendors needed to execute the plan; identifying the number, type, and location of all assets to be destroyed; and developing trip wires to determine when to abandon efforts to ship assets out of post and instead pursue emergency destruction procedures. If available, the guidance should also include best practices from disposition plans developed by other posts.
Following the implementation of Recommendations 3 and 4, OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring post Emergency Action Committees to periodically review and approve post disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, and to determine whether updates or changes are needed.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its emergency destruction procedures to describe all acceptable methods to destroy special protective equipment, including methods that can be employed in a limited evacuation timeframe, as well as the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance on the disposition of hazardous materials in an emergency evacuation scenario. The guidance should include steps that can be implemented in a limited evacuation timeframe and outline the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its armored vehicle disposal procedures to better guide Department of State personnel on how to efficiently disable or destroy armored vehicles in an exigent evacuation scenario. These procedures should include details on the estimated time needed to complete each required step, which steps should be prioritized over others, and which steps may be skipped given limited time and resources. The procedures should also include guidance and visual aids applicable to all models of Department of State armored vehicles maintained worldwide.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement training for post security personnel on acceptable practices for the disposition of special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles in an emergency evacuation scenario.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual, that, in the event of a suspension of operations, a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles must be conducted. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period following the suspension of operations in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post’s special protective equipment and armored vehicles; and, if applicable, include a means to facilitate their return to the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to, in the event of a suspension of operations, issue a report to the Department's accountable property officer detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations. The report would follow the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.
OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.